The democratic consolidation of the military administration:  
Objectives to be met in light of the Spanish experience

*Rafael Martínez*

Civil-military relations in contemporary Spain can be traced back to the Civil War period. After three years of bloody fratricide war the victory of the insurgent forces saw the Spanish Republic turned into an authoritarian regime (totalitarian at the beginning) with General Franco at its head. Franco’s dictatorship was not a military dictatorship, but rather the dictatorship of a military officer who developed a three-pillar power base upon which he felt secure and whose three sides—the armed forces, the Church and the single fascist party FET-JONS—offered him complete control over society. During the almost forty years that the authoritarian regime lasted, millions of Spanish men spent part of their lives as conscripts to military service under the orders of predominantly fascist officers and subject to the rule of an oppressive political power. It is not surprising, therefore, that in Spain the armed forces are regarded as one of the pillars of an authoritarian regime rather than, as is the case in other European countries, as those brave troops who defended democracy against fascism during the Second World War. Civil-military relations in Spain are therefore difficult, and to this day they bear the marks of dictatorship—this despite the fact that since the first governments of the democratic period attempts have been made to improve them.

* Professor of Political Science at the University of Barcelona. Associated researcher, CIDOB. I would like to thank the Casa Árabe de Madrid for inviting me to the “Conference on security sector reform in the Arab world with comparative examples from Latin America and Spain” (Madrid, November 4th and 5th, 2010) where I had the opportunity to share experiences and knowledge with the authorities of the Arab Reform Initiative which led me to contribute to this collective work.
The first democratic government of Adolfo Suárez faced a number of enormous challenges: (i) creating a constitutional framework to promote peaceful social relations; (ii) economic modernisation; (iii) integration within Europe; (iii) the territorial organisation of power; and (iv) military reform. With respect to the armed forces, there was an urgent need for modernisation in order to distance them from political power and transform them into a military administration that was subject, therefore, to civil supremacy; there was also a need to reduce their numbers to more reasonable levels.

Around the mid-1980s -after a military coup d’êtat (1981) and which time the democratic process had been consolidated after full membership of the European Union was granted in 1986- Spain’s democracy still faced several challenges in the area of security and defence. Although the armed forces had been democratised there remained a large civil-military gap. Members of the Spanish military were not well considered socially, and the profession as a whole was severely discredited. Anti-military feeling and its corollary, the desire to see the end of the armed forces, began to take greater root in the public consciousness but without the old fear of reprisals. This trend was not helped by the enormous presence of US bases and troops on Spanish soil, and the accompanying feeling that sovereignty was being violated. In this context the notable growth in conscientious objection was understandable. However, far from improving civil-military relations the attempt to address this issue through a poorly planned and wide-ranging professionalization of the armed forces merely created a new problem for the government: the extreme difficulty of finding volunteer soldiers.

By the 1990s, the challenge facing Spain concerned the establishment of its own defence strategy. This strategy involved: (i) increasing its influence and involvement within the defensive structure of NATO and the EU; (ii) strengthening the commitment to peacekeeping operations; and (iii) socialising the Spanish people into a culture of defence.

In short, during the last seventy year, every reason adduced above has generated in the Spanish society a strong anti military feeling that only recently, and very slowly, it has started to be diminished.

In studies on transitions, which were quite in vogue in the 1980s and 1990s, democratic consolidation was defined as the final stage of a dynamic of change that covered the movement from an everyday absence of democracy to the definitive – if anything can ever be thus called in politics – settlement of democracy; a point of no-return, the mathematical expression of an inflexion that shall lead to a new – and better, as it is democratic – scheme, without the possibility of any turning back. It was ultimately defined “as the process of strengthening, affirmation and reinforcement of the democratic system, on the path towards greater stability, a better capacity of persistence and able to counteract and prevent possible crises (…) the process of freezing-adaptation of democratic structures and norms that are accepted as legitimate, partially or entirely, by the civil society. Such a complex and multi-faceted process develops in different directions, and reaches the necessary level of strengthening required to ensure that those institutions and norms will persist.” (Morlino, 1986:13). The issue – hardly minor – was to determine which institutions and norms had to change and how it was possible to assert not only that this change had effectively occurred but also that it had been consolidated.

The voluminous literature that has emerged

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ever since has explained, *ad nauseam*, what are expected from the governmental, electoral, party and economic systems, the citizens’ political culture, and the implementation and guarantee of freedoms; ultimately, what accomplishments are necessary before asserting that the instrumental requirements Dahl (1998) claims for a democracy have been met and are settled: (i) elected public office, (ii) free, impartial and frequent elections, (iii) freedom of expression, (iv) alternative sources of information, (v) the autonomy of associations and (vi) inclusive citizenship. However, literature has been much less abundant on the military part of the administration, which might have been perverted and transformed into a political power during the undemocratic period. This results in a lack of definition of both the objectives to be pursued in this area, and the operational indicators to measure their fulfilment. So it follows that, when analyzing the process of transition of the Spanish Armed Forces and trying to determine if the step from political power to military administration - which is the central issue of this paper - has taken place, a larger issue emerges: when are we able to assert that the Armed Forces, that had been turned into a political power within the framework of the limited pluralism of an authoritarian regime, have been democratically consolidated into a military administration? Therefore assessing the events that occurred in Spain does not only mean examining a case study, but will allow me to formulate a theoretical hypothesis which I will subsequently have to assess on similar cases\(^2\), what Bartolini would qualify as a theory-checking case study.

Although I will be studying the final stage of a transitional process, the consolidation, I will not be raising the question of the duration, or time period that elapses in the lead up to the conclusion of this dynamic (Maravall and Santamaría, 1988). Neither will I be referring to the national or international triggering factors (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Stepan, 1986; Linz, 1990, 1992), the uncertainties, phases, pacts or dynamics that might have developed (Rustow, 1970; Alcántara, 1992), the importance of the actors involved (Linz, 1987 and 1990), or the indispensable necessity for a learning process of the new dynamics (Valenzuela, 1990). I will exclusively refer to the final result of the process (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986), to the transformations and implementations that allow us to foresee a new model of fully-fledged democracy, meaning the establishment of democratic institutions (Przeworski, 1988), in this case the Military administration, without limitations, safeguards or hybrid forms. A process that not only affects the political area, but also implies economic, institutional and social structural challenges, as well as a change in rules, norms, institutions and values (Santamaría, 1982). Obviously nobody can predict how the transitions will end. It is also true that the objectives defined in the first place often get overtaken or transformed by events. It is possible, however, to agree on where the line of democracy stands, and on what is indispensable for the dynamic combination of pacts, negotiations and reforms to develop on democratic grounds. And of course it is possible and necessary to determine what makes this democracy a consolidated fact. I mention this as several of the most important papers that study the role of the military within the processes of transition and consolidation analyze expected scenarios (Stepan, 1988) or the role that the military, as a presumably dominant actor, will play in a process of democratic liberalization they themselves had initiated (Linz and Stepan, 1992) or the concrete measures required to reach this democratic objective (Serra 2002, 2008). But none of them has focused on the objectives to be pursued to consolidate the process. The challenge is to make those

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\(^2\) Over the last four years, and with the financial support of the Dirección General de Relaciones Internacionales de la Defensa del Ministerio de Defensa de España, I have been leading a research project: “Democratic consolidation of Southern Latin America Armed Forces”. For more information see: http://www.cidob.org/alt/militares-latinoamerica/welcome.html
objectives a reality – it is quite clear that some of the scenarios mentioned above will be met in the process and that many of the measures previously mentioned will have to be taken. But I find it indispensable to always remember in the process the democratic ideal as far as the position of the Armed Forces within a democratic political system is concerned: purely and simply a military administration serving the government as an instrument which provides the State with the external part of the monopoly of violence. It is thus necessary to define the objectives to pursue during the transition and to be met in order to consolidate democracy. If not, opportunism or a mishandled pragmatism might lead us to a status quo and to accept levels of autonomy for the Armed Forces and power that are intolerable in a democracy.

Considering what was said previously, and adopting a systemic perspective, it is necessary to assert that, in a transitional dynamic within a political system starting from an authoritarian regime in which the governing body of the Armed Forces holds the power, the following elements require transformation: (i) the institutional system, towards a new network of political institutions meant to facilitate pluralism and representativeness and ease governability: a governability that the military will have to renounce completely, despite their initial reluctance and more than predictable resistance. This implies a second transformation, that of (ii) the military: a transition from an illegitimately gained political power to a new status as an administration serving a directly – in a presidential system – or indirectly – in a parliamentary system – elected government. Citizenship requires changes too. (iii) The social system, indeed, needs real and often drastic cultural change. Building a society which progressively enjoys democratic values through socialization and experience and knowledge-building of institutions is a major challenge. All of this bearing in mind that democracy, like any governing scheme, suffers economic dysfunctions. That is why (iv) the economic system, usually self-governed, clientelistic, corrupt and often State-planned, will need to undergo conversion to a liberal market economy.

We have now defined the major forces interacting in the movement to democracy. Considering the military, we know the main objective is to achieve their complete removal from political power, and their subsequent transformation into a military administration. That is the road map to be followed. But how do we know the objective has been reached? What are the indicators to be monitored? This is when specific objectives, i.e. the independent variables that will let us assess the transformation of the military political power into a military administration, need to be defined. In my opinion, four should be noted: (i) civil supremacy, (ii) military neutrality, (iii) civilianization of the military and, lastly, (iv) the existence of, according to the words of Almond and Verba (1970), a civic culture in the military. Each and every one of those objectives of our road map – to expel the military from power – implies several activities and concrete reforms which will be studied throughout this paper in light of the Spanish experience.

1. How do we reach this consolidated democracy?

Again we find ourselves facing a question that has been largely dealt with in literature but the study of which brings few answers\textsuperscript{3}. Beyond the generic idea we all agree with – “a situation that sees nearly all actors displaying pro-democratic regime preferences, making any turning back highly improbable as a result of the force of habit” (Alexander, 2002:59) – it is necessary to define what concrete elements will have to be reached. Narrowing the definition, I will fully embrace Linz and Stepan’s theoretical approach (1996). From their perspective, consolidation does not take one form, is not a point to be reached, but is, as always happens

\textsuperscript{3} A good and profound theoretical and casuistic example can be found in the two collective volumes edited by Diamond (et al, 1997a, 1997b) Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies.
in political science, a frontier to be overcome and that opens up a continuum to an infinite number of improvements to democracy. This perspective therefore implies back and forth movements across concepts, the fall of democracies being one of them.\(^4\) We will then focus on (i) behaviour, (ii) attitude and (iii) constitutionality. All of them can be linked to L-words, we could therefore refer to “the three required Ls”: loyalty, legitimacy and legality. Behaviour, or loyalty, implies that “no significant national, social, economic, political or institutional actors spend significant resources to achieve their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime or resorting to violent means” employed in the past (Linz and Stepan, 1996:6). Attitude, or legitimacy, means that “a great majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life” (idem). Finally, constitutionality, or legality, refers to the fact that governmental and nongovernmental forces alike become used to resolving conflicts through the laws, procedures and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.

Those three objectives must be reached within the State. In fact, “the inexistence of a State or an intense lack of identification of large groups of individuals, that wish to belong to another State or create their own, makes consolidation impossible” (Linz and Stepan, 1996:7). But a State, which in essence is an artefact, is not the only necessity. To consolidate and reach a society that is loyal to the democratic model, actors that accept and use the new set of rules and procedures, and a majority of the population that believes that democracy is the most legitimate and efficient model, the following are required:

(i) A solid civil society, strong enough to exercise its freedom of association and communication without limitations;

(ii) An autonomous and valued political society able to control public power and state apparatus.

(iii) Rule of Law which, in the spirit of constitutionalism, must be something more than just majority rule, and approach, when necessary, consensus, pact and negotiation.

(iv) A state bureaucracy that is acceptable, useful and cooperative enough to be used by the new democratic government. In our case, the reuse of the former regime’s bureaucratic apparatus once purged of its elite, demands substantial conscientiousness, especially if a military-controlled authoritarian system previously existed. Indeed the probability that the bureaucracy has not been politicized and that it maintains professional standards is almost null considering that in such circumstances the military tend to infiltrate all administrative interstices. The necessary purges can prove quite difficult and even affect the expected subsequent functioning of bureaucracies.

(v) An institutionalized economic society that will mediate between the State and the Market.

Furthermore, from Morlino’s point of view (2009), consolidation is a two dimensional process. On the one hand, legitimization understood as the process that flows from society to the institutions. In other words, society assumes that democracy is the most appropriate model and therefore accepts the new institutions and sticks to legality. This legitimization can either be (i) inclusive if citizens accept all of the political organizations, or (ii) exclusive or limited, if determined social sectors do not accept the new institutions. It is important to remember that democracy is the only political system that, instead of destroying its enemies, coexists with them (Linz, 1987).

In our case study – transitions trying to consolidate after military-controlled authoritarianism – legitimization implies the neutralization of the military. When Morlino (1986) determines the sectors, patterns, characteristics and indicators measuring the

\(^4\) On the subject see Linz (1987)
progress of consolidation, military neutrality comes as a central indicator within the pattern of inter-structural relationships. An absence of interference in political power by the military that will be measured through the following indicators: a/ modalities of subordination of the military to civilians, b/absence or presence of the military in decision-making processes, both at government or Parliament level, c/ absence or presence in coercitive operations, and d/ civil control of internal security apparatuses.

The second dimension of consolidation refers to the process that flows from the institutions – political parties being the main actors within them – to society, the anchorage. The role played by partisan organizations and gatekeepers, clientelic networks, the emergence of neo-corporatism, will be qualified as (i) dominant if civil society is poorly organized, with few resources (loose fabric of associations and restricted social capital) and the whole process is regulated by political parties through institutions, or (ii) neutral in the case of an active and participatory society, with a lively association fabric, different kinds of elite – not only political ones – and also alternative medias and media pluralism.

2. Democratic consolidation and military reform

We have already mentioned the elements necessary to consider the military as a fully-fledged component of the State in a context of consolidation characterized by an inclusive legitimacy. I have also noted that it is crucial to know the political role played by the military before the transition started and during the transition process as a negotiating actor, in order to analyze the modifications required in the military bureaucracy. Indeed the reforms and purges of elites that will be indispensable in all institutional and administrative sectors to adapt former structures to democratic norms, modalities and procedures, will be all the more complex if the institution and its members have played a significant role before the start of the transition process. In other words, the necessary military reform that is implied by any transition is harder to undertake in cases where the Armed Forces have been a political power, thereby triggering major resistance.

Furthermore, Serra warns us that “military reform cannot be isolated from the process of transition or democratic reform in which it is embedded (...) if the democratic transition slows down or is curtailed altogether, it is almost impossible for it to progress in the area of the armed forces as if it were an isolated sector.” (2008:62). We are facing a three dimensional process in which political actors, the military and society all play their part. It is not a discussion between government and the military. We have seen already that a “civil, political and economic society” is required; we know it is essential for political parties to legitimate and anchor themselves to society in order to consolidate the democratic phenomenon. We also know that the military, facing the reduction of their prerogatives, especially when these are of a political nature, will resist and continue to apply pressure on the new political actors - who are largely inexperienced and unprepared for managing the State apparatus, coming as they mostly do from the political opposition to the non-democratic regime - until they have inflicted small defeats on the reforming process and managed to safeguard parts of their autonomy. Only a solid running of democracy and its processes, as well as an articulate and participative citizenship standing next to its leaders, can smooth this reluctance out, avoid conflicts and keep the military’s autonomy in the hands of government and law.

Stepan (1988) shows us how the reduction of the military’s prerogatives, understood as rights or privileges to exercise effective control over their own government, other non-military areas or even the State, triggers an increase in the military’s conflicts with new political actors. In fact he describes four possible scenarios in that respect: (i) few conflicts and low prerogatives, which corresponds to a normal democratic scenario; (ii) few conflicts and high prerogatives, which characterizes the situation of the non-
democratic regime until the beginning of the transition; (iii) high number of conflicts and high prerogatives, a situation socially unsustainable that will almost certainly give rise to a repressive process led by the military against society; and (iv) high number of conflicts and low prerogatives, which characterized the situation in Spain in 1981 just before the coup. With this theoretical framework and considering the transitions to democracy in Argentina, Brazil, Spain and Uruguay as analytical cases, Stepan concludes that only Spain has achieved a democratic model of control over the military. In short, when starting a transition to democracy, a process of military reform and modernization also gets started, and implies the reduction of the military’s prerogatives aimed at civil control and democratic civil-military relationships in which the military administration is submitted to the control of the political power, without any kind of self-conferred autonomy left, and assumes and integrates this new condition as democratic normality.

Limiting those “retentions of title” identified by Serra (2008), areas of corporate auto-regulation, is neither a quick nor an easy task. Remember we are dealing with power. We are trying to analyze how a political actor – in fact the major political actor in a non-democratic regime – assumes a new democratic scenario that implies its complete loss of decision-making power. How, in other terms, the military political power turns into a military administration. In this process of losing privileges the military will defend itself, trying to minimize the losses. If it fails to do so, control of the armed forces will pass into the hands of civil society and within the military apparatus itself democrats will emerge. If the military, through confrontation, manage to paralyze the reform at some stage, they will achieve levels of autonomy in their regulation, governing and management; the socializing impact of democracy would most probably get lost on the way. To identify the different steps of this process of the military defending their power, and the renunciations bound to happen, we can refer to a preliminary work by Serra (2002) that marks the reduction of levels of autonomy, from which I will deduce the subsequent renunciations. The following phases unfold according to a temporal sequence whose duration depends on the particularities of each case:

(i) Military control over political power. The military simply dominate the State apparatus as a whole. That is what usually characterizes an authoritarian model with a limited pluralism in which the military elite play a predominant role.

(ii) Guardians of the national essence: with the irruption of the transitional process, the military step back, but remain watchful. They do not govern, yet they keep watch and warn they will intervene if necessary.

(iii) The military as a force that conditions the government’s policies, putting limits on reforms and vetoing decisions. In other words, an obstructive force. They are not able to block the process, for that might trigger international impacts, but they try to minimize the effects. They still think and claim they should act in every single State process, and refuse to let reforms modify their way of understanding the State and power.

(iv) They defend their organizational and operational autonomy. They are aware the State model cannot be preserved, changes become irreversible, and they start to protect themselves. They entrench themselves in their autonomy, trying to maintain and control their preserve.

(v) Formal but partial acceptance of civil supremacy. They resign to it with caution. In other words, they pretend to adapt to something they do not believe in; but other

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5 It is important to remember that the book was published in 1988. Today, with the exception of Brazil, all countries are getting closer to or have reached the “few conflicts and low prerogatives” category. In Brazil the level of autonomy is high and furthermore not determined by the government.
incentives – salary increases, for instance – might push them to be cautious.

(vi) Upholding of ideological control in military’s hands. The institution has been inserted in the democratic state as a military administration; yet it keeps hold of the processes of secondary socialization, which enables them to convey their non-democratic values.

(vii) Civil democratic control over Armed Forces. In this case we find fully democratic civil relationships, and furthermore and most of all, a culturally democratic military, i.e. military that not only accept democratic procedures, institutions and norms, but consider them legitimate.

Following the review of all these points, and considering that the main objective of our road map is to expel the military from political power, I assume the essential goals to be pursued to help the Armed Forces consolidate democratically from political power to military administration, need to be defined according to two dimensions. On the one hand, by thinking of the soldier as a citizen; a citizen that has been submitted to an extremely intense process of indoctrination and that needs to be resocialized, being aware that the older the soldier, the more effort it will take to have an impact on him, while keeping in mind the necessity to socialize future recruits. On the other hand, by thinking of the soldier as a professional: a Government employee belonging to an administration that enjoys the technical resources that enable a State to articulate the external monopoly of defence; that will imply keeping them out of any political decision-making process, to submit them to political power and the institutions it is founded upon, and to have them converge with the society they serve.

Therefore, the objectives necessary to follow our road map as regards the transformation of the Armed Forces in a process of democratic consolidation, in light of the theoretical body displayed and the Spanish experience which I will use to exemplify my point of view, are:

A/ As a citizen (individual level)
   (i) Democratic (civic) culture

B/ As a professional (collective level)
   (i) Civilianization of the military
   (ii) Civil supremacy
   (iii) Neutrality of the military

A/ Civic culture

Considering soldiers as outsiders would be ridiculous for it would contribute to isolating them even more and widen the gap between them and society. Soldiers are citizens, and as such must be well-inserted in civil, political and economic society, as Linz and Stepan put it (1996). This means citizens that are involved in the progress of democracy in their country, that are an active part of an inclusive citizenship (Dahl, 1999), with the limits on their fundamental rights required by their positions. Citizens that help achieve a high social capital (Putnam, 1993). What we therefore need is (i) soldiers with a democratic culture in their acceptance of the institutions and in their own values.

In other works (Caforio and Martínez, 2005; Martínez, 2007) I proved how limited the impact of secondary socialization has been in Spain, since the 1980s and 1990’s Armed Forces reforms, in shaping non-democratic soldiers. Some, undeniably, still exist, but fewer and fewer, and those that do, appear to match a rather idiosyncratic and limited profile: children of military personnel (third generation as a minimum), whose far-right ideology they have inherited from their father or more usually their mother, and who demonstrate highly religious and nationalistic sentiments, and who belong to the fighting forces. They are the product of primary socialization: they have received those values within their homes. The military academies are not the cause of this non-democratic gene, yet they are responsible for its persistence and, among those who did not have it, for a certain confusion, fortunately temporary. Nothing can be done about families: these ones are still here, but on a decreasing scale. That is why (ii) the reform of military
academies, especially their educational processes and curricula, has been the essential tool in helping the cadets assimilate civic culture. The rapprochement with universities and the reform of curricula according to the Bologna Accords educational plans have both had a major influence on that trend. Certainly much remains to be done in order to achieve better integration of civilians in the academies’ teams of teachers, or to make University classes compulsory in the process of education, especially for cadets and midshipmen. It is all about opening the windows of the last redoubt which the military protects as their own in every transition.

But in order to know whether individual soldiers espouse democratic values or not, it is useful to inquire, through interviews, about their orientation towards the political regime, the political community and, using Easton’s approach, the political system’s “input-output” process. In Spain we did this in 2000, as we interviewed all of the students (around 2500) from the three military branches’ thirty-two academies for officers and NCOs. After a principal components analysis, there appeared to be quite a healthy democratic culture among the then future, now in place command of the Spanish Armed Forces (Martínez, 2007:210-8). Thus those labelled as non-democratic represent only 10% of the cadets inquired. This group sets itself out from the rest by its stance towards the political regime and community, i.e. those variables that allow us to establish the system’s legitimacy empirically. Whereas 92% of all interviewees consider democracy to be the best political system for a country like Spain, the figure for this group is only 52%. Furthermore, a mere 24% consider that democracy can bring solutions to the problems of the country (contrary to 70% as an average of the 2500 interviewees). So not only do they question the democratic system’s legitimacy, they also have a negative opinion on the way it works in Spain. Quite coherently, they are the ones who most question the very pillars of the democratic system: elections, political parties, Parliament, the media, or the judicial power. It is also worth mentioning that 40% claim to espouse far-right positions (against 11% of the interviewees taken as a whole).

The largest group is that of participatory democrats with progressive values (27%). Those individuals display participatory orientations as well as a certain willingness to get involved in input processes that exert a certain degree of control over authorities. In other words, they share the perception that individuals are potentially capable of having an influence on political decisions. To measure this perception, the following indicators can be used: internal subjective political efficacy – i.e. the belief by individuals that resources are available to influence politics – and external subjective political efficacy – the perception that authorities or the regime are responsive to their demands. Both indicators mainly define this group. Concerning orientations towards input process, this group gives the highest rating to the role of political parties as the political system’s main actors. The idea that democracy is impossible without political parties is also most widespread among this group.

This group also notably distinguishes itself from the rest in the way it positions itself on the left-right axis and on the sub-State nationalism – Spanish nationalism factor. In this group left-wing stated options are six points higher than the average (20.4% against 14.3%). Concerning the sub-State nationalism – Spanish nationalism factor, this group notably deviates from the average interviewee: it is the group that least espouses exclusive options, displaying on the contrary a strong attachment to both.

6 The study was developed within the research project 98/14 of the Instituto Universitario “General Gutiérrez Mellado”. The analysis can be found in Martínez (2007), the data matrix at: http://www.cidob.org/alt/militares-latinoamerica/publicaciones/bancodatos.html
Similarly, they are the ones who present great sympathy towards autonomous communities which, as previously seen, are among the institutions the worst rated by the cadets. In fact it is the only group in which the majority manifests sympathy towards that type of government. The contrary is the case in all other groups, except the one referred to as apathetic.

Members of this group give the highest rating to the way democracy works in Spain. As for interpersonal confidence parameters, they even show a greater inclination to build what has been known as “social capital”. Those cadets mainly belong to NCO academies (especially in the Air Force branch), socialized in modest families in which religious fervour is weak and have no family history in the Army.

The second biggest group is that of the apathetic democrats with conservative values (23%). They can be characterised by three features. Firstly, the legitimacy of democracy is not questioned. This is not only because 96% consider democracy to be the best system, they also rate highly the institutions that make up the political system, and they consider elections as a legitimate factor of alternation allowing different political programs to be carried out. Secondly, we have labelled them as apathetic because of the weak role they believe citizens can play in politics. Lastly, they have a shared conservative vision of the values, concepts and social movements they were questioned about. They socialized in the wealthiest families, registered more occurrences of family history in the Army and a greater number of university graduates among parents.

The third group is that of disaffected democrats with progressive values (22%). This group is close to that of participatory democrats as they have a shared progressive vision of a certain number of social and ideological values. Yet they differ in their relationship to the world of politics. These doubt the role citizens can play to influence authorities’ decisions, as well as political parties as institutions capable of conveying the demands of citizens to the State. They have a negative assessment of a certain number of institutions that are the pillars of the democratic system – Parliament, unions, the media, central government or autonomous communities – and ultimately show a clear disaffection (Torcal and Montero, 2006) with politics in general.

The last group is that of apathetic democrats (13%)\(^7\). It is the most difficult to describe because of the diversity of its members’ origins. In reality, their attitudes are always very similar to those of the average interviewee: they are democrats, with a certain number of doubts about the real functioning of democracy in Spain; they reveal a low subjective political efficacy; they are far from the world of politics; they are critical of the political parties as actors of the political system; ideologically they can be qualified as conservatives.

Apart from the control of the democratic evolution of the military, it is important to remember – and too often Spain has failed to do so – that, in a society that may reject sharply every aspect of the military as that which would subconsciously remind it of its non-democratic past, (iii) re-socializing citizenship will be necessary. It is indeed necessary for society to understand that security, defence and the Armed Forces can be, and are, an indispensable element of modern democracies. To consolidate the Armed Forces and, most of all, all the duties conferred to them, it is therefore essential to develop a citizen security culture. It is not about creating warmongering, aggressive, action-driven citizens. It is about normalizing the activity and existence of the military administration within citizenship, as well as the necessity of an integrated and coordinated national security strategy in which the Armed Forces will indubitably play a major role. It is indispensable to make citizens understand that

\(^7\) 5% did not answer any question they considered to be of a political nature.
this by no means equals militarism, if we want to avoid provoking an instinctive, visceral rejection that might inhibit further reasoning on this subject. According to former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet, back in 2002, in her first year as Chilean Minister of Defence: “I understand there has been an excess of zeal in attacking the Armed Forces’ prerogatives, while forgetting the lack of consolidation in attitudes, the limited democratic political culture of the actors embedded in the process.”

Furthermore, referring now to the Latin-American case, and proceeding in the opposite direction to the one I have been outlining until now, it is urgent (iv) to de-militarize citizens’ consciousness regarding internal insecurity. Confusion between the police and the army does not help consolidate the Armed Forces. Having the Armed Forces play the police’s role, whatever the reason it be deemed necessary, whether it be in the face of citizen pressure and growing insecurity or because of high levels of police corruption, can only be an emergency solution, and for a limited amount of time. It cannot and must not be extended sine die. If some time ago the Armed Forces’ main and non-democratic mission used to be to control the population and prevent any kind of risk from arising for the non-democratic government, it is impossible, in a democracy, to put them back in an unwanted position. Their responsibility is to ensure the external security of the State. They cannot be granted any other mission. Besides, the experiences amassed over the past years have proven inefficient, and even counterproductive, resulting in the radicalization and increasing complexity of the problems that were meant to be solved militarily: maras, organized crime, drug trafficking, white-slave trade, etc.

B/ Civil supremacy

The importance of civil control over the Armed Forces is undeniable. In other words, the efficacy of the principle of military subordination to the public authorities, also referred to as civil supremacy (Agüero 1995). In the case of Spain, the demand for civil supremacy, the disciplined submission of the military to the political authorities, appears with the Juntas de Defensa. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century they enjoyed deliberative power and often set limits to insubordination. So the idea of civil supremacy intends to de-politicize the Armed Forces, prevent their interventionism, and submit it to government discipline. To that end, regardless of the different time scales of the transitions or the consensus achieved, a certain number of essential measures will have to be taken. The first two must be: (i) the creation of a Ministry of Defence and (ii) the appointment of a civil command for the Armed Forces. The conjunction of both is obvious. A Ministry of Defence is required to tone down the political potential of each military branch and integrate something more than just the military. A Minister, who will have to be a civilian, will lead the political direction of the ministry. It should be noted that the military’s corporate nature does not fit well with that kind of appointment, especially if there is a long tradition of operating in the opposite way. Thus in Spain, the cadets were asked whether they would prefer the Minister of Defence, the General Director of Defence Policy and the director of the then Superior Centre of Defence Information (CESID), now National Intelligence Centre (CNI), to be civilians or military. In the three cases they expressed a massive preference for military personnel (64%, 78% and 74% respectively), which would demonstrate a clear corporative orientation (Martinez, 2007:115). An excess of corporative zeal can lead to social isolation and clear the way for the refusal of a political governing body over military administration, in other words for militarism (Lleixá, 1986), which could have dramatic consequences. They also severely reject – by eight out of ten – the possibility that appointments of high commands of the Spanish Armed Forces – admiralty and generals – should be influenced by political considerations. This is another task to be carried out to achieve civil supremacy: the ministerial control of promotions. Eradicating seniority as the
primary merit is not an easy task, yet it is essential. Achieving a certain degree of ministerial discretion in the appointment process is a further healthy step. Otherwise, the military themselves determine who is promoted and when.

(iv) Freeing the other administrative bodies of all military presence is also necessary. During the dictatorship the political presence of the military undoubtedly penetrated all sectors of administrative life. Succeeding in leading them back to their own domain is essential to exert control over the Armed Forces and to ensure they will not be capable of regaining over the civil administration. To change the rules of the game as soon as possible, it is therefore necessary (v) to adopt a structural set of laws on Defence – 1978 Royal Ordinances for the Armed Forces and 1980 Organic Law of National Defence and Military Organization\(^8\) in the Spanish case – and (vi) to articulate the Parliamentary control of defence policy through a Defence Commission. The adopted legislation will focus on the structure of Defence and the integration of the Armed Forces, and will imply (vii) the exclusion of their participation from all public order matters and their exclusive dedication to Defence. Thinking ahead, it will also give rise to a future redefinition of the Armed Forces’ functions, given the erosion of the traditional sovereign functions of the State. But this affects democratic Armed Forces all around the world. In any case, the new configuration of the Armed Forces as a military administration integrated in a Ministry of Defence, led by a civilian, controlled by Parliament, unrelated to any matter of public order or other aspects of the administration, will make it possible for (viii) the degree of military autonomy to be determined by the Government. Then the last, tricky yet necessary manoeuvre will consist in the political power (ix) controlling intelligence services, preferably led by a civilian. That former will determine the objectives of the latter and intelligence services shall never again be focused on assuming the role of a political police over citizens -, adapt the structure according to the times and not the military ranks or chains of command, and accept Parliamentary control.

C/ Military neutrality

The conduct of the military as State employees requires objectivity, or neutrality, and professionalism. Neutrality can be guaranteed by (i) non-party membership, which does not equal apoliticism. Indeed the fact that Armed Forces members do not belong to any political party guarantees or facilitates the accomplishment and development of their functions under any government’s rule. That keeps any partisan bias from interfering in the missions the government gives to the Armed Forces, by virtue of the monopoly of violence it possesses as the legitimate decision-maker of State policy. Professionalism, on the other hand, is achieved through hierarchy and discipline. Without them, the collective organized work expected from the Armed Forces cannot be delivered. Indeed such a vast human contingent can only express itself as a hierarchized organization under the rule of rational and legal discipline. Meeting the objectives of neutrality and professionalism in the Armed Forces, based on non-party membership and the implementation of disciplinary and hierarchy principles, requires (ii) the restriction of determined rights and freedoms. Usual in the other bodies of public administration of any democracy, such a restriction of rights and freedoms raised, in the Spanish case, obvious difficulties and met limited acceptance within the Armed Forces (Martinez 2007: 116-21).

The Armed Forces as a state administration call for neutrality, on the one hand meaning the military personnel do not belong to any political party and accept a certain degree of restriction in their rights and freedoms due to the very nature of their functions; on the other

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\(^8\) It has been since partially reformed firstly in 1984, then completely reshaped in 2005 when it gave way to a new law that adds, among other changes, international operations as a function of the Armed Forces.
hand the refusal of any military participation in the political decision-making process. Such participation, quite usual during the non-democratic period, needs to be eradicated. From that perspective, we must demand that the Armed Forces (iii) accept the new political institutional framework set by the Constitution as the one and only framework. It is not only about accepting the new legal system; it is also about avoiding that anyone other than Parliament try to determine the constitutional and legal framework during the constitution-making process. In the Spanish case, the first two democratic governments led by then Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, that resulted from 1977 and 1979 elections, suffered the exhausting pressure of the military leadership every time it adopted decisions that annoyed them (legalization of political parties, legalization of the Communist Party, adoption of laws that authorized the autonomous governments of Catalonia and the Basque country, etc.). Enduring such pressure without bowing to blackmail was undoubtedly a difficult task for the government of the time, and has certainly not been recognized as such. It is certainly one of the causes that has allowed Spain to attain the quality of democracy it enjoys today (Martínez, 2008). Otherwise Spain would have fallen into the category of guarded or conditional democracies (Morlino, 1986). The new constitutional order will lead to the normalization of the Armed Forces’ administrative form, i.e. its (iv) conversion into an Administration⁹. From its respect of laws, parliamentary control and submission to the government spring the necessity (v) to accept the territorial structure of power – a recurrent problem in Spain over the last two hundred years – and also (vi) to accept the foreign policy and policy of alliances: the former as it is within the jurisdiction of the constituent power, the latter that of the government. In spite of the many years spent imposing their will on the subject, the Armed Forces, in a consolidated democracy, do not have any part to play in deciding those policies. It is this ambition to achieve consolidated democracy that leads us to another essential element towards the goal of military (political) neutrality: the separation of powers, which implies, at the same time, unity within each of these powers. It is indeed impossible to find, at the same level, a multitude of governments or Parliaments or judiciary institutions with the same competences. It is understandable that in a State such as the Spanish one, that is committed to legality and works within a federal political articulation, the principles of competence and territory be combined to generate multi-level governments, Parliaments or superior courts. The absurdity lies in the fact of having simultaneously two judiciary powers, one dedicated to citizens, and another one devoted to the military. Under certain circumstances, the common citizen can even be tried in a military court. It is therefore necessary to remove this court and (vii) integrate the military jurisdiction into a single judiciary power¹⁰.

Finally, regarding economic policy, the State will have to recover any mercantile activity carried out by the military using public funds. In practical terms, the State will have to (viii) withdraw the military’s ownership of publicly-owned companies and (ix) take away their capacity to buy and sell arms and other business, even if it is directly linked to their activity. Only the State should have this capacity. The question of neutrality in economic policy is, at present, one of the most pressing problems facing the Armed Forces in almost all Latin America.

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⁹ Article 97 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution: “The Government directs domestic and foreign policy, civil and military administration and the defence of the State. It exercises executive and statutory authority in accordance with the Constitution and the law”.

¹⁰ Article 117.5 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution: “The principle of jurisdictional unity is the basis of the organization and operation of the Courts. The law shall regulate the exercise of military jurisdiction strictly within military limits and in cases of state of siege (martial law), in accordance with the principles of the Constitution.”
D/ Civilianization of the military

The relationships between society and the military institution, known as civil-military relations, raise the issues of (i) political control over the military institution (civil supremacy), (ii) the participation of the military in the decision-making process (military neutrality) and, finally, (iii) the divergence or convergence of civil society and the Armed Forces. In their analysis of the evolution of the military structure and its relationship with society, Moskos and Wood (1987), within the pattern of democratic “civil-military relations”, refer to three different forms of military organization:

a/ traditional or institutional, therefore divergent from civil society;

b/ civilianized or occupational, i.e. convergent with it; and

c/ plural or segmented, with the coexistence of civilianized and institutional aspects, forming an eclectic intermediate path.

Later on, this idea of a modern military, capable of mixing the best of institutional and occupational worlds into plural or segmented civil-military relations, was replaced by the post-modern military. For Moskos and Burk (1994), post modernity arises at a time when the nation-state becomes weaker, when there is decreasing social consensus about what values shape the common good, and increasing difficulties to distinguish this from collective action viewed more and more often as negative. This wave of social, political and cultural change also affects the military, giving birth to a post-modern professional military meant to stand for the archetype of new, post-modern civic-military relations. These new relations are characterized by a societal change in the perception of threats and the probability of war, which have led to the endorsement of a gradual reduction in military budgets. Furthermore, the diminishing threat and the progressive participation in missions taking place in remote places far away from society’s major preoccupations leads to the loss of the moral legitimacy that used to be at the heart of conscription. This results in a much smaller model of armed forces and a shift in missions from the traditional defense of the territory to new peace operations and humanitarian interventions. Those changes will also affect the skills expected of the military personnel, from fighting capacities to diplomatic skills, knowledge in international relations, ability to handle the media. The result is a new and much more convergent type of civic-military relations. That is why age-old problems like the limited role of women in the military, homosexual exclusion, or the difficult acceptance of conscientious objection as a right, will eventually disappear. Thus post-modernity strengthens the converging process between civil society and the Armed Forces that has been unfolding since the 1950s, knitting them ever closer.

However, this post-modern military, which most democratic States are currently trying to put into place, could prove to be an illusion in the framework of a transition to democracy in which the military are not democrats in the day to day management of their actions, nor democratic in their values, their privileges or their recruitment methods. It would also be wrong to think that we are dealing with a modern, or late-modern, military as described by Moskos and Wood (1987) in reference to the democratic military of the pre-Cold War or Cold War era. In fact we are talking about a military which is foreign to all democratic procedures and culture. It is therefore necessary to achieve (i) the elimination of privileges. By privileges we do not refer to Stepan’s perspective (1988), which we used previously, that defines them as rights or privileges to exert effective control over government, other domains unconnected with the military’s activities or even over the State. Civil supremacy or political control over the Armed Forces indeed implies dealing with such issues. Here we are thinking of social privileges enjoyed only by the military, who also decided the conditions of access to such privileges for other citizens: schools, sports centres, commissaries, personal assistants, riding clubs, scholarships, aid to orphans and much more. Attaining (ii) greater closeness to
the predominant social values could prove a harder task. In this by no means peaceful debate, my position is close to the one held by Janowitz (1960). He suggests a pragmatic professionalism based on a/ training and education, b/ specialized knowledge and practice, c/ group cohesion and solidarity, d/ self-regulation of the organization. He also adds a fifth essential characteristic: e/ ethical code and sense of responsibility, i.e. its own code of ethics that reflect the traditional values and attitudes in the military. Indeed, “a profession implies acting in accordance with a core of values and moral principles that orientate professional activity” (Gutiérrez Valdebenito, 2002: 187). But contrary to Huntington (1957) who defines military professionalism as incompatible with traditional civil values, Janowitz (1960) analyses military activity as a dynamics that evolves by adjusting to the changes. He therefore defends the convergence of the Armed Forces’ values with those of society in general and the growing convergence between military capacities and those of civil administrators and leaders. In other words, according to Janowitz’s paradigm, far from Huntington’s radical separation, the military profession has civilianized. However, data from the Cultural Gap project for ERGOMAS\textsuperscript{11} could suggest that, as far as

Spain is concerned, the results coincide with Huntington’s analysis as the Spanish society’s values and those of the Armed Forces differ considerably (Haltinier and Weibull, 2007). Indeed, “after examining in greater detail the values that future civil and military elites wish to inculcate in their children, as well as those they consider vital for the military, both groups appear to share views to a very high extent. The same result appears when asking them to specify the qualities most needed in the military. Both groups also believe that civil and military values are and must be different” (Martínez 2007: 145). However, unlike what I could observe at the time, there is now agreement about the values one wishes the military to hold – the values that define the ethical framework Janowitz referred to – as well as those one wishes for citizens. So there is agreement on values, which means the achievement of one sub-objective of the consolidation. When Huntington talks about value-based divergence, he is referring to the case where the military wish to inculcate values in their children that are very similar to theirs; those values are therefore different to the ones the rest of society wishes for their children. Thinking that the military and the civilians should agree on the values required to be citizens and to join the Armed Forces is to forget some of the essential specificities of the military profession.

\textbf{Chart 1.- Modification to the segmented model}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chart1.png}
\caption{Modification to the segmented model}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{11} ERGOMAS: European Research Group on Military and Society. The Cultural Gap project, directed by Caforio, intended to quantify and specify the elements that shape the differences existing between the political culture of the military and that of the civilians on security and defense. To that end, ERGOMAS mobilized various national teams – I led the Spanish one – to carry out inquiries throughout the year 2002 on university students from four universities (Universidad de Barcelona, Universidad de Burgos, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Universidad de Granada) as well as cadets in officers academies from the three military branches (Zaragoza, Marín and San Javier) as members of the future civil and military elite. To complete the scheme, politicians, entrepreneurs, journalists, university professors were also interviewed, as representative of the established elite. The hypothesis was the existence of a substantial cultural gap between society and the military. The objective was to determine the concrete elements shaping such a
The previous debate irremissibly leads us to the distinction “institutionalism-occupationalism”. “An institution legitimates itself in terms of values and norms, i.e. in terms of an objective that transcends personal interest in favor of a presumably higher good” whereas “the occupational model implies the priority of the individual’s own interest over that of the organization they are working for” (Moskos and Wood, 1987: 43 and 45). Some authors claim the best solution is the progressive extension of occupational factors to the detriment of institutional features (Serra, 2008). In other words, the democratic reform of the Army implies the advance of occupationalism. As a premise, I will object that in these terms it could be understood that institutionalism forms a category of non-democratic Armed Forces. It does not: the non-democratic Armed Forces we are dealing with are a type of authoritarian, if not totalitarian, Armed Forces. The shift from institutionalism to occupationalism can only become an objective once those Armed Forces act within democratic procedural and legal paradigms. Before that, other objectives will need to be met first. At this point, it is nevertheless worth mentioning that neither institutional nor occupational homogeneity are satisfactory. An intermediate path, instead, should be pursued. There is indeed a need for Armed Forces that combine institutional and occupational aspects (see Chart 1): “armies in which soldiers and seamen are preferably occupational and whose command, especially officials, are more inclined to institutional models” (Martínez, 2007: 82). However, given that in the first moments of a democratic transition, the military usually stick to the institution, the third activity to be undertaken to achieve the civilianization of the military will have to do with (iii) supporting the extension of occupationalism to the detriment of usually overwhelming institutionalism. In the Spanish case, 67% of the interviewees are institutional, 24% occupational, and 7% display a blend of occupationalism and institutionalism (Martínez 2003, 2007). Although there is still a long way to go, the dynamics of occupationalism at the bottom of the institution, and institutionalism at its top, is starting to emerge.

Another mechanism that can help tackle the influence of institutionalism is to (iv) limit endogamy and provide universal access to conscription, putting aside revenue privileges military personnel’s sons may enjoy. It would also be interesting to bet on (v) non-traditional recruitments: women and immigrants. And certainly to put an end to homophobic rejections that do not have anything to do with the capacities of the members of the institution, (vi) accepting – or better still, making visible – the presence of homosexuals in the military.

Conclusions

I started this paper by referring to the transition as a process in which the political sphere and many other structures interact and transform until they reach a point of no return: the democratic consolidation. I think no one can deny that the Armed Forces are one of the elements that will have to adapt to the new rules and procedures. All the more if the starting point is an authoritarian system in which they are part of this limited pluralism that defines authoritarianisms (Linz, 2010: 156-65). We are aware that the essential work that will have to be undertaken – our road map – will consist in expelling the military from power by limiting the privileges they have been enjoying. In the process, conflicts will arise between the military and the young institutions. The military will want to assert their longtime dominant position to be part of the transitional process as negotiating actors. However, the first objective that needs to be fought for is democratic control over the Armed Forces through civil supremacy. This is the only way to later achieve military neutrality and finally the civilianization of the military. As those three objectives aimed at transforming the institution are progressively met, a huge step towards the democratic consolidation of the Armed Forces will have been made. Once the military, starting from their position as sole political power, convert
themselves into an administration serving the political power – the military administration –, the next challenge will consist in bringing about an administration whose members are democrats: an Armed Forces where civic culture rules, just like anywhere else.

Those four objectives (or sub-objectives if we consider the expelling of the military from power to be the main objective) are articulated through a variety of concrete actions that develop on the way to this much aspired global democracy. Thus, among many other actions, special efforts will have to be made to build equally a solid Ministry of Defense and the military policy deriving from it. A neat line will have to be drawn to separate the rightful use of the military administration from self-interested and devious misuse by the military. The necessary limitation on military privileges will imply, especially at the beginning, increased tensions. The need for the existence of the Armed Forces itself will have to be weighed up, as well as their functions. The military will have to be kept away from public order and the control and management of intelligence services. The essential and indispensable parliamentary control over security and defense policies will have to be improved. Undoubtedly international actors also have a role to play in the process, especially neighboring democratic political systems observing the efforts made by those countries towards democracy. They will have to cooperate and give as much protection as requested, and in the military field, develop multilateral and interoperable activities that will offer the military undergoing a transitional process a new professional window that is no doubt infinitely more satisfactory while being unknown to the majority of them.
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