Last Thursday, July 23, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned investment fund CEIBA Investments Limited over its business dealings with the Cuban regime. Alongside the designation, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued several general licenses temporarily authorizing the orderly wind-down of transactions involving CEIBA and any entities in which it owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest.
The decision deals a significant blow to one of the largest foreign investors in Cuba’s real estate sector and further tightens Washington’s financial pressure on Havana. At a time when the Cuban regime is desperately seeking to attract foreign capital to ease its deepening economic crisis, the United States has targeted one of its most valuable business partners and one of the key channels through which the government hoped to continue drawing investment.
CEIBA’s importance to the Cuban regime extends far beyond that of a conventional investment fund.
While the Cuban regime announced in June a package of 176 measures aimed at rescuing an economy in crisis—including authorization to sell state assets and properties—a far more significant operation had already taken place quietly.
More than a month earlier, on April 22, 2026, Inmobiliaria Monte Barreto S.A. (IMB), one of the most important companies within Corporación CIMEX S.A. and the owner of the iconic Miramar Trade Center—the largest business complex on the island—ceased to belong to the Armed Forces Business Administration Group (GAESA). Its new owner is now Ceiba Investment Ltd., a fund registered in Guernsey. Until then, Ceiba had owned 49% of IMB’s shares.
At first glance, this might appear to be just another foreign investment transaction. But testimony obtained by CubaNet points in a different direction.
The sale of Monte Barreto would not be an isolated case. According to two high-level sources within CIMEX and one official from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment (MINCEX), all of whom spoke to CubaNet on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals, it marks the beginning of a profound reorganization of GAESA.
The objective, they say, is to divest—at least formally—some of its assets in order to shield them from the growing impact of sanctions imposed by the Donald Trump administration and from a possible tightening of financial measures against the military conglomerate.
However, the sources insist that GAESA is not actually disposing of its companies; it is simply moving them elsewhere to avoid losing control of the island’s most profitable businesses.
According to those interviewed, one of the central components of that strategy is Ceiba Investment Ltd., a company that operates as a foreign investment fund but has maintained decades-long ties with the Cuban state.
The Monte Barreto transaction also carries enormous symbolic significance. It is the first complete transfer of a strategic CIMEX asset, a company integrated into GAESA’s economic network.
Until now, the military conglomerate had favored joint ventures or management contracts with foreign investors. The full transfer of a company of this magnitude sets an unprecedented precedent—and may be only the beginning.
Three sources consulted by CubaNet say that other assets managed by GAESA could follow the same path in the coming months. These include real estate companies, facilities linked to the Mariel Special Development Zone, and even dozens of hotels operated by the Spanish chain Meliá Hotels International.
This strategy suggests that GAESA is not selling off its holdings in order to genuinely withdraw from the Cuban economy, as it seeks to portray.
Ceiba: A Company with Deep Interests in Cuba
If the sale of the Miramar Trade Center and Monte Barreto were simply an ordinary transaction between a Cuban company and a foreign investor, there would probably be little more to say. But the new owner is no ordinary player, and its relationship with Cuba goes back decades.
Ceiba Investment Ltd. is registered in Guernsey, a British Crown Dependency in the English Channel off the coast of France, whose favorable tax regime has made it an offshore financial center.
Since its creation, it has presented itself as an international fund specializing in investments in Cuba, particularly in commercial real estate and tourism. It is therefore unsurprising that GAESA, with whom it has worked for years, transferred ownership to the company. However, several sources consulted by this outlet suggest that Ceiba was chosen not only because of its experience but also because of its close and trusted relationship with the Cuban regime.
According to a former official at the Cuban Embassy in the United Kingdom, who worked there during the years the company was established, the purpose of the transfer may be to «maintain control for the benefit of the Cuban government.»
According to his testimony, the project began to take shape in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when Cuba was searching for new ways to attract international investment following the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The idea, he explains, was to create a vehicle capable of attracting foreign capital while being managed by individuals trusted by Havana.
The company’s original name was Beta Gran Caribe Fund Limited, and since 2001 its principal manager has been Dutch attorney Sebastiaan Berger, who continues to oversee the fund today and is a recurring figure throughout this story.
A year later, the corporation was renamed Ceiba, after the tree deeply rooted in Cuban culture, revered by many and symbolic of the founding of Havana.
The ceiba is also known for its broad and deep network of roots—a fitting metaphor, according to the article, for the hidden, underground structure through which the Cuban military operates to evade public scrutiny and the U.S. embargo. GAESA has operated for decades without transparency, and now, amid the challenges brought by the current U.S. administration, it needs to disguise itself more effectively.
According to the former diplomat, from the outset Ceiba’s operations, like those of Havin Bank, were closely monitored by the Cuban diplomatic mission in London.
Ceiba Investment Ltd., Havin Bank, and CIMEX (GAESA), according to one official at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment, are «one endogamous system in which every element serves a single objective.» That objective, the source says, is to ensure the regime’s control, even though they «appear, quite intentionally, to be independent entities.»
According to the sources, the Monte Barreto transaction does not represent the transfer of control to an outside, unfamiliar actor, but rather a shift to a structure well known to the Cuban military itself.
Attorney Sebastiaan Berger, who has managed Ceiba Investment since the early 2000s, rejects that argument. He states that the foreign company has full control over all operations and does not consult the Cuban state or any other entity.
«There are no Cuban directors on its board of directors (they all resigned on June 4, 2026), and IMB enjoys full autonomy, including with respect to hiring and compensating its employees,» Berger told CubaNet.
In fact, the investment manager argued that the transaction demonstrated that meaningful change was finally taking place in Cuba—an assessment clearly not shared by the U.S. government, which has now sanctioned the company.
Following the designation, CEIBA publicly rejected Washington’s interpretation. In a statement released on Friday, July 24, the company maintained that its acquisition of the remaining 51% stake in Monte Barreto was negotiated on market terms, financed with funds generated by the real estate business itself, and completed within the deadline established for winding down its commercial relationship with GAESA. CEIBA described the sanctions as a mistake and denied that the transaction was intended to shield the military conglomerate’s assets or revenue streams. The company also announced that it would petition the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the U.S. Department of State to be removed from the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List.
A Sale in Which the Money Never Left the System?
Up to this point, the sale could be interpreted as a maneuver by the Cuban state to obtain liquidity amid the economic crisis. However, a report reveals a curious detail, one that Sebastiaan Berger himself confirmed to CubaNet.
The transaction required no cash contribution from Ceiba Investment.
To acquire the remaining shares, the company used Monte Barreto’s own resources: accumulated reserves, undistributed dividends, and other funds that already belonged to the real estate company.
In other words, the company was purchased using its own money—a type of transaction that in banking would resemble a leveraged or self-financed acquisition.
According to a CIMEX official interviewed anonymously by CubaNet, that detail suggests the operation’s primary objective was not to obtain fresh capital for the state or attract new investors.
«It wasn’t necessary,» the official said. «The deal was a façade.»
Berger responded that such claims—that the acquisition of IMB did not involve an actual transfer of control outside the Cuban state’s sphere of influence—are «categorically false.»
Nevertheless, multiple sources within Cuban ministries insist that the transfer is part of a much broader strategy that is only beginning.
That hypothesis aligns with information provided by two other experts consulted for the investigation. All describe the same phenomenon using different terms—reorganization, mutation, restructuring—but point to the same objective: a revolving-door strategy designed to reduce GAESA’s direct exposure to future international sanctions.
Since Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the military conglomerate has once again become one of the principal targets of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Financial sanctions, restrictions on companies linked to the military, and the prospect of additional measures have increased the risks for those doing business with firms controlled by the Armed Forces.
In that context, formally divesting certain assets could provide a strategic advantage.
If properties are registered under the names of ostensibly independent foreign companies, the political and legal costs of imposing new sanctions are considerably reduced. At least, that is the logic described by the sources consulted by CubaNet, who say that more companies are expected to follow the same path.
Monte Barreto Would Be Only the First Step
What happened with the Miramar Trade Center and the real estate company is not an isolated case. Sources connected to various levels of the regime’s corporate structure say that other strategic GAESA assets could follow suit in the coming months. They mention additional real estate companies, projects associated with the Mariel Special Development Zone, and a significant portion of the hotel infrastructure operated by foreign chains.
One of the most advanced cases reportedly involves Meliá Hotels International.
Sources within the Spanish hotel chain say that several of its senior executives have recently traveled to Cuba to accelerate negotiations concerning the acquisition of assets that the company has until now merely managed on behalf of the Cuban state.
Although Meliá officially announced this month that it was ending its operations in Cuba, the discussions reportedly involve around thirty hotels and other properties whose ownership remains in the hands of the state. The officials interviewed maintain that Meliá could replicate Ceiba’s model by acquiring both ownership and full control of several of its Cuban operations.
Notably, when discussing Meliá, the trail once again leads to the British investment fund.
As early as 2018, the two companies announced an ambitious joint investment program during the International Tourism Fair (FITCuba).
Five months later, the London Stock Exchange welcomed Ceiba Investment, making it the first Cuba-focused investment fund to be listed on that market. At the listing ceremony, Cuban diplomatic personnel from the embassy in London were invited.
Ceiba raised £30 million (approximately US$39 million) through its initial public offering of new shares. Following that success, its joint venture Toscuba began construction of the Meliá Trinidad Península Hotel, which is operated by Meliá Hotels International.
A former Cuban executive at Meliá, who agreed to speak with CubaNet, says that the presence of an international hotel brand on the island was crucial in attracting investors to Ceiba. According to him, Meliá ceased to be merely a hotel operator and became an essential component of Ceiba’s business structure—»an inseparable part of its strategic vision and business model.»
Through the joint venture HOMASI, the two companies participate in a portfolio comprising five hotels: Meliá Habana, Meliá Las Américas, Meliá Varadero, Sol Palmeras, and Meliá Trinidad.
The Man Who Connects Many of the Pieces
If Ceiba has become a key element in the new direction taken by Monte Barreto, one name appears repeatedly: Sebastiaan A.C. Berger.
The Dutch attorney arrived in Cuba in 1996 as part of the legal team from Trenité Van Doorne. Shortly thereafter, he founded the law firm Berger, Young & Associates in Havana, which over the years became one of the leading legal advisers for foreign investment in Cuba. He lived on the island until 2013.
But his role extends well beyond that of a lawyer.
Berger serves as a director or board member across an extensive network of companies connected to Ceiba Investment and, by extension, to Cuba. His name is associated with corporations registered in Panama, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom that are involved in managing major real estate developments and large-scale tourism projects in Cuba.
Berger has also played an important role in shaping Cuba’s financial relationship with foreign investors. For example, in 2008 he published a comprehensive guide to the legal framework governing business and investment in Cuba.
His influence in matters of foreign investment in Cuba continues to this day, as evidenced by Ceiba’s complete acquisition of Monte Barreto.
It was Berger who presented the investment proposal for approval to Ceiba Investment’s Board of Directors and who led the team that executed the transaction.
Everyone interviewed for this investigation believes that this continuity is no coincidence. Following Berger’s professional trail invariably leads back to the same destination: strategic business interests of the Cuban state.
It is precisely that history, they argue, that helps explain why, when GAESA decided to divest one of its most valuable assets, the transaction ultimately ended up in the hands of a company led by someone who has spent nearly thirty years working alongside the Cuban system.
According to those interviewed, the loyalty demonstrated by the Dutch attorney was an indispensable qualification because the objective was never to relinquish complete control of these assets, but rather to ensure that they remained under the stewardship of trusted individuals.
The sale of Monte Barreto, together with other transactions currently underway, marks the beginning of a new phase for GAESA. Rather than a withdrawal from the economy, it appears to represent a transformation—a process through which Cuba’s old nomenklatura seeks to shield its successors, the country’s emerging oligarchy. However, the Trump administration, with Marco Rubio serving as Secretary of State, appears to be one step ahead.
