Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East

A Comparative Study of the Political Role of the Military in Egypt and Turkey

By Ahmed Abd Rabou
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All chapters in this book have undergone peer review.
THIS WORK IS DEDICATED TO

Soad, Mohamed, and all the youth in the Middle East who resist peacefully, work hard, and sacrifice their bodies, freedoms, and souls for the sake of democracy, justice, and liberty in the region.
“In the End, we will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends”

Martin Luther King Jr. (1929–1968)
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Introduction

This work focuses on Civil-Military Relations (CMR) in Egypt, a country that witnessed uprisings calling for democratic change in January 2011, which led to the ousting of Hosni Mubarak from the Presidency, the suspension of the constitution, and the dissolution of the parliament as well as the ruling of the National Democratic Party (NDP). Ironically, revolutionary forces in Egypt were dependent on the Egyptian military in taking these steps, with the military ultimately taking power some 30 months later.

Turkey is another Middle Eastern country with a long history of a politically active military, which has always regarded itself as the guardian of the secular democratic goals proclaimed by Atatürk (Momayezi 1998, 3) and as responsible for dealing with internal as well as external threats. Indeed, the military has intervened in government four times, taking power into its own hands on three of these occasions (1960, 1971, and 1980), and pressuring the government to resign on the fourth (1997) (Heper 2011, 241). However, despite these military measures, Turkish civilians have managed to impose a kind of democratic civilian control over the military. A simple question in the context of these two countries concerns what causes this difference.

The establishment of a republic in Egypt in June 1953 was the consequence of a bloodless coup in 1952, later referred to as the “July Revolution.” The “Free Officers” plotted against King Farouk, assuming power after forcing him out. The state was then governed by the military “Revolution Command Council” until Gamal Abd-El Nasser was elected president in 1954. Following this, Egypt remained a quasi-military state led by a former military general who left the army to assume the presidency. This pattern appears to be repeating itself once again with Field Marshal Abdel Fatah El Sisi, who resigned from the military a few weeks before the 2014 presidential elections in order to run for the presidency.
Thus, for over 60 years, Egypt has been governed by military leaders in civilian suits, namely Nasser, Anwar El Sadat, and Mubarak, the latter forced to leave office in February 2011 by the above-mentioned popular revolution. Upon leaving office, Mubarak handed over power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the military’s top leadership structure, which collectively governed Egypt for nearly 18 months until the June 2012 election of Mohammed Morsú, the first civilian president since 1952. Weakened by rising political polarization among his supporters, the Islamists, and the liberal-oriented forces, President Morsú was easy prey for the military. Indeed, the military ousted him only three days after the eruption of popular demonstrations demanding his removal after one year in office.

The common denominator between the Egyptian and Turkish cases is the traditional involvement of their militaries in politics, either in the role of guardian (as in Turkey) or by fusion with the state’s structures ensured by an ex-military president (as in Egypt). Whereas Turkey’s civilian leadership has recently—and to a large extent—managed to keep its military at bay including suppressing the failed coup of July 2016, Egypt has witnessed a resurgence of the military in the political sphere. Against this background, the present study aims to analyze CMR in the Egyptian case in light of lessons and experiences from the Turkish model of CMR.

Whereas CMR is not a new topic in academia, the issues involved in both Western countries with established democracies and developing countries transitioning to democracy have changed over time. Ever since Samuel Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State* (1957) and Morris Janowitz’s *The Professional Soldier* (1960), academics have sought to explain CMR in democratic countries. Such sweeping contributions have focused on optimal ways in which to improve and maintain already-existent civilian control over the military. Whereas Huntington prescribed “objective control,” by which the military is entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining its own professionalism by keeping out of politics, Janowitz argued that socializing the military enables its members to recognize the democratic values of society and to instill the concept of the “citizen soldier,” thereby ensuring its acceptance of civilian control.

Although the explanatory merit of such works is beyond doubt, they do little to explain the military’s role in politics in less developed countries that are still transitioning to democracy. In such cases, civilian control has never existed, or was only ever a distant goal, given the military’s privileged position. Unlike
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developed countries in which the army is mainly concerned with external defense, the military in less developed countries, including Turkey and Egypt, is more often oriented toward maintaining internal order. Such a military is implicitly attuned to domestic politics, as asserted by Janowitz (1971, 306):

“The intervention of the military in the domestic politics [of non-Western states] is the norm; persistent patterns of civil supremacy are the deviant cases that require special exploration.”

Many scholars have studied developing countries that suffer under various forms of military intervention, some suggesting specific strategies that they claim will enable civil leadership to impose control. However, reality continues to disprove the efficacy of such universal strategies. For example, a leading work by Paul Champers and Aurel Croissant (2010) prescribed several strategies, including appeasement, monitoring, ascriptive selection, and sanctioning. Egyptian President Morsi followed most of these strategies, and yet was easily and quickly ousted at the outbreak of public unrest and demonstrations demanding his removal. Indeed, a large portion of the population welcomed this military intervention. Furthermore, multiple popular campaigns were launched to pressure Field Marshal El Sisi, the Minister of Defense, to enter as a presidential candidate. Ultimately, El Sisi succumbed to this pressure.

Currently, a military leader with little time for civilians presides over Egypt, whereas Turkey has relegated its army to the background and apparently subjected it to the leadership and control of civilian politicians. Retrospectively, it seems that in the last five decades, the two countries have witnessed similar dynamics in terms of the relationship between the military and civilian politicians, but differing control factors have resulted in their divergent paths. This raises a question related to the one posed above, namely what the main similarities and differences between the two countries are.

Turkey and Egypt have various elements in common. For example, both are leading regional powers with populations similar in number, and both feature substantial Muslim majorities. The armed forces of both countries enjoy tremendous respect, both as political actors and as the founders of the modern nation-state. Furthermore, the people claim to follow a moderate version of Islam in theory and practice, although political power has often rested in the hands of non-Islamic forces. Given these and other similarities, Turkey and Egypt are analytically comparable. The aim of this study is to propose a
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number of specifically designed strategies, based on the Turkish experience, that may be used within such a distinctive historical context to enforce civilian control, or at least to distance the military from politics.

This work is guided by a number of questions, the foremost being “what strategies might help Egypt’s civilians keep the military at bay?” In order to address this guiding question, further sub questions need to be answered regarding factors governing CMR in Turkey and Egypt, and the military’s stance on civil-Islamist competition in these countries. Specifically, these sub questions are “Why is the Egyptian army once again at the forefront of the country’s political scene only one year after the SCAF delivered authority to an elected president?” and “How, in general terms, might Egypt benefit from the Turkish experience, the latter having made considerable progress along the lengthy pathway to civilian control?

In order to address these questions, the present work is divided into five chapters. Chapter one sets the stage by reviewing theories developed thus far to study CMR in both developed and developing countries. Chapters two and three set out the history and the establishment of the military in Turkey and Egypt, respectively, focusing on the role(s) the military has played in both state and society. Finally, chapters four and five build on the content of the previous two chapters to suggest strategies for imposing civilian control, particularly over Egypt’s military.
The Theory of Civil-Military Relations

Introduction

This chapter seeks to present a state-of-the-art portrayal of civil-military relations (CMR) and thus will mainly focus on those theories that explain this dialectical relationship in less-developed transitioning countries. It first defines “CMR” and “civilian control” in studies that have dealt with both established and less-established democracies. It then proceeds to illustrates the main hypotheses and theoretical frameworks of the art.

Definitions of Civil-Military Relations

Two terms are essential for this study: CMR and civilian control. The first one, CMR, has a wide array of definitions. For example, Adedeji Ebo (2005, p. 2) offers a rather comprehensive one:

“The web of relations between the military and the society within which it operates, and of which it is necessarily a part. Such relations encompass all aspects of the role of the military (as a professional, political, social and economic institution) in the entire gambit of national life ... Civil–military relations involve issues of the attitude of the military towards the civilian society, the civilian society's perception of, and attitudes to the military, and the role of the armed forces in relation to the state.”

The term “CMR” thus describes the interactions among the state’s people, institutions, and military forces. At the institutional level, as the Marine Corps Veteran and the Naval War College professor Mackubin Owens (2012, p. 67) argues, there are two hands on the sword: the civil hand, which is the
dominant hand of policy that determines when to draw the sword from the scabbard and guides it in its use; and The military’s hand that makes sure that the sword is always ready and wields it in combat (Brooks, et al., 1999). In the same vein, Frank G. Hoffman (2008) describes CMR in terms of the overall relationship between the “Masters of Policy” (i.e., the civilians) and the “servants we ask to carry out those policies” (i.e., the military).

As a corollary to this conception of CMR in western democratic states, scholars who study CMR in these countries are usually puzzled by the following questions: who controls the military instrument;? what is the appropriate level of military influence on society;? what is the role of the military;? what pattern of CMR best ensures military success;? aAnd who serves?

The American CMR, As with many other democracies, CMR in the U.S. have constituted a bargain among the people, the state institutions, and its military, which bargain is the outcome of an “unequal dialogue.” It is “a dialogue, in that both [the civilian and military] sides expressed their views bluntly, indeed, sometimes offensively, and not once but repeatedly—and [an] unequal [one], in that the final authority of the civilian leader was unambiguous and unquestioned” (Cohen, 2002, p. 247). Hence, one of the most important principles of democratic CMR is that while officers are obliged to make their case as strongly as possible, they do not have the right to “insist” that their advice be accepted. However, there must be a “calculus of dissent” (Owens, 2012, p. 74).

In this context, militarism is a state of affairs in which military values predominate, and the military devours a disproportionate share of the society’s resources. It is the extreme form of military influence on a society. According to Naison Ngoma (2006, pp. 107−108), in order to avoid such militarism and to ensure democracy, militaries have to:

- be accountable to civil authorities, independent oversight agencies, and civil society;
- adhere to the rule of law, that is, international law and domestic constitutions;
- adopt transparent planning and budgeting processes;
- respect human rights and a culture of civility;
- be subject to political control over operations and expenditures;
- consult regularly with civil society;
- be professional; and
- support collaborative peace and security.
Militarism can be avoided only by asserting civilian control over the military. Harold A. Trinkunas (1999) argues that civilian control exists when government officials hold ultimate jurisdiction over military activities and that this control is maximized when soldiers are confined to tasks linked to their primary function: preparing for war. Civilian control will emerge only when civilian rulers gain enough power to compel the armed forces to accept their oversight. Moreover, democracy will prevail only if civilian control is institutionalized. In summary, in the context of CMR, civilian control is not so much an endpoint as it as an ongoing process, because even the rulers of consolidated democracies focus primarily on supervising their armed forces by defining their roles, missions, and budgets.

However, this control should be democratic in terms of military compliance with government authority, rather than just be the absence of armed rebellion. This situation exists when government officials, rather than military generals, make decisions concerning the military’s missions, organization, and deployment. On top of that, complete civilian control over the military also means that the latter refrains from interfering in the public policy-making process.

In this context, Samuel Huntington (1957) differentiates between two versions of democratic civilian control:

- **Subjective control**: when political elites shield themselves from military intervention by ensuring that the armed forces share common values and objectives with them, often achieved by politicizing the officer corps.
- **Objective control**: when the military is independent from civilian interference. Therefore, it is self-directed through strong norms of professionalism that include subordination toward the duly constituted state authority and an apolitical attitude toward the civilian government’s policies and activities.

According to Trinkunas (1999), strong democratic civilian control has two aspects: institutionalized oversight of military activities by a civilian government and the professionalism of the military forces. Trinkunas argues that maximizing civilian control in a democracy involves limiting the areas of state policy in which the armed forces hold the upper hand. Moreover, the existence of enclaves of military autonomy within the state and institutional vetoes over civilian policy-making threatens the stability of any political regime. It is far harder to monitor and control those militaries that control
the state economy and are outside the supervision of civilian authorities. Furthermore, military control of the internal security agencies makes it difficult for the civilian authorities to prevent its political intervention. On top of that, the military’s participation in areas outside its primary mission has historically led to its politicization, friction between the civilian and military leaders, and a significant reduction in military effectiveness.

In this regard, scholars differentiate between civilian control and non-interference by the military, as the former is seen as being wider and more desirable for democratization. However, they disagree over how to reach this end. Both Huntington and Janowitz introduced two divergent schools of thought. According to Huntington (1957), the best way to ensure civilian control is to develop a distinct form of “military professionalism.” He argues that such professionalism implies a specific expertise in the use of force, a primary responsibility within the state for military functions, and the existence of a bureaucratic military organization with its own internal hierarchy and rules of advancement. If this kind of professionalism is achieved, Huntington claims, the military would be willing to submit to the civilian authorities.

Janowitz, to a certain extent, suggests an opposite path. Like Huntington, he highlights the fundamental difference between the military and civilian spheres, with the former based on hierarchy, order, and strict discipline, whereas the latter is disorderly and values individual freedoms. In contrast to Huntington, Janowitz advocates the convergence of the military and civilian realms in order to achieve civilian control over the military. According to him, encouraging mutual exchange and regular interaction between these two domains is the best way to ensure civilian control, because it would ensure that the society’s values and expectations remain present within the military establishment. For this reason, Janowitz supports general conscription, which he sees as a key instrument for ensuring the envisaged convergence. In his view, conscription would lead to civilianization of the military and thus prevent undue military interference in politics (Lutterbeck, 2011).

Civil-Military Relations: State of the Art

According to May et al. (2004), the post-colonial era has been characterized by newly independent states with militaries that were more often oriented toward maintaining internal order than external defense. Therefore, their natural focus on domestic politics resulted in a surge of military interventions
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in Asia, Africa, and Latin America during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Since these interventions were largely considered to represent a rejection of democratic values and institutions, considerable scholarly attention was devoted to explaining why and how military coups occurred.

Therefore, early CMR scholarship explained the coup leaders’ motives, the military’s structure, and the predisposing and facilitating socio-economic, political, and external conditions. The main trend in the literature concluded that military interventions were due to underdeveloped civil-political institutions. Other scholars sought an explanation in the military’s corporate interests (e.g., Janowitz, 1964; First, 1970; Nordlinger, 1977; Horowitz, 1980). Still others portrayed the military as merely an extension of the larger civil society, subject to the same class, regional, and ethnic cleavages; as prone to internal friction and likely to side with particular political factions at particular times; and as based on the coup leaders’ personal ambitions.

May et al. (2004) claim that such explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, since personal, organizational, and societal factors are amalgamated. In this context, a growing number of case studies provided support for all of these propositions, claiming that while most military interventions had several common denominators, the explanation of individual cases required an understanding of their particular historical and social conditions.

For example, a series of studies in the 1970s and early 1980s (Nordlinger, 1970, 1977; Schmitter, 1971; Hoadley, 1975; McKinlay and Cohan, 1975; McKinlay and Cohan, 1976) recognized the economic performance of military regimes but concluded that, in terms of performance, they did not form a distinctive regime type. Heeger (1977, p. 274) went further, suggesting that for Africa and Asia during 1965–1975 “most military regimes have hindered the development of their countries.” More recently, Seitz (1991, p. 7) studied around 40 sub-Saharan African states and concluded that there was “no significant discernible pattern separating the economic performance of military and civilian regimes.”

When it comes to political performance, another study conducted by Nordlinger (1977) measured political performance by four indicators (i.e., legitimization, no coercive rule, minimization of violence, and responsiveness to popular wishes), suggesting that the performance of military governments “is significantly and almost consistently poorer than that of civilian
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governments” (p. 197). More recently, and based on the data supplied by Freedom House, Finer (1991) noted that 94% of military governments were ranked as authoritarian and lacking basic civil freedoms, compared to 60% of 73 civilian regimes.

A third trend in the military-in-politics literature began to differentiate among the various types of military and civil-military regimes after making a deep study of the army’s post-intervention economic and political performance. Scholars differed on how to categorize these interventions, but eventually came to agree on the lack of a dividing line between military and civilian regimes (e.g., Heeger, 1977; Finer, 1982; Bebler, 1990). During the 1980s and early 1990s, with democratization sweeping over parts of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, this type of literature converged with the ongoing literature on regime change (May et al., 2004).

A recent trend in CMR literature concentrates on the multinational relations among military personnel and civilian humanitarian agencies in conflict-affected areas (Haysom and Jackson, 2013). These scholars paid attention to the relations between military personnel deployed to a conflict zone and the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance provided by international civilian employees.

Finally, the increasing CMR literature during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s was driven by a fear of the West’s democratic norms and institutions. As a corollary, the literature’s dominant paradigm based itself upon the successful separation of civil and military institutions as the best option for minimizing any army’s inclination to intervene in any nation’s domestic politics, regardless of its specific political, economic, social, and cultural structures.

The concordance theory, one of the very few critiques of this dominant paradigm, distinguishes itself by focusing on each nation’s cultural and historical experiences and how these have affected both its military and political institutions. In the next section, the premises of both theories will be discussed in an attempt to devise an applicable analytical framework for Egypt to help in the pursuit of civilian control and democracy.

The Theory of Civil-Military Relations

As mentioned earlier, dividing lines within the relevant literature revealed two major theories that differ on three grounds: (1) their way of analyzing
domestic military intervention, (2) their prescribed solutions to deter such interventions, and (3) their ideological limitations.

Separation theory postulates a separation of military and civilian institutions, whereas concordance theory argues that the military, the political elites, and the citizenry somehow formulate a cooperative relationship that may or may not involve separation. The latter theory seeks to deal with separation theory’s two major shortcomings: (1) its ideological bias (i.e., it is derived mainly from the American experience and thus is not applicable to many other nations) and (2) its institutional emphasis ignores each nation’s specific cultural and historical conditions.

Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn (2010), building upon both theories, provided a distinct framework of analysis to deal with CMR from a dichotomous perspective but without neglecting the effect of multiple situational and structural factors, including, but not limited to, public support, an active civil society, and external actors. Thus they neither overlooked the citizenry in their analysis nor gave it too much weight.

First: Separation Theory

A review of the CMR literature on both developed as well as underdeveloped countries reveals that its centerpiece is the separation between civil and military institutions. The major contribution of most of this literature is to note that a country’s military should remain physically and ideologically separate from its political institutions (Schiff, 1995) on the grounds that detaching the professional military from politics and specific political causes leaves it no reason to intervene in civilian politics and institutions. In separation theory, achieving such a separation requires a distinct set of civilian institutions that can maintain political control over the armed forces. The question here concerns the status of those countries that lack the existence of “civil” institutions. The idea of military professionalism is a cornerstone of separation theory, which argues that the professional army should be prepared to advise civilians and defend the nation from foreign threats, however, should not become involved in political decision-making.

For example, Trinkunas (1999) suggests that civilian control exists when government officials hold ultimate jurisdiction over military activities and that such control is maximized when soldiers are confined to tasks linked to their primary function: preparing for war. Civilian control, he asserts, will
only emerge when civilian rulers gain enough leverage over the armed forces to compel them to accept oversight. Therefore, democracy will not prevail until civilian control is institutionalized.

In his account of civilian control, strong democratic civilian control has two dimensions: a civilian government’s institutionalized oversight of military activities and a professional military. In order to measure the degree of civilian control that exists in a society, he depicts state activities in a pattern of four concentric rings, with each ring representing a core state function (see figure 1).

The military’s core task, as shown in figure 1, is external defense, which involves preparing for war, conducting war and related military missions, managing the military bureaucracy, training, and strategic planning. The more it expands to other areas of policy-making, the more politicized it becomes, and the harder it becomes for the civilian authorities to impose civilian control. The second area of jurisdiction, internal security, includes maintaining public order in emergency situations, preparing for counterinsurgency warfare, gathering domestic intelligence, and daily policing. To a large extent, it is all
right for the military to take part in internal security maintenance, but only on the condition that it is under the direct supervision of the civilian authority.

The third area, public policy in general, covers state budgets, the functioning of government agencies, and the crafting of public policies designed to achieve social welfare, development, and political objectives. The fourth area that might intersect with the military’s involvement in politics, leadership selection, involves decisions concerning the criteria and process by which government officials are recruited, legitimated, and empowered.

To sum up, we can say that resource allocation, domestic policy, and leadership selection are the areas of state policies that are least connected to the role of the armed forces as regards external coercion, particularly in times of peace. In many countries, the armed forces may attempt to lobby or exercise influence in support of military industrialization projects and budget allocation. However, there is a clear distinction between influence, the threat of force, and the direct military control of these processes (Colton, 1979).

Another approach within mainstream separation theory calls for considering the CMR in any nation a principal-agent relationship. However, this is yet another dichotomous approach that overlooks the society in its CMR analysis, not to mention ignoring the cultural and historical contexts and their impact on the CMR.

In line with the mainstream focus on the interplay between a nation’s political masters and its military, Peter Feaver (1998) proposed that these interactions are best understood through an institutional lens: the application of the agency theory of CMR. As Thomas S. Sowers (2005) argues, the principal-agent theory originated in microeconomic analysis and was first used in the context of business. It has since been applied to many political situations and relationships. Its primary focus is the hierarchical relationship between two actors: principals (i.e., bosses, those within a hierarchical relationship in whom authority ultimately rests) and agents (i.e., actors hired by the principals and delegated with the necessary authority to perform tasks in the former’s name). So the relationship described here is hierarchical and defined by a delegation-of-authority contract.

Feaver (2003, p. 54) employs this theory to understand CMR: “Relations between civilians and the military are, in their most basic form, a strategic interaction carried out within a hierarchical setting.” He first proposed his
theory in an attempt to provide the micro-foundational logic to explain the causal mechanisms of CMR through a game-theoretical approach to agency and CMR. His account of CMR as a principal-agent relationship bases the developments of this relationship on three main variables, as follows:

1. **Information asymmetry and monitoring**
   Since principals face constraints (e.g., time, focus, and implementation capability), whereas agents only implement, agents develop an advantage in knowledge—“information asymmetry”—over the principals. The principal has an interest in overcoming this information asymmetry in order to ensure that agents specifically implement the principal’s assigned policy. As the assigned policy turns out to be more important to the principal, less power is delegated to the agent. Sowers (2005, p. 388) notes: “The main problem, commonly referred to as a moral hazard lies in the principal’s dilemma: how to delegate to agents while maintaining accountability.”

2. **Principal monitoring as a variable**
   Echoing Feaver’s account, Sowers (2005) also argues that, in an attempt to overcome information asymmetry, the principal utilizes different monitoring mechanisms to ensure that the agent is acting in the principal’s interest. Such devices range from investigations and requiring reports to hearings and visits with varying degrees of involvement and severity.

   Like all bureaucracies, the military prefers autonomy to monitoring in both policy formation and implementation. As Feaver (2003, p. 64) stresses, soldiers seek “the ability to decide what to do and…. the ability to decide how to do it.” For the military, civilian monitoring is more than a tool for information; it has been seen as a punishment or an intrusion into their professional domains. However, in situations of exacerbated information asymmetry (e.g., the case of soldier-state relations), a variable level of principal monitoring is predicted.

3. **Agent response as variable**
   As a reaction to this variable level of principal monitoring, principal-agent theory provides for a variable level of agent reaction. In the simplest game, the agent can act in accordance with the principal’s wishes (to work) or in opposition to the principal’s wishes (to shirk). In a favorable civil-military implementation scenario, two factors play into the agent’s decision. First, the agent recognizes the difference in terms of utility between working
and shirking. Second, the agent recognizes the likelihood that the civilian principal will be able to detect shirking and, once this occurs, the likelihood the civilian principal will punish the military agent for shirking.

Feaver states that this two-actor game can achieve equilibrium, or a predictive capability, by positing those conditions in which the military might choose working over shirking and vice versa. Thus, in this approach, CMR is once more a dichotomous relationship between two players that depends on a set of decisions and responses starting from the principal’s decision to monitor the military, to the level and degree of monitoring, and the response of the military agent, which changes from one situation to another. Probabilities are calculated and will vary with changes in the makeup of the civilian and military actors (Feaver, 2003).

Finally, we can say that separation theory is descriptive in that it describes the western separation of civil and military institutions and prescribes this pattern as the best deterrent to domestic military intervention for any nation, regardless of its culture and whether it resembles that of the United States and the West or not.

Second: Concordance Theory

Concordance theory, on the other hand, argues that “three partners—the military, the political elites and the citizenry—should aim for a cooperative relationship that may or may not involve separation but doesn’t require it.” (Schiff, 1995, p. 7). According to Rebecca Schiff, a high level of integration between the military and other parts of society is one type of CMR. Given that each type of CMR reflects the specific institutional and cultural conditions shared by the three partners, no single type is seen as the driving motive behind domestic military intervention. According to concordance theory, what really matters is not the specific type of CMR adopted, but rather the ability of the three partners to agree on four indicators: the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, the recruitment method, and the military style. Should they agree on these indicators, domestic military intervention is less likely. Concordance theory also explains not only the institutional conditions that affect relations among the military, the political elites, and society, but also incorporates each nation’s cultural and historical experiences in its explanations. Different historical and cultural experiences, Schiff notices, may result in “various other possibilities for CMR, which may be different from the American example.” (Schiff, 1995, pp. 7–8).
Concordance theory moves beyond institutional analysis by addressing issues relevant to the nation’s culture, including its ethnic composition and diversity-related issues. It, therefore, looks for the empirical conditions under which the military, the government, and the society may agree on separate, integrated, or other forms of CMR to prevent domestic military intervention. Culture here refers to the values, attitudes, and symbols informing not only the nation’s view of its military’s role, but also the military’s own view of that role (Schiff, 1995). The various societal forces that should be incorporated in the analysis include those characteristics of the general population that may influence the army’s role and purpose, the cultural considerations of different local communities, and so forth.

In contrast to separation theory’s emphasis on the civil sphere’s authority over the military, concordance theory highlights dialogue, accommodation, and shared values or objectives among the military, political elites, and society. According to Schiff, concordance theory does not require a particular form of government, set of institutions, or decision-making process, for it usually takes place in the context of active agreement. Furthermore, it encourages cooperation and involvement among the military, political institutions, and the society at large. Eventually, the cooperation and agreement on the four specific indicators related above may result in a range of civil-military patterns, including separation, the removal of the boundaries separating the civil and military spheres, or any other variation (Schiff, 1995).

Schiff’s four indicators are important elements of concordance because they reflect specific conditions that influence agreement or disagreement among the three partners. In fact, each country’s particular cultural and historical conditions affect how the indicators shape its CMR, whether in the form of separation, integration, or other alternatives.

1. Composition of the officer corps
A country’s historical and cultural conditions affect whether an agreement on the composition of the officer corps can be reached or not. In most modern nations, the officer corps is in charge of broad institutional and day-to-day operations. As leader of the armed forces, it can provide the critical links between the citizenry and the military as well as between the military and the government. In democratic countries, it usually represents the wide variations of the nation. However, such a broad representation is not a prerequisite for concordance because the concordance on the officer corps’ is shaped differently according to each nation’s different cultural and historical conditions.
2. Political decision-making process
In this context, the political decision-making process does not imply a
particular kind of government, but simply refers to the specific channels
that determine the military’s needs and allocations (e.g., budgets, materials,
size, and structure). These issues are usually decided by open parliaments,
closed cabinets, and special committees, as well as, potentially, through
the participation of military officers. A governmental channel or agency
is often tasked with considering these needs as well as the resources and
requirements of the society at large. The critical issue and the ideal case
here is that the political elites, the military, and the citizenry will agree
on the political process that best meets the armed forces’ needs and
requirements.

3. Recruitment method
Recruitment refers to the enlistment, either coercive or persuasive,
of citizens into the armed forces. Coercive recruitment, defined as the
forcible conscription of citizens for military purposes, usually does not
result in concordance between either party because the citizenry is forced
to cooperate. Persuasive recruitment, on the other hand, can be either
voluntary or involuntary. Persuasion here is based on the individual
citizen’s belief in the virtue of the sacrifice of military service. This kind
of recruitment implies an agreement among the three partners over the
requirements and composition of the armed forces.

4. Military style
Military style, as Schiff (1995, p. 15) notes, refers to “the external
manifestations of the military and the inner mental constructions
associated with it: what it looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people
think about it.” It deals directly with the armed forces’ human and cultural
elements.

Concordance theory, Schiff argues, is both descriptive and prescriptive in that
it describes a concordance among the military, the political elites, and the
citizenry found in a wide range of cultures and also promotes concordance as
the best deterrent to domestic military intervention. Given its flexibility, it is
applicable to various kinds of cultures. Moreover, this theory does not deny the
importance given to the international environment in general and a nation’s
external threat conditions in particular by proponents of the structural realist
school of thought, for its primary focus, similar to that of separation theory,
is domestic politics.
Similarly, Zeki Sarigil (2011), who critiques the dominant dichotomous CMR paradigm, asserts that three distinct but interpenetrating realms exist in a polity: social, political, and military. Developing Schiff’s tripartite approach, Sarigil argues that the nature of the military’s relations with the social and political spheres and actors delineates four types of militaries: professional, a nation’s army, predatory praetorian, and popular praetorian.

The military domain refers to matters related to its establishment (e.g., recruitment, training, and promotion of the officer corps as well as arms procurement), national security, and defense issues. The political domain involves the state and governmental affairs. Finally, the social realm is constituted by socio-economic processes and such actors as the people, civil society, and the market. These three realms interpenetrate or intersect with each other. For example, military spending or military budget is not only an important matter in the military sphere, but also a major political issue. In addition, military service cuts across both the military and the social realms.

One way of approaching militaries would be to analyze the following questions: to what degree are they involved in political issues; to what extent are they integrated with society; how popular or prestigious are they in their respective countries; and how permeable or impervious are the political and social ambiats?

In line with the same argument, Huntington (1957, p. 89), the founding father of separation theory, finds that “the standing of the officer corps and its leaders with public opinion and the attitudes of broad section or categorical
groups in society toward the military are key elements in determining military influence.”

If we agree that the state has these three intersecting realms, then one way to study CMR in a given polity is to look at its military’s relations with both the social and political spheres, in other words, to look at the military’s social integration and its political role. As table 1 shows, the interaction of these two variables creates a fourfold typology of armies: professional, national, predatory praetorian, and popular praetorian.

In line with Huntington’s arguments, this table shows that a professional army, the first category, is the least involved in policy decisions because it believes that politics is not really for soldiers and that policy decisions are reserved for civilians even in cases of major conflicts with the government or civilian incompetence. Huntington (1956, p. 381) argues that “[o]fficership, in short, is an exclusive role, incompatible with any other significant social or political roles.” On the side of social integration, professional soldiers similarly maintain a clear distance from the social sphere in the sense that their integration with society remains relatively limited. The West European and North American militaries are examples of this type.

Second, the nation’s army is more likely to have stronger ties with social actors and enjoy a higher degree of popularity and support. Sarigil (2011) notes that states with a national army-type military might find that the political and social spheres sometimes overlap. For example, political actors frequently intrude into military matters and violate the army’s professionalism and autonomy,

Table 1  A Fourfold Military Typology (Sarigil, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Politcal Role</th>
<th>Societal Integration</th>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Q1 Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Q2 Nation’s Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Q3 Predatory Praetorian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Q4 Popular Praetorian</td>
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Ahmed Abd Rabou

and military officers are represented in political decision-making bodies. At times, they even occupy key posts in such high-level decision-making bodies as the party or the government (e.g., Communist China and the Soviet Union).

Before we speak of the praetorian military type, it is important to define what “praetorian” means. This term comes from a special military unit found in Imperial Rome—the *Roman Praetorian Guard*. Its main duty was to defend and protect the Senate and the emperor against any transgression by rebellious military garrisons. At the same time, it had enough influence and/or power to impose its candidate upon the Senate (Nordlinger, 1977, p. 3). “In modern times, Sarigil (2011, p. 268) adds, “a praetorian military refers to the one which tends to intervene in and dominate the political system.”

Perlmutter (1969, p. 383) remarks that in such regimes:

> The political processes...favor the development of the military as the core group and the growth of its expectations as a ruling class; its political leadership (as distinguished from bureaucratic, administrative, and managerial leadership) is chiefly recruited from the military, or from groups sympathetic, or at least not antagonistic, to the military. Constitutional changes are effected and sustained by the military, and the army frequently intervenes in the government. In a praetorian state, therefore, the military plays a dominant role in political structures and institutions.

Those praetorian militaries that have a predatory nature usually have limited confidence in civilian institutions and regimes. In fact, their primary concern is the military’s corporate interest. Therefore, they are probably inclined to intervene and stay in power for longer periods of time. In addition, they are more likely to be repressive and violent, and engage in major human rights violations and widespread state terror. Consequently, their popularity and prestige in society are very limited. The Latin American context of the 1970s offers various examples. For example, the militaries of Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Chile showed strong “predatory praetorian” characteristics.

Popular praetorian militaries also involve themselves in civilian politics to a great extent. However, they act as guardians of the political regime’s survival and stability. In other words, the military’s interventions are triggered by its desire to solve political problems or settle political disputes rather than to set up a long-term military regime. Consequently, this type of regime is
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characterized by a lower degree of social penetration, political control, and repression. The military chooses to act behind the scenes rather than assume direct political power. A popular praetorian army also enjoys such a high level of social trust and support that large sections of society might even encourage or welcome its entrance into the political arena. In line with Sarigil’s typology of militaries, both the Turkish and Egyptian militaries are likely to be classified as popular praetorian armies.

Sarigil (2011) suggests that the Turkish military is an archetype of the popular praetorian military, for it has always been a core element of the political system. After all, it directly interrupted the democratic processes four times during the Republican era (i.e., 1960–61, 1971, 1980–83, and 1997). In its own words, the primary motivation of each intrusion was to restore the democratic secular order and save the state apparatus, not to establish a long-term military regime. In addition, the Turkish military enjoys a relatively high level of popularity and legitimacy.

Third: The Civil-Military Contest

Croissant and Kuehn (2010) framed a conceptual approach that can analyze CMR in newly democratized states (see figure 3). Their dichotomous approach viewed the military and the civilians as two contesting players who compete for control over the five major decision-making areas, especially in newly democratized countries or those in transition. Their dichotomous perspective does not overlook the citizenry or the society at large, but rather views the society as one of the structural factors that governs CMR. They argued that various components of civilian control can be organized into five decision-making areas of CMR: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defense, and military organization. The state’s position on the continuum of political power distribution between civilians and the military depends on the outcome of both groups’ competition over who will dominate those areas. Hence, full-fledged civilian control requires that civilian authorities enjoy uncontested decision-making power in all five areas. On the other hand, the military can limit the civilians’ decision-making power either through institutionalized rules (e.g., reserving some constitutional prerogatives for itself, like the complementary constitutional declaration issued by SCAF a few days before delivering authority to President-elect Morsi) or through contestation, which means threatening to engage or actually engaging in illegitimate conduct to challenge the civilian decision-making power, like what happens in coups and attempted coups.
Hence, the most pressing questions are how the new civilian regime can institutionalize civilian control over the military and which factors determine this effort’s success or failure. To answer these questions, we should bear in mind that the degree of civilian control in new democracies depends on the civilian elites’ ability and willingness to develop short- or medium-term strategies for establishing institutions that limit the armed forces’ political activities. They can employ many strategies to control the army: appeasement, monitoring, ascriptive selection of armed forces personnel, political socialization of the military, as well as rewarding compliance and punishing non-compliance.

Furthermore, civil-military interaction does not take place in a vacuum, for certain structural and situational factors affect that interaction. Croissant and Kuehn distinguished three sets of structural and situational factors: initial conditions, military-endogenous factors, and military-exogenous factors. Initial conditions include the type of outgoing regime and the scope of military prerogatives. These and other conditions, such as the type of military rule (e.g., hierarchical or non-hierarchical) and the military’s role in the transition, have profound implications for the challenges and opportunities related to crafting civilian control in new democracies (Croissant and Kuehn, 2010). For example, if the military played an important role in the old regime, one could expect that the transition to a new regime characterized by civilian control over the military would not be easy. In such cases—Egypt is currently a very good example of this—the military would want to maintain monitoring or tutelary capacities that would impede civilian control.

The military-endogenous factors are related to the military’s internal aspects, such as its organizational culture, internal cohesion, and economic posture. On the other hand, the military-exogenous factors shape the civil-military balance of power from outside the military complex. Six different factors can be identified here: public support for the regime, civilian consensus, an active civil society, external threat perception, internal threat perception, and external actors. Based on these structural and contextual factors, the civilian elites can choose which control strategies to adopt in their attempt to dominate the main five areas of political power distribution in the CMR.

As shown, the three theories presented above refer to four facts: (1) civilian control is a prerequisite for democracy—a truly democratic system requires civilian control of at least the decision-making process, elite recruitment, and internal security; (2) several factors determine which party will win this
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contest, of which some are related to the army’s social and economic position, and others are related to the civil and political actors; (3) the role of foreign actors as well as internal and external threats strongly influence and shape the public’s perception and position toward this contest; and (4) scholars posit two strategies for achieving civilian control over the army: (a) socialize the army via politicians and political actions so that its members will acquire a sense of political and democratic values, and (b) detach it completely from the nation’s political life so that its members can pursue their own professionalism. There is no final say on which strategy is the best, for that depends upon each country’s internal conditions as regards its military’s history and importance in society, the economy, and politics.

![Diagram of Civil-Military Relations and Control Strategies](image)

**Figure 3** Factors and Strategies of Crafting Civilian Control (Croissant and Kuehn, 2010)
Civil-Military Relations in Less-Developed Countries

Most CMR theories have been derived mainly from the experiences of the U.S. and other developed countries. However, other analysts have focused on the specific nature of CMR in less-developed countries, the military’s greater political role in many developing countries, and its frequent intervention in politics. The military’s intervention and political role were the two main concerns of those scholars who studied the military and politics in less-developed countries. Explanations for these factors were sought in, among other things, the low level of political culture, the military’s role in nation-building, and the countries’ social conditions.

Finer (2006) argues that “low political culture” might be the trigger for military intervention because such an incident is more likely and more extensive in such countries as opposed to those with a “developed political culture.” Political culture, in his analysis, has to do with the existence of state institutions and procedures that regulate the exercise of political power. In countries with a “low political culture,” these either do not exist or lack popular legitimacy. Thus military intervention is more likely and, when it happens, is more intense and far-reaching than in countries with functioning state institutions. Such intervention may also occur in countries with a high level of political culture. However, according to Finer, this is usually limited to exercising pressure on the political leadership (Lutterbeck, 2011).

Other scholars sought an explanation for this extended political role in the “birthright” principle: in those developing countries where the military led the independence struggle and subsequent state creation, its political influence often lasted into the post-independence period (Koonings and Kruijt, 2002; Lutterbeck, 2011). Algeria is a typical example of this principle, for its army played a crucial part in the independence struggle and remains the predominant political actor even now. Another account ascribed such interventions to the social conditions of those states that might not be so opposed to a strong military role in politics. For example, according to Amos Perlmutter (1981), a lack of social cohesion, the existence of fratricidal social classes (particularly a politically weak middle class), and a low level of political mobilization contribute to what he called “praetorianism,” namely, a state in which the military controls, or at least heavily influences, political decision-making.

The interaction between the state and the armed forces is one of the most salient features of Middle Eastern politics. Writings on CMR in the Middle
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East were widespread during the 1960s and 1970s, given the frequency of military coups during this period. Since then, they have been very scarce and far between (Kamrava, 2000). Surprisingly, Turkey is the only Middle Eastern country that has been studied rigorously with regards to CMR and the political role of the military in general. This could be justified in the light of the relative success achieved by consecutive Turkish governments in minimizing the armed forces’ role and keeping them at bay.

However, the Arab Spring was a turning point for the CMR studies on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region due to the armed forces’ return to the political scene in most of the affected Arab countries. The Egyptian, Syrian, and Libyan militaries played a pivotal role during the transitional period: Bashar Al-Assad of Syria survived a three-year armed revolution thanks to many factors, including the support of the Alawite army; Libya is still being torn apart due to the army’s role in the political equation; and Field Marshal Abdel Fattah El-Sisi became the Egyptian President after three years of political confusion that ended with the ouster of the elected President, Mohamed Morsi.

As Merhan Kamrava (2000) noted, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed the emergence of a significant body of literature on the military’s political influence in Middle Eastern states, which was followed by a somewhat declining degree of interest in the topic in subsequent years. This academic interest was driven by the frequency of military coups and other forms of military intervention. Key elements in this early literature were the nature and patterns of military coups, the social background and outlook of the military officers who assumed power, and the nature of the military-dominated regimes that resulted from these interventions in politics (e.g., Be’eri, 1969; Haddad, 1965). Different scholars offered various classifications for the resulting regimes. For example, Perlmutter (1981) differentiated between the “Military Ruler” and the “Military Arbitrator” regime, asserting that most Middle Eastern regimes at the time were of the latter type. Kamrava (2000) offered a four-type typology ranging from “Autocratic Officer-Politician” regimes to tribally dependent monarchies, regimes with dual militaries, and military democracies.

First: The “Military Ruler” vs. the “Military Arbitrator” Regimes

Perlmutter’s distinction is commonly used to analyze the characteristics of MENA military-based regimes. These two concepts refer to different stages of intensity and the length of the military intervention. According to Perlmutter
Ahmed Abd Rabou (1981), a “military ruler” regime is one in which the military takes direct control of the political decision-making process for an extended period of time, whereas in a “military arbitrator” regime, the military influences politics largely from the background, seeking to limit its involvement in politics in both time and intensity.

Currently, most MENA countries can be said to have the second type of regime, for most policy-making areas are left to civilian governments. Nevertheless, the armed forces remain a key actor, for they oversee the political process from behind the scenes. Moreover, in times of crisis or when core interests are threatened, the military is likely to grab the reins of power and assert direct control over the political decision-making process (Cook, 2007).

Second: Typology of Civil-Military Relations in MENA

Kamrava (2000, pp. 71–80) identified four types of CMR in the MENA region:

1. **“Autocratic Officer-Politician” Regimes**
   Such regimes are usually led by former officers who gradually became civilian politicians. The state apparatus as a whole has also been largely civilianized, not least because the leaders themselves became wary of the army’s political power. Although the army is no longer directly involved in politics, it still plays an important role in the background, often through more informal channels. Algeria, Egypt, and Syria are examples of this regime, for their armed forces exercise political power through their symbolic relationship with the all-powerful presidency.

2. **Tribally Dependent Monarchies**
   This category includes the oil monarchies of the Gulf, Morocco, and Jordan. The distinguishing feature here is the monarch’s heavy reliance on forces drawn either from those tribes that are particularly loyal to the regime or dependent on foreign mercenaries. For example, the Saudi National Guard, whose main task is to counterbalance the influence of the regular armed forces and protect the regime against internal challenges more generally, is drawn mainly from tribes particularly loyal to the royal family (Global Security, 2014).

3. **Regimes with Dual Militaries**
   Dual (or even multiple) military structures that are based less on tribal loyalty than on ideology can also be found in several MENA countries, such
as Iran, Iraq (prior to 2003), and Libya (under Gaddafi). In addition to a regular army, these states have created parallel militias whose primary task is to secure the regime in power against domestic threats, including challenges by the regular army. In contrast to the regular military, these militias are highly ideological and subject to constant indoctrination. They are usually made up of volunteers with a strong ideological commitment and an emotional attachment to the leader or regime, again in contrast to the typically conscription-based regular army. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard is one such highly ideological militia, for it views itself as the main guardian of the 1979 revolution.

4. Military Democracies
This category only applies to Turkey and Israel, for they alone come closest to being considered democratic because they hold regular meaningful elections, maintain vibrant political party systems, and allow the electorate to have genuine input in the political process. They are distinguished from other democracies because they have witnessed varying degrees of civilian-military interaction and cooperation that are not commonly found in other democracies.

In these Middle Eastern democracies, civilian-military interactions are cemented by institutional devices (the National Security Council in Turkey), international geopolitical realities, or tradition (retired Israeli officers becoming politicians). With the military having become a highly visible and integral feature of the political system, these states may best be described as “military democracies.”

Third: The Response of Arab Militaries to the 2011 Uprisings

The response of the MENA region’s militaries to the 2011 uprisings varied according to their specific characteristics. First, we need to consider whether the army in question is an institutionalized or a patrimonial institution. Second, we need to look at its relationship with the population at large. Therefore, the divergent responses can be explained by two main factors: (1) the degree of institutionalization of the armed forces and (2) their relationship to society at large. The more institutionalized the military apparatus is and the stronger its link to society, the more open it will be to pro-reform movements. Conversely, in countries where the armed forces are characterized by a low
level of institutionalization and a weak relationship to the population at large, they will oppose anti-regime uprisings (Lutterbeck, 2011).

1. **Institutionalization vs. Patrimonialism**
   This differentiation is used to explain the response of the Arab armed forces to pro-democracy uprisings. Drawing on experiences with transformations from authoritarian and military-based to democratic rule in other parts of the world, Eva Bellin (2004) suggested that an institutionalized army will tolerate the uprising, whereas a patrimonial one will defend the regime.

   In this context, institutionalization refers to the fact that the armed forces, or the security apparatus more generally, are rule-bound and based on meritocratic principles. In addition, they are governed by a clear set of rules, have established career paths, and have a promotion system based on performance rather than political or other loyalties. In addition, a clear separation between the private and public realms exists to counteract corruption and the security forces’ predatory behavior vis-à-vis society (Lutterbeck, 2011).

   The opposite of institutionalization is, in Bellin’s analysis, “patrimonialism,” meaning that the security apparatus is characterized by political favoritism and cronyism and that its internal hierarchy and advancement are determined by political or ideological loyalties, as opposed to military or professional competence. Other characteristics are the blurring of borders between the private and public domains as well as a high level of favoritism and corruption. Patrimonial militaries are more likely to oppose political reforms and regime change because their role and status are closely tied to the regime. Thus they have more to lose from such reforms.

2. **A Conscript vs. a Professional Army**
   The strength or weakness of the armed forces’ relationship to the population at large should be taken into consideration in order to explain their responses to the MENA region’s recent pro-reform movements. It can be assumed that if there is a strong organic link between the armed forces and the population, it is less likely that the former will use force against those protests that are supported by large segments of the latter.

   While there are various ways in which the military might be linked to society, arguably the most important mechanism used by states to ensure a strong linkage between these two entities is general or broad-based
conscription.\(^1\) Popular uprisings stand a greater chance of success if there
is a conscript, as opposed to a professional, army (Lutterbeck, 2011).

Conclusion

Given that several areas and issues remain uncovered and unresolved as regards
the existing studies on the Middle East, we propose the following: scholars should (1) study CMR in MENA politics beyond the coup-no coup
dichotomy; (2) study what external factors facilitate and enhance the armed
forces’ influence and determine the military’s role in the internal politics
of states; and (3) transcend the narrow meaning of the “military” and its
operations and organizations in order to study its history, role in the making
of modern nation-states, and position in society, the economy, and politics.

In light of the scarce writings on CMR in the Middle East in general and in Egypt
in particular, not to mention the inapplicability of the reviewed theories and
approaches to the Egyptian or Turkish cases due to the disparities in the two
militaries’ circumstances and traditional positions, we will analyze each case
separately. We will pay attention to the history and the establishment of each
country’s armed forces, as well as keep in mind the theoretical underpinnings
introduced by different theorists, in order to formulate conclusions that suit
the cases studied.

In the following three chapters, we will analyze the CMR by focusing on
six main dimensions in Turkey and Egypt, respectively: (1) the historical
development of the army’s establishment, (2) its role in establishing the
modern nation-state, (3) its position in politics vs. politicians, (4) its societal
dimension, (5) its economic power, and (6) the relevant external factors and
how they affect the civil-military relationship in each case.

\(^1\) Among theorists of civil-military relations, Janowitz was the strongest advocate
for the use of conscription to ensure “convergence” between the civilian and military
realms.
Introduction

The role of the military as warlords in the founding of the Ottoman Empire was so paramount that, during its early centuries, the central administration was referred to as “Askeri.” This role was strengthened by the relatively less-significant roles played by weak sultans during the so-called period of decline from the late sixteenth until the end of the eighteenth century. This resulted in an oligarchy composed of the military, the civil bureaucracy, and the religious hierarchy, all of which actively participated in ruling the empire. In the early nineteenth century, military reforms were initiated, and the traditional Janissaries corps was replaced by the New Order corps. Metin Herper (2011, p. 175) argues,

By the end of that century (19th century), the military had turned into not only the object of change but also the subject of change, particularly as a consequence of the establishment of military institutions of higher learning.

In the early twentieth century, the military supported the transition and maintenance of the constitutional monarchy and, during the Union and Progress period² (1912–1918), became involved in day-to-day politics. Thus,

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² The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) began as the “Committee of Ottoman Union,” a secret society established in Istanbul in 1889 by the medical students Ibrahim Temo, Abdullah Cevdet, Ishak Sükuti, and Ali Hüseyinzade. Bahaeddin Sakir transformed it into a political organization, and later on into an official political party that aligned itself with the Young Turks in 1906, during the empire’s dissolution.
despite some efforts to further reform the military, it could not be turned into a professional body.

The founders of the republic, set up in 1923, kept the military out of politics but presented it as the ultimate guardian of the republican reforms, including secularism and civic nationalism. On the other hand, during the single-party years (1923–1945), the military’s professionalism deteriorated, and its officers began to be exposed to western education. Consequently, during the late 1940s, the younger officers supported the Democratic Party (founded in 1946) because they were not satisfied with over 20 years of single-party rule.

With Turkey joining NATO in 1952, alongside the glimmers of politicization and political neutrality (at least among the military’s lower ranks), the institution started to become a professional body. As this trend increased during the 1950s, the military as a whole abandoned its political neutrality and became an ardent proponent of secularism and civic nationalism. Having accepted the virtue of total Westernization and its pro-democracy worldview, the military acknowledged that the civilians were entitled to have the last word. However, this was only in principle, for it continued to view itself as responsible for safeguarding the country against serious internal as well as external threats. Thus, whenever it concluded that the country faced a serious internal threat, it intervened either directly (1960, 1971, and 1980), in collaboration with other institutions (1997) or by public declarations (from the 1960s onward).

From the early 1980s onward, officers began to wonder whether their interventions could make any real difference in politics; from 2002 onward, they questioned the very wisdom of such intervention. In addition to this internal reassessment, the European Union (EU) presented the Copenhagen criteria that obliged Turkey to democratize its CMR if it hoped to become a full member.

Furthermore, the discovery that a few high-ranking generals and middle-ranking officers had plotted to remove the governing Justice and Development

Although it began as a liberal reform movement, the Ottoman imperial government persecuted it because it called for democratization and reform.

At the end of World War I, Sultan Mehmed VI court-martialed and imprisoned most of its members. A few members were executed after being put on trial for the attempted assassination of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1926. Those who survived continued their political careers as members of the Republican People’s Party and other political parties.
Party (JDP) by force some time before 2006 must have adversely affected the military’s prestige in the eyes of the people. Consequently, by 2010, the military began to think that the “civilians have the right to be wrong” and, therefore, became rather unwilling to intervene. Although its leaders still make public declarations when they consider an internal situation to be very threatening, they do so only rarely. The following sections explain the main historical incidents that have affected the army’s role in the country’s political, economic, and social contexts.

Under the Ottoman Empire

Sultan Mahmud II’s (r. 1808–1839) 1826 abolition of the Janissaries through military force, execution, and exile, all of which was followed by the establishment of a modern army, was a watershed event in Ottoman military history (Hanioğlu, 2011). For almost five centuries, the Janissaries had served as the elite infantry units that formed the Sultan’s household troops and bodyguards. These “slaves of the Sultan” were educated and trained for both the army and government service. Over time, they became an efficient and formidable fighting force and Europe’s most outstanding army.

Sultan Murad I (r. 1362–1389) is usually credited with organizing the first Janissary corps. The youths were drawn mainly from the prisoners of war and slaves allocated to the Sultan as a one-fifth share of the war booty, as dictated by Islamic law. However, these two sources were not enough to fill the corps’ ranks, and so the Ottomans instituted a system of conscripting adolescent Christian boys, chiefly from the Balkans, to fill the gap after they completed a lengthy period of education and training. The resulting corps eventually became an extension of the Sultan’s family, for its members served as his private standing army and were both loyal to him and directly under his command (Ducharme, 2001).

The conscripted boys and prisoners of war were usually converted to Islam to ensure their loyalty. Being a field officer in the Janissary corps was not the only viable goal for the recruits, however, for the finest boys were selected for further specialized training and subsequently appointed to high-level administrative positions. By the second half of the seventeenth century, conscription was abolished, and the boys were recruited from the sons of retired Janissaries as well as free men. Another branch of the Ottoman armed forces, the provincial armies formed by freeborn Muslim cavalrymen, existed before the Janissaries and lasted until the nineteenth century. In fact, the Janissary corps enabled the
Sultans to lessen their reliance upon those frontier warlords and to suppress the challenges posed by some of them (Ducharme, 2001).

By the mid-eighteenth century, Janissary revolts, though not unprecedented, became more frequent, usually due to the empire’s growing financial and economic (sometimes political) problems. As these recurrent problems affected their salaries, bribery and corruption began to appear and spread within the corps. In the provinces, the Janissaries collected arbitrary \textit{ad hoc} taxes from the villagers to support themselves. During the early nineteenth century, especially after their multiple defeats at the hands of the Russians, it became clear that the corps had to be modernized. Unsurprisingly, the Janissaries resisted the proposed reforms and reorganization because they feared that they would lose their special privileges.

Unlike previous Sultans who had failed to assert their control over the corps, Sultan Mahmud II ended the turbulence once and for all. In 1826, when the Janissaries refused to be trained in European tactics by his New Order army, which had been trained by his French advisors, he crushed them (Ducharme, 2001). Following the “Auspicious Event,” as this episode came to be called, Sultan Mahmud II abolished the corps and replaced it with a European-style army led by a unified leadership. Unlike the Janissaries, this new land army combined infantry and cavalry alongside the artillery and engineering support units.

Beginning in 1839 and influenced by European ideas, a series of reforms known as the \textit{Tanzimat} were promulgated with the intent of moving the empire away from its old theocratic system to that of a modern state (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2014). These reforms peaked in 1876, when the government and an indirectly elected parliament implemented a constitution that checked the Sultan’s autocratic powers. It was repealed two years later by Sultan Abdülhamid II, who had sanctioned it in the first place.

After this event, various reform groups formed the Young Turk coalition and led a revolutionary movement against the Sultan’s authoritarian rule. This culminated in the establishment of a constitutional government in 1908. Although many cadets and young officers joined the Young Turk movement in its earlier stages, it remained predominantly intellectual in nature until 1905. While the influential Young Turk organization known as the \textit{Committee of Union and Progress} (CUP) played an important role in disseminating liberal ideas, in cooperation with other affiliated liberal organizations, the actual impetus came mainly from discontented members of the 3rd Army Corps in Macedonia.
Many young officers garrisoned at Salonika (now Thessaloníki, Greece) organized themselves into the Ottoman Liberty Society in 1906. This secret revolutionary group merged with the CUP in Paris the following year, thereby putting the command of the 3rd Army Corps in the hands of the Young Turk ideologists. The revolution started on July 3, 1908, when Maj. Ahmed Niyazi of the 3rd Corps led a rebellion against the provincial authorities in Resna. As other bands soon followed this example, the rebellion spread rapidly throughout the empire. Unable to rely on government troops, Abdülhamid submitted to pressure, restored the 1876 constitution on July 23, and recalled parliament (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2014).

Although this CUP-led revolution was led by officers, strictly speaking it was not a military coup because the CUP’s intent was to force the Sultan and his government to reinstate the 1876 constitution (Hanioğlu, 2011). In fact, the Ottoman top brass remained loyal to the Hamidian regime until the end and even dispatched some units to Macedonia to crush the rebellion. However, eventually those units either joined the rebels or vowed that they would not fire on their coreligionists. From a CMR perspective, this particular revolution prompted the military’s re-emergence as a major power broker in politics alongside the parliament (Hanioğlu, 2011).

Another episode that altered the officers’ understanding of the military’s role in society before the 1908 revolution was the 1893–1894 restructuring of the Ottoman Royal Military Academy by the renowned German military theorist Colmar von der Goltz. Goltz introduced a new ethic of service and discipline and also promoted an enhanced role for the military in society. His ideas that military commanders ought to be more than loyal servants of the state—in fact that they ought to occupy a superior position in the state—were taught to generations of officers who studied the Turkish translation of his “The Nation in Arms” at the Royal Military Academy from 1886 onward. By 1908, virtually the entire senior officer corps believed that it was its duty to transform the empire into a nation in arms (Hanioğlu, 2011).

In order to understand how the military reinstated itself as a considerable power broker in the post-1908 era, its complex partnership with the CUP needs to be explored first. At the time of the revolution, 70% of the CUP’s roughly 2,500 members were young officers in uniform. Moreover, they represented only a small portion of the total officer corps of approximately 26,000 men. It should be clear that no CUP military member occupied a significant military position. In fact, they were reservists, as opposed to regular units and battalions. This uneven relationship between the military
and the CUP, which was very troublesome during the revolution’s early days, left the CUP with the arduous task of somehow strengthening its grip over the army high command (Hanioğlu, 2011).

Among the CUP’s post-revolutionary steps to expand the military’s autonomy was the establishment of a new Military Council with exclusive powers, including determining who would be promoted. Similarly, new regulations reorganized the general staff council in order to give it more powers and place it beyond parliamentary control. In addition, the CUP leadership took multiple steps to appease the military. On the political level, the revived parliament provided legitimacy to the CUP and enabled it to act on the people’s behalf. For the CUP, the chamber of deputies was an invaluable asset since the committee members occupied a majority of seats and enacted the required legislation, thereby preventing any possible confrontation between the military and the parliament (Hanioğlu, 2011).

The years between 1908 and 1913 were characterized by instability due to the failed April 1909 counter-coup to restore Sultan Abdülhamid II’s autocratic rule as well as multiple elections and governments. This period also witnessed the emergence of multiple conspiracies and secret military organizations to back the conspirators. In January 1913, the CUP took matters into its own hands by forcing the resignation of the Grand Vizier, Mehemed Kamil Pasha, and replacing his cabinet with the “Three Pashas” triumvirate: Interior Minister Mehmed Talat Pasha, War Minister İsmail Enver, and Naval Minister Ahmed Cemal. This triumvirate de facto ruled the empire until the end of the World War I. After the 1913 coup, the boundaries between the military and the CUP became so blurred that determining the dominant partner was not only impossible but also meaningless (Hanioğlu, 2011).

The War of Independence (1919–1923)

Following the Ottoman defeat in World War I, the Allied forces occupied Constantinople (currently Istanbul) in November 1918 and started to lay claims to different regions. Resistance to these territorial demands was immediate.

Starting as the “Honorary Aide-de-campus to His Majesty Sultan,” on April 30, 1919, Mirliva (Major General) Mustafa Kemal Pasha was assigned as the inspector of the 9th Army Troops Inspectorate to reorganize the remaining military units and improve internal security (Mango, 1999). Building on his honorary position and reputation as the “Hero of Anafartalar” after the
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Gallipoli Campaign (April 1915–Jan. 1916), Kemal Pasha initiated contact with other commanders of military corps stationed in Anatolia to launch the Turkish war of independence. The Turkish National Movement held multiple assemblies until the “Sivas Congress” of September 1919, after which it formed the “Representative Committee.” Mustafa Kemal declared that this would be the only legal government as long as the Ottoman government in Constantinople remained under the sway of the entente tripartite.

At his behest, elections were held in April 1920 for a new Grand National Assembly in Ankara. After this event, the Turkish revolutionaries announced the Turkish nation’s new parliament. It soon assumed full governmental power and, at its first meeting, made Mustafa Kemal its first President and Ismet Inönü chief of the General Staff. By May 3, 1920, a Turkish Provisional Government was also formed in Ankara. Due to the advances made by the nationalist militias, the Allies had to engage them in peace talks. In the meantime, the Grand National Assembly was moving toward abolishing the Sultanate system and finally did so on November 1, 1922. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923, officially ended the state of war between Turkey and the Allied forces. Turkey gave up all claims to the remainder of the empire’s territories, and, in return, the Allies recognized Turkish sovereignty within its new borders.

Turkey had effectively been a republic since its establishment of the Grand National Assembly in April 1920. However, the official proclamation was made only on October 29, 1923. The Grand National Assembly soon elected Atatürk as the newborn republic’s first President. In this context, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, then an army officer, led the Turkish national movement in the country’s war of independence. Having established a provisional government in Ankara, he defeated the forces sent by the Allies, led a successful war of independence, and achieved official recognition of the modern Turkish state.

From the Republic’s Establishment to the First Coup (1923–1960)

One can divide this era into three phases: 1923 to 1926, when Atatürk established strict control over the political system by overcoming all challenges to his authority; 1926 to 1945, when the army backed the regime, helped modernize the republic, and launched no interventions; and 1945 to 1960, when Turkey adopted a multi-party system and the Democrat Party claimed power in 1950, an event that culminated in the coup d’état of May 27, 1960.
The First Phase (1923–1926)

During the war of independence, Kemal Atatürk rebuilt the army as an effective fighting force after its defeat and foiled the Allied forces’ attempts to divide Turkey among them. However, he was left with the challenge of dealing with existing rival political currents and their potential threat to the newborn republic (Hale, 2011). It is frequently asserted that one of Atatürk’s main aims was to keep the army out of politics. However, some critics, among them George Harris (1965, p. 56), assert that his main concern was “not to keep it out of politics, but to make sure it remained completely loyal to him and to the Republic.” Under Atatürk, the army achieved a sort of symbiosis with the single-party state, for each reinforced the other.

Atatürk’s political authority was now so unchallengeable that not even his ambitious colleagues could pose a real threat. The disturbing issue with regards to the military’s position in the political system was the political ambitions of some of Atatürk’s comrades-in-arms who had fought with him during the war of independence and believed that they deserved a share of political power. The real danger was that until 1924, a number of senior army officers combined active commands in the armed forces with political careers as members of the Grand National Assembly. This posed a threat to Atatürk’s political position, because if they ever fell out with him, they could revert to their command positions to launch a counter-coup.

Some of the senior commanders who served in parliament after 1923 remained loyal to Atatürk, including Prime Minister Ismet Inonu and Chief of the General Staff Fevzi Çakmak. They were not a threat; the actual threat came from those senior commanders who associated themselves with the opposition. This made them more dangerous, especially in light of their expansive reputations throughout the country.

Atatürk’s government took some steps during 1923–1924 to reduce this danger. After his government signed the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, the army was demobilized and reorganized as nine Army Corps, grouped under three Inspectorates. In October 1923, just before the proclamation of the republic and Atatürk’s election to the presidency, some of these generals were appointed to commanding positions outside Ankara, which removed them at a critical moment. Others were simultaneously forced to resign when their posts were abolished (Hale, 2011).
In addition, Atatürk adopted some legal and constitutional reforms to actively limit any possible challenge. In this regard, Law No. 385 (passed in December 1923) prohibited officers and soldiers from becoming deputies in the parliament unless they resigned from the military. Abolishing the caliphate in March 1924 caused the Chief of General Staff to lose his cabinet seat and eventually made the military directly responsible to the President. Moreover, Article 23 of the republic’s first constitution confirmed Law No. 385, which states that “a person is not permitted to be a Deputy and hold another Government post at the same time.” Under Article 40, supreme command of the army was vested in the Grand National Assembly, “represented by the President of the Republic” (Hale, 2011, p. 193).

Months after the law was passed, those military commanders who were still members of parliament were asked to resign either from the parliament or from the army and did so. This strategy enabled Atatürk to remove any potential opponents from active command posts or from political engagement in the parliament. Most army commanders resigned their parliamentary seats, while a few, mainly those associated with the opposition, preferred to stay in parliament.

By November 1924, those generals who had given up their military positions established the Progressive Republican Party, the first organized opposition to the ruling People’s Party (later the Republican People’s Party). Atatürk strongly opposed this party right from the onset. It was shut down in June 1925 over allegedly unfair accusations of collusion with Kurdish rebels (Zurcher, 1991).

In 1926, a genuine assassination attempt on Atatürk’s life was uncovered, and the consequent investigations and trials represented yet another episode in his campaign against any dissent. The plot was arranged by Ziya Hurist, a former deputy in the first Assembly and a member of the opposition Second Group, which was affiliated with the Union and Progress society. Atatürk used the trials to extinguish any threat from this group by prosecuting those of its surviving members who still posed a threat (Hale, 2011).

During this period, Atatürk’s main concern was to establish an independent united country that could resist colonial politics and differentiate itself from its Arab neighbors by adopting the principles of secularism (Ulucakar, 2014). Modernization was driven from above, led by the military that networked with the bureaucrats, and was supported by the middle classes (Keyman, 2014).
The Second Phase (1927–1945)

The elimination of Atatürk’s rivals by 1926 and the political monopoly of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) meant that the army could not act against the regime. Thus there was a kind of symbiosis between both entities, a situation enhanced by Chief of the General Staff Fevzi Çakmak’s extraordinarily long period of service (1921–1944). His loyalty to Atatürk ensured the army’s subservience to the regime. In addition, the government used the army as an instrument of education, social mobilization, and nation-building (Hale, 2011).

Military service was made obligatory for all young men: 18 months for the infantry and three years for other sections of the service. In this regard, the army played an essential role in modernizing the country through top-down mobilization. Military schools offered free and modern education to talented youth, thereby paving the road for their rise in Turkish society. Henceforth, the military academy bore the slogan of “development, reform, and modernity.” Young officers were introduced to lessons and practical sessions conducted by leading scholars and made field-work visits to the villages to underscore the drive for modernization. In this way, the army came to see itself as both the guardian of the state and of Kemalist nationalism and secularism (Hale, 2011, p. 195).

As had been done in 1924, further legal provisions were adopted to separate the army from politics, such as Article 148 of the Military Penal Code. Enacted in 1930, it made any political activity among military personnel, even if it was just a speech or an article with political objectives, a punishable offence: it provided that any military personnel who “assemble together for political objectives, join political parties, participate in political demonstrations, meetings, or elections, or in any manner whatsoever make oral suggestions with these objectives, or write political articles or make speeches to this effect, shall be imprisoned for up to five years.” As all military personnel were now banned from politics, there could be no alliance between active commanding officers and the political opposition (Hale, 2011, p. 195).

Surprisingly, another piece of legislation served the contrary purpose. Article 35 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Law of 1935 decreed that “the duty of the armed forces is to protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey, as determined in the Constitution.” This wording has frequently been quoted by the leaders of coups or other military interventions to justify their actions. They claim that it requires them to protect and defend
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Kemalist secularism and not just the country. After Atatürk’s death in 1938, the new President, Ismet Inonu, kept Chief of the General Staff Fevzi Çakmak in office. Çakmak was replaced when he reached the normal retirement age in 1944 (Hale, 2011, p. 195).

During World War II, Turkey managed to maintain its neutrality through careful diplomacy. However, threats from both Germany and the USSR pushed the republic to mobilize its army. This does not deny the fact that the army at that time was weak and could not fight a modern war. In fact, this situation was the result of two factors: (1) the tradeoff that had taken place between military spending and economic development needs throughout the 1920s and 1930s and (2) the obsolete concepts of a static defense strategy adhered to by the elderly Chief of General Staff Çakmak.

Following Çakmak’s retirement, President Inonu sought to eliminate the status and independence of the Chief of the General Staff by making Çakmak’s successor responsible to the Minister of Defense. However, as Hale (2011, p. 196) notes, “this idea went into fierce opposition in the military hierarchy, so that he was instead made responsible to the Prime Minister, with appointment by the cabinet, on the Prime Minister’s recommendation.” This represented the civilian government’s first attempt to harness the military establishment in the exercise of its professional functions.

This phase was arguably characterized by civilian control of the armed forces, given Atatürk’s military background. Sarıgil defines this period as having been “characterized by the coexistence of civilian control of the armed forces and guardianship understanding.” He adds, “However, primarily due to concordance between Kemalist leadership and the top brass, the military generally did not act against the preferences of civilian leadership” (Sarıgil, 2014, p. 168).

The Third Phase (1945–1960)

In 1960, the army launched its first coup d’état since the Young Turk era to overthrow a democratically elected government. The roots of this turnabout can be traced back to the immediate post-war years. In 1945–1946, Ismet Inonu had allowed the formation of an opposition party, thereby opening a new era in Turkey’s modern politics. In the eyes of the army, the end of the single-party state broke its symbiotic relationship with the regime and thereby opened the door for the reemergence of political activism within the
middle ranks of the corps. This culminated in the 1960 coup, after which Turkey entered a turbulent period due to the military’s political activism. The Democratic Party (DP), led by Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar, won the 1950 general elections and formed a one-party government. The competition between the DP and the deeply rooted CHP re-ignited politics within the officers’ ranks. One group that strongly supported the end of the single-party regime effectively aligned itself with the DP. Its members had no plans for a coup, but agreed that if the government rigged the 1950 elections against the Democrats they would force a new election to ensure a fair result (Hale, 2011).

Actually, some of these officers, including Colonel Seyfi Kurtbek and General Fahri Belen, resigned from the army and ran in the 1950 elections as DP candidates. The new government appointed Kurtbek as Minister of Public Works and Belen as Minister of Transport. Meanwhile, soon after taking office as DP leader and elected Prime Minister, Menderes purged the army high command by replacing the Chief of the General Staff, three of the four force commanders, and various generals whose loyalty he suspected. When no resistance was offered, he became confident that he had the armed forces under his control (Ahmad, 1977).

Officers who supported the DP and ran in elections under its banner were the main reason for increasing army-party tension. Fahri Belen resigned from the cabinet after serving for only six months, complaining that the Supreme Defense Council, which was supposed to coordinate defense policy between the government and the military, met irregularly and was ineffective. Soon afterward, Seyfi Kurtbek was appointed Minister of Defense in 1952. He planned to reform the army command structure by purging the top-heavy officer corps and instituting a more flexible promotions policy. Menderes supported its implementation, but was forced to abandon it after the army top brass made its strong opposition known. Consequently, Kurtbek resigned from the government in July 1953 (Ahmad, 1977). Thereafter, the DP government and the army went their separate ways.

As Hale highlights, direct planning for the 1960 coup had started by the mid-1950s, a time when groups of young officers were discussing such intervention. In one way, these young planners were driven by a perceived need to reform and modernize the army in the face of an ultra-conservative high command. The government’s failure to do so and Kurtbek’s resignation explain such an inclination. Furthermore, these young officers were frustrated by the
rigid hierarchy and the belief that their own knowledge of modern warfare was superior to that of their commanders, who had not participated in the Marshall Aid Program’s courses designed to teach the young officers through training and the use of modern equipment. In addition, by the late 1950s, they felt widespread discontent with their pitiful salaries in the face of high inflation, as well as with Menderes’ allegedly disdainful attitude toward the army in general (Hale, 2011; Harris 1965b).

Conspiratorial groups started to form during 1955. The first of them, the Society of Atatürkists, was formed by young officers studying at the Istanbul Staff College. From this moment, plans to initiate a coup were set in motion. The Society joined forces with other conspiratorial groups and started recruiting officers all over Turkey. Up until 1959, the conspirators were mainly middle- and junior-ranking officers. Due to their belief that a coup could not succeed without at least one senior general on board, they recruited General Cemal Gürsel, the commander of Land Forces (Hale, 2011).

Although the conspiratorial organization was restructured after recruiting Gürsel and acquired four generals, it was essentially driven by junior- and middle-ranking officers. This created serious rivalries, which became all too evident after they seized power in 1960. In addition, their lack of an agreed-upon post-coup agenda only helped to exacerbate these inter-group conflicts (Hale, 1994; Harris, 1965b). Orhan Erkanli later admitted, “we had brought off a revolution on May 27 [1960] but none of us knew what we were going to do on May 28” (Hale, 2011, p. 198). The National Unity Committee, which had led the intervention, was not the only conspiratorial group within the military; other groups led by junior military officers emerged against the DP government as well toward the end of the 1950s, as illustrated by the alleged “Nine Officers Incident” coup attempt (Hale 1994, pp. 88–100).

The political turmoil during the spring of 1960 accelerated the coup. In April 1960, growing street demonstrations, mainly by university students who supported the opposition, pushed the government to declare martial law on April 29, thereby ironically throwing the ball into the army’s court. After some hesitation, the conspirators took over in a bloodless coup on May 27, 1960 (for a full account of the 1960 Coup, see Weiker (1963)). The military’s increasing political activism resulted in its intervention during May 1960, in which the National Unity Committee, composed largely of young officers, ousted the DP government. The post-coup courts sentenced the Prime Minister and his ministers of finance and foreign affairs to death (Ulucakar, 2014).
Establishing and Consolidating the Tutelary System (1960–1980)

As George S. Harris (2011, p. 203) notes, the Turkish population largely supported the 1960 intervention because it viewed the military as an impartial, nonpartisan, and trustworthy state element dedicated to protecting the citizens. Among the main reasons for the 1960 coup were the tensions engendered by a widespread belief that Menderes’ DP government was about to return to one-party rule by abolishing Atatürk’s party, then led by former President Inonu. In other words, the coup initiators perceived their action as a move to save the state. This belief is ascribed to the DP government’s fierce response to the opposition demonstrations that culminated in the declaration of martial law in April 1960.

The 1960 coup was largely orchestrated and designed by field-grade officers, some of whom had far more radical intentions than protecting the constitution. Like Gamal Abdel Nasser, who brought General Mohamed Naguib to ostensibly lead the 1952 coup, the initiators of this coup recruited one of Turkey’s most senior generals, General Cemal Gürsel, to lead the action and to bless it. This was done because Turkish military culture relies heavily on a strong chain of command. Yet a significant number of key plotters did not accept his leadership, for they wanted to lead it themselves (Burak, 2011).

After the coup, the National Unity Committee (NUC) led by General Cemal Gürsel took power. This committee consisted of 38 officers ranging in rank from captain to general and in age from 27 to 65. Acting as the supreme authority, it initially appointed a cabinet consisting of five officers and 13 civilians to carry out executive functions. General Gürsel, who had fought at Gallipoli under Atatürk, temporarily assumed the positions of President, Prime Minister, and Defense Minister. At the outset, he announced that the committee’s rule would be of an interim nature and that the government would be returned to civilian hands at an early date (Global Security, n.d.).

A split began to develop between the junior- and middle-ranking officers on one side and the more conservative generals on the other. The ensuing plotting by officers of all ranks became so intense that many NUC members were afraid to sleep in the same place for two consecutive nights, worrying that they would be captured by rival plotters. At first, it seemed that the field-grade officers who wished to extend their grasp over power might prevail. Indeed, within a short time, 90% of the generals retired to open the way for promotions from the lower ranks. However, the balance was tipped in the
high-ranking generals’ favor when 14 middle-grade officers were ousted from the leadership group and sent to temporary exile abroad on the grounds that they had promoted dissidence and unrest within the armed forces. It looked like the fears of the ranking generals were about to be realized: the armed forces would descend into unrest. They, therefore, concluded that civilian rule should be restored once a new constitution was written (Harris, 2011).

The constitution of 1961

The generals gradually restored the chain of command and started the process of writing a new constitution. This document, which went into effect in 1961, handled what the ranking generals thought was the main cause of the problem with the Menderes/Bayar regime: the concentration of all administrative and legislative power in a unicameral parliament. Therefore, a new house of parliament, the Senate, was introduced to delay the execution of laws alongside a constitutional court to repeal or invalidate those laws that contravened the constitution. The new constitution also adopted the proportional representation system in order to ensure the representation of Kemalist views, which were congenial to the military leadership, in the parliament. In an attempt to end the lack of communication between the military and the civilian administration, a National Security Council (NSC) was created to give the military a forum in which its leaders could share their views with the civilian authorities (Harris, 2011).

In an attempt to ensure that the coup could not be undone and against the appeals of civilian politicians (e.g., former President Inonu) and its NATO partners, the NUC ordered the death sentence for the ousted Prime Minister Menderes and two of his colleagues; the ousted President’s sentence was commuted due to his age. As Keyman states, this constitution was a paradox for scholars and commentators because it both protected political rights and liberties and established what might be called a “tutelary system.” In other words, the army had gone from playing the modernization role to playing the guardian role (Keyman, 2014). The army established the NSC in the constitution to harness the political and social realms, since the word “security” is very broad and can be extended to cover all aspects of society (Ozpek, 2014).

Coalition government’s era and political instability

The introduction of the 1961 constitution, with its proportional representation electoral system, set the stage for another episode of political instability,
for the absence of a majority party necessitated the formation of coalition governments. On top of that, the constitution and the conduct of the generals in power during the NUC era extended the military’s role in politics for a while. First, the generals successfully fought to secure the nomination of Ismet Inonu, the leader of the military-aligned Republican People’s Party, so that he would head the coalition cabinet due to its plurality of seats in the 1961 parliament. The strong showing of the Justice Party, which was the successor of the banned Democrat Party, in the 1961 general elections (second after the Republican Party, with a few seats), ignited dissatisfaction within the military and more coup plotting. An attempted coup was headed off, and the key plotter, Col. Talat Aydemir, was executed. This ended, at least for the time being, all plotting among field-grade officers and restored respect for the chain of command (Harris, 2011).

In general terms, the constitutional changes introduced by the generals were not limited to diluting the civilian government’s power, for they also sought some way to allow the commanders to maintain an influence in political life. Under the new NSC, all civilian leaders were obliged to consider the views of ranking generals on matters of security, defined in terms that were flexible enough to include threats to domestic order as well as foreign policy issues. In other words, these generals could express their opinions freely. They perceived domestic and foreign dangers as issues of national security that authorized the army to do whatever was necessary to prevent them. In addition, by tacit consent, the office of the Presidency was to be filled by a retired general or an admiral, a tradition that would be preserved for a long time. Moreover, the generals conducted regular and forceful purges of those officers deemed too attached to Islamic practices (Harris, 2011).

The coup by memorandum: March 1971

While the 1961 coup was a “bottom-up” model led by junior- and middle-ranking officers, the 1971 coup by memorandum was a move by several high-ranking officers to prevent a group of radical officers from gaining political power and ending the military’s unity (Karabelias, 1998). Despite the ranking generals’ privileged position in the new political system, their ability to dictate the course of events gradually eroded as the civilians used the power of assignment to bring in new blood, especially after Prime Minister Inonu stepped down in 1965. Their declining influence was reversed by the need to combat the growing domestic disorder being experienced toward the end of the 1960s (Harris, 2011).
These bloody clashes among left-wing and right-wing students caused the army leadership to deliver an ultimatum to the civilian government in March 1971. Faced by Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel’s inaction in ending the widespread leftist violence, not to mention a potential interventionist plot by some military personnel under the influence of such radical leftist intellectuals as Dogan Avcioğlu, the senior generals delivered their ultimatum during March 1971 (Burak, 2011).

This domestic disorder had multiple underlying economic triggers, among them economic stagnation and a sky-rocketing inflation rate that had reached 80% by the late 1960s. Unsurprisingly, such triggers resulted in workers’ demonstrations and right-wing counter-demonstrations and attacks on left-wing demonstrations. The military described its March 1971 intervention as an effort to “restore order.” The memorandum delivered by Chief of the General Staff Memduh Tagmac to Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel accused the government of driving the country into anarchy and demanded the formation of a “strong and credible government ... inspired by Atatürk’s views.” (Aljazeera, 2012)

To avoid the generals’ threat to use “the authority of law to protect the Republic” by assuming direct governing authority, a cabinet of technocrats was formed to deal with the threat of leftist terrorists after the Demirel cabinet’s resignation at the behest of the generals. Parliament cast a vote of confidence in the new cabinet and permitted the army to take harsh measures against internal disorder. This has led some scholars to call this intervention a “coup by memorandum.” Non-party cabinets ruled until the 1973 elections, in which the Republican People’s Party secured a plurality of 33.6%. As Harris notes, these non-party cabinets launched a wave of arrests that included people who had no direct connection with violence. On the political side, and unlike the post-1960 coup phase, Prime Minister Demirel and his party were allowed to retain their parliamentary majority and even to compete freely in the 1973 elections. In response, Demirel did not challenge the string of non-party cabinets that took power until new elections were held (Harris, 2011).

Constitutional changes in 1971 after the coup

After this coup, 35 regular articles of the constitution were amended, and nine temporary articles were added. The goal here was twofold: (1) to strengthen the government’s hand against threats to national unity and national security and (2) to increase the commanders’ autonomy and freedom of action. At that
time, the left was seen as the principal enemy of national security. Therefore, any exploitation of class, sect, religion, race, or language to divide the nation was banned. Freedom of the press was restricted on the grounds that the press might encourage violations of national unity; unions were restricted; and the autonomy of universities was violated. In the same vein, the amendments increased the Minister of Defense’s authority and enhanced the powers of the NSC’s military members. Moreover, civilian administrative courts were no longer allowed to review military personnel actions and shield them from judicial review (Harris, 2011).

These remedies represented the generals’ limited approach for dealing with Turkey’s problems during a time of political instability and communal violence. They chose to fine-tune the system rather than sponsor a radical reform to change the military’s position or to strengthen the civilian government’s hand, as would happen after the 1980 coup. Given the Justice Party’s success in attaining parliamentary majorities throughout the 1960s, the generals obviously resisted any major change to the electoral system. However, they underplayed the threatening effect of proportional representation and thereby increased the likelihood of fragile coalition governments that might resolve the unstable domestic environment (Harris, 2011).

In general terms, the substantial constitutional amendments introduced in 1971 and 1973, respectively, after the military intervention, were designed to strengthen and restore the state’s authority after the widespread terror and violence of the late 1960s and early 1970s had eroded the public order. Unexpectedly, these constitutional amendments proved unable to resolve the increasing polarization, worsening public order, and increasing terrorist activity. All of this was complicated by the worsening economic crisis and governmental instability during the second half of the 1970s. Therefore, by early 1980, the road was already paved for another military intervention (Yazici, 2011).

The context of the military coup of 1980

As Ulucakar states, economic hardship and governmental vanity were the most decisive factors in the 1971 and 1980 coups. The 1980 concordance with the present political leaders was no longer regarded as an essential element (Ulucakar, 2014). Harris (2011) notes that the context separating the partial intervention of 1971 from the full military takeover of 1980 was characterized by a gradual weakening of the top military commanders’ influence and
an increasing disregard for military interests. On the other hand, security threats were multiplying. Rivalries and dissension within the top ranks of the armed forces, particularly between Air Force Commander Muhsin Batur and General Faruk Guler, were so clear that they eroded the military’s prestige among the public. At the same time, the government’s inability to confront political challenges led to an acute security crisis by the end of the decade. In fact, the country’s disorder and terrorism again grew to the point where the democratic process was clearly threatened. It looked like the constitutional remedies enacted in 1971 had clearly failed to bring stability and coherence to the Turkish political arena.

The military itself presented the civilians with an opportunity to undercut its power: rivalries erupted with the end of General Cevdet Sunay’s presidential term in 1973. Feuding among the senior generals along inter-service and partisan lines as the military prepared for the presidential election was exacerbated by the annual round of promotions and reassignments in August 1972. The civilian administration ignored the presidential bid of the politically active General Faruk Guler, then Chief of Staff, and went for Admiral Fahri Koruturk, a far less ambitious and long-retired senior officer with strong links to civilian politicians. This preserved the unwritten practice of allocating the presidency to a military figure who would not threaten civilian control of government. At the same time, the civilians reassigned to ceremonial posts those officers whom they did not trust. In sum, the civilian government’s nomination of Admiral Koruturk did not serve the Chief of the General Staff, but left the mistaken impression that the commanders were willing to return to barracks. As a result, the civilian government concluded that it could confront the military and remain intact despite the latter’s continuing real power.

By the end of the 1970s, Turkey’s domestic political situation was totally devastated: military leaders seemed inclined to tolerate politicians only if they could prove their political will and ability to come up with a plan to retain order and stability. However, since no major political party had enjoyed a majority since the 1969 elections, the two main political parties—the CHP and the Justice Party—started a long-distance maneuver to control the very fragmented cabinet as well as the paralyzed political scene when President Koruturk’s term ended in early 1980. Since then and until September 1980, over 100 attempts to elect his successor failed, and all parliamentary business was frozen (Harris, 2011).

On the other hand, the coalition governments’ continuous failures caused the army to worry about the escalating challenge of Necmettin Erbakan’s
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Religiously oriented National Salvation Party (NSP). The generals perceived Erbakan’s maneuvering as a series of deliberate moves designed to extract concessions that seemed to violate Atatürk’s principles of secularism. For example, they proposed their own plan for education and foreign policy and refused to congratulate the commanders on Turkey’s Victory Day. Some of the NSP’s members even refused to salute the flag and keep quiet while the national anthem was being played. These and many other factors led to mistrust between both sides. While the NSP constantly triggered the army’s anger and distrust, the politicians’ ongoing failure to deter separatist activism and political violence in southeastern Turkey encouraged the generals to find another way to deal with the chaotic political system (Harris, 2011).

Unlike the 1960 coup led by junior- and middle-level officers, the September 1980 military intervention strictly followed the chain of command. Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren became the Chief of State and head of the NSC, and Navy Chief Bulend Ulusuwas was appointed Prime Minister to control executive work and public policy-making. The military banned all political activities, detained political leaders, and established martial law courts. A number of subsequent executions silenced all dissenting politicians and activists. Hoping to pave the way for political stability and prevent parliamentary deadlock, in 1982, the military rewrote the rules of the game through a new constitution and a new parliamentary act to craft a system that would, it believed, ensure effective governance. The Senate was abolished and, in an attempt to reduce the possibility that minor parties would gain representation in parliament, a threshold of 10% of the national vote was imposed (Harris, 2011).

According to the new constitution, the military founded new power zones. In this context, it added precision to the composition of the NSC and provided for a staff. For example, Article 118 specified that “[t]he Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society.” That strengthened the language inserted in 1971, which had stated that the NSC could only “recommend” its views to the Council of Ministers.

Relying heavily on the presidency to grasp power, the new amendments gave the President the authority to represent “the office of the commander in chief,” the right to decide when to use the armed forces, the prerogative to appoint the Chief of the General Staff (at the request of the Council of Ministers) and to convene the NSC, and to proclaim martial law. For the
first seven years, the President was given exceptional authority to guard
the system: his veto of any constitutional amendments could be overturned
only by a vote of three-quarters of the parliament. Before the 1983 elections,
most political parties were banned, and the generals managed to harness the
political environment (Harris, 2011).

The most prominent difference between the 1971 and 1980 coups and that of
1960 appears to be related to the number of internal regulations adopted by
the military between 1960 and 1971, supposedly to distance the officer corps
from politics. In the end, however, these regulations merely served to prevent
coups from taking place outside the chain of command (Ulucakar, 2014).

Enhanced Military Autonomy and Increased
Intervention Capabilities (1980–2002)

Generally speaking and as Narli (2011) notes, many institutional and politico-
cultural processes sustained and enhanced the military’s guardianship role
in the post-1980 coup period until 2002. The guardianship model, which
the military had erected over years by securing the tools of formal political
influence after the 1960 coup, was only enhanced after the 1971 and 1980
coups. After the latter coup, the military was well established as the watchdog
of the country’s republican principles. It built what A. Robin Luckham (1971,
p. 29) defines as a “covert guardianship model” that permitted it to use various
forms of intervention, ranging from controlling and influencing the civilian
political process through formal and informal mechanisms to initiating either
a blatant or an indirect coup.

This period ended in 2002 and opened the way for a new era with different
rules. When the religious-oriented parties, the military’s traditional enemy
and suspect, assumed power in 2002, the military did nothing. This could be
ascribed in part to the unfolding of several events between 1980 and 2002,
which will be presented next. This era is best divided into six distinctive
periods, whereby every period played its part in the military’s decision not to
oppose the Justice and Development Party’s ascent to power after it won the
2002 elections.


The politicians perceived Kenan Evren, who had led the 1980 coup, as a
non-political figure. He was originally appointed Chief of the General Staff
in 1978 to replace the supposedly more partisan General Semih Sancar. In line with the argument that military leaders were inclined to tolerate political disorder if they found some cooperation from the civilian politicians before the 1980 coup, Evren had used his NSC position several times to call upon the civilian politicians to cooperate. After the intervention, although power was nominally shared between the council’s members, he kept power firmly in his own hands. Moreover, his political mastery started to unfold with his frequent radio and television addresses as well as speaking tours. By the end of the military’s time in power, he had become a popular political leader in his own right, a standing that was reinforced by his accession to the presidency with the ratification of the 1982 Constitution (Harris, 2011).

Harris (2011) notes that the general public largely accepted the military intervention as legitimate due to the depth of the ongoing political crisis and the confidence inspired by General Evren’s “fatherly” approach. Even Bulent Ecevit, leader of the Republican People’s Party, acknowledged that the people generally welcomed the end of political violence.

Unlike the aftermath of the 1971 intervention, both right- and left-wing politicians were targeted. The existing political leaders, specifically Ecevit and Demirel, would not allow their followers to participate in drafting the new constitution. Although both of them and other prominent political leaders were banned from politics for years, they soon got around the ban by sponsoring new parties, both directly and indirectly. For instance, Demirel seemed to support a revival of his own old party as the rapidly banned Great Turkey Party, while Ecevit’s wife became the leader of the Democratic Left Party. Thus it was very clear that civilian politics would return to its normal course after the end of military rule (Harris, 2011).

The generals did their best to strengthen their grasp on power and to end the political disorder. In pursuit of those goals, some 30,000 people were reported arrested during the first few weeks after the coup. Figures are uncertain, but a year later, about 25,000 were still being held. After two years, an estimated 10,000 remained in custody, some without ever having been formally charged. The Grand National Assembly was dissolved, and its members were barred from politics for periods of up to 10 years. The state abolished political parties and liquidated their assets, as well as purged the trade unions and banned strikes (Metz, 1995).

During the following junta period, the military enjoyed great power. Civilian political input was minimized because political parties and NGOs
Ahmed Abd Rabou

were banned in 1981. Moreover, these years of military rule weakened future political parties and enhanced the military’s position in the political equation. For example, Provisional Article 4 of the 1982 Constitution barred the political parties’ chairmen and senior office holders from active political participation for 10 years (Narli, 2011, p. 217). In line with this constitutional provision, legal provisions, represented in the 1983 Political Parties Act, introduced certain restrictions on the formation of new political parties. That same year, the Elections Act’s introduction of a 10% national threshold curbed the chances of small parties being represented in the parliament (Narli, 2011).

Strengthening the NSC through the new constitution further enhanced the institutional foundation of the military’s covert guardianship role in politics. Under Article 118 of the 1982 constitution, the NSC’s 10 members were evenly divided between civilians (i.e., President of the Republic, Prime Minister, and Ministers of Defense, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs) and military officers (i.e., Chief of General Staff, commanders of the army, navy, and air force, and General Commander of the Gendarmerie).

These constitutional provisions, alongside the practice in the post-1980 era, rendered the NSC’s decisions as powerful as decrees, as opposed to mere recommendations to the executive branch. Indeed, the executives were forced to implement these recommendations through the NSC General Secretariat’s power to monitor executive decision-making. Narli (2011) asserts that Article 118 and Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Act (enacted in 1961) allowed the NSC to dominate any discussion related to defining internal and external threats as well as national security priorities. These considerations were then translated into a National Security Policy Document without much civilian input. The NSC also had the right to oversee the document’s revision every five years. As result of these constitutional changes, the military now enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from any civilian government, a situation that continued until the turn of the century.

Following the 1980 coup, the members of the European Community (EC), which Turkey aspired to join, froze relations with Ankara. The pan-European parliament, the Council of Europe, cited the military regime’s record of human rights violations as its justification for banning Turkish participation in 1982. Despite that, the Turkish electorate overwhelmingly approved the military-endorsed constitution by 91.4%. The same vote approved Evren as President for a seven-year term. He took office on November 9, 1982 (Metz, 1995).
In 1983, general elections ended the three-year period of military rule. The military’s delivery of authority to the elected cabinet marked its formal separation from the civilian authorities. Nevertheless, both sides forged a partnership based on a fragile concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry. The ensuing complicated interaction played a crucial role in maintaining the military’s autonomy as well as its formal and informal power to intervene whenever it deemed such an action to be necessary (Narli, 2011).

Other contextual factors also played their part, such as the instability of the political parties (they were closed and re-founded several times following each coup), separatist terrorism, and political Islam. The last two factors, which arose during the 1980s and peaked in the mid-1990s, further enhanced the military’s legitimacy by allowing it to fulfill its self-proclaimed role of chief custodian of the republic (Narli, 2011).

2. **Turgut Özal’s administration: challenging the military’s political influence and enhancing the civilians’ position (1983–1991)**

The restoration of parliamentary rule in 1983 could be ascribed in part to external pressures by Turkey’s European allies. In fact, western European governments appealed to the military to restore parliamentary rule and withheld a portion of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) relief package. The European Community also suspended financial assistance and denied Turkish delegates their seats in the Council of Europe assembly (Metz, 1995). Even if these external factors did not play a substantial role, they surely accelerated the restoration of civilian government.

The return to civilian rule called into question the generals’ ability to stabilize the political scene and overcome political deadlock. Indeed, their desire to have only a few political parties in order to limit coalition politics was strengthened. The commanders’ forceful intervention limited the field to just three of the 15 parties requesting certification (Metz, 1995). However, their desire to diminish political partisanship could not be achieved. Indeed, Harris (2011, 211) notes, “from the vigor of the political contest in the wake of the return to civilian politics, new politicians were clearly no more disposed than their predecessors to eschew partisan advantage for the sake of national interest.”
The people also were not very supportive of having this particular goal implemented. Surprisingly, and to the dismay of the President and the generals behind him, Turgut Özal’s newly established Motherland Party (MP), composed of a potentially disruptive mixture of Islamic revivalist and secular liberals, secured a commanding majority in the 1983 general elections. The President made his opposition to this party very clear through his election-eve appeal, in which he asked the people not to vote for it. However, they gave Özal a commanding majority. Despite Evren’s public support for the conservative Nationalist Democratic Party (NDP), led by a former general, the NDP finished in last place (Harris, 2011).

Once in power, Özal utilized the European reservations about dealing with military rule to secure his position against any possible military intervention. He followed the military-endorsed constitution and involved the President in law-and-order issues, especially as regards the southeast, in order to please the military. However, he was also keen to show his independence every now and then. For instance, the Motherland Party’s MPs overrode President Evren’s veto of a bill that would regulate municipal elections. Yet Özal strongly opposed requests from all political quarters to grant amnesty to the many thousands jailed for involvement in violence during the years of military rule (Harris, 2011). This strategy both allowed him to show his independence of the President and the military as well as to go along with them to the extent that he would not lose their trust or end up pushing them to respond.

As mentioned before, banning the previous political parties caused new ones to emerge. Indeed, 15 new parties had been established by August 1983. The NSC disqualified all but three of them on the grounds that they had ties to such banned political leaders as Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit (Metz, 1995). The three parties that qualified were (1) Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party, considered by some to be the successor of Demirel’s Justice Party; (2) the people’s party that represented the continuation of the former Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the only left-wing participant in the elections; and (3) the short-lived Nationalist Democracy Party established by retired General Turgut Sunalp and favored by the military junta.

The Motherland Party won an absolute majority of 212 out of 400 seats in the November 1983 general elections. This was a stunning repudiation of the military government, for the Nationalist Democracy Party secured only 23.3% of the votes cast, that is, only 71 of the assembly’s 400 seats (Metz, 1995). Özal served as Prime Minister from 1984 until 1989, when he was elected
President—the second civilian to hold this position since 1960 (Narli, 2011). However, the restoration of civilian government did not mean the immediate restoration of civilian rule, for even though the NSC had dissolved itself, President Evren could still veto any policies that might displease the military. In addition, most of Turkey remained under martial law, which meant that military officers retained ultimate decision-making authority at the local level.

As Prime Minister, Özal gradually challenged the military’s formal and informal influence and thus strengthened civilian influence in the polity. This led to occasional discordance in government-military relations. In general, he proceeded cautiously to reassert civilian authority but also recognized that easing various military-imposed restrictions was essential to improving Turkey’s international image, especially in Western Europe (Metz, 1995).

According to Narli (2011), Özal took a number of steps to decrease the military’s influence. Very early on, he sought to demonstrate his commitment to democracy by allowing three of the political parties whose participation in the 1983 general elections the military had vetoed to contest the municipal elections that his government had scheduled for March 1984. Each of these parties seemed to be obvious continuations of dissolved pre-coup parties. For example, the True Path Party had been formed by former members of the Justice Party, and Demirel was widely acknowledged to be its de facto leader. Supporters of the old CHP had formed the Social Democratic Party (Sodep) under the leadership of Erdal İnönü, the son of Ismet İnönü. Finally, the Welfare Party (RP) was headed by Necmettin Erbakan, an Islamic activist whose political views had irked the military since the early 1970s. The local elections and the lifting of martial law in several Turkish provinces had a positive effect on some European governments, and in May 1984, the Council of Europe voted to readmit Turkey as an associate European Community member (Metz, 1995).

Following the 1984 municipal elections, the formerly banned political leaders challenged the restrictions placed on their activities by making public speeches and appearing at political meetings. In response to this open defiance and under pressure from both domestic public opinion and international human rights organizations to relax these restrictions, Özal convinced President Evren and the other pro-ban senior military officers to put the issue to a vote. The vote on the provincial Article 4 of the 1982 constitution, which banned leaders of the pre-1980-coup political parties from returning to active politics, was held during September 1987. A large majority approved its repeal.
Both Demirel and Ecevit immediately and publicly assumed leadership of the parties they had controlled from behind the scenes, the True Path Party and the Democratic Left Party, respectively, and began campaigning for the National Assembly elections scheduled for November 1987 (Metz 1995). The two parties, along with the Motherland Party, the Nationalist Labor Party (MÇP), the SHP (a 1985 merger of Sodep and the Populist Party), and the Welfare Party, all competed. However, only three parties exceeded the 10% threshold to qualify for assembly seats. The Motherland Party upheld its dominance in parliament by winning 36% of the national vote and more than 60% of the assembly seats—292 out of 450 (Metz, 1995).

Özal extended the civilian cabinet’s power to the area of internal security, part of an effort to demilitarize formal political decision-making, alternated the military-connected appointees in each ministry with civilian bureaucrats, and built new regional governorships with extraordinary political powers. He also passed laws that permitted the formation of civilian associations, empowered the business community by inaugurating a new liberal economic policy, and sponsored small- and medium-sized economic entrepreneurs in Anatolia. Eager to show that the civilian government controlled the military as well as security-related decision-making, Özal overruled the Military High Command’s recommendation to appoint General Necdet Oztörun as Chief of the General Staff in August 1987. Instead, he appointed his preferred candidate: General Necip Torumtay. Furthermore, he asserted civilian supremacy over two security issues by (1) disagreeing with Chief of General Staff General Torumtay, who opposed his idea to support the U.S. in the First Gulf War, and (2) trying to reach a deal with Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou about ending air force exercises over the Aegean without consulting the military (Narli, 2011, p. 219).

To maintain the civil-military concordance, which would remain predominant throughout most of his administration, Özal allocated more resources for restructuring and modernizing the military. With regards to his relations with society, his policies arguably improved the people’s economic and social life by increasing economic growth and expanding the size of the middle classes. In Schiff’s concordance model, concordance is sustained if the economy is satisfactory to various segments of society and the military (Narli, 2011).

When President Evren’s seven-year term ended, Özal succeeded him due to his party’s majority in the Grand National Assembly, albeit on the third ballot. In accordance with the constitution, Özal cut his political ties to the
Motherland Party. As a consequence of this and of the fierce opposition of his mentor Demirel, leader of the True Path Party, the Motherland Party was weakened politically until it came in second in the October 1991 general elections (115 seats of 450). As a result, the True Path Party (first with 178 seats) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (third with 88 seats) formed a coalition cabinet under Demirel’s leadership. Following Özal’s unexpected death in 1993, the Grand National Assembly elected Demirel President of Turkey (Metz, 1995).

3. The Tansu Çiller Years and the Imposed Concordance, 1993–1997

Under the cabinet of Tansu Çiller, who became Prime Minister in June 1993, the escalation of Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) terrorism created a strong concern about national security. This enhanced the armed forces’ public policy role, for Chief of the General Staff Dogan Gures’s reported sway over Çiller deterred her from excluding the NSC. He reportedly told her “that the proper place to discuss such issues is the National Security Council” (Narli, 2011; Barkey and Fuller, 1998). Moreover, President Demirel’s argument that “concessions could not be made while terrorism was escalating” (Barkey and Fuller, 1999), as well as the public’s rising anxiety, led her to task the military with resolving this issue. Consequently, she made sure that good relations would be maintained with the military (Narli, 2011).

As usual, security concerns were pervasive. Thus the government, the military, and most of the citizens endorsed the military’s guardianship role in terms of protecting the country from Kurdish separatism. However, the Islamic Welfare Party, which obtained 21% of the vote in the 1995 general elections, challenged this government-military coalition. The only way to maintain the existing partnership was for Çiller’s DYP and Mesut Yılmaz’s Motherland Party (ANAP) to form a coalition government, which they hoped would be able to prevent Erbakan’s Welfare Party from forming a government. The resulting DYP-ANAP coalition was unstable from the beginning and collapsed three months later. Both the military and the secular elites were very frustrated, for the Çiller-Yılmaz clash had no ideological grounds and was taking place at a time when threats to Turkey’s economic and political stability were escalating. The business elite and the secular middle classes now began to share the military’s worry about political Islam as a national security threat (Narli, 2011).
Nevertheless, and despite the risk of creating civil-military discordance, Çiller decided to form a new coalition government with the Welfare Party. The Erbakan-Çiller (Refahyol) coalition government failed to survive because the military viewed it as soft on political Islam. In fact, it was the first cabinet headed by an Islamic party.

4. The Islamic factor and the soft coup on February 28, 1997

This government-military tension culminated in what scholars call a “soft coup” on February 28, 1997. The NSC issued 18 measures against the Islamist threat and forced the Refahyol coalition government to sign it. These measures forced its resignation a few months later. The domestic political environment largely welcomed the soft coup, for business circles, labor, and the secular middle classes all agreed on the military’s attempt to protect secularism (Narli, 2011). One account sees this event as a successful attempt by the military’s absolutist members, including such commanders as Çevik Bir, to galvanize like-minded civilian affiliates (e.g., the media, higher education, business chambers, unions, and even politicians) to block the government from exercising power and eventually force its resignation (Aydinli, 2011).

In essence, the military encouraged and coordinated a societal reaction against Erbakan’s Islamist coalition government. This led to society-wide protests. Within this context, and during the NSC’s meeting of February 28, 1997, the military presented the government with a list of measures that it should take. Several measures, if adopted, would have caused the Welfare Party to commit virtual political suicide (e.g., an education reform package that extended compulsory education for an additional three years, which would require the closure of the imam-preacher schools’ middle three grades). Unable to go along with or overcome the concerted pressure applied, Erbakan eventually stepped down (Aydinli, 2011).

The U.S. did not welcome the soft coup, for the U.S. tolerance of the Turkish military’s interventions began to decline with the new realities of the post-Cold War world. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright warned the military against making any extra-constitutional attempts while reaffirming Washington’s strong support for Turkey’s secular system: “We have made very clear that it is essential that Turkey continue in a secular, democratic way” (New York Times, 1997).
To restore concordance and avoid further military intervention, the military and civilians agreed to implement some of the 18 measures. This decision enabled the military to extend its informal political influence via such new channels as frequent public declarations by the top military leadership and seminars conducted by the Western Study Group, which began to educate the public on the threat of Islamic retrogression. At this point, the military seemed to be acting as the guardian of the republic (Narli, 2011).


Erbakan resigned as Prime Minister in the hope that his coalition partner Çiller would succeed him in that post (the coalition still had a majority in the National Assembly) and form a similar government. However, President Demirel appointed Mesut Yılmaz of the Motherland Party, who formed a coalition among the Motherland Party, the Democratic Left Party (DSP), and the Democrat Turkey Party (DTP). This arrangement eventually gained the support of the newly reformed CHP. Although the outgoing Welfare Party-True Path Party coalition still had a majority in the parliament when Demirel asked Yılmaz to form the new government, its status declined drastically due to the coalition government’s resignation and the parliament’s vote of confidence in Yılmaz’s new coalition.

The new coalition was seen as a military-endorsed government, although it had been engineered by Demirel. Faced with the military’s direct and indirect political control mechanism, Yılmaz faced a serious dilemma: how could the February 28 NSC measures be implemented in order to restore the civil-military concordance? At the same time, he also had to deal with the pressures of the religiously oriented middle classes and the members of the opposition who voiced their discontent and demanded the maintenance of democratic standards (Narli, 2011).

All of this engendered a civil-military clash, which became more visible on September 13, 1997, when Yılmaz ordered the military to restrict its anti-Islamist campaign. When he also asked the military to trust the civilian government, because it had taken “the necessary measures to protect secularism,” the military responded with a harsh warning. When the CHP withdrew its sponsorship after some privatization scandals, the cabinet fell in November 1998 and was replaced by a caretaker minority government led by Bülent Ecevit of the Democratic Left Party (DSP). This arrangement lasted until the new elections of April 1999 (Narli, 2011).

The general elections of April 1999 ended the caretaker government and inaugurated a new coalition government, also under the DSP’s leadership. Given that the most successful party only won 136 out of 550 seats, and given that it would take at least three parties to form the new government, Ecevit asked the ANAP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to participate in the government. This government remained in power until the 2002 general elections. Upon reaching an agreement as to which measures should be taken against ethnic separatism, the military-civilian concordance partially improved (Narli, 2011).

However, Yılmaz, now Deputy Prime Minister, sparked another round of discordance by publicly hinting on August 4, 2001, that the threat to national security was often exaggerated (Narli, 2011, p. 222):

> There is no nation where the national security is left to the military. It is the job of civilian politicians to determine the scope of national security. Unfortunately, Turkey is the only country where the view on national security determines the scope of politics.

As expected, the military issued a strongly worded press release on August 7, 2001, stating that these comments targeted the institution and that core national security should be discussed in the appropriate venues, namely, the National Security Council (NSC). This new dispute did not result in any open debate on formulating national security policy.

The Ecevit-led coalition period can be characterized as a time of strong military influence and a visible concordance among civilians and military personnel participating in the military-dominated NSC meetings. While this concordance was largely maintained, the coalition government’s efforts to harmonize the nation’s legislation with that of the European Union (EU) tended to sour civilian-military relations to a certain extent. The newly formulated Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution rendered the NSC’s decisions less influential. While the civilian government had traditionally given priority

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3 Turkish General Staff Press Release (dated August 7, 2001), No. 17.
consideration to the NSC’s decisions, it now had more latitude vis-à-vis those decisions. In other words, the military had fewer legal tools with which to maintain its covert guardianship role (Narli, 2011).

External challenges to this role came not only from the EU, but also from changes in U.S. policy toward the Turkish military’s role in politics. Washington’s tolerance of military intervention during the 1980s evaporated in the 1990s. Since then, this new attitude has been converging with Brussels’ policy of advising Turkey to reduce the military’s political influence. Despite U.S. support for civilian democratic supremacy, the situation before the U.S. occupation of Iraq compelled U.S. officials to turn to the Chief of the General Staff on the assumption that he was the major decision-maker in security affairs. In March 2002, Vice President Cheney wished to hold talks with Prime Minister Ecevit and Chief of General Staff Huseyin Kivrkoğlu; he even demanded a tête-à-tête meeting with the latter. General Kivrkoğlu rejected this demand on the ground that it was inappropriate for a general to meet with a foreign official without the government’s presence. In any event, the government arranged a formal meeting. Cheney met Kivrkoğlu at a dinner on March 20, 2002, attended by Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ugur Ziyal.

This concordance survived until the EU harmonization reforms kicked off in 2001 and deteriorated soon after the Justice and Development Party’s electoral victory the following year. The U.S. once again stated its disapproval of the military’s significant role in politics. In less than a decade, dramatic swings took place in the country’s CMR, and a new mind-set began to flourish among politicians and citizens concerning this relationship. These developments paved the way for progress toward a new liberal democratic model of CMR (Narli, 2011).

The AKP governments: A More Democratic Model of Civil-Military Relations

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) managed to overcome the military’s traditional worry about the Islamic threat (e.g., the 1997 soft coup) by distancing itself from the traditional form of political Islam presented by Erbakan and his colleagues. Instead, it introduced a new form of conservative democracy as the party’s ideology. The party’s standing had been enhanced by the economic development achieved since 2002. Its political position was strengthened further when Recep Tayyip Erdogan assumed the presidency
in August 2014 through popular vote. Nothing like this had ever happened before in the country.

The AKP’s turn toward a more democratic control of the armed forces was largely triggered by external factors. The most important one was the quest for EU membership, since a smoothly functioning democracy is a *sine qua non* for membership, as set forth in Copenhagen Criteria adopted by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. Another factor was the Madrid European Council of 1995 (Güney and Karatekelioglu, 2005, p. 440). Generally speaking, the West has been using NATO and EU conditionality to encourage the democratization of CMR in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). This also applies to Turkey. However, Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952, for NATO membership is not a precondition for the democratic control of a country’s armed forces.

**EU Accession and Civil-Military Relations in Turkey**

Turkey has long sought to become a member of the EU. In fact, it signed an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963, much earlier than did those CEE countries that are now EU members. Its EU membership fits perfectly with the modernization and westernization programs launched by the Ottomans and has become ever more entrenched. As a result, neither the military nor society can oppose it. Indeed, Turkey’s EU candidacy has acted as an important external trigger for democratization in general and for encouraging civilian control of the military in particular.

To join the EU, a potential member state must meet the three Copenhagen criteria: (1) the political criterion of stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; (2) the economic criterion of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and (3) the acceptance of the Community *acquis*, that is, the ability to assume the obligations of membership (e.g., adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union) (Europa Portal, n.d.). Meeting the political criterion is a precondition for starting the relevant negotiations. Turkey’s continued failure to fulfill this criterion was used to deny it the official status of a candidate country until October 3, 2005, when the European Council decided to begin these negotiations, thereby formally conferring candidate-country status. One of the most important conditions here is democratic control of the military. The opening of negotiations means that the council approved of Turkey’s progress toward a more liberal democratic CMR model.
Throughout these negotiations, the European Commission monitors the candidate country’s progress in applying EU legislation and meeting its other commitments, including any benchmark requirements. The negotiations usually move forward along the 35 chapters of the *acquis*, including multiple economic, political, and social conditions (EC, 2014a, 2014b).

The 2001 and 2008 National Programs for the Adoption of the Acquis, respectively the first and the last of this kind of program, issued by Ankara, identified CMR as an area of change to align itself with the principles of a democratic state governed by the rule of law (Ministry of EU Affairs, 2001, 2003, 2008). Furthermore, the EU-Turkey 2007 Accession Partnership, the latest of its kind, identified the twofold need to align civilian control of the military with the practice of EU member states: to ensure that the military does not intervene in political issues and that civilian authorities fully exercise supervisory functions over all security matters. For example, the formulation and implementation of the national security strategy became short-term priorities to be fulfilled under the Democracy and Rule of Law criterion of the negotiations. The Accession Partnership also urges Turkey, among other things, to start working toward greater accountability and transparency in the conduct of security affairs; establish full parliamentary oversight of military and defense policy, as well as over all related expenditures, including by external audit; and limit the military courts’ jurisdiction to the military duties of military personnel (Official Journal of the European Union 51, 2008).

A review of the European Commission’s 2014 progress report shows that Turkey, under the AKP government, has come closer than ever before to achieving the liberal democratic model of CMR adopted by the EU member countries. The report only sheds light on some reforms that still need to be implemented, such as translating the 2010 constitutional amendments with regard to military justice into new legislation. The report also asserts the need to improve parliamentary oversight of the executive and public expenditures, most notably military expenditures. It then discusses various developments in democratizing CMR, including reducing military service from 15 to 12 months, increasing awareness of conscripts’ rights, and civil initiatives undertaken to prevent maltreatment, forced excessive physical activity, and torture (EC, 2014c). The report urges Ankara to amend legal provisions related to the Supreme Military Council’s composition and powers and to make the Chief of the General Staff report to the Minister of Defense instead of the Prime Minister. The report concludes by asserting that “[r]eforms are needed to improve civilian scrutiny of the military, the police, the gendarmerie and the intelligence services” (EC, 2014c).
At last, the consecutive AKP governments have arguably played the EU accession card well in order to pass major constitutional, legal, and institutional amendments that help further democratize Turkey’s CMR in line with European standards.

Constitutional, Legal, and Institutional Amendments by AKP Governments

AKP governments have taken multiple legal and constitutional steps to reduce the military’s political influence and undermine the likelihood of any future intervention. These steps included, among other things, the following:

a. **Redefining the role of the National Security Council (NSC)**

   The 2001 constitutional amendments, which were added before the AKP assumed power, amended the NSC’s role as an advisory body. This advisory nature was confirmed in a new law related to Article 181 of the Constitution, which re-organized the NSC and also increased the number of its civilian members. Furthermore, amendments to the relevant laws removed all NSC representatives from such civilian boards as the Supervision Board of Cinema, Video, and Music.

   The seventh reform (harmonization) package adopted in July 2003 introduced some fundamental changes to the NSC’s duties, functioning, and composition by amending the Law on the NSC (Michaud-Emin, 2007), as follows:

   - The extended executive and supervisory powers of the NSC’s Secretary General that empowered him to follow up, on behalf of the President and the Prime Minister, on the implementation of any NSC recommendation, have been abrogated.
   - Unlimited NSC access to any civilian agency has been abrogated.
   - The post of NSC Secretary General is no longer reserved exclusively for a military figure, and the NSC will now meet every two months instead of once a month (Güney and Karatekelioglu, 2005, p. 456).

b. **Amendments to the Military Judicial system**

   The AKP governments sponsored an amendment to the Establishment and Legal Procedures of Military Courts law to align it with the EU members’ liberal democratic standards.
c. **Enhanced transparency for defense expenditures**

In accordance with the amended Article 160 of the Constitution, itself amended in 2005, all incomes, expenditures, and state properties of the Turkish armed forces are subject to audit by the Court of Audits. A new Law on the Court of Audits was drafted to explain how to fulfill all of the technical regulations related to its implementation. Nonetheless, any audit conducted by the Court is still subject to the restrictions under Article 160, which established the confidentiality of national defense.

d. **2011 Constitutional amendments**

The 2011 constitutional amendments represented the main pillar of Erdogan’s effort to curb the military’s political influence. These amendments, among other things, guaranteed the privacy of personal information, made it harder to close down political parties gave appeal rights to military officers who had lost their jobs due to High Military Council decisions, limited the sphere of military jurisdiction to military offences, reformed the Constitutional Court by empowering the Grand National Assembly to appoint four of the court members, and reduced the number of military court members from two to one. Most importantly, the amendments guaranteed more civilian jurisdiction over the military by designating greater independence for juridical institutions as regards electing members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (Aydinli, 2011).

e. **Amendment of Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Act**

During July 2013, parliament amended the notorious Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Act, a piece of legislation that the generals had often cited to justify overthrowing those governments they believed were undermining the republican principles enshrined in the constitution, such as secularism. The rewritten article now restricts the army’s role to “defending the Turkish nation against external threats and dangers” (The Hindu, 2013).

The Changing Mindset of the Military Leadership from 2002 onward

Metin Herper (2011) notes that the military intervened because it felt responsible for dealing with internal and external threats. However, from 2002 onward, its leaders seem to have come close to thinking that civilians have the right to be wrong. This is in line with Ersel Aydinli’s (2011) idea of
“pacted transition.” Aydinli argues that the current pacts in Turkish CMR have had a positive impact on consolidating Turkish democracy.

According to Aydinli (2011), the February 28 soft coup revealed the heterogeneity within the military and raised questions about its motivations and actions vis-à-vis society and politics. This heterogeneity was made clear through the military’s various non-hierarchical initiatives, especially the excessive visibility of the army’s number-two general, Cevic Bir, in the General Staff office. Such an action revealed the influence of a strong clique of absolutists within the armed forces.

After the soft coup, the military leadership’s dual discourse revealed the difference between the gradualist leadership and the absolutist circles. For example, during May 2003, Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok openly described the military’s relationship with the Islamist-leaning AKP government as harmonious. However, at the same time, he made public declarations about the threat of regressive Islam and assured the public that the armed forces would monitor any such developments with the utmost diligence (Aydinli, 2011).

This dual discourse showed that the gradualist top military leadership favored cooperation with the civilian government, as well as the fact that its members were not in any position to ignore the military’s absolutist circles. In fact, events like the bombing of the offices of Cumhuriyet, the leading secularist newspaper, or the attack on the Council of State in May 2006, not to mention the following investigations, showed just how far the absolutist circles were willing to go to undermine the Islamist-leaning AKP government. Both events were later linked to the Ergenekon case by the judicial claim that the absolutist circles were either behind them or at least tried to use them to convince people about the enormity of the Islamist threat.

Tensions between the AKP Cabinet and the Military

The military and the AKP government seem to have reached a citizenry-backed concordance with regards to imposing civilian control over the military. Yet this concordance has been disrupted several times by military-AKP disagreements and conflicts. The military was sometimes put on the defensive due to the party’s rising popularity (e.g., what happened with the e-memorandum of April 2007). At other times, the military (or at least part of it) adopted an offensive strategy to uproot the AKP government and undermine political Islam in general (e.g., the Ergenekon case and the multiple coup attempts that it uncovered).
a. The Ergenekon Case

The Ergenekon case, which began as a small-scale operation by the Istanbul police department, represents the most important turning point in CMR in modern Turkey due to its impact upon the absolutist members of the military and their civilian affiliates. Its significance lies in its attempts to cleanse not only the military, but also the entire system of absolutist groups. The investigations were triggered by an anonymous phone call that reported the storage of explosives in the Umranıya district. The ongoing investigation detected the presence of 27 hand-made grenades into which the serial number of MKEK, the government-owned armaments factory, had been carved. The press publicized the assumption that these serial numbers were known to be produced by the MKEK and had been used in the bombings of Cumhuriyet’s newspaper offices in May 2006. These arguments, however, implied that the bombings had been a false-flag operation by ultranationalist secularists designed to implicate the Islamist groups.

In parallel, the investigations led to the arrest of many military officers, including retired army Major Muzaffer Tekin, who was believed to be associated with Alparslan Aslan, who in turn had attacked the Council of State in May 2006. He killed a senior judge and injured four others, justifying his attack as a reaction to the council’s ruling that teachers could not wear headscarves in public schools. On June 26, 2006, the police raided the house of retired army Major Fikret Emek, where they found explosives and weapons. These two raids became known as the first and second waves of the Ergenekon operation.

On January 21, 2008, the third Ergenekon wave swept up several more prominent figures, including middle- and high-level retired officers as well as a lawyer, an Aksam columnist, the spokesperson of the Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate, two mafia leaders, another journalist, and a writer. These individuals were linked by their staunchly secularist and nationalist political stances. Shortly thereafter, the fourth wave, launched in February 2008, resulted in the arrests of Emin Gurses and Umit Sayın, both of whom had equally secularist and nationalist views. Later on, such prominent figures as Dogu Perincek (leader of the Workers’ Party), Kemal Alemdaroglu (former rector of Istanbul University), and Ilhan Selcuk (chief columnist of Cumhuriyet) were detained (Aydinli, 2011).

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4 This name given refers to a mythical place located in the Valleys of the Altay Mountains.
These raids reached a whole new level when even higher-ranking figures were detained. Among these people were General Sener Erugur (former Commander of the Gendarmerie), General Hursit Tolon (former Commander of the First Army), Sinan Aygun (Chairman of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce), and columnist Mustafa Balbay (Ankara representative of Cumhuriyet). This was called the sixth wave. Erugur and Tolon were eventually arrested.

On July 14, 2008, roughly after a year and these consecutive waves of detaining and arresting civilian politicians and retired army officers, the Istanbul Prosecutor’s Office prepared and submitted the first indictment to the Thirteenth Branch of the Istanbul Court for Serious Crimes. The 2,455-page document included indictments for the detainees from the first five waves. The indictment formally charged 86 suspects with “membership in an armed terrorist organization … attempting to overthrow the government of the Turkish Republic by use of violence and coercion … inciting people to armed rebellion against the government of the Turkish Republic … encouraging the military to insubordination” and “inciting people to hatred and enmity.” It further stated that the Ergenekon members considered their group an embodiment of the “inner state” and as acting on behalf of the nation and the state (Aydinli, 2011, p. 233).

On January 5, 2012, İlker Başbuğ, chief of the General Staff from August 2008 to August 2010, was arrested and accused of leading a terrorist organization that was plotting to bring down the government. Başbuğ, the highest-ranking officer to face trial in the Ergenekon case so far, described his arrest and his accusations as tragicomic (NBC News, 2012). He utterly denied the main accusations of attempting to overthrow the government by creating several websites and making several press statements. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party, soon described the arrest as a political decision, which was confirmed by the military (Hurriyet, 2012).

The outcome of the Ergenekon case in August 2013 was unprecedented for Turkey: Başbuğ was sentenced to life in prison. On the same day, three serving parliamentarians of the opposition CHP were sentenced to jail terms ranging from 12 to 35 years on the same charges (The Hindu, 2013). During the same month, a further 275 suspected coup-plotters were handed sentences totaling hundreds of years (Hurriyet, 2014).

Recently, the Ergenekon trials backfired on the AKP government when Başbuğ was released 26 months later due to the Istanbul 20th Heavy Penal Court’s
ruling on March 7, 2014. Upon his release, he described the case as a virtual one that does not exist. Başbuğ’s release was the result of a constitutional court ruling that his legal rights had been violated, a ruling that President Gül welcomed on the same day.

Many of Turkey’s Islamists saw this trial as an attempt to uproot the remnants of the Kemalist era, and it, therefore, triggered some protests by supporters of the defendants near the courthouses where the trials were being held. These protests were sometimes met with an oppressive security force response that involved teargas bombs and the like. Critics, including the main opposition party, dismissed the trial as “theatre” aimed at demoralizing the secularists, who have long been the county’s most influential players (The Hindu, 2013).

b. April 27, 2007 E-Memorandum
In the spring of 2007, it was widely expected that the AKP-dominated parliament would soon elect someone with an Islamist past and agenda for the presidency. This increased the tension between the military and the civilian leadership, especially because the President plays a critical role in matters of national security and has the power to elect members to the Constitutional Court (since 1982). The fact that a military figure, or at least someone sympathetic to the military, has always filled this post made the 2007 presidential elections critically important to the armed forces. Massive anti-AKP demonstrations were launched against its presumed stance on the presidential elections. Some of the predominant slogans favored the military, such as “Orduya uzanan eller kırılsın” (Down with the hands that encroach on the army), “Mustafa Kemal’in askerleriyiz” (We are soldiers of Mustafa Kemal), and “Enbuyuk asker bizim asker” (The greatest military is our military) (Aydinli. 2011, pp. 229−230).

On April 24, 2007, the AKP announced its presidential candidate: Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül. His candidacy was considered controversial due to his past involvement with two banned Islamic political parties. In response to the massive demonstrations and the AKP’s failure to secure the necessary quorum of 367 parliamentarians to elect Gül three days later, the armed forces released the following statement later that evening on the General Staff’s official website: “… when needed, the Turkish military will declare its position clearly and precisely….” In essence, this statement revealed the military’s readiness to intervene in the political process if the Islamist challenge was not contained. Aydinli (2011, 230) notes that “while the goal appeared to be to send a reminder of the autonomy of the hard realm and inner state, the
style and indirectness brought back memories of the February 28 process, and led to the whole event later being branded by critics as an e-coup attempt.” Primarily, the controversial e-memorandum provided more evidence of the internal divide raging at the time.

Ultimately, the e-memorandum neither changed the presidential election’s results, nor predicted the subsequent efforts of Buyukanıt—then Chief of General Staff and the memorandum’s presumed author—to cooperate with civilians. According to Aydinli (2011, p. 230), “[t]he e-memorandum appears to have been more intended therefore to satisfy absolutist demands within the military, and thus reflects the dual discourse that was necessary to establish a balance between the struggling absolutist and gradualist agendas.”

This e-memorandum also helped to blemish the military’s image. The government immediately seized the chance, after being victimized by the military through its e-coup attempt, to call for immediate elections, so that the people could voice their opinions of the party’s performance in contrast with the military’s discourse. The fact that the AKP won 46.6% of the vote, a rather remarkable result, indicated that the people no longer approved of the military’s intervention in political life.

A significant part of society viewed the e-memorandum as both exaggerated and improper. This delivered a strong message to the military’s absolutist wing and strengthened the gradualist wing. In addition to that and after the elections, the reactions of Buyukanıt and other commanders to Abdullah Gul’s definitive election as President were cooperative to an extent (Aydinli, 2011).

Now that the absolutist agenda had lost its appeal, the gradualists began to feel more courageous. While the army retained its position on multiple symbolic issues (e.g., wearing the headscarf in a public space), on most major issues, it approved of working with President Gul, whose legitimacy could no longer be questioned. Buyukanıt’s statements revealed little more than his transformation from an absolutist into a gradualist, for his calling this an “era of change” implied the internal partition’s shift toward the gradualist wing.

The subsequent ongoing erosion of the absolutist agenda, when combined with the overwhelming election results of a political elite with the know-how and self-confidence to deal with an internally transforming military, would lead to the most controversial yet important legal case related to attempts to eradicate the absolutist political agenda and its elements from the Turkish political system: Ergenekon.
The 2016 Attempted Coup

On the night of July 15, 2016 the world was taken by the news coming from Turkey with a military statement that was released from a state broadcaster announcing seizing power to protect democracy from President Erdogan where the bridges over Istanbul’s Biosphere straits occupied and blocked by military troops and military jets were flying over Turkey’s tow main cities—Ankara and Istanbul—with gunshots heard and reports about the occupation of the Turkish parliament were flying (BBC, 2016).

After a short TV interview where President Erdogan asked the Turkish people to deploy in the streets to reject the coup, people soon were seen in the street reacting against the coup with all main opposition political parties condemning the military intervention in politics. In less than 12 hours, it was obvious that the military faction who carried out the coup were lacking support, that is when military officers starting to surrender to police officers and the President and his Prime Minister announced the failure of the coup warning the public of possible other trials asking them to remain in the streets (BBC, 2016).

In this context, President Erdogan has taken severe countermeasures not only against the faction that had plotted the coup but also against many others including bureaucrats, teachers, scholars, and journalists accusing them of connecting with Gulen movement. Additionally, he pledged to overhaul the army with a decision to shut down military academies and bringing back the capital punishment that was outlawed in 2004. Despite the sever criticism to his undemocratic procedures from the EU and other human right organizations, Erdogan seems to be determined in his counter actions to keep the military at bay while trying to shut all possible rivals— including civilians— out of politics It seems too early now to determine the success of Erdogan in reshuffling the army, but he is either pushing Turkey to a vicious circles of military coups or achieving undemocratic civilian control; this last scenario means Turkey will be a model of CMR similar to the Russian or the Chinese models where the president or the ruling party control the army in an undemocratic equation of power (Abd Rabou, 2016).

Economic Activities of the Military

In the Turkish context, the military is a capitalist collective actor because its officers can become industrialists, merchants, financial investors, and
landlords. While such a military economy exists in other nations as well, the Turkish one is the earliest and most advanced.

1. The Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK)

Under Law No. 205, the National Unity Committee founded the military holding company OYAK on January 3, 1961, shortly after the 1960 military coup. Its proclaimed mission was to represent members of the military, the bureaucracy, the intelligentsia, and the bourgeoisie from those social sectors that championed the coup. Its core mission was to ensure that retired officers would “no longer be worried about their future and could enjoy financial and spiritual peace.” These words of the Junta leadership reveal how military officers in Turkey see themselves as a “privileged community.”

As of 2010, this massive holding company comprised 60 companies, 29 of which were wholly owned enterprises. OYAK’s investments and profits are never used for military spending and projects; rather, they are invested in industrial production and the financial and services sectors. In general terms, its main investments can be found in the automotive, cement, and iron-steel industries as well as distributed across the finance, energy, mining, agricultural chemicals, food, construction, transportation-logistics, domestic-foreign trade, private security, technology-IT, and tourism sectors.

The projects that it runs are among the country’s largest and most profitable ones. Since its establishment, OYAK has achieved varying degrees of business partnerships with major domestic and foreign corporations as well as publicly owned enterprises. According to Akca (2010), OYAK’s current business partners include Renault, STEAG-AG, Nuh Holding, Eti Holding, Halkbank, and SSK. Over the past 50 years, it has also partnered with such global giants as Axa, Goodyear, Elf, and others; such large domestic concerns as Sabancı, Koç and Yasar Holdings, Gama, Yapı Kredi Bankası, Garanti Bankası, Kutlutaş Holding, Alarko, and Cerrahogulları; and such publicly owned enterprises as Ziraat Bankası, Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), and Petkim.

As it played an essential role in transforming the officers into an isolated class, OYAK is largely responsible for causing them to adopt upper middle class lifestyles. In this context, this holding company has functioned as a socio-economic channel to rebuild the military hierarchy, discipline, and integrity, all of which were damaged during the 1960s and 1970s. However, OYAK has also contributed to a new division between low-ranking and high-ranking officers, one in which the latter reap most of benefits due to their presence in its higher administrative division (Akca, 2010).
Moreover, OYAK has dragged the armed forces into deep socio-economic power relationships due to its participation in and engagement with them as a direct counterpart in these power relations. If its military interventions damaged its claims of political neutrality, playing an economic role submerged into socio-economic relationships has destroyed its claim of economic neutrality. OYAK’s presence means that the military is seen as part and parcel of various divisions among corporate groups in the market. In short, the army’s praetorian practices discredit its claims to be “non-partisan and non-aligned in terms of class and politics.” Practices that drag it further into socio-political and socio-economic power relationships also have a negative effect on the military’s operations and structures.

2. Military Spending

The military’s most important economic arm is spending. Experts estimate that the world spends almost $1.7 trillion per year on arms, which equals 2.4% of the global gross domestic product (SIPRI, 2014). In Turkey, military spending has always boomed regardless of its economic situation. In theory, the Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) budget, which is a part of the national budget, is open to legal audit. However, in practice, neither legislative nor executive bodies can oversee military spending (Akca, 2010).

Even though the National Defense Commission (NDC), a permanent commission within the Turkish Parliament, is authorized to audit the military budget, it is not authorized to determine the defense budget, arms procurement, and other spending. Its only mandate is to screen the draft laws submitted by the President to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). The MoD does not consult the NDC when drafting the annual defense budget.

When Neşe Düzel interviewed former Minister of Defense Zeki Yavuztürk in 2005 about the defense budget, his reply was very telling:

As a Minister of Defense, you are authorized to act as a signatory, but you do not know where the funds will go. When you ask to know why the amount is that high, you are given an official response. In order to be able to comprehend what the official response means, you will need civilian personnel that will be able to work together with military personnel. Yet, the minister does not have a cadre of civilian personnel that can provide this type of service. All MoD experts are soldiers. Now, the institution in charge of security provision tells us ‘This is what I need.’ I cannot step up as a
minister alone and say, ‘Why is what you’re asking for so pricey?’ I don’t know. How can I make a claim for which I do not possess the necessary background knowledge? [At the TGNA,] we defend the figures. After a while, you begin to trust [the military]. Besides, this is a security matter and perhaps one does not need to know a great deal more than one should (interview excerpts from Düzel, 2005).

3. Military Industry

The Turkish army runs various industrial projects worth billions of dollars in order to become self-sufficient in terms of its defense needs and those of the expanding military-industrial sector. According to statistics, in 2003, this rate of self-sufficiency was 25%; it rose to 36.7% in 2006, to 41.6% in 2007, and to 44.2% in 2008. The target set for 2010 was 50%. In 2004, the sector’s total revenue was $1.3 billion; this figure almost doubled to $2.3 billion in 2008 (Akca, 2010).

The main partners of military procurement are the country’s large corporations, such as Mercedes-Benz, MAN, STFA-Savronik, Alarko Holding, Otokar (Koç Holding), KOÇ Bilgi ve Savunma Teknolojileri, BMC (Çukurova Holding), TEMSA (Sabancı Holding), FNSS (Nurol Holding), Nurol Teknoloji, VESTEL Savunma, OYTEK (OYAK Teknoloji), Kale Holding, NETAŞ, Siemens, and Yakupoğlu Deri Ticaret. This trend led business interest groups such as TOBB and TÜSİAD to found “Defense Industry Working Groups” within their organizations. According to 2008 estimates, the analysis of the distribution of revenues in Turkey’s defense industry shows that 36% is generated by private companies, 33% by TAF affiliates, and 31% by public sector companies. This distribution shows that the military industry is a substantial market for capitalist businesses in Turkey and their partners, as well as any market in which the military wants to exercise control over the production processes via TAF (Akca, 2010).

Conclusion

At this stage, seven broad conclusions can be drawn concerning the history of the Turkish army in relation to politics:

First, for many decades, the army was underdeveloped and totally detached from politics and national affairs. It entered the political sphere only when some young and middle-ranking officers joined the Young Turk revolution and began to change the army’s view of politics. However, one should
distinguish between the political role played by the army before and after the 1960s. Before the 1961 coup, one notices that the army was more concerned with national issues (i.e., liberating the country, amending the constitution, and building a modern country). In this regard, we should also note that Atatürk himself was a military officer who played a great role in liberating and establishing the new country. Once he did so, he was intent upon keeping the military out of politics. Even though Harris believes that Atatürk was not keen to exclude military officers from politics as long as they remained loyal to him, one should consider that he did this in order to build the new modern Turkey and keep the army focused on national security and defense strategies. Article 23 of the republic’s first constitution should not be downplayed, for it stipulated that any officer who wanted to enter politics had to retire from the military. This article paved the way for the civilian control that would come decades later.

Second, the army started to become heavily involved in politics only after the 1960 coup and throughout the 1990s. The ensuing rivalry between officers belonging to the newly established Democrat Party and the dominant Republican People’s Party played crucial roles in this contest, and politics and their economic interests became the main motives for the subsequent coups. In this regard, the army was the main official and unofficial political actor. Military officers changed constitutions, banned political parties, forced elected politicians out of power, and reshaped the rules of the political game.

Third, while engaging in politics, the army was trying to act constitutionally, even in theory. Each military intervention, starting with the 1908 Young Turk revolution and continuing with the 1960 coup and the 1971 memorandum, was connected to the constitution. The 1908 revolution restored the abolished constitution; the 1960 coup established a new constitution to remedy the problems with the pre-coup regime; and the 1971 memorandum instigated several constitutional changes the generals insisted upon. After each military intervention, the military’s political influence was enhanced through multiple legal and constitutional provisions (e.g., the 1961 and 1982 constitutions). After each intervention, the constitution was amended to favor both the army’s political and economic presence as well as its independence.

Fourth, the civilian government’s power of assignment played a large part in maintaining its long-term control over the military. However, it was always countered by the rising political turmoil or domestic disorder that usually triggered military intervention. Civilian governments learned to
accommodate the military’s perceptions after the 1960 coup, especially when
violence escalated, as was made clear by the Demirel government’s immediate
resignation after the 1971 memorandum. This memorandum also revealed
that the military high command did not want to repeat the bitter experience
of direct rule so long as the civilian leadership would help maintain domestic
order. Moreover, the military interventions of 1960, 1971, and 1980 were
followed by oppressive security measures directed against the opposition.
Civilian governments since 1960 did not try to change the established
tradition. Rather, they sought to preserve the presidency for a military figure
and thus avoid provoking the military. After the 1960 and 1980 coups, the
banned political parties were soon superseded by “new” political parties
sponsored by the old political leaders. At this point, we should note that when
civilians are unable to deal with both security and economic threats, they are
easy targets for military interventions regardless of the army’s loyalty to them.

Fifth, the role of public opinion should be mentioned in this context. Public
opinion is widely believed to have supported the military interventions
of the 1960s and 1970s in the hope of gaining more security and a better
economic situation, but after the 1980 coup, the public began opposing these
interventions once they understood the potentially negative results of such
actions. In an attempt to defend their public space and political environment,
the public voted in 1987 to repeal the ban imposed by military leaders on
certain political parties. After that event, serious political changes were made
to decrease the army’s political role until the 1997 soft coup. This change
in public opinion, among other factors, was crucial in redirecting the CMR
toward more civilian control.

Sixth, external factors played a paramount role in subordinating the military to
the civilian government, since the military had tasked itself with modernizing
Turkey so that one day it might join the EU. This political conditionality, in
terms of respecting democracy and human rights, was clearly a great incentive
for it to stay out of politics or at least to return the governing authority to
a civilian government after each intervention. This was made clear by the
Council of Europe’s punitive measures: freezing Turkey’s participation in the
European Community due to its worsening record of human rights during
1982 under the military regime. In 1984, this ban was lifted after civilian
rule was restored, and martial law was lifted in many provinces. In the same
vein, as elaborated above, the Copenhagen criteria encouraged the civilian
governments to do more in order to assert their control over the military.
Seventh, we cannot leave this part without mentioning the Islamic factor and its role in civilian control. The Islamic threat always worried the military, as the 1997 soft coup proved, but the AKP managed to overcome this worry by distancing itself from the traditional form of political Islam presented by Erbakan and his colleagues. In fact, the party introduced a new form of conservative democracy as its ideology. The AKP’s standing has been further enhanced by the economic development achieved by its governments since 2002. With Erdogan elected to the prime ministership, the AKP has enjoyed great popularity, and the civil-military equation has been fundamentally changed.

Eighth, the economic influence of the Turkish military must also be considered. Running an extensive empire of economic activities with limited civilian oversight allows the Turkish army to enjoy considerable organizational independence. Whether this economic independence is regarded as an incentive awarded to the army by Turkish politicians to keep them away from politics, or simply a prerogative it inherited over the course of its history, it remains a signal that the current Turkish civilian control may always be at risk.
Introduction

Since the creation of modern Egypt by Mohamed Ali Pasha (r. 1805–48) in the early nineteenth century, the army has shaped the country’s major socio-political developments. Initially conceived as the pillar of the regime, it has shaped Egypt’s perceptions and visions of its role at both regional and international levels (Chartouni-Dubarry, 2001).

After several failed attempts, around 1821, Mohamed Ali began establishing his new army through a general conscription policy after getting rid of other rebellious military cliques, including his Albanian colleagues and the remaining Mamluk forces. This new army was used to extend Cairo’s control over the rest of Egypt, including the desert and Upper Egypt. He also used it to expand his control outside the country’s traditional boundaries into Sudan and Arabia. It was this military might that enabled him to oppose the Ottoman army in 1831 and finally secure hereditary rule for his progeny over Egypt.

Through the ethnic division of labor within the army as well as the bureaucracy, between Arabic-speaking Egyptians in the lower ranks and the Turkish-speaking military-bureaucratic elite, Mohamed Ali and his descendants effectively controlled the army and the whole population. This division caused resentment among the frustrated Arab-speaking officers toward the Turco-Circassian oligarchy that controlled the army. Multiplied by differences in pay and other financial benefits, as well as the parallel political discrepancies that privileged the same Turkish-speaking elite, this discontent culminated in the ‘Urabi Revolution of 1881–1882, the first military intervention in politics in nearly 60 years after the modern army’s inauguration.
This uprising was quickly quelled by the British military invasion in late 1882, which broke the newly established coalition between the constitutionalists and the army. The British initially reduced the army’s role and, after establishing a uniformed police force under British supervision, cancelled the army’s traditional police functions. Thus, the Egyptian army had no access to the political realm.

Nearly 70 years after the ‘Urabi Uprising and after a prolonged constitutional and independence struggle triggered by multiple social, economic, and political causes, the Free Officers, a secret group within the army, staged a bloodless coup and took power into its own hands. This opened the way for the rise of the “Officers’ Republic,” for the officers’ networks penetrated all levels of the government bureaucracy and, later on, the economy. The 1952 revolution, as the episode came to be called, resulted in the formal militarization of Egyptian politics for the next two generations. Each of the four Presidents who served during these years came from the military, and numerous military men occupied core diplomatic and managerial positions. This militarization lasted throughout Nasser’s era (1956–1970), but started to diminish under both Sadat (1970–1981) and Mubarak (1981–2011).

From 1952 until 2011, the army posed no major threat to the political elite. Initially, the line between them was so blurred that it was neither practical nor possible to tell who controlled the army or the civil administration. Although Nasser restored the army’s role in maintaining public order, the police forces soon took over this role once more. The rising power of militant Islamist groups towards the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s restored the Interior Ministry’s traditional role of maintaining internal security and, consequently, relegated the military to the background, at least ostensibly. The pervasiveness of the Officers’ Republic under Mubarak was unprecedented, for retired military officers were holding positions in the national and local governments, the bureaucracy, and the economy at all levels—even the highest. This underscored the role that the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) played in regime maintenance.

In 2011, and at the behest of President Hosni Mubarak, who was forced to leave office by massive popular demonstrations between January 25 and February 11, 2011, the army again took power into its own hands. Thus the military man delivered the authority to his military leaders in the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), who ruled the country for the next 18 turbulent months before passing it on to Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate
in the 2012 elections who became the country’s first-ever elected civilian President.

Surprisingly, after exactly one year, massive popular demonstrations demanded his ouster and called upon Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, then defense minister, to depose him. Within 72 hours, specifically during the evening of July 3, 2013, el-Sisi, surrounded by representatives of different political forces and religious institutions, deposed President Morsi, suspended the constitution, and made several other proclamations.

Amid alleged public calls to run for the presidency, el-Sisi resigned his position as defense minister in the public speech in which he declared his intention to run for the presidency. Now that he is the President, the army is once more the focal point of the Egyptian political system, and generals are being appointed to high-level managerial and administrative posts ranging from governorates to national development agencies.

The Military and the Founding of Modern Egypt

When Mohamed Ali Pasha was selected vali (mayor) of Egypt by Ottoman Sultan Selim III, he already knew that Istanbul did not approve of this decision. In fact, he was appointed due to the sultan’s inability, as well as of that of his army, to overrule the will of religious and merchant groups. In addition, a state of disorder followed the exodus of the French troops who were part of Napoleon’s attempt to conquer the wealthy country. Although the Sultan and his successors never tried to overthrow Mohamed Ali, they did offer other tempting positions with higher monetary rewards and forcibly involved him in regional conflicts that drained his own resources and those of his army. The Egyptian army never had enough power to oppose any potential Ottoman aggression, for it was composed of the few soldiers who had fought alongside Mohamed Ali in Cairo against the French troops and the remnants of the Mamluk forces who had been Egypt’s actual rulers back then (Fahmy, 2001).

While in power, Mohamed Ali sought to eliminate all obstacles to realizing his vision of forming a well-established and trained army. For example, in 1811, he dispatched multiple army delegations of his unwanted and rebellious Albanians to fight the Wahhabis in Mecca and Medina; many of them were killed. Moreover, he committed the widely known Carnage of the Mamluks in the Citadel, in which hundreds of their leaders were killed, and thus
undermined them as potential rivals and barriers to his army-related goals. In addition, he gathered the remaining Albanian troops and trained them excessively at the Citadel so that they would become part of his entrusted army. However, when they began plotting against him, he sent them to their deaths in the war against Wahhabis in the Arabian Peninsula. By then, Mohamed Ali Pasha had already thought of an alternative source of human capital: the launching of two campaigns in 1820 to seize as many Sudanese as he could. Some 20,000 were captured and then scrutinized to determine their suitability for military purposes, only 3,000 of whom survived the ensuing mismanagement and improper transportation. In other words, his alternative failed (Fahmy, 2014; Dodwell, 1931).

The only remaining source he could think of was the farmers. In 1822, he asked the governors of the Sa`idi provinces to send him physically adequate men for the army. These men were supervised by the Mamluks (personal slaves) of Mohamed Ali and his family, who were loyal to him, and were trained by French officers hired specifically for that purpose. The most famous of these French officers was Colonel Seve, who converted to Islam and was renamed Soliman Pasha (Fahmy, 2001).

This first attempt to form an army to protect the regime gradually grew into a mass conscription policy like that of revolutionary France. Impressively, this new policy caused the army’s numbers to reach 30,000 and enabled it to expand its influence not only over Upper Egypt, but also over the desert lands that had long escaped Cairo’s control. In the meantime, and along with training the peasant conscripts, Turkish-speaking Mamluks owned by Mohamed Ali and his family were being trained to form the nucleus of the Pasha’s officer corps (El Rafe’y, 1989, p. 327). Military schools, the first two of which were established in Upper Egypt, sought to transform the Mamluks into officers who could lead battalions of conscripts. Later on, this army managed to defeat the Wahhabi-Saudi coalition that threatened the Egyptian presence in Arabia. In addition, it settled the situation in Sudan after the failures committed by the previous army. An estimated 18,000 of them helped the Sultan defeat the Greek war of independence and succeeded in capturing the Peloponnese, which made the Europeans feel threatened (Fahmy, 2014).

Yet Mohamed Ali’s most successful campaign was the one he initiated in Syria, for it resulted in a decade-long occupation of all Syrian provinces toward the end of 1831. During this campaign of conquest, the troops led by Ibrahim Pasha, Mohamed Ali’s son, inflicted such tremendous defeats on the Ottoman
troops that Istanbul finally realized that it faced a serious threat. When Ibrahim Pasha’s conquests approached Istanbul itself, European powers and Russia agreed to rescue the empire by convincing both sides to sign a seven-year peace treaty in December 1832. In 1839, however, the fight resumed, and Ibrahim Pasha emerged victorious. Surprisingly, Mohamed Ali agreed to the European condition that he withdraw from all occupied land, except for Egypt and Sudan, in exchange for Europe’s audit of an Ottoman decree that would promise both his and his descendants’ continued rule over Egypt and Sudan. Thus, he finally achieved his long-life dream (Fahmy, 2001, 2014).

Due to his innate cleverness and Ottoman weakness, Mohamed Ali was able to transform Egypt’s legal status from that of an Ottoman province into an independent kingdom with a veneer of Ottoman governance. This accomplishment was also the result of his son Ibrahim’s leadership skills, as well as his careful logistical and administrative preparations before each military campaign and the sacrifices of the Egyptian soldiers. This development also helped transform the country’s economic, political, and social life (Fahmy, 2001).

Since supplying a 130,000-man army required a continuous stream of money, medicine, and clothing, the economic system had to be completely renovated. One part of this undertaking was the introduction and monopolization of long-staple cotton, a new lucrative crop that allowed Mohamed Ali to sustain his army and let it prosper. In this way, the Egyptian economy became an element of Europe’s industrializing markets, for it fulfilled the dual role of serving as a supplier of raw materials and a market for manufactured products. Its peasants now had to struggle with a global economy that was rapidly expanding.

To sum up, Mohamed Ali’s establishment of a modern conscript army led not only to a river of blood, but also indirectly to the suffering of the majority of Egyptians who served in one way or another in what was practically a war economy. Yet these were only temporal consequences. Other effects included strained relations between the population and Mohamed Ali, expanding the state’s manipulation and control over the people, and transforming the elite’s racial composition—all of which had a crucial effect on Egyptian economic and political life from the nineteenth century onward (Fahmy, 2001).

a. Difficulties in the conscription system

During the 1820s and 1830s, the conscription policy reached its peak and began disrupting the Egyptian countryside. However, this growing
anti-Mohamed Ali feeling was only one element of the gathering discontent. Others were the cruelty of the army’s conditions and the random conscription (it was not based on any reliable census). Some of those who tried to escape their fate resorted to self-mutilation (e.g., amputating their index fingers, blinding themselves, and pulling out their front teeth) to be declared unfit for military service. If these and other measures failed, they just deserted. So many men deserted that the average ratio was two serving soldiers for every soldier on the run. Obviously, there was a high degree of mistrust between the Egyptian civilians and Mohamed Ali, which was carried over to his successors (Fahmy, 2014).

b. The army’s role in maintaining internal security
Long before the nineteenth century, Egypt’s *de facto* military rulers, the Mamluks, used to raid multiple villages to assert Cairo’s authority and influence. Mohamed Ali’s finely trained and well-disciplined army, however, was able to extend its grasp to permanently reach the entire population during the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s. In addition, he sought to display his trust in his troops by allowing them to repress uprisings in their own villages, where, unsurprisingly, the cruelty of the conscription policy led to many uprisings (Fahmy, 2001).

c. Ethnic Differentiation within the Pasha’s army
Being non-Egyptian himself, Mohamed Ali initially had no intention of allowing native Egyptians to be anything more than conscripts. His own Mamluks would be the leading officers, while the Turkish officers would hold lower ranks. He based this pattern on that of the British colonials in India, who placed Indians at the very bottom of the British-led military hierarchy. As such, Turks were automatically entitled to higher positions, whereas Egyptians barely qualified to reach the rank of captain. Indeed, this ethnic differentiation permeated the bureaucratic structure as well, wherein a new generation of Turkish origin gradually obtained leverage over both the military and bureaucratic structures and thereby ensured its domination of the country’s political life for a very long time (Fahmy, 2001).

The Egyptian Army under Mohamed Ali’s Dynasty
In 1841, based on the European-brokered peace treaty between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, Mohamed Ali was forced to limit his borders to Egypt and Sudan, give up the lands he had acquired forcibly, and reduce his army to a maximum of 18,000 troops during peace time. All of these measures
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were designed to ensure that his dynastic dreams were restrained. However, during the 1853–56 Crimean War (in which Russia fought an alliance of Great Britain, France, Sardinia, and the Ottoman Empire), the Sultan prevailed upon Mohamed Ali’s successor Abbas Pasha to supply him with army and naval troops. To fulfil this demand, the former conscription policy was reactivated. As a result, around 26,000 Egyptian soldiers fought in Crimea, nearly 7,000 naval soldiers served on board 12 ships, and 19,000 army soldiers were dispatched (Tusun, 1996, p. 47). During Ismail Pasha’s reign, Egypt twice supplied the Sultan with soldiers: during the Cretan revolution of 1864, when 21,000 troops were sent to quell a revolution, and during the Serbian revolution of 1876, when 12,000 troops were sent to assist the Sultan. On top of that, Egyptian troops were permanently garrisoned in Sudan, which by now had become an Egyptian colony (Bayyumi, 1993).

The role played by Mohamed Ali’s army in securing more independence, as well as Ismail Pasha’s military assistance to the Sultan during the Cretan revolt and his generosity with the Sultan, helped Egypt secure a larger degree of autonomy. In fact, Ismail Pasha was acknowledged as the Khedive of Egypt, a unique title that placed him above all other Governors General (valis), in June 1867. An official Ottoman decree (firman) issued in May 1866 changed the order of succession to the benefit of Ismail’s direct male heirs in exchange for increasing Egypt’s annual tribute from 400,000 to 750,000 pounds sterling (Raafat, 1995).

Similar to the wars during Mohamed Ali’s reign, the wars during his successors’ terms were of no significance to the peasants, for they found little sense in engaging in such imperialist wars nor in being repeatedly used to quell multiple internal uprisings among the peasants and the nomads throughout the nineteenth century (Fahmy, 2001).

From the time of Mohamed Ali up until the British conquest in 1882, a key factor of the army’s policies was its ethnic structure: Egyptians served mainly as soldiers and lower-ranking regular and non-commissioned officers, whereas Albanians/Turks/Circassians served as superior officers. This reality led to serious instability and tense feelings throughout the entire military hierarchy. However, when Sa’id Pasha (son of Mohamed Ali and the fourth vali [r. 1854–1863]) came to power, he granted the formerly exempted sons of village mayors the right to be recruited and allowed them to move up the hierarchy; indeed, some managed to become colonels (Scolch, 1981). This pattern, however, was not continued under his successor Khedive
Ismail (1863–1879), who relied mainly on Albanians/Turks/Circassians as his grandfather Mohamed Ali had. He also recruited 54 American officers with Civil War experience to train Egyptian officers at a specialized college for staff work (Hamrush, 1983). The graduates were then placed on duty under American supervision. Charles Stone, a prime American officer, was appointed Chief of Staff during Khedive Ismail’s reign as well (Fahmy, 2001).

The ‘Urabi Uprising’: a way Station to the 1882 British Invasion

One illustrative example of how a typical peasant viewed the army was provided by Ahmed ‘Urabi, who was recruited during Sa’id Pasha’s expansion policy after completing an Azhari education in 1841. He was never promoted past colonel under Khedive Ismail, despite his nineteen-plus years of service. He directed most of his dissatisfaction and frustration toward the Turco-Circassians (not the Americans), for not only were they favored in the hierarchy and promotion, but also in terms of financial privileges. This endless loop of ever-growing hostility between the two groups was also the result of various policies that privileged the latter and guaranteed them complete domination of the elite bracket. In addition, the ongoing financial crisis eventually led to European (especially British and French) intervention and subsequent pressure upon the Sultan to replace Khedive Ismail with his eldest son Khedive Tawfiq in June 1879 (Fahmy, 2001).

It was only to be expected that such an environment and unjust conditions would engender a revolution, and that is exactly what happened in 1881–1882 when ‘Urabi and his limited movement decided to act. Initially, the participants demanded specific reforms in the military sector, such as paying higher wages to Egyptians, allowing them to occupy higher positions, increasing the size of the army, and appointing an Egyptian to head the War Ministry (Fahmy, 2001). Yet what started as a limited movement grew into a full-fledged revolution when economic, military, and constitutional demands were added. They organized a huge demonstration on September 9, 1881, in front of Abdin Palace to voice their demands to dissolve the cabinet headed by the Turk Riyad Pasha, diminish European intervention, and recall the suspended parliament. All of these were designed to decrease the Khedive’s authoritative autocracy (Salim, 1981).

At first glance, it seemed as if the Khedive and the cabinet were responsive and that the movement had succeeded, for they appointed the “constitutionalist”
Sherif Pasha to form a new government, reconvened the parliament on December 16, 1881, and promulgated a new constitution on February 7, 1882. However, since these changes seriously threatened British and French interests, London and Paris sent a joint note urging the Khedive to refuse the movement’s demands. After he accepted this note, Sherif Pasha resigned and was replaced by Mahmoud Sammy El Barody, who held the War Ministry under Sherif Pasha at the request of the revolutionaries. Ahmed ‘Urabi was appointed War Minister in the new cabinet. The heavy British and French interference, which only increased after their navies arrived in Alexandria on May 25, 1882, broke the ‘Urabi-constitutionalist coalition.

‘Urabi’s subsequent seizure of power and formation of a new government paved the road for the inevitable European invasion. During July 1882, the British navy bombarded Alexandria and eventually occupied the city. ‘Urabi’s forces were defeated and retreated to Kafr al-Dawar, an offshore city near Alexandria, to resist the occupiers. Surprisingly, Khedive Tawfik welcomed the occupation and demanded that ‘Urabi suspend all defense preparations. ‘Urabi refused and called for the formation of a national assembly comprising the country’s elite and intellectuals. The assembly endorsed resisting the British so long as they represented a threat to the country’s independence. The British eventually defeated the weak resistance army raised by ‘Urabi on September 13, 1882, at Tal al-Kabir, which ushered in a British occupation that would last for over 70 years (Fahmy, 2001).

Given the above, ‘Urabi’s revolution cannot be considered a mere coup driven by the army’s attempt to amend its policies or acquire wider financial rewards. Rather, it laid the groundwork for the key role that the military would play later on, for it now contained members from the country’s intelligentsia alongside low-income peasants (Cole, 1993). Moreover, even though this revolution has been widely criticized for ushering in the British invasion, this event can only be studied in light of the external factors, including the British-French interference backed up by financial concerns and Istanbul’s attempt to counter the Khedive’s authority (Fahmy, 2001). Indeed, the ‘Urabi uprising was a military movement that occurred outside the hierarchical order, one that merged with the societal struggle against the Khedive’s failure to meet the long-held demands for minimizing foreign influence and Egyptianizing the cabinet. Although the revolution ended badly, it opened the way for spreading nationalism and nationalist ideas within the army, a development that culminated in the 1952 revolution.
The British Occupation and the Egyptian Army

As expected, the Khedive sided with the British. Several days after they occupied Cairo, they convinced him to demobilize the 130,000-man army because it was considered too large. Both parties thought that 6,000 soldiers would be enough to ensure security in the region, for the country was bordered on three sides by desert. However, there were two other concerns as well: such a large army would require a huge outlay of financial capital and might one day threaten Khedive Tawfiq’s authority. This policy was eventually reconsidered due to the ongoing Mahdist revolution in Sudan and the danger of his troops attacking Cairo, as well as London’s March 1896 decision to recapture Dongola and attempt to reoccupy Sudan. Thus, the army’s size gradually began to range between 20,000 and 25,000 soldiers (Ramadan, 1977).

Four very significant factors played a role during this period. First, British maneuvering sought to keep the Egyptian army occupied in Sudan, so that it would not be pervaded by any nationalist sentiments (Mahzun, 1935). Second, the disturbed relations between the British and Tawfiq’s successor Abbas Helmy were clearly displayed during January 1894 when Lord Cromer, the British Consul-General and de facto ruler of Egypt, was out of town. Khedive Abbas took this chance to deliver a speech in a military outpost in which he vented his hatred toward those British officers who held the leading posts, in order to increase his popularity among the Egyptians living there. When Lord Cromer learned of this incident, he reported it to Lord Rosebery, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who then demanded a decree of praise and appreciation to the British officers. The third factor was the British decision to exclude the army from the country’s political life and urban policing by assigning this job to 1,750 British-supervised policemen as well as a 5,650-man gendarme force to serve in the provinces (Ramadan, 1977; Fahmy, 2001).

The fourth and the most significant factor was ethnicity’s continued central role in the army, which created a state of unease between the Egyptian officers and their British superiors. Pure Egyptians could only become colonels, and pure Turco-Circassians could become senior officers. However, major was the starting rank for British nationals, and nothing stood in his way of their further advancement (Ramadan 1977, 74). The British also dominated the War Ministry (Fahmy, 2001).

The constitutionalist endeavor to curb the Khedive’s authority by consolidating parliamentary democracy became an anti-British independence struggle.
The outbreak of the First World War and the Ottoman Empire’s alliance with Germany caused Britain to end any remnants of Ottoman sovereignty in Egypt; it declared Egypt a British protectorate in 1914. Alongside those developments, U.S. President Wilson’s announcement of his Fourteen Points on January 8, 1918, and his subsequent call for self-determination on February 11, 1918, raised the hopes of the nationalist movement, now led by Sa’ad Zaghlol and the Wafd Party, that Egypt would secure peaceful independence via the post-war Paris Peace Conference. The British denial of Sa’ad Zaghlol’s request to join the peace conference for this very purpose ignited the famous anti-British popular revolution of 1919. Unlike ‘Urabi’s uprising, this one was completely civilian in nature, because the army was busy imposing order in Sudan and elsewhere in Egypt.

Faced with this rising resistance, Britain finally made some concessions. It negotiated a new agreement with Sa’ad Zaghlol that ended with the infamous British declaration of February 28, 1922, in which Britain acknowledged Egyptian sovereignty with four reservations: that Britain have the right to secure international trade routes passing through Egypt, defend the country against foreign aggression, protect foreign subjects living in Egypt, and maintain British dominance over Sudan. Although this declaration fell short of the Egyptians’ aspiration for complete independence, it did usher in a new phase: the now-sovereign country promulgated a new constitution during September 1923 that laid the groundwork for developing an indigenous nascent parliamentary democracy. Nonetheless, the constitution authorized the king to dissolve parliament without any justification, an allowance that resulted in non-partisan cabinets that only ignited the nationalist constitutionalist movement under the leadership of the Wafd Party.

This ostensible independence only minimized the British military presence. British troops were re-stationed to Sinai and the Suez Canal region under the pretext of securing the free passage of trade and in accordance with the four above-mentioned reservations. The Egyptian army, however, remained under the direct supervision of a British officer, and the British High Commissioner remained intimately involved in the governing process.

The military had no political role between 1923 and the British-Egyptian treaty of 1936. However, the recurring constitutional conflicts between the majority Wafd Party and the king echoed in the army. In 1930, these conflicts culminated in the 1923 constitution being replaced with one that enlarged the king’s powers vis-à-vis parliament, thereby disrupting the nascent
parliamentary democracy by making it, once again, an absolute monarchy. However, this development proved to be so unpopular, as was clear from the ensuing opposition, that it was abolished in 1935 after a popular uprising forced the king to restore the 1923 constitutions and request Nahas Pasha, leader of the Wafd Party, to form the government (Ismail, 2005).

In power once again, the Wafd Party sought to revive the quest for full independence through renegotiating the four reservations. Eventually, Britain and Egypt signed a new treaty that repealed the 1922 declaration but fell short of granting full independence. It allowed, among other privileges, for a modest 10,000-man British force to remain in the Suez Canal region to safeguard free passage.

According to the terms of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Egypt sided with Britain during the Second World War and allowed British troops to use its ports and airports in return for a promise that all British troops in Egypt would be evacuated. Just as had happened before, the war ended and London kept reneging on its promise until the Wafd government finally nullified the treaty in October 1951. This action opened the way for armed resistance against the British troops in the Suez Canal Region, who were now considered occupying troops (El-Sa’id, 2010).

By early 1952, the political situation was ripe for the army, more specifically the Free Officers Organization, to make its long-planned move against the king. The Egyptian army had been humiliated in the 1948 war against Israel. The subsequent attribution of this defeat to inappropriate weapons and ammunition left the junior and middle-ranking officers discontented. Furthermore, the beginning of the armed resistance against the British forces in Sinai and the Suez Canal during October 1951 had catastrophic consequences for the security situation in Cairo, which culminated in the notorious “Cairo Fire” of January 1952. This event pushed the government to declare martial law and command the military to restore order by imposing a curfew (El-Sa’id, 2010). The king fired Nahas Pasha and his cabinet in order to calm the situation. However, his action only increased the political turmoil and anger against him and accelerated the Free Officers’ plan.

The Army between the 1952 and 2011 Revolutions

In 1936, the Wafd government ensured its own demise by allowing middle class Egyptians to join the military academy in response to their discontent
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with the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty. This decision exposed the military to the country’s intellectuals, who explained to the officer corps the economic, social, and political status that was beyond its reach. Later on, this knowledge ignited the Free Officers’ 1952 revolution, for eight of the 11 officers who launched it were admitted to the military academy in 1936 (Fahmy, 2001).

One of the most widely expected results of the 1952 revolution was that the military re-emerged as a political actor. All of the Presidents who served after the republic’s inauguration in June 1953 had a military background, as did approximately 34% of all cabinet ministers who served between 1952 and 1968. Moreover, all key ministries were headed by military men. All Vice Presidents from 1953 to 1970 were army officers, and so were all five Prime Ministers. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was run by the military, for all but three ambassadors in 1962 had a military background. All of the national bodies fell under the same military dominance (Fahmy, 2001; Hammad, 1990).

The Revolution and its direct consequences

The Free Officers’ secret organization that took command of the army on the eve of the revolution of July 23, 1952, was mainly composed of junior- and middle-level army officers who had convinced the widely respected General Mohamed Naguib to lead their intervention. After their coup, the leading officers proclaimed their desire to cleanse the military of corruption. However, feeling that the king’s position was weakening, they escalated their demands until King Farouk was forced to abdicate in favor of his infant son and go into exile. Soon after his departure, a 13-member Revolution Command Council (RCC) was formed to lead the country. Among its members were 12 junior- and middle-ranking officers. Its chair was General Naguib, who had nominally led the intervention but was in no position to control either the RCC or the Free Officers.

In the beginning, it looked as if the officers had no intention to rule because they asked Ali Pasha Maher, a prominent politician, to form a new government. Tensions soon arose between the RCC and Ali Maher, and he was replaced by General Mohamed Naguib, who still maintained his position as the RCC chairman. The council soon outlawed political activity within the army in order to preclude any internal threat. On a fundamental level, this act implied that the 1952 revolution was not only a militarization of the political arena, but also a technocratization of the army (Abdalla, 1988). In the same
vein, Mohamed Naguib, who was sidelined by Nasser and the council during November 1954, notes in his memoirs that appointing generals and high-ranking officers to prominent civil and diplomatic positions opened the way for the quick militarization of all fields (Naguib, 2003).

The ensuing military purge forced out around 800 officers; military fact-finding committees were assigned to investigate alleged corruption; and a revolutionary military court was appointed to confiscate the fortunes of the former economic and political elites. As early as September 9, 1952, far-reaching land reforms were launched in the name of social justice. All of these developments caused the people to embrace the army and turn the coup into a true revolution. Within the *Free Officers* movement, conspiracies started as early as October 1952. Indeed, in January 1953, an “artillery coup” plot was uncovered, and 35 officers were sentenced, some of them to life in prison. Furthermore, in March 1954, a “cavalry mutiny” plot was crushed. (Naguib, 2003).

The RCC soon reneged on its promise of a true democratic life that would commence with parliamentary elections during February 1953 by decreeing, the month before this event, the dissolution of all political parties and confiscating their property. It then proclaimed a three-year transitional period. The Liberation Organization, a national political body, was established in the same month to fill the ensuing political vacuum and to mobilize mass support for the revolution. Both of these actions ensured a long period of single-party rule. On top of that, press oversight was restored, and a new labor law permitted the firing of workers and criminalized strikes (Naguib, 2003). In February 1953, a few weeks after establishing the Liberation Organization, a new interim constitution was issued to replace the 1923 constitution, which had been suspended during December 1952.

In June 1953, the RCC abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the Republic of Egypt. The RCC has appointed General Naguib as President, in addition to his posts as Prime Minister and RCC chairman, until the presidential elections that would be held after the new constitution was approved. Naguib's appointment as Prime Minister and President sent the message that he was in control of the RCC. However, this was a move taken by then-Colonel Abdel Nasser, the actual leader of the Free Officers and his colleagues, to get him off the council. Indeed, the officers’ prior agreement that all post-intervention decisions would be made by a majority vote among them made General Naguib, regardless of the offices he held, no more than a powerless figurehead. The resulting tension between Naguib and Nasser’s group was
revealed when the general resigned during February 1954 and was placed under house arrest until he settled his conflict with the rest of the council members. He was thereafter restored to his position as President but not as RCC chairman. That position was filled by Nasser.

Initially, it looked like the young officers who wanted to remain in power forever were defending General Naguib’s desire to restore democracy and partisan politics. However, in March 1954, massive popular demonstrations, allegedly triggered by Nasser’s group, swept Cairo’s streets, its participants cursing democracy and political parties and hailing the RCC and its policies (i.e., Nasser’s group). The “March Crisis,” as the episode came to be known, was decisive in the RCC’s ongoing internal conflict. General Naguib was sacked and placed under house arrest in November 1954, a sentence that this time would last for 18 years. Egypt remained without a President until Nasser, already holding the posts of RCC chairman and Prime Minister, was elected to that post as well during 1956.


As mentioned above, during the two years that followed the revolution, Nasser managed to get rid of General Naguib and gather all power in his own hands by using the RCC as a tool to control the state. On June 23, 1956, the new constitution was put to a public referendum along with Nasser’s candidacy for the presidency. Both secured an overwhelming majority, which made Nasser a publicly elected President within a new constitutional framework that adopted a presidential system in which the Council of the Nation (the unicameral Parliament House) nominated the President and then held a public referendum. Under this new system, parliament had no real power, because the all-powerful President could dissolve it at will, and it had no say in appointing or dismissing ministers.

Abd Elhakim Amer, Nasser’s RCC colleague and close friend, had already been appointed General Commander of the Armed Forces on June 18, 1953, the same day that General Naguib was appointed President (Naguib, 2003). In fact, Amer was instrumental in suppressing dissidents within the military during the first two years after the revolution and later on, as well as in putting down any post-revolutionary pro-Naguib groups within the Free Officers organization itself and within the army in general.

Nasser’s impressive record in office and Amer’s personal loyalty eliminated any possible anti-Nasser plots. His appointment of loyal officers of various
ranks to prominent administrative and diplomatic positions as a reward for loyalty and following orders encouraged officers to adhere to Nasser’s policy. Indeed, within a few years, Nasser established himself as a popular leader through his enthusiastic speeches and actual accomplishments, among them nationalizing the Suez Canal Company in July 1956, creating a leading political standing for himself within the Arab world, building the Aswan High Dam, co-founding and leading the international Non-Aligned Movement, and the far-reaching socialist measures he initiated in 1962.

His popularity withstood two consecutive military defeats: the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis and the 1967 Six-Day War. However, his friendship with Amer gradually declined. Their post-revolutionary relationship was so strong that in June 1958, after assuming the presidency of the newborn United Arab Republic (i.e., Egypt and Syria), Nasser promoted Amer to the newly created rank of marshal and appointed him Vice President. After this, Nasser authorized Amer to act on his behalf with regard to Syria just as if he were the President.

This tension first appeared when Nasser tried to interfere in the army command structure after the 1956 defeat by retiring several commanding officers. Amer resigned in response, but Nasser soon offered some concessions that convinced him to resume the post. In fact, toward the end of the 1950s, the tension escalated but remained hidden due to Amer’s all-powerful position and his popularity within and control of the army. In other words, he was practically invulnerable. Moreover, throughout his years as General Commander, he not only tightened his control by granting officers unprecedented privileges, but also extended his control over civilian life through appointing retired officers to positions ranging from ministers and ambassadors to governors and mayors. Nasser began to see him as a potential rival. After the United Arab Republic ended following a bloodless coup in Syria during 1961, this tension increased because Amir bore the greatest responsibility for this separation. Yet it only burst into public view after Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War.

This particular defeat represents a noteworthy moment in Egypt’s military history in general and for its CMR in particular. Indeed, General Commander Amer’s significant political profile was considered one of the main reasons for the defeat. Thus the decision to retire him and his commanders was a logical result. Although Nasser took responsibility and resigned in a public speech delivered on June 9, 1967, the massive pro-Nasser public street
demonstrations caused him to retract it (Aburish, 2004, pp. 268–269). Upon his reinstatement as President two days later, he accepted Amer’s resignation from all of his official positions and replaced him with General Mohamed Fawzi, thereby ensuring an extensive depoliticization of the army. Dozens of pro-Amer army officers of various ranks were also retired.

The first episode of conflict between Amer’s sympathizers and Nasser happened soon after this event in the form of a march on the army headquarters to demand his reinstatement as General Commander. The demonstrators were met by the Presidential Guard. Some of the participating officers were sacked, and others were arrested. Afterward, it was reported that Amer and some of his army allies were devising a plot against Nasser. In response, he was detained and placed under house arrest on August 24, 1967. This looked like a pre-emptive move by Nasser to prevent any possible mutiny by Amer and his sympathizers. In the same vein, allies of Amer’s coup plot were arrested and tried before an *ad hoc* tribunal. They received long sentences, some of which were life sentences.

This process of depoliticizing the army, which saw dozens of leading pro-Amer military and intelligence figures put on trial, ended Amer’s legacy within the military and restored the army to the President’s direct control (Kandil, 2012). On the political level, it opened the way for Anwar Sadat, an RCC member, to get closer to Nasser. He was eventually appointed Vice President in 1969, only one year before Nasser’s sudden death.

Under Nasser, the armed forces were portrayed as the agent of social transformation in his “revolution from above,” which involved overseeing land reform, Egyptianizing the industrial and financial sectors during the 1950s, and implementing socialist policies from 1961 onward.


Upon Nasser’s sudden death in September 1970, Sadat assumed responsibility and was then nominated by the Socialist Union, Egypt’s sole national political organization, to the presidency. After his confirmation, Sadat continued the campaign of changing the higher-ranking officers—but with the intention of guaranteeing their loyalty, not of enhancing their professionalism. For example, after the palace coup of 1971, in which Minister of War Mohamed Fawzi and other ministers and key political figures in the Socialist Union
were recorded plotting against Sadat, he accused Fawzi of preparing a coup in accordance with the Nasserite centers of power and replaced him with General Mohamed Sadiq, who had been the chief of staff. Within a year, Sadiq was replaced with Ahmed Ismail, an officer who had been found to be responsible under Nasser (and subsequently fired) for letting an Israeli raiding party slip away after attacking Egyptian troops in the Red Sea city of Hurghada and filming the whole operation (Sutuhi, 1993).

Cracking the “May 1971 coup attempt,” as the episode came to be called, did not end the tension between Sadat and his high-ranking officers, whose relations with him remained bad for the remainder of his term (Springborg, 1987, pp. 5–6). Their negative view can be explained, to some degree, by Sadat’s personality and his double-approach policy. This policy, adopted in 1972, sought to make peace with Israel and simultaneously restore the army’s pre-1967 reputation, which could only be done by conquering Israel in another war. Besides being contradictory, these two policies led to a severe clash between Sadat and his chief of staff, Sa’d al-Din al-Shazli, who thought that the Israeli counter-attack on October 14, 1973, could have been stopped, whereas Sadat and his war minister, Ahmed Ismail, thought of it as a public relations hustle to placate Washington’s threats of an enforced peace. Shazli, who disagreed, was named ambassador to London in an attempt to silence him. When this did not work, he was sent to Lisbon, where he would attract less attention, and eventually ended up as an exile in Libya and then Algeria (Fahmy, 2001; al-Shazli, 1983).

These disagreements and conflicts persisted for the next five years, after which Sadat replaced both Minister of War Abd al-Ghani al-Gamasi and Chief of Staff Mohamed Ali Fahmi with more resilient officers who had accepted the 1978 Camp David peace treaty signed with Israel (Hinnebusch, 1985).

On a parallel level, the long-held policy of militarizing the higher administrative and political ranks was abandoned because Sadat’s policy of openness and peace necessitated the demilitarization of the cabinet as well as of all ambassadorial and other key positions (Springborg, 1987, p. 5). During Sadat’s term, only 13% of his cabinet contained officials with military backgrounds; in his final cabinet, only the military and foreign affairs portfolios were held by men with military backgrounds (Springborg, 1987). However, such success did not completely separate the military from politics, for in 1981 Sadat was assassinated by one of the many Islamist army officials who had infiltrated the army (Fahmy 2001).

When Mubarak took over, he also sought to keep the military out of politics by recruiting fewer officials with military backgrounds, restricting their admission in the National Democratic Party (NDP), and appointing higher-ranking officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as ambassadors. In addition, governors with a police background were appointed, especially to sensitive governorates, thereby implying that the police, not the military, were helping protect Mubarak’s regime against its primal internal threat: armed Islamist groups.

Relegating the army to the background, a consequence of the rise of the security state, did not mean that it could no longer penetrate the system. Rather, the army now penetrated almost every sphere of Mubarak’s crony patronage system, but in new ways. The senior officer corps was co-opted by the promises of post-retirement appointments to leading cabinet posts, government agencies, and state-owned companies, as well as offers of supplementary salaries and lucrative opportunities for extra income generation in return for loyalty. Furthermore, junior- and middle-ranking officers were willing to wait for their turn to reap such benefits upon their retirement as well. (Sayigh, 2012)

Under Mubarak the self-perpetuating military networks known as the “Officers’ Republic” permeated virtually all branches and levels of the state administration and the state-owned sectors of the economy. Despite the demilitarization of the cabinet that started under Sadat and increased with Mubarak, the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) gradually became a mainstay of the latter’s crony system to such an extent that they were able to assume full power in early 2011.

The EAFs’ incorporation involved the complete abandonment of their former ideological mission as an agent of social transformation. Taming the senior officer corps via privileged access and patronage co-opted and depoliticized the EAF as a whole. As a result, the military became invisible by virtue of its very ubiquity to the extent that the “Officers’ Republic” became so entangled with the civilian sphere that it was deemed normal and natural by both society and the military (Sayigh, 2012).
Mubarak achieved this incorporation through the use of multiple tools, starting with regularly cleansing the corps of those officers regarded as political or untrustworthy by retiring them at the mid-career level. In addition, the “loyalty allowance” (i.e., lucrative post-retirement jobs) ensured the senior officer corps’ abstention from any political engagement and represented a powerful incentive for middle-ranking officers to follow their lead while waiting for their turn.

When Mubarak was first appointed President through a public referendum, it was clear that he had already secured the army’s loyalty, even though at first he was obliged to compete with Abu-Ghazala, Sadat’s last Minister of Defense, who was known for his ambition, verbal eloquence, and charisma. Mubarak’s first move, the 1989 removal of Abu-Ghazala, was the result of his determination not to risk the rise of a powerful military figure who could pose a challenge to his power. The highly regarded Lieutenant General Youssef Sabri Abu Taleb filled this post for nearly two years, only to be replaced by the more compliant Mohamed Hussien Tantawi in May 1991. Under Tantawi, described as “Mubarak’s poodle” by unnamed Egyptian officers who were quoted in a 2008 U.S. embassy cable released by WikiLeaks, the EAF high command was drawn deep into Mubarak’s crony system.

The rise of the security state, especially after the 1995 attempt on Mubarak’s life in Addis Ababa, only rendered the EAF’s power less visible. The pervasiveness of military retirees at all levels of local administration showed just how indispensable the army was to regime maintenance. Furthermore, the neoliberal economic reforms launched by Mubarak in 1991 generated new opportunities for former officers embedded in the civilian administration to acquire wealth or accumulate assets, which only enhanced the position of the “Officers’ Republic.”

So it can be argued that even if the army did not assume a direct political role under Mubarak, its pervasive penetration of the state bureaucracy and economy enabled it to become a “state within the state.” In short, the EAF was a key player in the “conflicting polyarchy” of various institutional and political actors, including the security and intelligence agencies, leading economic groups, and the National Democratic Party. Fully incorporated into Mubarak’s regime, the senior officer corps became detached from Egypt’s social and political realities. Yet this reality in no way diminished its members’ wish to protect their accumulated prerogatives and privileges, which was very clear in their struggle to secure their custodianship status in the 2012 constitution.
The Military-Economic Power

Like its counterpart in Turkey, the Egyptian army enjoys economic independence. Even before Mubarak’s ouster, the size of the army’s economic share was a subject of great debate. It is well known that the army manufactured many items, but the absence of transparency and scrutiny made it impossible for anyone to determine just how much of the country’s economy was controlled by its military industries (Abd Rabou, 2014a, p. 134). Military expenditures consumed 1.67% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2013, which made Egypt rank 53rd in terms of military expenditures (CIA, 2015). The military’s oldest commercial interests are the factories run by the Ministry of Military Production (MOMP), the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), and the National Service Projects Organization (NSPO). Not only does it oversee numerous subsidiaries of state-owned holding companies and own shares in public-private ventures (Marshall and Stacher, 2012), it also has enjoyed annual American military assistance of $1.3 billion from 1987 to the present (Sharp, 2015).

Over the past 30 years, the army has refused to reveal any information about its enormous interests in the economy, effectively making public transparency and accountability impossible. Some estimates argue that its share is somewhere between 25−40% of all economic activity. Army generals and colonels are in charge of those enterprises (Abul-Magd, 2011). The rationale behind this economic activity is to relieve the budget by not placing additional pressures on it while establishing a great and strong army to guard the republic (Chams El-Dine, 2013).

It is certainly true that one part of its budget deals with defense-related activities, such as the procurement or co-production of weaponry. This part is accepted as secret, but why should this be the case with such elements as producing non-military goods and services, from which the army derives huge profits (Marshall and Stacher, 2012)?

Experts expect that Egypt’s defense spending will increase at an annual rate of 9.51% over the next four years, reaching a value of $8.5 billion in 2019. According to recent research by Business Monitor International, the military expenditure of the Egyptian army has reached $5.2 billion. Three causes of this increase have been shown here, namely the ongoing reconstruction drive to counter threats of terrorism in the Sinai Peninsula, the stressed relationship with Ethiopia, and the political instability since January 2011,
with maritime security concerns over the Suez Canal. Budget apportionment for the Egyptian Armed Forces was set to increase by LE3.4 billion in 2013/14 to reach some LE31 billion (Global Security, 2014).

Evaluation of the Egyptian economy has long been problematic due to the military budget and allocations being secret. However, defense expenditure was made public in 1983, when the Minister of Finance stated that the military would receive £E2.1 billion (approximately US$3 billion at the time) in the 1983 fiscal year. This amount was 22% higher than that of the previous year, and amounted to 13% of Egypt’s total expenditure. In early 1989, the former Minister of Defense, Abu Ghazala, indicated that military expenditure rose to £E2.4 billion, approximately 10% of total government spending. Despite these official published figures, experts believe that Egypt’s actual military expenditure was far higher. In addition to annual American aide, the Egyptian army receives an unrevealed amount from Saudi Arabia and earns foreign exchange from exports of domestically manufactured military equipment. According to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), military expenditure as a share of gross national product (GNP) dropped from 22.8% in 1977 to 9.2% in 1987. Among other Arab states, Egypt’s defense expenditure was relatively modest, as in 1987 the average military expenditure in the region rose to 11% of GNP (Global Security, 2014).

One can argue that the army’s economic activities have assumed a form for which the army is unfit, and thus have steered the military establishment away from its principal obligations: advancing national defense and protecting the country’s borders. A review of the Egyptian army’s main industries under MOMP reveals that it owns and runs nine engineering companies (five produce only civilian products), three chemical companies (two produce only civilian products), an electronics company that mainly serves the civilian market, and training centers that train civilians as well as army personnel (MOMP, 2015). In short, the army is running factories that contribute nothing to its key function: protecting and maintaining national security. Besides, the National Service Products Organization (NSPO), created by the MOD in the 1980s, contributed to public infrastructure projects as well as producing cheap civil goods.

In the 1990s, the military expanded its production of civil goods and services, established new companies, built new factories, and cultivated vast farms that had untaxed and unaudited special autonomous status. Alongside the three main economic arms of the military that are engaged in profitable non-military
manufacturing and services, namely NSPO, MOMP, and AOI, the army owns a large number of gas stations, hotels, wedding halls, supermarkets, parking lots, domestic cleaning offices, and transportation and shipping companies across the country (Abul-Magd, 2013).

This economic empire enabled it to act coherently during the current delicate transitional period. Although fragmentation or clashes among the SCAF’s different wings are always expected, the anticipated internal coup against Tantawi never happened due to the military’s strong internal discipline, coherence, and independence.

The 2014 constitution strengthened the economic independence of the military by providing that its budget be inserted into the national budget as one number and that the Council of National Defense be the sole authority entitled to discuss and approve that budget.

Finally, we can argue that civilian control might be in danger if it threatens the military’s economic empire. These economic interests might provide the military leadership with incentives to resist expanded civilian control as a way to defend their own interests and economic position.

The Return of the Military in 2011 and the Aftermath

After a long period of latency, the army was restored to the forefront of the political scene in the aftermath of the revolution of January 25, 2011. In his forced resignation statement, Mubarak authorized the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) to lead the country and transferred full executive and legislative power to it. The military institution’s isolation from the widespread corruption of the Mubarak years allowed it to retain its patriotic public image. This transfer of authority was at first welcomed wholeheartedly.

In fact, the army enjoyed public support right from the revolution’s beginning due to its neutrality and its role in forcing Mubarak to resign peacefully 18 days later. The army’s approach captured public support simply because it did not oppose the revolution. In fact, the prevailing slogan at the time was “the army and people are one hand.” Theoretically, the EAF did not oppose Mubarak in public, which is clear in their call for the crowds to comply with the curfew he imposed. However, the on-site military personnel never tried to end the sit-ins or open fire on the crowds either.

Throughout the eighteen-month period that followed Mubarak’s ouster, SCAF struggled to offer a social vision, an economic blueprint, or a political master plan for the country’s transition. However, it mostly blundered because its conservative nature prevented it from offering any major reform, for any such undertaking was regarded as an inherent threat to the EAF’s long-held privileges and prerogatives (Sayigh, 2012).

Within a few months, and in response to SCAF’s manipulation of the crowds and its reluctance to heed the revolution’s demands, the army went from being the guardian of the revolution to its adversary. In addition, many demonstrators began demanding that a civilian presidential council replace SCAF and move on with the road map (Abd Rabou, 2014a).

The conservative nature of the top brass, who favor gradual instead of revolutionary change, soon collided with the revolutionary demands of the youth, the revolution’s true engine. This was multiplied by the SCAF’s own core characteristics that shaped its behavior, such as adversity to change, a tendency toward secrecy, hostility to dissent, and strict hierarchical structure. All of this eventually caused the activists and protestors to question SCAF’s longer-term objectives (International Crisis Group, 2012).

SCAF’s highly tumultuous time in power saw several clashes between the security forces and the protestors over different, and sometimes trivial, causes. Unfortunately, they all left behind a pile of corpses. There was no one to blame but SCAF, which endorsed such practices and sometimes blamed the protestors for the ensuing bloodshed (Abd Rabou, 2014a).

During this period, SCAF’s predominant approach was “divide and rule.” Largely aware of the Islamists’ strong organization and mobilization capabilities, specifically in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist movement, SCAF made sure to gain them as allies against the revolutionary forces, which collided with both SCAF and the Islamists multiple times during this period. SCAF utilized the lack of civilian consensus over the country’s future direction to appoint, during February 2011, a legal committee with an Islamist head and a Muslim Brotherhood member to amend the 1971 constitution. The composition of the committee and the amendments it proposed opened the first rift between the revolutionary forces, who demanded a new constitution altogether, and the Islamists, who supported SCAF’s gradual approach.
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of amending the 1971 constitution. This rift, which continued to expand, enhanced SCAF’s position and grip on power.

On another level, the post-revolutionary security breakdown and the serious external threats perceived by the public, especially with the recurring terrorist attacks in Sinai, augmented the army’s political and social omnipresence. This enabled SCAF to extend its time in power, despite its initial promise to hand power over to civilians within six months.

External actors, including the U.S. and the European Union, actively supported ending the transitional period and holding parliamentary and presidential elections to return a civilian government to power. Nonetheless, their support was only limited to words and statements designed to encourage Egyptians to move toward democratization, while at the same time they were urging SCAF to stick to discipline in its dealings with the protestors. In fact, despite U.S. omnipresence in Egyptian politics through its economic and military aid (nearly $1.3 billion per year) (Sharp, 2015), Washington’s influence was minimal as regards bringing the transitional period to a quick end or at least tempering SCAF’s conduct.

SCAF managed to sail the ship through the wild storm of transition due to its strict hierarchy, internal cohesion, and huge economic empire, which reportedly accounts for something between 25 and 40% of the nation’s economic activity. Indeed, by the time the Muslim Brotherhood’s presidential candidate Mohamed Morsi assumed office, SCAF had already secured the EAF’s economic and institutional independence in the new political system—a position that it had never before explicitly articulated.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Rule and Increased Polarization: June 2012–June 2013

Mohamed Morsi’s year in office was characterized mostly by polarized political turmoil and a lot of bloodshed. This ended during the first week of July 2013 when the military, backed by a diverse political elite that opposed Morsi and the mass protests demanding his removal, overthrew him and proposed a new road map supported by various political elites.

The conduct of Morsi and the Brotherhood in office only deepened the already-thriving political polarization between Islamists and civil-state advocates. To no one’s surprise, any prospects for civilian consensus were eventually
undermined, a development that opened the door to calls for the military to once again “save the country.” Morsi commenced his reign by embracing the public support, which was clearly apparent in his decision to take an informal presidential oath in front of the masses gathered in Tahrir Square before taking the official oath at the Constitutional Court. He built on this support by cancelling the complementary constitutional declaration that the SCAF leaders had issued just a few days before his election, and reserving for himself legislative authority and veto power over articles of the new constitution. In this same statement, he fired Tantawi, Chief of Staff Sami Anan, and other SCAF members.

Only then was he able to assume his position uncontested by any of the SCAF leaders who had handed power over to him in the first place. With his newly appointed defense minister and new military leadership, Morsi, at least momentarily, tossed aside his fear of military intervention. Unfortunately, public support for his presidency was conditional: he was expected to ease the polarization and introduce major reforms. Yet nothing changed because Morsi’s administration, restricted by its allegiance to the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, could not fulfil its promises of a national unity government, a satisfactory new constitution, or any improvement in living standards. On the contrary, Morsi’s swaying political and economic policies and unclear economic vision, not to mention the worsening security situation, undermined his rule and renewed discourse about a new military intervention to save the state.

In fact, the lack of consensus among the political elites about Morsi made him an easy prey for the military only one year after his election. Morsi’s conduct was widening the gap between Islamists on the one hand and liberal and leftist forces on the other. The point of no return was the complementary constitutional declaration that he issued in late November 2012, in which he declared himself Egypt’s omnipotent leader who could (and most controversially did) issue any decision or law without any judicial review, not to mention had the right to use all “necessary procedures and measures” to confront any danger threatening the January 25 revolution, the life of the nation, national unity, and the safety of the nation, or hampering the state institutions from performing their roles. The opposition perceived this very vague and broad statement as threatening.

In addition, he stipulated that no authority could dissolve the existing Shura Council (the remaining Upper House of Parliament—the Lower House had already been dissolved by court order over the constitutionality of the electoral
law) or the Constituent Assembly, which had been tasked with writing the new constitution. He extended the assembly’s work by another two months, in light of the assembly crisis, following the walkout of nearly one-quarter of its members (primarily the liberal bloc, the church, the journalists and farmers’ syndicates, and the assembly’s advisory council) over the Islamist majority’s increased domination of the assembly and the persistent debate deadlock.

However, these decrees were not all bad, for they included re-conducting all revolution-related trials, retiring the sitting Prosecutor-General (a long-held revolutionary demand), and expanding the pensions for injured revolutionary protesters (Sabry, 2012). Nonetheless, the declaration as a whole set off a wave of popular discontent and demonstrations to initially demand its cancellation but then eventually called for the new President’s removal. Morsi’s stubbornness caused clashes between his supporters and his opponents in front of the presidential palace and elsewhere in Egypt, events that resulted in deaths and injuries on both sides. The remaining seven months of his reign saw extensive failures in the public service sectors, including electricity, gas, and water shortages. Such shortages were alleged to be due to the complicity of the deep state institutions, namely, the involvement of the security institutions.

The ongoing polarization, failures in public service provision, a worsening economic situation, and an increasingly serious security situation culminated in the Tamarod Movement, a youth movement devoted to collecting public signatures to peacefully remove Morsi from office by holding an early presidential election. The movement, which enjoyed high media coverage, managed to gather a million supporters and eventually declared June 30, 2013, as the day to demonstrate against the president and his group and to push for early elections.

The demonstrations erupted two days early, and people in the street called upon the army to topple Morsi. “Come on Sisi! Morsi is not my president” was the prevailing slogan of those demonstrations. The protestors embraced the military, police officers, and soldiers in the streets. The army was seen as the only alternative to Morsi, and the strongman al-Sisi was the man of the hour.

The Military is Back

The Egyptian people widely welcomed the overt military intervention on July 3, 2013, due to the widespread public feeling of insecurity that had preceded it. Unlike its first military intervention in 1952, this time the military
strictly observed the chain of command and stood behind such societal actors as al-Azhar (the country’s Islamic religious authority) and the Coptic Church, and such political actors as the Wafd Party and the Nour Party.

The Minister of Defense did not assume the presidency; he only presented a new road map, sanctioned by those political forces that supported this intervention. The road map included an interim President from the judiciary, a new constitution, and new parliamentary and presidential elections. Many commentators argued, but never proved, that the Minister of Defense was in control of everything. The interim President appointed two Prime Ministers, in July 2013 and February 2014, respectively, who formed non-partisan cabinets to run the state until the road map was fulfilled. The security forces crushed all signs of resistance by Morsi’s supporters, leaving behind hundreds of corpses in their wake. The pro-Morsi sit-in at Raba’a Square ended on August 14, 2013. The cabinet soon declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization and began hunting down and prosecuting its members.

A far more turbulent year passed, after which al-Sisi began to display his political mastery via frequent television addresses. By the end of this second transitional period, he had become a well-established popular political leader in his own right, a standing that was only reinforced by his accession to the presidency during May 2014 after his overwhelming defeat of his only rival, the popular leftist figure Hamdeen Sabahy.

Since then, a new constitution has replaced the 2012 constitution issued by the Brotherhood. Surprisingly, both documents ensure the military’s long-held institutional independence through clear constitutional provisions, as we shall see next.

The Military between the 2012 and 2014 Constitutions

Feeling threatened by the republic’s first-ever civilian president and by public questioning of its own position within the system, the military managed to enhance its position in both the 2012 and 2014 constitutions vis-à-vis the President and the public in general. The President’s authority to appoint civilian and military personnel was restricted by requiring the Minister of Defense to be a military figure. In the 2014 constitution, SCAF apparently attempted to secure its position by adding a temporary article (Article 234) that allows the military to veto the President’s appointment of the Minister of Defense for a period of eight years after the new constitution is approved: “the
Minister of Defense is appointed after the Approval of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. The provisions of this article are valid for the two complete presidential terms following the approval of the constitution.”

Furthermore, the military secured its long-held opaqueness by constitutional provisions in both documents. The 2014 constitution preserved the Council of National Defense, established by the 2012 constitution to oversee defense matters, but added that the armed forces’ budget had to be discussed by that council and inserted into the state’s budget as one number. This is a long-established tradition; however, it had never been constitutionally endorsed before 2014.

Following the same trend, the 2014 constitution expanded the possibility of military courts trying civilians by specifying those crimes to be placed under military jurisdiction in vague and broad terms. In other words, it opened the door to wide interpretations of who could be subjected to such trials. Furthermore, this same constitution restricts the President’s ability to declare a state of war or send troops abroad by requiring him to first consult with the Council of National Defense. If parliament is dissolved, he must then secure the council’s agreement to declare war (Abd Rabou, 2014b).

It could be argued that the rising public debate over the military’s position in the political system, as well as its institutional privileges and prerogatives (all of which contradict democratic principles) pushed the military to secure those very privileges through constitutional provisions designed to block any near-future reconsideration of them.

Finally, we can argue that the military’s position during the first transitional period was undermined by the continuous bloody clashes between the security forces and the revolutionary youth. Nonetheless, the bloody political polarization between the Islamists and civil-state advocates, starting from November 2012, made the military the only possible institution that could set things right. Thus, the people welcomed its July 2013 intervention.
This study has been guided by one major question: which strategies can help civilians in Egypt keep their military at bay? In order to answer this and other minor related puzzles, the study conducted a comparative research study of CMR in Turkey and Egypt. These countries were chosen due to their many similar initial conditions that make them analytically comparable. For example, each country has a substantial Muslim majority, an army that has functioned not only as a political actor but also as founder of the modern nation-state, a citizenry that claims to follow a “moderate” form of Islam in theory and practice—although secular actors have controlled political power for decades—and a prestigious and even contested role in the Middle East for its military forces.

Other differences remain to be explored. Although these militaries have historically played a dominant role in their respective states and societies, this role had fluctuated until it finally began to follow dramatically different paths in 2010 (Turkey) and 2011 (Egypt). Currently, the Turkish army seems to have pulled back from politics after the election of the civilian Islamic-flavored AKP, whereas the Egyptian army came to dominate the policy-making process after the army’s head, appointed by Egypt’s first-ever popularly elected president, replaced him only one year later. Despite these similar historical dynamics, different factors controlled the military-politician relationship in each case. This study sought to explore what was similar and what was specific to each case, as well as how both of these factors shaped the current level of civilian control in each country’s contemporary politics.

Indeed, thinking of civilian control as an endpoint is neither accurate nor realistic. Conversely, conceiving of it as an ongoing CMR process is more
analytically helpful, because, even in consolidated democracies, rulers concentrate principally on supervising their armed forces by defining their roles, missions, and budgets. In all cases, civilian control is a prerequisite for democracy since strong democratic civilian control has two aspects: institutionalized civilian oversight of military activities and the professionalism of the military forces. Moreover, the existence of enclaves of military autonomy within the state and institutional vetoes over civilian policy-making threatens the stability of any democratic political regime.

In general, two main CMR schools have dominated the understanding of how to achieve civilian control. The CMR literature of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s was driven by a fear of the West’s democratic norms and institutions. As a corollary, the dominant paradigm based itself upon the separation of civil and military institutions as the best option for minimizing any military intervention in domestic politics despite the given nation’s different political, economic, social, and cultural structures. One leading example of this school was the work of Samuel Huntington (1957), who tried to distinguish between “subjective control” (i.e., civilians trying to forestall intervention by politicizing the officer corps to generate shared values) and “objective control” (i.e., separating civilians and military officers, but subordinating the latter to the duly constituted state authority and inculcating a neutral political attitude toward the civilian government’s policies and activities).

In terms of the concordance theory, the main challenge to this separation is the fact that it distinguished itself by focusing on the nation’s cultural and historical experience and how they had imprinted themselves on the military and political institutions. Therefore, while separationists postulate separate military and civilian institutions, adherents of the concordance theory argue that three partners—the military, the political elites, and the citizenry—should seek to establish a cooperative relationship that may or may not involve separation.

A recent third trend, suggested by Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn (2010), views civilians and military officers as competitors for control of five major decision-making areas, especially in newly democratized or transition countries. Their study paid a great deal of attention to both exogenous and indigenous factors that either help or hinder militaries from gaining control while exploring strategies developed by civilians to extend their control. The main merit of this approach is that it does not overlook the citizenry or the society at large. Rather, it regards them as among the structural factors that govern the military-civilian relationship.
A comprehensive review of the literature for the less-developed countries reveals that explanations for a military intervention and continued political role have been sought in, among other factors, the low political culture, the military’s role in nation-building, and the specific country’s social conditions.

One can draw the following five main conclusions from the CMR literature: (1) civilian control is a prerequisite for democracy, for no truly democratic system can arise if civilians do not control the decision-making process, elite recruitment, and internal security; (2) who will win this competition depends, to a certain extent, on the army’s position in society and the economy, whereas the dynamics of civil-military completion are related to the civilian and political actors; (3) the role of foreign actors as well as internal and external threats strongly influences the outcome and thus can shape the public’s perception and position on the issue; (4) scholars differ over whether subjective or objective control should be applied, for this decision depends upon the country’s internal conditions with regard to its military’s history and weight in society, the economy, and politics; and (5) a number of areas and issues remain to be discovered and resolved, among them, the need to (a) study CMR in MENA-region politics beyond the coup—no coup dichotomy; (b) analyze what external factors facilitate and shape the armed forces’ influence and determine the military’s role in the state’s internal politics; (c) go beyond the narrow meaning of “military,” as well as its operations and organizations, to study its history, role in creating modern nation-states, and its position in society, the economy, and politics.

In this context, this study concentrated on exploring the Turkish and Egyptian cases by using the comparative method to demonstrate how the interplay of a complex of factors (e.g., history; public perception of the army, its organization, economic, and security role; and international and regional dimensions) can contribute to the status quo of CMR.

Chapter two explored the army’s role in creating and then building the Republic of Turkey. After its establishment in 1923, former officer Mustafa Kamal Atatürk modernized the nation-state and built a new modern professional army. The result was a single-party state governed by the Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP). In 1950, Turkey abolished its single-party system and adopted a multi-party system. This decision resulted in four military interventions and the application of great pressure on the government to do the “right” thing. This long history of military intervention led to a long-term self-learning process for each actor and eventually produced the present-day reality of an Islamist political party (the military’s former adversary) governing the
country with the apparent consent of a military that has restricted itself to its own sphere.

Multiple factors interacted to bring about this result, including EU and NATO pressure, the military’s growing maturity due to its realization that intervention can sometimes backfire and that normal partisan politics are restored once it leaves the stage, and, finally, the traditional Islamist actors have transformed into a more flexible conservative democracy. Moreover, Turkish society as a whole is witnessing a socio-economic transformation, a situation that tends to discourage military intervention. However, talking about absolute civilian control is a matter that still needs to be investigated.

Chapter three investigated the history and role of the Egyptian military. An analysis of the literature revealed that the country’s military officers were the founding fathers of the Republic of Egypt and that the armed forces remain very influential in the political sphere. Although the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) have not interfered directly, they have been so blended into the state’s structures that they still enjoy—and can defend—major prerogatives and privileges. The presidency, the top executive power, has been unofficially reserved for someone with a military background. This fact has entrenched the EAF’s political dominance and caused it to embrace a feeling of superiority toward the civilians, which became very clear when it removed President Morsi in July 2013 after only one year in office. Unlike the Turkish case, both the multi-party system and the military’s direct involvement in power are relatively new phenomena, which means that the Egyptian army and civilian population have yet to undergo the self-learning process that culminated in civilian control over the Turkish army.

This present chapter has two main tasks: to (1) illustrate the differences and similarities between the Egyptian and Turkish styles of military intervention by capitalizing on the relevant historical account; (2) present a comparative analysis of the military’s position in crafting the state, which necessitates conducting a comparative analysis of the military organization itself, its position vis-à-vis the society and the state, its economic and security roles, and, finally, the influential roles of the regional and international environments.

What does the Comparison Tell?

Comparing the history and the present of these two militaries with regard to politics reveals four major similarities and two main differences, as follows:
A. Similarities

Both armies are characterized by the following elements: taking a great interest in politics and state affairs, intervening in politics to change the rules of the game in their favor, the tendency to dominate and diminish political life, and acting always as coherent actors.

1) A Great Interest in Politics and State Affairs

Analyzing the history of both militaries reveals their great interest in politics and state affairs. Their essential role in building their respective modern states has led them to claim the right to set the rules of the political game in order to guard it. The independent Egypt established by Mohamed Ali was inseparable from the birth of a strong and well-established modern army for that time. Fighting the colonial power and ousting the corrupt and weak king paved the way for the military establishment of the independent Arab Republic of Egypt. Seeking success and dominance, the Free Officers movement went on to adopt new laws designed to redistribute power and resources among the population and thereby assume the role of the country’s sole ruler. Based on the military participation in the 1956, 1967, and 1973 wars, the leading officers came to believe they were the only actors entitled to political rights. As a result, they totally dominated the political game.

Similarly, former army officer Mustafa Kamal Atatürk ended the corrupt and weak Ottoman Empire by establishing the modern and independent Republic of Turkey in 1923. As a result, the republic’s army has continued to dominate the political scene as well as state affairs. In the case of the CHP, the most vital of its members were former army officers. As a result, the military managed to lead a great modernizing project under Atatürk’s leadership. Since then, its generals have continued to rule the political game and intervene systematically to correct the country’s political path, as defined by their interests and vision.

Unlike many other well-established democracies, the political life in both countries was decided first by army dynamics, as opposed to political party dynamics or civilian efforts. This point has been always a watershed in the relationship between civilians and politicians on the one side, and the army on the other.

2) Changing Rules of the Game

In both cases, army officers showed a great interest in politics and state affairs, as well as a keen interest in changing the rules of the political game. 
Ahmed Abd Rabou

to their own advantage after each intervention. That was very clear in Turkey, where the army launched three main interventions in addition to Atatürk’s establishment of modern Turkey. Once he claimed power, Atatürk instituted a number of legal and constitutional amendments to hinder any threat coming from the army. As chapter two explained, he adopted Law No. 385—soon confirmed by Article 23 of the newly adopted constitution—which prohibited holding a military and a governmental post at the same time. Although this might have been seen as a tool to keep army officers away from politics, it was the only way for Atatürk to ensure his potential military competitors’ submissiveness to his authority. In fact, this article has been used only against those of his opponents who later on tried to establish opposition political parties, as opposed to those military officers who remained loyal to him and the ruling People’s Party.

In 1961, 1971, and 1980–83, the army adopted similar constitutional reforms to maintain its political dominance. For example, after the 1961 coup, it introduced a new body to the 1961 constitution, the National Security Council (NSC), to give itself a larger share in the decision-making process, especially with the broad definition of “national security.” In addition, this army-made constitution founded a “tutelary system” to change the army’s role from one of modernizing the country to serving as its guardian (Keyman, 2014).

After its 1971 intervention, the army adopted major amendments to the 1961 constitution to extend its hand in politics by expanding the Minister of Defense’s power, increasing the NSC’s authority, and, most importantly, depriving civil courts of their former right to review military personnel actions.

In the aftermath of the third military intervention and the new constitutional provisions in 1982, Article 118 stated that the NSC could now issue decrees, instead of recommendations, to the executive branch. As a result, the executive was forced to implement the NSC’s decrees through the power of its General Secretariat to monitor executive decision-making. In this way, the NSC acquired a dominant role in defining the scope of internal and external threats and national security priorities. These considerations were then translated into a National Security Policy document without much civilian input. Moreover, the NSC also had the right to oversee this document’s revision every five years. In all these interventions, the Turkish military used the constitution to secure a large degree of autonomy from any kind of civilian control or oversight.

The Egyptian army adopted almost the same style to ensure its own autonomy. Its style of intervention did not differ significantly from that of its Turkish
counterpart. For example, it issued a number of constitutional declarations and provisions as soon as it claimed power in 1952. All of these culminated in the new 1956 constitution, which made the Free Officers organization, now renamed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the country’s pivotal and only prominent political actor after it cracked down on all political parties. In short, the army became the only legitimate and vital institution in the newly established republic.

Similarly, after the January 2011 uprising, the Egyptian army once again tightened its grip on power by adding many provisions to ensure its full independence from any kind of civilian or political oversight. One study has compared the constitution of 2012 with that of 2014 (which is actually an amended version of the first one), and highlighted five main areas of increased powers, as follows (Abd Rabou, 2014b, pp. 2–6):

First, the 2012 constitution emphasized that “[d]efense of the nation is an honor and an obligation. Our armed forces are a neutral, professional national institution that does not interfere in the political process. It is the country’s protective armor.” The text of the 2014 constitution, meanwhile, not only omits this important principle, which establishes a civilian state, but puts forward a strange and unpalatable phrase on the fifth page: “We are now drafting a Constitution that completes the building of a modern democratic state with a civilian government.” The phrase “civilian government” is unpalatable in political science literature because it narrows the principle of a civilian state or even of civilian rule, since “government” is narrower than “state” or “rule.”

Second, the 2014 constitution entrusts the appointment of the Minister of Defense to the elected civilian authorities (the government and the president). In contrast, Article 143 of the 1971 constitution stipulated that it is the President who appoints and removes military and civilian employees. The 2012 constitution produced under the Morsi government restricted this absolute right by retaining the same formulation for Article 143 (though renumbering it as Article 147), but re-defining and limiting it in Article 195, which stipulates that “the Minister of Defense is the General Commander of the Armed Forces and is appointed from among its officers.” In other words, the President does have the authority to appoint the Minister of Defense, but he must be chosen from among the armed forces’ officer class. The 2014 constitution as well followed the lead of the 2012 constitution in limiting the appointment of the Minister of Defense to the officer class within the armed forces.
Third, while the 1971 constitution was entirely silent about the armed forces’ budget and military-specific draft laws, Article 203 of the 2014 constitution maintains the gains obtained by the military in the 2012 constitution (Article 197), which stipulated the establishment of Council of National Defense (CND). This council is headed by the president and tasked with (among other things) discussing the military budget. In addition, it must be consulted about any legislative bill related to the armed forces. The 2014 constitution also put forward three changes to the 2012 constitution concerning the council’s formation and discussion of the military budget, as follows:

a) The 2012 constitution stated that the CND is to be composed of eight civilians and seven military officers (with the assumption that the Minister of the Interior and the head of general intelligence are civilians), whereas the 2014 constitution says that it is to be composed of seven civilians and seven military persons. With the elimination of the Shura Council in the constitution, thereby leaving the House of Representatives as Egypt’s sole legislative body, that council is no longer represented on the CND.

b) Article 203 of the 2014 constitution stipulates that the army’s general budget is to be inserted as a one number of the general state budget without details. This stipulation is not found in the 2012 constitution.

c) The 2014 constitution also requires that the head of financial affairs for the armed forces be present at all discussions that deal with the military budget, along with the heads of the Budget and Planning Committee and the Defense and National Security Committee.

In general, the 2014 constitution has maintained the jurisdiction of the CND, which is dominated by members of the military, as regards all matters pertaining to the army budget or to any legislation pertaining to the military.

Fourth, with regard to judicial oversight over the military, the 1971 and 2012 constitutions established military courts. The first document gave only a brief description of this judiciary body, leaving it to legislators to define its competencies (Article 183). The 2012 constitution, however, established military trials for civilians through Article 198, which stipulates the independence of military courts and gives them the right to try civilians for crimes that “harm the armed forces.” This document also left it up to the legislators to define such crimes and ensured that members of the military judiciary could not be removed.
Yet the 2014 constitution, by way of Article 204, does not stop with the previous assurance. Rather, it puts forward three additional points that represent new powers for the military judiciary:

a) The addition of “their equivalents” in the jurisdiction of the military judiciary. This categorizes crimes connected with the armed forces, their officers and soldiers, and their equivalents, and widens the military judiciary’s sphere of jurisdiction. This stipulation was not in the 2012 constitution.
b) The inclusion of crimes committed by the personnel of the General Intelligence while in the course of and by reason of their duties. This is an additional stipulation, which extends the military judiciary’s authority into areas where it did not previously exist.
c) The inclusion of trials for citizens for attacks on the following: military facilities, camps of the Armed Forces, or their equivalents; military zones or border zones determined as military zones, military equipment, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, documents, military secrets, military public funds, or military factories.
d) The inclusion of crimes pertaining to military service or crimes that represent a direct assault against military officers or personnel because of the performance of their duties.

The article, unprecedented in Egyptian constitutional history represents an expansion of the possibility of military trials for civilians. Such general and ambiguous expressions as “their equivalents” may be used to punish the political opposition and activists.

Lastly, the 1971 constitution limited the right to declare war to Article 150, which stipulated that the president had to gain the approval of the People’s Assembly before making any such pronouncement. However, the 2012 constitution put forward two important amendments: war could not be declared without consulting the CND, the council created in this constitution, and this same council’s assent had to be obtained before any declaration of a state of emergency or of sending forces abroad.

Article 152 of the 2014 constitution put forward two important additions:

a) any declaration of a state of war requires the approval of a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives, instead of the absolute majority (50%+1) required by the 1971 and 2012 constitutions.
b) if the House of Representatives has been dissolved, the approval of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is required, along with that of the CND and the Council of Ministers.

In conclusion, both armies have utilized their interventions to amend their countries’ respective constitutions in a way that expanded the military’s control over the citizenry and political life.

3) **Diminishing Political Life**

The third similarity between the armies of Turkey and Egypt is that once they interfered in political life, whether by direct or indirect coups, not only did they seek to enhance their positions through constitutional amendments, but they also tended to diminish political life so that they would become the dominant political actors.

This trend was very clear in the 1970s crackdowns on leftist political parties and again in the 1980s with raids on both the leftist and rightist political parties. For instance, after the 1980 coup, Turkey’s General Kenan Evren, perceived by politicians as non-partisan, adopted a number of procedures to ban all features of political diversity, among them all political parties and NGOs. Moreover, the military years in power weakened later political parties and enhanced the military’s position in the political equation. For example, Provisional Article 4 of the 1982 Constitution barred the chairmen and senior office holders of all political parties from taking an active role in politics for 10 years.

The Free Officers in Egypt followed the same course, for the Command Council soon reneged on its promises of a true democratic life to be inaugurated by the holding of parliamentary elections in February 1953. In fact, one month before these promised elections, it decreed the dissolution of all political parties and confiscated their properties on the ground that a three-year transitional period was necessary. During the same month, the Liberation Rally, the country’s only national political body, was established to fill the resulting political void and mobilize mass support for the revolution, both of which led to a long period of single-party rule. On top of that, press oversight was restored and a new labor law permitted the firing of workers and criminalized strikes (Naguib, 2003, pp. 180–186). Several weeks later, during February 1953, a new interim constitution was issued to replace the 1923 constitution that had been suspended in December 1952.

Although the Egyptian military did not pursue the same course of action right after its 2011 intervention, in 2013 and a few weeks after ousting President
Morsi, it gradually got rid of all liberal leaders, cracked down on some political parties, and took harsh security actions against others. It has indirectly used the “war on terror” to nationalize all aspects of political life, legislate an unconstitutional “demonstration law” that has placed dozens of people in prison, and jailed hundreds (if not thousands) of Islamist and Liberal activists. This has led to a one-man show starring former Minister of Defense Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, who was elected president by receiving 96% of the votes cast. During this period, laws related to the upcoming parliamentary elections were enacted to favor members of Mubarak’s network and to stand against the existing political parties by eliminating the proportional representation system and reinstating the majoritarian system through which the Mubarak regime dominated the political scene (Abd Rabou, 2014b).

4) Coherence

The last similar feature between both armies is their coherence, the result of a very well-established hierarchal system characterized by a top-down command structure that permits no serious threat to the top generals. In both 1952 and 2011, Egypt’s experienced top-ranked generals acted against ruling politicians in a very coherent and well-orchestrated manner. Even in times of internal clashes, such as those between Naguib and Nasser and later on between Nasser and Amer, no internal factional struggles emerged. All such clashes were put down immediately by the major and powerful generals, thereby showing the organization’s great unity. During 2011 and 2014, and despite the spread of much speculation based on the assumption of clashes among SCAF members, the country’s military has always stood united and spoken with one voice against the fragmented civilians and politicians.

Similarly in Turkey, and despite some clashes and threats among the middle- and lower-ranked officers to the organization’s unity in the 1960s, the army has always followed the hierarchical system of order and acted as a united body against all other competing political forces.

B. Differences

Despite these similarities, two main differences stand out in their approach to politics: the frequency of army intervention and the indirect style of governance.

1) The Frequency of Army Intervention

Whereas the Egyptian army has intervened only twice since the establishment of the republic in 1953 and with a comeback in 2011 upon the January
revolution, the Turkish army has intervened more frequently since the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923. The Turkish army took action in 1960, 1971, and 1980, in addition to the soft coup of 1997. In other words, the Egyptian army has intervened only twice (i.e., an average of once every 25 years); whereas the Turkish army has taken political action five times (i.e., an average of once every 18 years).

This frequent intervention was caused by, among other factors, the instability of Turkey’s domestic political, economic, and security environments due to the fractious nature of competition by civilian actors (mainly political parties). By exploiting the ensuing instability, the army was able to impose its control over the civilian politicians. However, these frequent interventions gradually placed the army on a long-term path of self-learning that caused its officers to realize that removing themselves from politics after securing their economic, social, and organizational benefits is the best path forward.

In contrast, the Egyptian army has yet to learn this lesson and thus needs more time to understand this CMR equation. In other words, the Turkish army’s early involvement in politics (1923) has led both actors (civilians and military) to a level of maturity that its Egyptian counterparts have not yet approached. Moreover, while we can trace Turkey’s multilateralism back to the end of the 1940s (i.e., creating the Democrat Party to end the long period of CHP dominance), Egyptian multilateralism has yet to emerge. Despite the nominal multi-party system under Mubarak, during which the NDP dominated the political and economic scenes, and despite having more than 100 registered political parties after January 2011, Egyptian multilateralism is still too immature to create strong political parties that can counterbalance the army.

2) Ruling without Governing

Another major difference between the two cases is that while the Egyptian army tended to govern and extend direct control over politics after each intervention, the Turkish army tended to rule, which means that it sought to impose indirect governance on the politicians via constitutional arrangements.

In this regard, the Egyptian army governed the country directly after its 1952 intervention through the RCC’s mandate while cracking down on all political parties and civilian platforms. Again in 2011 and after adopting multiple techniques to maneuver against both the Islamists and the secularists, the army nominated its leader (Minister of Defense Abdul Fattah al-Sisi) to govern the country during the uncontested 2014 presidential election.
In contrast, the Turkish army usually sought to lay down the rules of the game without governing. This happened first with the 1960 coup, when it used the National Unity Committee (NUC) to pave the political scene for the 1961 constitution. It then turned power over to the winners and left office that same year. Although it took the army longer to “set the rules of the game” in both the 1971 and 1980 interventions (two years for the first and three years for the latter), the army did transfer power to the elected politicians after securing its political goals as regards political power and competing political and civilian actors. Moreover, in 1997, the army only had to issue 18 measures through the National Security Council to force the resignation of Erbakan’s coalition government.

In conclusion, the styles of both interventions have more similarities than differences. This does not deny, however, that these differences are still significant enough to cause very divergent outcomes. In principle, the main merit of the Turkish army’s interventions, when compared to those of its Egyptian counterpart, is ruling without governing by means of intervening when needed (in its opinion) to return the civilian politicians to the republic’s core ideals and values. In addition, the maturity of Turkey’s military and civilian actors finally enabled them to formulate a balanced formula of civilian control, something that is clearly lacking among their Egyptian counterparts.

The Army Position in Politics: A Comparative Analysis

Now we can take the comparison one step further not only to contrast the history of these interventions, but also to explore both armies’ organizational, societal, security, and political roles more deeply. This section explores all possible internal as well as external factors in an attempt to explain the different outcomes of the civilian-military contests in Turkey and Egypt.

A. The Organization

This section of the study presents the main similarities and differences between both institutions based on three main criteria: social background, organizational coherence, and belief system.

First, the two armies are similar in their composition because their officer corps mainly tend to represent the middle and lower middle classes or, in
other words, the composition of their societies. However, this composition has been changing since the top generals started to act as a closed group that represented only the limited number of families who had been mobilized socially to act as members of the upper middle class.

Until the 1960s, the Turkish army was the agent of national modernization and development and was, therefore, inseparable from the middle class. However, due to its frequent interventions, the army started acting as the state’s guardian and claiming political and economic rights that had been enjoyed by the top generals who had attained a very high level in society.

Similarly, the Egyptian army, which represented the middle and lower classes from the 1940s onward, witnessed a transformation under Mubarak as top generals became separate from society and enjoyed a high level of economic interests. As the result of clientelism in admissions to the military academies, the military’s social composition went from one built mainly on the lower and middle classes (under Nasser) to one filled with the children of well-connected people (under Mubarak). Thus the only place for the poor was in the rank of conscripts.

Second, and as shown in the study’s first section, both armies enjoy a high level of coherence because they adhere to a hierarchical system of order, both organizationally and politically. Although the Turkish army suffered from some poorly disciplined middle- and lower-ranking officers during the 1960s, it eventually was able to enforce discipline and act as a unified political actor. Similarly, the Egyptian army showed unity and discipline in all major historical moments when a political move was needed, as in 1952, 1967, 2011, and 2013. Political or ideological factions have not been part of army dynamics in either nation, with the exception of Turkey in the 1960s.

Third, it has been difficult to conduct direct interviews when dealing with both armies’ belief systems, as well as to read and analyze the results. Drawing upon the interviews we conducted with Turkish military experts and former military officers, as well as performing content analyses of the political speeches made by Egyptian generals, we reached three main conclusions:

(i) Theoretically, the officers’ belief system is mainly framed by the education they receive in military academies and other specialized institutions. Based on his premise of “objective civilian control,” Samuel Huntington treats politics and military service as two different and unbounded areas of expertise. Therefore, officers who have received an inadequate education
in politics should not involve themselves in that realm. In the same regard, politicians should avoid addressing issues that require military expertise. Henceforth, and for the sake of civilian control, civilians should accept the military’s advice only with regard to issues requiring military expertise in the realm of security planning (Huntington, 1956).

Janowitz, however, believes that professional soldiers cannot be detached from domestic political affairs. Moreover, he writes that it is undesirable to leave the tasks of political education exclusively to professionals, despite their high level of responsibility for such assignments. For him, “societal control” is the inevitable method for creating and making civil control meaningful, and this control’s principal objective should be to integrate the military into the social structure and ethos (Janowitz, 1971, p. 439). However, as Kamrava argues, such professional military education leads officers to view themselves as distinct from or even more qualified than other segments of society, including politicians, as has been observed in Egypt, Turkey, and Israel (Kamrava, 2000).

(ii) Critics of military education in Turkey often refer to its structure of indoctrination, which presents the officer corps as the guardians of “Kemalism” against internal threats rather than focusing exclusively on national defense. As Ulucakar (2014) argues,

> [t]he curricula and intentions of professional military education in Turkey are not a direct cause of the continued intervention of the military in politics or its resistance to objective civilian control. Nevertheless, there is [a] clear need to make certain revisions in professional military education, to respond to the need for contemporary forms of democratic control, and to correspond to current needs and the developments occurring in the contemporary democratic world.

In his thesis “Professionalism in the Turkish Military: Help or Hindrance to Civilian Control,” Wick makes this very argument. Therefore, as he notes, military officers are taught to concentrate on preserving this particular ideology against such internal threats as political Islam and Kurdish separatism (Wick, 2000).

Thompson (1972, pp. 36–8) also emphasizes the four perceptions held by officers that provoke military intervention: (1) a vulnerable political system and lack of authority, (2) their view of themselves as guardians
of the state, (3) their views of internal and domestic politics, and (4) their views of political grievances. According to Akyaz Doğan (2002), a Turkish retired army colonel and a scholar of CMR, professional military education in Turkey instills a belief in the necessity of action, particularly within the context of Atatürk’s principles and the notion of the revolution being in danger, as a professional and ethical obligation.

(iii) The Egyptian army is also educated to defend and guard the “republic,” as defined by Nasserist ideas. The Nasser Academy, one of the country’s main military education colleges, teaches both top- and middle-ranking officers military science and national security-related topics, the core doctrine of which is that the “republic” is the norm. However, unlike its Turkish counterpart, this education is not totally secular, for it ensures faith in God and encourages regular prayers at the military bases’ mosques. In fact, most military officers are devout and observant Muslims who do not welcome secular ideas. Yet this religious trend remains defined by the “republic,” that is to say, an Egyptian national version of Islam that respects the “republic” and the Egyptian nation-state. This is related to what Nabulsi calls the Egyptian military’s nationalization of religious institutions, an equation founded by Nasser and still practiced (Nabulusi, 2003).

Although army officers are required to study political science and human rights before they can be promoted, these are just complementary courses that are not taken very seriously. Since 2011, many Egyptian middle-ranking officers mainly attached to military intelligence and related military units joined Cairo University’s political science department to get diplomas or masters of political science. However, very few attended the classes regularly and many did not take them to expand their knowledge. While serving as their graduate-level instructor for two academic years, I learned that they joined this department only to acquire social prestige and secure promotion.

In brief, an analysis of their respective organizations shows that both armies share strong coherent organizational, disciplinary, and loyalty norms. Moreover, both of them started out representing their respective middle classes but eventually became involved in the national economy and politics while adopting a clientelist approach to recruiting new officers. As a result, both sets of top officers became closed groups of middle class people who shared societal values but represented themselves differently in terms of social appearance (i.e., housing, education, and style of consumption). There is,
however, one major difference: the Turkish military is a secular organization entrusted with defending Kemalism, whereas its Egyptian counterpart represents the religious values of society as defined by the nation-state and Nasserism.

B. Perception of the State

In order to analyze the CMR in both cases, one must understand the relationship between the modern nation-state and the army. Actually, both Egypt and Turkey were built by strong army officers or leaders who wanted to establish strong states based on strong modern military institutions. This is hardly a unique approach, for in most Third World nations, building the modern state has been connected with and linked to the existence of just such an army. In Turkey and Egypt, however, the army was both a strong pillar of the state and the agent of national modernization and development.

As stated in chapter two, the Republic of Turkey was declared the successor of the collapsed Ottoman Empire. Atatürk built and developed a modern professional army that helped modernize all other sectors. This role shifted in the 1960s to that of a guardianship type, and constitutional amendments were made to ensure the leading role of the core Kemalist principle—secularism—in society. From the 1960s onwards, the army has monopolized this right and interfered in politics to protect, in its view, the republic’s secular nature. In other words, until the soft coup of 1997, the army considered itself the sole guarantor of the state and its secular nature and used all possible tools, including political intervention as well as social and economic benefits, to fulfill this task. The elected politicians finally corrected and counterbalanced this misguided role during the first decade of the new millennium.

Similarly, and as shown in chapter three, the Egyptian army was the agent of modernization, but not of secularism, during the 1950s and 1960s. As time passed and the Camp David Accord was signed in 1978, the army shifted its role from modernization to guardianship. This role differs slightly from the one in Turkey, however, for the Egyptian army only intervened when called upon to do so via popular uprisings, as happened in 2011 and 2013. This guardianship role was implicit under Mubarak, a time when it enjoyed strategic positions in local governance, social welfare, and the economy (Abd Rabou, 2014a). Its role became explicit in 2011 and, more specifically in 2013, when the president legislated many new laws to favor the army in various infrastructure projects, telecommunications projects, and government positions.
One can say that neither nation ever managed to detach the army from statecraft. However, due to the maturity and long learning experience of both civilians and military officers, among other factors, Turkey has witnessed the unfolding of an advanced CMR formula. This is not yet the case in Egypt.

C. Military-Economic Empires

The similarities between the Turkish and the Egyptian military lie in the economy. In the Turkish case, the military runs its own economic activities unchecked, allowing it to be a capitalist collective actor. Top officers of the Turkish Army are industrialists, merchants, investors, and reinters. Through its main economic arm, OYAK, established shortly after the second military intervention in 1960, the army ensures that retired officers have access to generous financial resources. The enterprise is composed of 60 companies, as of 2010, and invests in industrial production and the financial services sector, including automotive, cement, and iron-steel industries, as well as the energy, mining, agricultural chemicals, food, construction, transportation logistics, domestic-foreign trade, private security, information technology, and tourism sectors.

Moreover, with a budget that is audited by neither legislative nor executive bodies, and with industry that made it a self-sufficient institution with a total revenue that almost doubled from $1.3 billion to $2.3 billion in 2008, the Turkish army has become a socio-economic super-power. Despite claims that the Turkish army is politically neutral, its major economic role denies economic neutrality, and indeed jeopardizes its claim to political neutrality.

Similarly, the Egyptian army enjoys enormous economic independence. As of 2013, military expenditure has mounted to consume 1.67% of the GDP, placing Egypt in position 53 worldwide in terms of military expenditure (CIA 2015). Through several arms, such as the Ministry of Military Production, the Arab Organization for Industrialization, and the National Service Projects Organization, the army enjoys a ever-tightening grip over the economic activities of Egypt. If the military economic assistance received by Egypt from the USA, amounting to $1.3 billion from 1987 to the present, is considered, it may be concluded that the Egyptian army is a major economic actor.

Like its Turkish counterpart, most of the economic activities of the Egyptian army are not audited. Over the last three decades, the army has refused to reveal any information about its interests in the economy. With an estimated 25%–40% share in Egypt’s economic activities (Abul-Magd, 2011), the
Egyptian army as an economic empire is able to act coherently in the current delicate transitional period and has managed to resist the imposition of civilian control, including the 2014 efforts of the constitution to keep the military at bay.

D. The External Factor

Understanding the international aspect of the CMR in both countries can help us determine where both militaries stand in contemporary politics. The international role has been a vital dynamic for both militaries, but from different perspectives. In Turkey, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and other western organizations have played a significant role in helping civilians impose their control over the military. In 2004, Umit Cizre (2004, p. 107) reported his finding that one of the essential factors that blocked Turkey’s accession to the EU was the prevailing civil-military relationship.

While the EU was prescribing a package of political requirements during the 1990s and 2000s, the strengthening military establishment and the army’s guardianship role were regarded as obstacles. The EU accession criteria suggest that a nation’s military forces should be strong against external threats in a professional manner, but politically disengaged with regard to internal public affairs (Cizre, 2004).

As a result, in 2001 and 2003, Turkey adopted two major constitutional reforms, as well as eight legislative packages between February 2002 and July 2004. The democratic packages of July 2003, formally put into effect on August 7, 2004, encompassed an amendment to some articles of the Act on the NSC that tipped the balance of CMR (in terms of membership) in favor of civilians. The package also revoked the NSC’s executive powers that either exceeded or contradicted the executive branch’s prerogatives. Thus the NSC was turned into an advisory council instead of an executive one. The Eighth Harmonization Package, passed by Parliament on May 21, 2004, further consolidated civilian oversight of the defense budget and removed military representatives from the Council on Higher Education (Yuksek Ogretim Kurumu, YOK) and the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (Radyo Televizyon Ust Kurumu, RTUK). It also eliminated the State Security Courts, which tried crimes against the state, an inheritance from the 1980 military coup (Cizre Spring, 2011).
The European Commission has been evaluating Turkey’s application to join the EU based on its fulfillment of the political criteria set out in the Copenhagen European Council meeting of 1993. The Copenhagen Criteria, as they are now known, oblige all aspiring members to meet a number of criteria, such as institutional stability, freedom of expression, the entrenchment of human rights, protection for minorities, and an efficient market economy. Although CMR are not directly referred to in the criteria, the document is read in a way that necessitates limiting the extent to which the military establishment is independent of democratic control. In this context, the European Commission’s annual reports on Turkey have called for the reform of certain institutional areas. For example, in November 2001, the Commission reported, “The basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, but a number of fundamental issues, such as civilian control over the military, remain to be effectively addressed” (EC, 2001, p. 97). In fact, the EU’s ongoing reports (EC, 1998; EC, 1999; EC, 2000; EC, 2001) on Ankara’s accession progress have emphasized the need for structural changes in the CMR’s structure to enhance civilian control and bring the institutional structure in line with EU standards (Cizre, 2004).

In the case of the Egyptian military, this external role mainly involves highlighting an increasing U.S. role in Egyptian politics both before and after January 2011. Post-January 2011, this role has both mushroomed and become far more comprehensive and subtle, so that the U.S. can network with all of the main internal actors, among them the SCAF, the presidency, both Islamic and Liberal political parties, and others.

If the external actors involved support civilian attempts to control the military, civilians are more likely to adopt robust strategies to impose such control. First, before and after the revolution, the U.S. was always the country’s most important strategic partner and influential actor. It is also Egypt’s largest trading partner. Although there is not yet a free trade agreement, many 5

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5 At the Luxembourg Summit held on December 12, 1997, the EU turned down Turkey’s application for full membership because of its tarnished record on fundamental rights, mostly incurred as a result of fighting a war to protect its internal security against Kurdish and Islamist groups. At the Helsinki European Council meeting of December 10–11, 1999, this decision was reversed as a consequence of a series of positive actions, including the Turkish-Greek rapprochement after the August 17, 1999, earthquake and Washington’s decisive pressure on the EU. The Helsinki Summit called for opening accession negotiations with six countries, but decided that Turkey would benefit from a pre-accession strategy to support the same reforms as the other candidate countries.
Egyptian products are given free entry to the U.S. through various American economic programs and agreements, among them the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the Qualifying Industrial Zones Protocol (QIZ) among Egypt, Israel, and the U.S. (MFA, 2015).

Second, the United States has provided significant military and economic assistance since the late 1970s, justified by policymakers as “an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and on sustaining the March 1979 Egyptian Israeli peace treaty.” U.S. administrations usually perceive Egypt as influencing Middle Eastern developments in line with American interests (Sharp, 2015). For instance, before the events of June 30, 2013, President Obama requested $1.55 billion in total bilateral aid to Egypt during Fiscal Year 2013 ($1.3 billion in military aid and $250 million in economic aid) (Sharp, 2013b).

Egypt is strategically important to the United States because it is needed to guarantee Israel’s security by maintaining the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty, as well as maintaining U.S. naval access to the Suez Canal. U.S. policymakers view it as the largest Arab country and thus seek to promote both domestic democracy and economic growth (Sharp, 2013b, p. 8). Egypt, in turn, is highly dependent on American military and economic aid, which accounts for more than $1 billion per year. Between 1948 and 2015, the United States provided Egypt with $76 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars, not adjusted for inflation). The economic aid since 1975 amounted to $30 billion (USAID, 2015). Egyptian-American strategic relations began after the 1973 war, when the U.S. brokered a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

Since 1979, Egypt has been the second-largest recipient of U.S. bilateral foreign assistance, the largest recipient being Israel. From 1987 onward, it has received $1.3 billion a year in military aid. It also receives the bulk of foreign aid funds from three primary accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET) (see Table 2). In addition, it occasionally receives relatively small sums from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account and the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account. NADR funds support counterterrorism training, and INCLE funds support police training and respect for human rights in law enforcement (Sharp, 2013b).

U.S. military assistance involves financing arms sales, upgrading existing equipment, follow-up and maintenance of existing arms, and co-producing
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military tanks and equipment. Although the exact amount of Egyptian military spending is unknown, it is estimated that U.S. military aid covers as much as 80% of the Defense Ministry’s weapons procurement costs (Sharp, 2013b). Other estimates argue that the $1.3 million military aid yearly represents 25% of its total yearly defense spending (Alterman, 2012).

This military aid has remained intact regardless of the acrimony over U.S. democracy promotion efforts. However, this has not been the case with economic aid, as could be seen during the 1980s and 1990s when Egypt received large loans and grants to support large-scale USAID education, sanitation, and telecommunication infrastructure projects. ESF to Egypt was reduced from $815 million in FY 1998 to $411 million in FY 2008. When the relations between the Bush and Mubarak regimes suffered due to Mubarak’s reaction to Washington’s democracy agenda in the Arab world, the Bush administration asked Congress to cut ESF aid by half in FY 2009 to $200 million. This was done. When Obama took office in 2009, he sought a $50

Table 2  U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt in $ U.S. millions (Sharp, 2013a, p. 18)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>IMET</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948–1997</td>
<td>23,288.6</td>
<td>22,353.5</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>45,669.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>815.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2,116.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>775.0</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2,076.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>727.3</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2,028.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>695.0</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1,996.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>655.0</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1,956.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>911.0</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2,212.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>571.6</td>
<td>1,292.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1,865.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>530.7</td>
<td>1,289.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1,821.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>490.0</td>
<td>1,287.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1,778.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>450.0</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1,751.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>411.6</td>
<td>1,298.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1,702.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>250.0</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1,551.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>250.0</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1,551.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>249.5</td>
<td>1,297.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1,548.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>250.0</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1,551.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31,320.3</td>
<td>41,809.2</td>
<td>44.54</td>
<td>73,174.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Egyptian and the Turkish Militaries: Comparative Analysis

million increase in economic aid for FY 2010, which Congress also approved (Sharp, 2013b).

Tracking America’s steps during the transitional period shows that it never chose one side over the other, but tried to maintain good relations with both the civilian elites and the military. This is clear from the series of visits its diplomats and representatives paid to different actors during the transitional period and especially after the parliamentary elections, which revealed the weight of different political actors. This knowledge helped direct U.S. networking efforts. In January 2012, after the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and al-Nour Party controlled the majority of seats in both chambers of Parliament (i.e., the Shura Council and the People’s Assembly), U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson visited the headquarters of the MB and the al-Nour Party for the first time in the same week (Al-Masry al-Youm, 2015).

Moreover, from February 2011 to September 2012, the U.S. provided $90 million to support democratic development through technical expertise on best practices in election administration and campaigning. It also supported election monitoring and voter education programs, although no funding was provided to political parties or candidates. Other components included programs designed to increase young Egyptians’ knowledge of democratic processes and develop their political party-building skills, as well as help independent worker organizations establish democratic management structures and advocate for their members in collective bargaining negotiations. Some funds were also provided for domestic human rights organizations.

During the transitional period, American diplomats assured the nation that they favored no specific party or group; rather, they supported the democratization process per se (Al-Sanhory, 2011). They also asserted more than once the importance of holding parliamentary and presidential elections and then transferring authority to a civilian elected government (Zein-Al-Dein, 2011).

In other words, the U.S. was generating incentives for the Egyptian military to internalize the principle of civilian control, especially through its delivery of a great deal of military aid. Those incentives included the possibility of suspending this assistance, including military aid, if Cairo did not transition to democracy. Congress conditioned assistance on an executive branch certification that Cairo was moving toward democracy, as was clear in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, (P.L. 112–74), which specifies that funds can only be released after the Secretary of State certifies that
Egypt is supporting such a transition by holding free and fair elections and implementing policies that protect the freedom of expression, association, and religion as well as due process (Sharp, 2013b, p. 13). The administration may waive this certification under certain conditions. Former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton first exercised the waiver on March 23, 2012. Secretary of State John Kerry exercised the waiver for FY 2013 in early May 2013. This condition was also included in the Consolidated Appropriations Acts of FY 2014 and 2015 (P.L. 113–76 and P.L. 113–235 respectively). As of February 2015, the Secretary of State has not made a determination that would waive democracy-related certification requirements and allow for the provision of assistance (Sharp, 2015).

In his speech on the day of Morsi’s ouster, Obama called upon the Egyptian military to “move quickly and responsibly to return full authority back to a democratically elected civilian government as soon as possible through an inclusive and transparent process” (Obama, 2013). He also implied the possibility of suspending all U.S. assistance.

In addition, the U.S. enjoys multiple potential levers of influence over Egypt that it can utilize to encourage the military to subordinate itself to civilian administration. For example, Egypt cannot secure loans from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and similar institutions without American support, for the U.S. has the largest quota and hence the most significant voting power in both institutions.

Foreign powers play an essential and dynamic role in stability and change of CMR. This role was decisive in Turkey, for it enabled Ankara to push for more civilian control over the military. In the case of Egypt, however, it is less likely this factor affects civilian control as it did in Turkey. In fact, Turkey’s passion to join the EU has allowed this foreign factor to positively affect civilian control. However, in the case of Egypt, foreign actors, mainly the U.S. and the EU, are only interested in regional stability and view Egypt as playing a pivotal role there. Thus there is no direct threat to European or any other western identities that would push them to promote civilian control in Egypt, except in a very minimal manner.

E. Internal Security

The Turkish army’s omnipresence in internal security issues has been historically attached to the Kurdish question, as it was Ankara’s chief anti-separatist tool. Today, the PKK, the Kurds’ main militant party, is stationed
primarily outside of Turkey, a reality that has minimized the army’s presence in internal security matters. As a result, it has become very involved in planning the defense policy against PKK terrorism, now launched mainly from Iraqi Kurdistan.

Turkey has regarded its Kurds as outsiders for decades. Atatürk modeled his promised republic on the somewhat ethnically homogeneous European nation-states of the time, which meant that there was little room for allowing any open expression of non-Turkic ethnic or national identities. Conversely, Ankara has always tended to deny the Kurds’ presence while trying to crush their dissent by forcibly integrating its “mountain Turk” (meaning Kurdish) population. Recently, however, it has entrusted this task to the Southeast Anatolian Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi [GAP]).

The danger that religion represented to the newly created republic’s secularist identity was one of the main causes of the later military interventions. The general staff considered the Kurdish population part of this danger and ended up establishing a “village guard system” that militarized those southeastern Anatolia tribal leaders who showed loyalty to the state in order to keep their regions peaceful (Çancı and Şen, 2011, pp. 42–6) However, this system led to increased anti-state resentment on the part of many Kurds because it strengthened intra-tribal tensions. Meanwhile, the PKK, which had begun to confront the government in the late 1970s, increased its terrorist activities by directly targeting village guards (Robins, 1993).

To stop the deteriorating security and economic situation of the 1970s, the military stepped in in 1980 and issued a new constitution in 1982. This relatively short intervention had a devastating impact on the Kurdish question. Ankara has always accused the PKK of receiving support from external sources, including the Soviet Union; the Kurds of Iraq, Syria, and Iran; and Damascus (Brown, 1999). As the 1980s progressed and the village guard system failed to provide the desired level of security, Ankara declared a state of emergency that lasted from 1987 until 2002. During this period, 378,335 Kurds were forced to evacuate their villages, and another 55,371 were arrested on terrorism-related charges (Bozkurt, 2009).

The political instability of the 1980s and 1990s, caused by short-lived coalition governments, resulted in the application of inconsistent policies toward the Kurds. Therefore, Prime Minister (later President) Turgut Özal (1983–89) as well as Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel (1991–93) sought a new policy that
would counter the traditional one set by the military command. Soon after reassuming the office of Prime Minister, Demirel declared:

> Turkey’s border, flag, and official language cannot be debated, but ethnic groups [sic] demand to retain their own ethnic identity and culture should not be rejected ... They have their own history, language, and folklore. If they wish to develop them, let them do so. (Hatem, 2013)

However, by the late 1990s and early 2000s, a variety of events had led Ankara’s policy to evolve. The deployment of Turkish forces on the Syrian border in 1998 led to Abdullah Öcalan’s exile from Syria and subsequent capture. This development caused the PKK to transform its strategy into one of peaceful opposition at the urging of Öcalan, who announced that the Kurds “want to give up the armed struggle and have full democracy.” (Kinzer, 2001, p. 127) As a reaction, the AKP adopted the “Kurdish initiative.” Following the June 2011 election and the repeal of the previous year’s cease-fire, Öcalan called upon the PKK to abandon the armed struggle in Turkey during March 2013 as part of a cease-fire agreement, which is still in effect (Tol, 2013).

Similarly, the unstable domestic security environment in Egypt was the main reason why its armed forces intervened and took control of the country. Since the 1986 uprisings of the central police in Cairo, when Mubarak was forced to call in the troops to impose a day-long curfew, he realized the risk of calling upon the military to act in the political sphere. After ousting General Abu-Ghazalah, Mubarak was very keen to detach the armed forces from internal security issues, as can be seen in the fact that he did not summon the military back to the streets after that particular incident.

Nevertheless, in the last decade before the revolution, the EAF felt uneasy with the police’s increasing role amid Mubarak’s failed economic policies, not to mention the rise of Mubarak’s son Gamal in internal politics. Although they were excluded from a direct role in internal security issues, the entrenching of many former generals in the Interior Ministry and the General Intelligence Directorate, when combined with the role of military retirees in the local government establishment, suggested a certain degree of cooperation among the military and security structures in terms of regime maintenance before the revolution (Sayigh, 2012).
In the aftermath of the security breakdown on January 28, 2011, SCAF has played the major role in the internal security establishment by assuming the responsibility for ending sit-ins and demonstrations, protecting important institutions, and dealing with sectarian crises. After Mubarak’s ouster, SCAF soon brought the State Security Investigations Service under its direct control, using the powerful General Intelligence Directorate as its pivotal arm alongside Military Intelligence.

For the first time since the revolution, on August 5, 2011, SCAF closed Tahrir Square and prevented protests there. Amid the demonstrations in front of the Israeli embassy on September 10, 2011, SCAF also declared emergency law to deal with any security breakdown.

Once he assumed power, Morsi was expected to change the equilibrium of the country’s internal security establishment. He changed the interior minister, but consistently failed to reform the ministry itself and thus was obliged to recall the military whenever he needed to sustain the fragile internal security. Amid the terrorist attacks on Sinai during August 2012, the army reasserted its crucial role in maintaining internal security in light of the huge army arsenal deployed during those operations. So far, the military is the only actor able to maintain security in Sinai. Moreover, amid the demonstrations triggered by his decision to amend the constitutional declaration in November 2012, the police seemed too weak to protect the regime. When the call was made for a public referendum in December 2012, only the army could protect and guard the process.

After Morsi’s ouster in July 2013, and specifically after ending his supporters’ sit-in in Rabaa’a Square on August 14, 2013, military personnel and equipment were again deployed in the streets, where they imposed a partial curfew for a few weeks in some regions. The constitutional referendum and subsequent presidential election were secured by military personnel and their equivalents in the security forces. The army’s role of preserving internal security has continued with respect to the flow of the deadly terrorist attacks on Sinai, Cairo, and other parts of Egypt.

Thus internal security was a main platform used by both the Turkish and Egyptian armies to intervene in politics and hinder civilian control. However, unlike in Egypt, Turkey’s elected civilian governments managed to find a way to resolve the Kurdish question, which has given them a chance to assume at least part of the military’s internal security role.
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Why Civilian Control Succeeded in Turkey but Not in Egypt

Before delving into this matter, one should highlight that some Turkish specialists still doubt whether civilian control will remain in Turkey. For instance, Nihat Ozcan (2014) believes that civilian control over the armed forces is not yet complete. Conversely, he believes that the AKP dominates the decision-making process and is interested only in its own goals. Although he admits that it is too early to anticipate how the army will react to this party dominance, he insists that “this is not a finished job,” and that many events are yet to follow. With the attempted coup of July 2016 one should reconsider the CMR model in Turkey under the rule of AKP and Erdogan. Nevertheless, one can still talk about a real advance in civilian control when compared to what has happened in Egypt, where the army now controls political life.

In this section, we draw main five conclusions in an attempt to explain these different situations. These concern army maturity, foreign incentives, civilian coherence, the Islamic factor, and socio-economic development.

A. Army Maturity

One main reason for civilian control in Turkey could be related to the maturity and experience that the army has gained over its more than 50 years of engagement with politics. For one thing, it has learned not to jeopardize its unity by becoming too deeply involved in politics (Keyman, 2014; Ozcan, 2014). Unlike its Egyptian counterpart, which has started to oust elected governments only very recently, the Turkish army stepped back from the official exposed decision-making process and left it to elected politicians.

As illustrated earlier, this does not imply the Turkish army is totally out of the picture. Rather, it only means that the army is more cautious vis-à-vis politics and now prefers to approach elected politicians within power-sharing frameworks instead of governing alone. An institution with long-term traditions, the army still believes that it knows much better than the elected civilians and is more knowledgeable about national security issues. In 2007, for instance, the army challenged President Gul’s election based on its own interpretation of the constitution. However, maturity led them to retreat from direct political interventions, especially against a strong elected popular party like the AKP (Mahcupyan, 2014).
B. International Incentives

While international actors are always ready to sustain a totalitarian regime in Egypt as long as it protects their regional interests and stability, Turkey’s long-standing relationship with both NATO and the EU has tended toward democratic consolidation and civilian control. Since Turkey began seeking full EU membership in 2000, the AKP has been able to use this card as leverage to sustain democracy and keep the army out of politics. In fact, it used both the Copenhagen Criteria and periodical reports that evaluated democracy and civilian control in the country to improve its democratic and civilian control arrangements by amending the 1980 constitution. This played a pivotal role in strengthening the political power of civilians in the coming decades.

However, what will happen to this civilian control if Turkey’s EU membership continues to be delayed and resisted? One should expect that if Turkey is not admitted, a possible shift in the current equation of democratic strength and civilian control may occur, given the tendency of some Turkish citizens and political actors to pay too much attention to the EU’s negative reactions.

C. Civilian Maturity

If the military’s long experience in politics has led its officers to retreat from direct intervention, the maturity of civilian and political actors is no less important to understanding the advancement of civilian control in this context. As shown earlier, while Egypt enjoyed a very short period of genuine multi-party politics amid the January 2011 revolution, the Turkish multi-party system started in the 1940s and continues to function, albeit with many ups and downs.

As a result, democracy was consolidated in Turkey due to (1) the growing maturity of many political actors on how to resolve political disputes without summoning the army and (2) through rationalizing political behavior and, in particular, voting behavior. Organization, negotiation, and dialogue are some of values that have not yet entered into the outlook of Egypt’s political and civilian actors.

D. The Islamic Factor

One cannot accurately understand how Turkey achieved civilian control without analyzing the role of the AKP, a political party with an Islamic
background and attitude. Its role has drawn attention not only because it was the first one to remain in power for years without being ousted by the army, but also because it brought about economic development and gained an increasing degree of trust from the general public as well as attention from international commentators and specialists. Its Egyptian counterpart, the Freedom and Justice Party, continues to be criticized for failing to lead Egypt after the revolution.

Many other factors should be mentioned in this context. First, as Keyman (2014) notes, the nature of Islam in Turkey is more secular and modern than it is in Egypt. Due to Atatürk’s revolution and the country’s geographical position vis-à-vis Europe and western civilization, a different version of Islam seemed to develop, one that appears to be able to work well with modernity and secularism. One still remembers how Egypt’s Muslim Brothers were shocked when the Turkish prime minister remarked during a Cairo press conference that “Turkey is a secular country.”

The AKP not only offered a new version of modern Islam, but also showed professionalism in growing the country’s economy and enhancing the lifestyles of so many middle and lower middle class people. Learning from the Refah (Welfare) Party’s very short experience in 1997 under Necmittin Erbakan, the AKP was able to reach an unspoken deal with both the army and the society as regards civilian control and democratic consolidation. Respecting individual rights and emphasizing the republic’s secular nature, as well as enhancing people’s lives, helped the AKP to implement civilian control. These factors have all been missed by Egypt’s Islamists, who seem unable to take the necessary progressive actions needed to lead a coalition that could prevent a military intervention.

E. Sociological Development

Other experts like Ozdil (2014) and Gundogar (2014) believe that there is yet another aspect of this whole narrative, namely, the rise of both an Islamic and an Anatolian bourgeoisie (i.e., Turkey’s lower classes). Members of the latter group are getting educated and becoming entrepreneurs and new business people. In addition, they are influencing the business networks and the bureaucracy to continue supporting AKP governance and to oppose any military intervention, which would only bring about unexpected socio-economic outcomes.
This aspect simply means that the economic, social, technological, and international developments that started in the 1990s have influenced Turkey’s domestic atmosphere. Proof of this can be found in the improved economy, health, and education indicators related to the middle classes. As a result, democratic ideas have been consolidated and no room has been left for old-style military interventions (Mahcupyan, 2014).

The Future of Civilian Control in Turkey

Experts are divided over the future of civilian control. Some analysts believe that the AKP has introduced a successful model of civilian control that will continue in the future due to the party’s determination to extend its control over the army, bureaucracy, and other business circles (Gundogar, 2014). Other experts, however, still believe that civilian control is far from ensured. In this regard, while Ulucakar (2014) agrees with Gundogar (2014) that the AKP is determined to extend its control over the army, he still has doubts about the great organizational and economic independence that the army enjoys. It is true that the army obeys the chain of command, at the top of which is the Prime Minister, but it was also true that although the civilian government has controlled the army in the past, this control did not hinder military interventions. For instance, even though Ankara managed to force more than 200 generals to retire during the 1950s so that it could extend its control, the army did pull off a successful coup in 1960 (Ulucakar, 2014). If one recalls Ozcan’s (2014) view that what is going on now in Turkey is only AKP control over state institutions instead of real civilian control, and that the post-Arab Spring Middle East is witnessing dramatic shifts, the defeat of political Islam in most Arab nations, and the great threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), we can conclude that civilian control seems to be only temporary. The only thing that currently guarantees the party staying in power is its ability to provide economic and security stability. Given the last attempted coup, Turkey is heading either to a civilian non-democratic control, or to a vicious circles of military coups and political violence.
Scholars of democratic transition differentiate between three main phases in the consolidation of a democracy in a given country. The first phase occurs when a number of social and political forces struggle for power, the initial aim not necessarily being the establishment of a democratic system. The second phase occurs when political leaders explicitly accept the “existence of diversity in unity” and agree to institutionalize certain fundamental rules for democracy. The final phase occurs when politicians and citizens alike establish these rules as applying to other issues and “adjust to the new democratic structure” (Serra 2010, 10).

Egypt currently appears to be at the first stage, in which all political and social factions are struggling over power and resources. However, it is an unequal struggle, as one strong institution—the army—is highly superior to all other social and political forces. Therefore, one might claim that Egypt will be unable to embark on a real democratic transition unless the army is well controlled by civilians and politicians. In the section below, I offer a number of conclusions and policy recommendations in this regard, given the current political and social dynamics in Egypt. I begin by recommending policies for all stakeholders, including civic actors, politicians, scholars and intellectuals, Islamists, and international actors. I then propose a new theoretical model of CMR in Egypt.

The main aims of this concluding chapter are (1) to offer policy recommendations to Egyptian stakeholders as to a strategy that might lead to the desired level of civilian control and (2) to present a new analytical model to address Egypt’s CMR.
How Can Civilian Control Be Achieved in Egypt?

The Turkish case gave us some insight into this question, although Egypt does have its own unique elements. Egyptians should not only seek “civilian control,” but also “democratic civilian control,” as many other countries, including Turkey after 2014, Russia, and China, have some sort of civilian control by enabling civilian leadership (the Communist Party in China, the President of Russia, and the President of Turkey after 2014) to have an upper hand over military actors, but this civilian supremacy does not exist in a democratic context. Moreover, we should differentiate not only between the “civilian” and the “military” spheres in Egypt; we should also consider a third, “religious” sphere where Islamists play another active role and complicate the equation of CMR, as they are mainly seen by both civilians and military actors as non-civilians. Learning from the Turkish CMR and benefiting from the literature review, we can recommend certain policies to achieve civilian control and can conclude by suggesting an amended model of how to best approach its Egyptian counterpart.

A. Policy Recommendations

First of all, we have to realize that most of the current literature approaches the Egyptian military as nothing more than a corporatist actor, which is not an actual reflection of the rather complicated reality. It is true that the Egyptian army runs a lot of projects, as was seen in both chapter three and this chapter, and that it is therefore competing with other actors for the state’s resources, including business circles and various interest groups. However, the middle- and lower-ranking officers, as well as the Egyptian general public, do not perceive it that way.

As this study has shown, middle and lower class officers do not derive the same economic advantages, as do the top generals. They mainly join and swear loyalty to the army because they believe that they are guarding the republic and its national security. Throughout my personal contacts with these officers in classroom settings, they come across as having conservative attitudes and as not benefitting from the army’s economic interests as much as do the top generals. However, this realization is somewhat offset by their deep belief, as well as that of the general public, that officers play a sacred role in defending the country. In fact, one can say that those who have supported it from June 30, 2013, onward regard the army as the country’s only remaining unified institution and supporting it as a national duty.
Therefore, scholarly understanding of its corporatist role as one factor that determines the CMR in the country should be joined with another factor, namely, the public perception of them and their role in guarding the nation. Although the general public remains polarized due to the army’s recent intervention amid the events of June 30, those segments that continue to support it and consider it a guardianship institution make all the difference when it comes to the overall CMR equation.

Second, one should clearly state that the ongoing struggle makes civilian control and consolidated democracy highly unlikely. Civilian control might be achieved through and as an outcome of political struggles, as happened in Turkey. However, the ongoing security struggle, in which the army and other security institutions are depicted as being engaged in a sacred anti-terrorism mission as opposed to being weak civilian and political establishments, does not support any return to civilian control. Henceforth, negotiations are needed to calm the heated atmosphere so that a new scenario for civilian control can be formulated.

In this context, one can suggest two broad scenarios under which civilian control could be achieved: (1) a sudden shift in the current political equation that would force Egypt’s generals to leave politics immediately and focus on national security. For example, a military defeat or an economic disaster would make it very hard for the military to remain in politics, as would a third revolution that might force it out of power and (2) the army leaving politics after a prolonged process of self-learning that finally convinces it that the price of direct intervention in politics is too high to bear, whereas the country’s civilians, politicians, scholars, and academicians manage to rebuild and consolidate democracy, all the while waiting for the right historical moment to assert their control over it.

The first scenario is actually pretty unrealistic, for the army’s historical discourse does not seem to support its retreat from politics after sudden changes in CMR equations. In fact, its deep relationship with all state institutions, including the bureaucracy, security, local governance, and media, have always enabled it to maneuver, change faces, and return to political power. The 1967 military defeat and the 2011 ouster of Mubarak are but some major examples in this regard. Under this scenario as well, there is more than one alternative to military rule. One must realize that civilian rule is not only the opposite of military rule, but also of religious rule, for forcing a particular religious platform or interpretation into the political sphere excludes other civilians
from the political process. The current discourse of many Islamist factions, among them Salafists and Jihadists, seeks to exclude all other citizens from governance and place the entire political process under the Sharia, which deprives millions of non-Muslims and those Muslims who do not agree with them of their political and civil rights. If these groups replaced the military rule, can one really call this civilian control? Thus a paradox emerges: does such a reality mean that we should exclude Islamists from the political process when the military is in power?

Given the above, the second scenario seems more achievable (and desirable) because it involves a prolonged process of negotiations and conditioned concordances during which civilians and politicians can consolidate their establishments and organizations. The army can also use this period to learn some harsh lessons by remaining in politics. This scenario may lead to a more solid and realistic form of civilian control. The following sections suggest policies for stakeholders who have an interest in civilian control, namely, civilians, politicians, scholars, Islamists, and international actors.

First: For Civilians

Civilians can be defined as all those who work in the non-governmental sector and focus mainly on civil work: what might be called civil society organizations and activists. If this sector is serious about helping Egypt impose civilian control, given the current circumstances, its members need to:

1. **Disseminate the Culture of Civility Among the General Public:**
   Despite the long history of Egyptian NGOs and civil society organizations, civic culture remains unpopular among Egyptians because (1) the restrictive laws under which civil society organizations have to function leave them little space in which they can form free and full interactions with the public, and (2) that same public generally views civil society work as somehow attached to elites and high-class well-educated people, as opposed to ordinary citizens. Civilians have to continue to struggle against these restrictions and spread civic culture further afield via social media platforms as well as direct interaction with the public through popular campaigns, street theatre, and street conferences, all of which worked well between 2011 and 2013.

2. **Diversify Methods and Tactics to Approach the Government:**
   After the February 2012 crackdown on civil society organizations and the subsequent other minor raids and warnings directed toward NGOs, which
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were accompanied by a media campaign that distorted their image and functions and accused them of espionage, many NGOs suspended their work or left the country to continue their campaigns abroad. Such decisions do nothing to help change the political equation or further the possibility of imposing civilian control. The historical record of the dialectical relationship between NGOs and Cairo suggests that the latter welcomes such boycotts and is able to create its own fake NGOs to fill the vacuum. Henceforth, it is recommended that NGOs keep diversifying their methods to approach the government through resistance, reverse media campaigns, and registering under restrictive laws, while continuing to work on their original missions as much as they can. In conclusion, civilians should maintain a relationship with the government in order to resist, continue to function, and give it a hard time in general.

3. **Diversify Activities:** It is really helpful to have an increasing number of NGOs working across human, political, or civil rights agendas, including minority empowerment. However, and for the sake of civilian control, it is also recommend to have as many NGOs as possible working to fulfill the people’s socio-economic needs. While this will decrease the amount of government attention usually given to other organizations working on political issues, it will also attract the public and get the people more involved with civic activities. One major reason why the public does not recognize, support, or even sympathize with civil society organizations is that they do not feel directly attached to their missions and goals. Given that at least 40% of Egyptians live under the poverty line, 60% are illiterate, and 30% are unemployed, touching upon the people’s basic needs is one recommended method for disseminating civic culture and hence imposing civilian control.

4. **Change the Discourse:** The country’s civilians have to change their discourse in order to connect more deeply with the people’s direct culture and needs. The elitist, western-flavored discourse adopted by most civilians and activists, whether in terms of their personal lives, connections, or interactions with the public sphere, needs to change if civilians truly want to disseminate their culture and mission. Their self-isolation via self-built elitist walls and narratives prevents the widespread acceptance and adoption of their civic mission. Prioritizing their discourse agenda as regards addressing their society’s pressing needs, using more popular terminologies, and interacting directly with the public will further the goal of ultimate civilian control.
Second: For Politicians

I define politicians as those people who are actively working on various political platforms like political parties, social movements, lobby groups, parliamentarians, and others. Of course, these recommendations are made only to those politicians who believe in civilian control.

1. **Consolidating Democracy:** One of the most important insights gained from the Turkish experience is that if democracy is not consolidated, civilian control remains no more than a distant dream. In the case of Egypt, any consolidation of democracy will have to begin with the appearance of strong political parties, social movements, and all other forms of political actors in the public sphere. This “strong” existence will happen only if well-organized, coherent political actors exist. Thus the first step toward asserting civilian control is to initiate internal changes in their political institutions that will allow them to enhance their organizational and representational skills.

   This necessitates internal reform and direct interaction with the public. Internal reform means keeping the internal rules alive; building a strong organizational, management, and operational system; and merging with similar political parties or splitting one’s own political party, if necessary.

   As with civilians, politicians also need to adopt some populist strategies to keep a close eye on the people’s needs and to establish long-lasting links in order to develop mobilization, raise funds, and formulate representational tactics. In this regard, one question usually puzzles the adherents of change and democracy in Egypt: should we boycott elections if we cannot determine whether they are free and fair? This actually leads to the second recommendation: diversify tactics.

2. **Diversify Tactics:** While it is easy to recommend strategies for dealing with totalitarian but stable political regimes, it is not so easy to do so when confronted with totalitarian but unstable or transitional regimes. This is the case now in Egypt. Thus the political equations have not been finalized and there is some room, albeit not very much, in which to maneuver, lobby, and resist. One may boycott one election, but one would be ill-advised to quit politics or simply turn one’s back on democracy.

   In this context, politicians should lobby vigorously for the constitutional and other legal reforms needed to bring the military gradually under
parliamentary control. Reforms like more budgetary oversight and limiting the military courts’ jurisdiction over civilians are just some of the needed reforms that could be approached over time, provided that their supporters continue to lobby and apply pressure for them.

Recommended tactics for usage during a transitional period include keeping one’s political organization alive, enhancing one’s organizational and political awareness, maintaining some kind of presence in the media and all other public platforms, boycotting one election but participating in the next one, lobbying the regime to amend and reform electoral and representation laws, and working to pass and then implement laws guaranteeing political rights. All of these necessitate maintaining an open door policy toward both the regime and the public, as well as realizing that ethical positions are good things to have but (may) have to be compromised to secure victories in a complicated political game.

3. Changing Political Discourses: This strategy is not only about changing vocabularies or appearing less elitist, for it also requires an ongoing process of revising the narrative and revisiting how political actors read history and their own political positions at a specific point in time. Politicians and activists must change slogans like “Down with military rule,” if for no other reason than that the media and the regime alike have successfully portrayed them as proof that pro-democracy political actors, rebels, and activists are seeking to foment military fragmentation in order to bring about chaos and disorder. Democrats should not change their positions in response to political blackmail and a defamation campaign, but it is no less true that democrats and reformists should keep in mind that both the media and the regime intentionally traumatize the people so that they can pursue their own agendas. One simple tactic in this context is to change the slogans while keeping the same content. For instance, “Down with military rule” could be turned into “Isolate the army from political affairs.” The real intention behind the former call, which emerged in 2011 and soon became a popular slogan and an icon for rebels, was simply to ask the generals to hand power over to elected politicians and civilians, not to fragment or defeat the army. If one slogan is raised to attack another party’s intention and will, why not try to modify it and use it against its originator?

Revisiting one’s own narrative of political events and positions is just as important. Dealing with June 30 as simply a “military coup” or a “revolution” does not explain all of the complicated before-and-after
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developments. For example, I am still convinced that, academically speaking, the army’s ouster of Morsi might be called a military coup. However, as it was supported by various segments of the public, including some of the liberals and Salafists who had voted for him in 2012, it can be differentiated from the traditional military coups that, for example, plagued Africa during the 1960s and 1970s. Revisiting one’s narrative does not mean changing positions or platforms. Rather, it is no more than a matter of pragmatism to understand the complicated reality before June 30, which is full of mistakes committed by Morsi and his supporting political organizations, whether the Muslim Brothers or the Freedom and Justice Party.

In the same regard and using the same logic, the military’s popular intervention to “correct” Morsi’s mistakes should not be used simply to justify or explain away the military’s human rights violations, political exclusion, and the democratic backwardness that occurred a few weeks after this event. Adopting naïve, simple, or black-and-white narratives obscures complicated realities and decreases or even erases the public and its hardships.

Third: For Scholars and Intellectuals

Scholars, intellectuals, and public opinion leaders who are devoted to concepts like the civilian state, liberty, democracy, and similar progressive slogans have to change the mindset of people and then develop and lead a different CMR discourse. For those people, this study suggests the following approaches:

1. Disseminating a Dialogue and Negotiation Culture: In a highly polarized country like Egypt, it is neither recommendable nor possible to strengthen civilian control without first opening platforms for dialogue, negotiations, and future reconciliation among the contesting groups. This cannot be limited to seeking a political reconciliation between the Muslim Brothers and the military, for at this point in time, seeking any such reconciliation, even if possible, will only end in a political deal that will never approach or enhance civilian control. What is needed now is to support all attempts at society-wide reconciliation. Disseminating words like “negotiation,” “mutual understanding,” “inclusion,” and others in all media and public opinion platforms can help heal this polarization over time.

Repeating over and over again defensive or brutal ideas like “revenge,” “power,” “war,” and “terrorism” will not only keep society polarized, but will also hinder the implementation of civilian control. Nations at
war simply need the military to take over, not the civilians to dominate. Therefore, decreasing the level of public phobia and hatred is only a first and basic step to push civilians and elected politicians into the top levels of the decision-making process. This can be done in schools and universities as well, for young people need more inspiring historical examples of reconciliation and transitional justice, not to mention democracy, civility, and liberalism.

2. Differentiating between the Army’s Security Mission and Political Role: One can notice how easily the army’s two roles are being confused and mixed up in Egypt. Some scholars still claim that military intervention is inevitable, given Cairo’s war on terrorism, the absence of strong political institutions, and the existence of weak political parties. If one were to differentiate between the national security sphere, in which the army plays a central but not necessarily exclusive role, and the political sphere, which it should avoid in order to remain a professional and coherent force, all such confusions could be ended.

The first action Egypt needs to take to avoid following Iraq and Syria down the same path is to keep the army professional, non-sectarian, and neutral. Although this was made clear by President al-Sisi when he was the Minister of Defense, and even though a few weeks before the military intervention he admitted that the army should stay clear of the political struggle,⁶ he came to adopt exactly the opposite policy (Ashour, 2015). Whether he was only maneuvering or actually talking seriously, this is the reality. Helping the public differentiate between the army’s two roles will, first of all, calm the Egyptians’ deep-seated fear of losing security if the army gets out of politics and, second, will strengthen the civic culture over time and thus help sustain civilian control.

3. Increase Mutual Understanding: Another way to consolidate civilian control and keep the army out of the political decision-making process is to break each party’s stereotypes of the other. In other words, if the military continues to see civilians as passive, spoiled, lazy, corrupt, and untrustworthy, and the civilians continue to see all army officers as greedy, horrible, and brutal, the necessary dialogue and negotiations cannot occur. Achieving this mutual understanding necessitates the establishment of

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military and security awareness programs for civilians. The Police Academy and the Nasser Military Academy, as well as similar institutions, should offer programs for civilians in military and security science. In the same spirit, all political science and international relations departments should enable military officers to study topics related to comparative politics, political economy, and international affairs so that they can familiarize themselves with democracy, civilian control, human rights, and similar concerns. Narcis Serra, Spain’s long-serving defense minister (1982–1991) who comes from a civilian background and is one of his country’s main architects of the military reform process, has always emphasized the importance of raising security and military awareness among civilians and politicians as an initial step for this reform (Ashour, 2015, p. 30).

Fourth: Islamists

In their capacity as pivotal political actors, Egypt’s Islamists will determine the future of the CMR in this densely populated country. The January revolution politicized most of its Islamists, starting with the Muslim Brotherhood and then the Jihadists and Salafists. Most Islamists, including the radicals, were involved in politics and created legal political parties, thereby accepting the “nation-state” and its modern political structures. The military intervention of July 2013, which was followed by a massive crackdown on Islamist political parties and social organizations, as well as the mass killing and jailing of their members, supported by many secular political actors, has led Egypt into a paradox: Cairo decided to marginalize most Islamic political actors, drain their resources, and fully exclude them from attaining any potential future political power. Whether this approach will eliminate them or not, it is pushing most Islamists toward radicalization and violence.

In my interview with three mid-ranking politicians one year after the military intervention, specifically in July 2014, the Muslim Brothers showed and highlighted their great desire to keep mounting a “pacifist resistance” to the ensuing military oppression. But when the Salafist Front issued a call a few months later for an “Islamic Revolution” in November 2014, most young Islamists welcomed it. Importantly, they strongly criticized their leaders when the latter declared, on the Muslim Brothers’ official website, that they denounced violence. For young Islamists who have most probably lost one or more members of their close circles to death or serious injury, to torture or

jail, peaceful action is no longer considered. Given this reality, how can they be persuaded to adopt a non-violent negotiation and political process in order to sustain civilian control, especially when this control will never be achieved unless all political actors are included? Below are some recommendations for the Islamists.

1. **A Long Process of Self-Criticism:** Islamists in general and the Muslim Brothers in particular will never be able to form a coalition with non-Islamist political forces or re-enter the political process unless they (1) seriously analyze their political performance and mistakes between 2011 and 2013 and (2) challenge their own literature-based frameworks as regards organization, mission, and politics. Challenging the main ideas and political platforms of Hasan al-Banna (1906–49) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–66) is a must if the movement is to advance and produce new political ideas and projects that are connected to modern politics and that take regional and international political and economic developments into account. This process should be long, deep, and serious enough to produce real outcomes and to enable this conservative organization to learn from its fatal mistakes over the last eight decades.

2. **A Historical Reengineering:** One problem that should be given serious consideration is that if the Islamists had succeeded in governing Egypt according to their ideology and conservative political platforms, they would not have produced any kind of civilian control. Instead they would have imposed an “Islamic control” that would have excluded civility, liberty, and liberal democracy. Revisions to the political discourse of Jihadists, the Muslim Brothers, and the Salafists, including the al-Noor Party (a partner with the al-Sisi regime), both before and after June 30, 2013, show just how undemocratic and anti-liberal their political thought is. Through my own direct interaction with these groups before June 30 at various conferences, workshops, meetings, and interviews, I came to the conclusion that their main concern is consolidating their control by the sudden or gradual implementation of the Sharia while avoiding a repeat of the 1954 crackdown, not sustaining democracy or increasing civilian control.

Therefore, and based on a long process of self-criticism as highlighted earlier, a historical reengineering of both the Islamists’ thought and organization must occur before a totally different version of political Islam, one that learns from all of the historical mistakes since the republic’s...
establishment, can be produced. This reengineering has to include the separation of political and religious activities as well as the adoption of a modern vision of the nation-state and citizenship, the Sharia, liberties, diversity, and similar matters. This long-term process is the only way to reengage the Islamists in politics in order to create a wide trans-ideological democratic front that can consolidate civilian control.

3. **Non-Violent Political Resistance:** Turning to violence, terrorism, and revenge cannot resolve the current political paradox. The military will continue to govern with popular support due to its anti-terrorist efforts, while Islamists will pursue their wish for revenge, incurring a growing number of causalities and victims. Ousting narrowly elected presidents is not a new phenomenon. The Islamists should understand that this happened, happens, and will continue to happen. In less-democratic countries like Egypt, civilian control and democracy is the only path toward stability, transitional justice, and development. Therefore, the Islamists and the Muslim Brothers should pursue non-violent resistance. Withdrawing from the current polarized scene while reforming their political thought and organization will help them avoid their old political mistakes and can help them reengage with a wide array of other political forces seeking democracy, freedom, and prosperity. Taking such a decision is both difficult and requires a high level of pragmatism. However, one cannot escape the fact that such historical moments always require progressive decisions and unique ways of acting.

**Fifth: International Actors**

International actors comprise both international and regional state and non-state actors, such as the U.S., the EU, Turkey, and other states concerned with the political situation in Egypt. Also included are human rights organizations and other NGOs, universities, and international media outlets concerned with politics and democracy. As can be seen in the Turkish case, the international environment was vital to Ankara’s pursuit of civilian control given its desire to join the EU. While there is no such motivation in Egypt, there are other motivations, such as gaining international recognition for the new regime and attracting international and regional investments. Such factors can help Egypt eventually attain civilian control over its military. For those actors, the following policies are recommended:

1. **Non-interventionist Politics:** The past decades have proven that interventionist politics have little, if any, influence on the advancement
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of political reform and democratization. Given the Arabs’ high degree of sensitivity toward any western intervention in their domestic affairs due to the long history of imperialism, colonialism, and the current painful western interventions in Iraq and Syria—all of which is intertwined with the world’s largely passive attitude toward the Palestinian issue—international actors should be cautious when it comes to intervening directly in domestic affairs in the name of promoting democracy or sustaining civilian control. The majority of Egyptians always regard such interventionism as provocative, and whatever regime is in power has always exploited such an action to spread conspiracy theories while justifying its own version of military and totalitarian rule.

2. Less Political Conditionality and More Oversight: Just like interventionist politics, tying political conditions to aid and donations has failed over the last three decades to create a real democracy. Egypt’s various totalitarian regimes have developed maneuvers to resist such conditions and to exploit foreign pressure to convince the public of a foreign conspiracy-based discourse. Therefore, all of the Muslim Brothers’ efforts to convince foreign powers and organizations to boycott, intervene, or impose conditions on Egypt after June 30, 2013, failed and only provided the regime with more popular support. As the current regime needs major economic support, as well as international recognition and legitimacy, international actors may keep supporting it economically while asking for certain oversight powers in order to ensure that their money and investments are used properly. Henceforth, pressuring Cairo to establish a truly representative parliament, discuss electoral laws, and work toward transparency and accountability is feasible and can gradually improve the prospects for civilian control and democracy.

3. Strengthening Civil Society and Political Parties: Another important technique that is already in use elsewhere is to extend financial support for civil society organizations and political parties, which is not highly welcomed by the Egyptian authorities and might be even risky, and investing in human resource and capacity building. Workshops, vocational training, summer schools, and even scholarships can provide many benefits to those Egyptians who work in such organizations. For example, such aid will help them develop mobilizing techniques as well as acquire a deep and accurate knowledge of democratization, and CMR studies can help them formulate practical guidelines for how to both work under and to resist the military’s comprehensive influence. Foreign organizations
can offer scholarships in democratization and CMR for civilians at the 
graduate and undergraduate levels. Spreading such knowledge at both the 
theoretical and the practical levels to civilians working in political parties, 
civil society organizations, and universities, not to mention the obvious 
need to direct them toward the youth, can help the coming generations 
strengthen civilian control.

4. Cooperation with the Military: International actors can capitalize on 
their cooperation with the army to spread such concepts as democracy, 
human rights, civilian control, and civil rights. The great military cooperation 
that exists between the U.S. and Egypt, which was highlighted earlier in 
this chapter, should be extended to include cultural and academic training 
not only on military affairs, but also on modern definitions of national 
security as well as on such political economy topics as democratization and 
development. Without a profound change in the military’s mentality, it will 
be extremely difficult to attain civilian control.

Toward a New CMR Model: Conditioned Concordance

In line with the anticipated prolonged process of mutual military and civilian 
maturity to attain the goal of civilian control with a minimal likelihood of any 
sudden shift in the CMR equation, the following conditioned concordance 
model is recommended (See figure 4).

This model visualizes civilian control by differentiating among actors, issues, 
and stages, as follows:

A) Actors: This level differentiates among active civilians, passive civilians, 
security actors, and Islamists.

1. Active Civilians: These civilians seek to sustain and consolidate 
civilian control and democracy, namely, politicians, NGOs, activists, 
and scholars.

2. Passive Civilians: The general public and those ordinary citizens 
who might not be concerned directly with democratization and civilian 
control-related issues, but nevertheless pay attention to economic 
and security situations and support whoever can deal with them 
successfully, regardless of his background. These include both civilians 
and military actors.
Interacting Actors

Islamists
Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists, Jihadists

Security Actors
1. The Army
2. Security Forces
3. Other Security Agencies

Passive Civilians
(The General Public)

Active Civilians
Politicians, NGOs, Political Activists and Scholars

Negotiation process (phase 1)

1. Maturation of All Actors
2. Public Support for Civilians
3. Trust Building

Negotiated Issues
1. Internal Security
2. Defense
3. Military Organization
4. Economy
5. Local Governance

Negotiation process (phase 2)

3. Conditioned Concordance
5. Civilian Control

Figure 4  Negotiated Concordance Model
3. **Security Actors:** Members of the army, the police, security and information organizations (e.g., intelligence), and surveillance institutions (e.g., the Accountability State Authority [ASA] and the Administrative State Authority [ADSA]). Together, all of them play a role in defining Egypt’s national security and thus in formulating the decision-making process due to the deteriorating position and capacities of domestic political parties and civil society organizations.

4. **Islamists:** This group includes the Muslim Brothers, Salafists, Jihadists, and similar groups. They differ from other active civilian actors in three ways: (1) most of them are currently banned as political actors and viewed as terrorists by the law, which means the situation resembles the 1950s in terms of the political equation of Islamist-state relations; (2) the Islamists do not recognize the current regime’s legitimacy and have frequently stated their refusal to participate in any kind of negotiations or dialogue with it. Therefore, they should be placed in a separate category for analytical reasons, for this model is based primarily on negotiation tactics. Finally, the Egyptian Islamists’ ideology and political programs set them apart from other civil political actors. As shown earlier, their mobilization tactics and political platform appreciate neither the diversity nor the liberal democratic norms that are essential for genuine civilian control.

**B) Negotiated Issues:** This suggested model contains five main issues for negotiations, as follows:

1. **Internal Security:** All topics related to internal security, especially the police and the Ministry of the Interior.
2. **Defense:** All topics related to defense, including war and peace decisions.
3. **Military Organization:** All topics related to the military as an organization, including the appointment of the Minister of Defense and the Commander-in-Chief, the military’s budget, the economy, and so on.
4. **The Economy:** All decisions related to the management and ownership of economic projects, including gas and oil production, infrastructure, and so on.
5. **Local Governance:** This is as an important negotiated topic, given the current military and security presence and dominance in localities and the new arrangements spelled out in the 2014 constitution.

**C) The Negotiation Process**

This process is to have five stages, as follows:
The First Stage: Maturation

During this stage, and while the balance of power totally favors military and security actors, civilian actors and Islamists are not required to resist as much as they are to engage in a long process of internal organizational, ideological, and public discourse reform. The reform process requires them to develop their mobilization tactics and recruit young activists who can provide new blood. Internal training, seminars, dialogue, brainstorming sessions, and similar activities are necessary for both civilian actors and Islamists so they can undertake the next step, which calls for a greater level of capacity in terms of establishing organizations, developing human resources, and formulating appropriate political tactics.

The main challenge here is simply to endure the government’s and/or military’s anti-civilian campaigns, which naturally encourage ideas and the spirit of resistance and thereby negate any ideas of undertaking internal reform. However, the ability of these actors to differentiate between being “victims” and the inevitable need to radically change their organizations, thoughts, and tactics will determine their resistance and success in consolidating civilian control in the long run.

The Second Stage: Public Support

During this stage, which begins only after internal reforms have been adopted and implemented, civilians can approach the general public more deeply in terms of spreading awareness, explaining electoral politics, providing various social services, or working for wider representation. The main aim here is to mobilize the people behind civilians and their ideas of civilian control, a system of political checks and balances, democracy, and similar concepts.

The main challenge is that the political system and the media will keep trying to prevent politicians and social movements from establishing strong ties with the public. Actually, there is no guarantee or simple tip on how to overcome this reality. Moreover, this is the time when one decides to resist or insist upon one’s right to exist within the public sphere regardless of the consequences.

The Third Stage: Building Trust

If the current political turmoil continues, the army will need to change its path and approach to domestic politics. This is when civilian-military dialogue and
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negotiations can begin through gestures of good intentions and building trust. Civilians should lobby and negotiate for such constitutional and legal reforms as prohibiting military trials for civilians, ensuring parliamentary oversight over the military budget, amending the constitutional law, and freeing political prisoners. In return, all Islamic actors should renounce violence and accept the new regime’s legitimacy.

The main challenge here is the need for rationality on all sides. This is a hard condition to meet right now, given the current regime’s repression. However, the main assumption is that time and political events will somehow manage to push some military officers and/or political leaders to influence and change the regime’s course of action and philosophy as to how it approaches domestic politics in line with civilian rationality.

The Fourth Stage: Conditioned Concordance

If the previous stage has been successful, all actors in Egypt can move to a more advanced phase, namely, that of negotiating contested issues. These involve the army’s total control of defense affairs, its own military organization, and the right to choose its own Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defense. In addition, its economic activities could be preserved, provided that the government and/or parliament is given the right to oversee the military’s economic activities and budget, while domestic security policies should be drafted by both actors. In this context, legislation, execution, and judicial power, as well as local governance, should remain exclusive rights for civilians and politicians. In addition, Islamists can be gradually included in the political process only if they accept the state’s civic nature and national unity.

Although this process seems difficult, it could be approached rather easily if the first three stages were fulfilled, for this success would endow civilian actors and the public with real weight and political influence in the decision-making process. One must also realize during this process that justice can be attained only by a fairly elected parliament, a first step toward transitional justice.

The Fifth Stage: Civilian Control

This is the final stage, during which true civilian control can be achieved. This process can take decades, for it is conditioned upon the successful completion of the previous stages, all of which are designed to enable civilians and politicians to assert their control over those aspects of contested issues
(i.e., decision-making, local governance, internal security, defense affairs, and military organization) that should rightly be theirs. At this stage, all actors will have acquired the necessary maturity to rationalize their choices and decisions. In addition, the general public would also be sufficiently mature and more aware of democracy, as well as its requirements and how they relate to the country’s domestic political parties and civil society organizations.
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The Arab Reform Initiative is the leading independent Arab think tank working with expert partners in the Middle East and North Africa and beyond to articulate a home grown agenda for democratic change. It conducts research and policy analysis and provides a platform for inspirational voices based on the principles of diversity, impartiality and social justice.

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This publication is part of the first round of the Arab Research Support Program (ARSP), which aimed to promote, through financial grants, quality research by researchers in Arab countries that would (a) guide policy debates and paths during the transition and (b) empower individuals or groups to strengthen existing research and civil society institutions or initiate new institutional settings. It gave priority to innovative, evidence-based research related to the Arab democratic transitions, particularly in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria. Suggested topics for research included transition and consolidation processes of the new political regimes; modes of mobilization and expression of emerging and informal political actors; the role of the state in politics, societies and economies; civil society and its relation to governance, constitutional debates, constitutional reform; changes in the legislative and the judiciary; platforms of political parties, coalition-building among diverse political actors; governance of religious, linguistic, ethnic diversity and gender equality; social demands, labour activism and the role of trade unions and professional associations; transformations in the security sector and the role of the media.