HAVANA. – If three promotions in less than two years aren’t enough to make us realize that Oscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga is getting closer each day to becoming president of Cuba—reclaiming for his family a position that, according to the thinking of the most hardline Castro supporters, should never have passed into the hands of an outsider—then we’ll have to wait until the National Assembly appoints him as a deputy in the coming months, so that he has all the necessary credentials to be named (not “elected”).
Cuban communists bypass the Constitution whenever they feel like it, as they demonstrated a few days ago by reactivating Raúl Castro as head of the National Defense Council. And if tomorrow they wanted to replace Miguel Díaz-Canel—even with Sandro Castro—they would do so without needing to consult a “Parliament” that exists mostly to vote unanimously.
However, in matters as delicate as these, where it’s necessary to maintain a constitutional façade to avoid making the lack of democracy too obvious, they will surely proceed step by step—albeit at such a fast pace that their desperation becomes clear. Desperation to find, before 2028, a new “disciplined and loyal” administrator. At the same time, they reveal their frustration with that so-called “reserve of cadres,” which has proven so disappointing (ambitious for power and corrupt) that it undermines the regime’s main narrative—unity—when it boasts of its “strength.”
There are so many and such deep divisions within the Cuban regime, and so much distrust in the ability of the leaders to prevent a social uprising, that Castroism has been forced to make visible the power that never actually left the control of the ruling family —but which had tried to simulate democratization in the eyes of the world; and above all, to give the masses a punching bag on which to vent their anger.
It is because of this corrosive distrust that Raúl Castro reappears as head of the Defense Council (at a time when conditions for a social explosion are becoming ripe) and not Miguel Díaz-Canel. And it is perhaps also part of this strategy to recover total control that Oscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga is emerging in a leading role—one that had been reserved for Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Calleja.
Why a nephew and not the son?
López-Calleja, who was preparing to replace Ricardo Cabrisas not only at the Ministry of Foreign Trade but also as Deputy Prime Minister, died suddenly in July 2022, having already met the necessary requirements for Parliament to appoint him as President once Díaz-Canel had fulfilled his decorative role—but above all, his role as a “punching bag.” In the end, he was placed in that position with clear bad intent, right in the middle of the highly unpopular measures of the Tarea Ordenamiento (Economic Overhaul Program).
Both Marino Murillo and Miguel Díaz-Canel were used as a shield by Raúl Castro to avoid, as much as possible, being the main target of criticism for a disastrous government administration for which he is responsible. Let us remember that he prioritized strengthening GAESA and the military elite surrounding it, sacrificing—out of his pursuit of personal enrichment—the living conditions of millions of Cuban men and women.
For this reason, no member of the Castro family could become too visible, lest they become hated for being as useless as Miguel Díaz-Canel is today—himself not absolved of blame. He was, and still is, fully aware of the mission assigned to him, especially given that he knew the role reserved for him since between 2004 and 2008. An autonomous entity had been invented for Colonel Alejandro Castro Espín, namely an entity that rose above the Ministries of the Interior and the Armed Forces: The Commission of Defense and National Security (CDSN), of which he is the top chief.
The leading role played by Castro Espín in the talks with the Obama administration; his tour of Europe aimed at rebranding himself, giving interviews under the guise of being a book author and political analyst; his presence at his father’s side during international trips and high-level meetings—led many to believe that Raúl Castro was preparing to hand over power to him. However, that would have been an unnecessary formality, especially since, by that time, Colonel Alejandro—at the head of the CDSN—was already the most powerful man in the Castro regime, with the ability to decide who rises or falls from power, who lives or dies on the estate he controls.
Let us recall that the dismantling, in 2009, of the so-called “Commander-in-Chief’s Support Team” and his group of favorites—even while Fidel Castro was still in power—was the work of Raúl Castro, who at the time tasked his son with deploying an exhaustive surveillance system against the targets marked for elimination. That entire operation was carried out secretly, behind the backs of the Interior Ministry’s intelligence and counterintelligence services, which remained under Fidel Castro’s control. Today, that entire apparatus answers to Alejandro Castro Espín.
Between him (with full control over the repressive forces) and Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Calleja (with total knowledge of every thread that moves the dictatorship’s economy), they were meant to govern the Island—but only once the conditions were in place for them to publicly emerge as figures responding to the alleged popular demand to fix what the handpicked appointee is supposed to have ruined. And in doing so, to reaffirm the myth they themselves have cultivated: that only the Castros can govern Cuba.
(An idea that, although absurd, has a significant number of followers both inside and outside of Cuba, and therefore must be taken into account when analyzing possible scenarios for political change.)
The exaggerated cult of Fidel Castro promoted by the Communist Party of Cuba is no coincidence—nor is the flood of posts and criticisms on social media by alleged revolutionaries disillusioned with “Canelism,” whose complaints begin and end by lamenting the death of the man (Fidel) who “would never have let this happen.”
That Raúl Castro took the position that should have gone to Miguel Díaz-Canel at the head of the National Defense Council is not just a curiosity; it is a preview of what will happen in the coming months, when Díaz-Canel is gradually sidelined and returned to his proper place as a disposable figure in a couple of years. Or perhaps he will be reactivated to another term if the National Assembly will extend his leadership once it decides that the moment still isn’t right to replace Díaz-Canel with the Castro now being prepared to inherit the position left vacant by the late López-Calleja.
Oscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga, a Substitute Heir
When in July 2013, amid Raúl Castro’s reforms, it was decided to separate business management from the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Oscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga was already an important figure within GAESA at MINCEX. That’s why the decision greatly benefited him, as he was placed at the head of a company like Maquimport, one of the 12 companies that formed the Foreign Trade Business Group that year, and perhaps the most important one, since it was the mandatory intermediary for importing machinery and equipment for both the state and non-state sectors.
This means that Maquimport would become the recipient of large sums of dollars the regime intended to absorb—especially from private entrepreneurs and foreign investors who, encouraged by the thaw in relations with the United States, decided to begin investing in Cuba. This was the case with the American company John Deere Financial, which in November 2017 signed an agreement with Maquimport to sell agricultural machinery to the Island.
Up until that point, Oscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga’s role was to manage those agreements in GAESA’s favor—perhaps even to continue rising through the ranks (as happened when he was appointed Business Director of the Mariel Special Development Zone)—with the long-term prospect of one day replacing Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Calleja. But only that far—and with no real certainty it would ever happen.
López-Calleja’s death changed Pérez-Oliva’s fate, and that’s when his meteoric rise began. With no political profile and no military background, his chances of reaching the position he holds today—even as a great-nephew—were almost nonexistent before 2022, let alone the idea that he might be considered to replace Miguel Díaz-Canel as administrator. But, as in 2018, Raúl Castro once again found himself facing the difficulty of identifying a successor, lacking both options and people he trusts.
Oscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga is a Castro without the Castro surname. Yet despite that detail, it’s not his bloodline that makes him suitable, but rather his status as a rare exception in a family mostly full of useless freeloaders—or scattered across the world, perhaps trying to protect themselves from what might happen when the harm inflicted on millions of innocent people finally turns back on them.
His mission this time is the same one he was given years ago at Maquimport, at Mariel, and as Cabrisas’s second-in-command: to ensure that the Castros rule forever, and to make sure that investments, agreements, foreign aid, and whatever else they manage to attract under the pretext of “prosperous and sustainable development” are all used in the service of a single family.
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