THE STATE OF REFORM IN THE ARAB WORLD 2011

THE ARAB DEMOCRACY INDEX

Edited by The Arab Reform Initiative and The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
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Editors

Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

Khalil Shikaki
Mudar Kassis
Jihad Harb

Arab Reform Initiative

Bassma Kodmani
Salam Kawakibi

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The Report is based on field work conducted in the twelve countries surveyed by teams of researchers and data collectors: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and Tunisia. The original data by country as well as the overall report are available on the website www.arab-reform.net.

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Opinions and findings in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the member institutes of the Arab Reform Initiative.

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About the Arab Reform Initiative

ARI was founded in 2005 based on the prevailing consensus that the Arab world is in need of reforming its social, political and economic systems and on the belief that the way challenges are met depends on who produces the knowledge and formulates the issues.

The Initiative’s priority is to mobilize Arab research capacities to generate knowledge by those who are the prime targets of reform, nurture and promote realistic and home-grown agendas for democratic reform, foster public debate and produce recommendations for policy leaders. The Initiative promotes a comprehensive vision of reform that integrates the interaction between the political, economic, societal and cultural spheres and raises awareness in the Arab region about successful transitions to democracy in other parts of the world.

With members and partners in more than 15 Arab countries, ARI holds a unique position that allows it to draw on a broad network of scholars and activists to grasp the diversity of situations among countries of the region and produce a combination of country specific and comparative and transversal research.

The Arab Reform Initiative is an independent organization with no ties to any specific country or any political agenda related to the region.

**Member Institutes**

ARI is a network of 14 think tanks based across the Arab world as well as Europe and the United States: AJ Abram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (Egypt), the Arab Reform Forum, Bibliotheca Alexandrina (Egypt), the Center for Strategic Studies – University of Jordan (Jordan), Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (Palestine), Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (Lebanon), Center for Sudanese Studies (Sudan), Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches en Sciences Sociales (Morocco), King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (Saudi Arabia), Gulf Research Center (UAE), Center for European Reform (UK), U.S./Middle East Project (USA), Fundacion Para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior (Spain), Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (Greece), the European Institute for Security Studies (France).

Other partner organizations are: the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Relations – American University of Beirut (Lebanon), Partners in Development (Egypt), Center for Middle Eastern Studies – Lund University (Sweden), Democracy Reporting International (Germany).

**How We Work**

ARI’s work agenda and strategic orientations are decided by a Plenary composed of the directors of its 15 institutional members. The ten Arab member institutes are spread across the Mashreq, the Maghreb and the Gulf and work in partnership with four European and one American centers.

Priority areas for work are selected according to the concerns and priorities of the region’s key stakeholders and are designed to support local initiatives by citizens and policy leaders.

The Initiative puts great care in protecting its independence, particularly in its fund-raising policy, applying strict criteria such as the diversification of sources (Arab and international) and the principle of “no strings attached” to donations.

Support is provided primarily by member institutes, private foundations and corporations as well as individual contributions from Arab citizens concerned with reform.
Foreword

Salam Kawakibi

This book appears at an extraordinary moment in the history of the Arab region. Although the region as a whole is undergoing varying degrees of transformation, it relies on the inevitability of change and democratic transition based on local specificities and mechanisms.

With the publication of its third report on the State of Reform in the Arab world, the Arab Reform Initiative maintains a tradition which it hopes will become part and parcel of academic and political practices in our region. The report allows the monitoring of changes, reforms and transformations based on objective standards and indicators, carefully drawn to suit the nature of societies under study.

The report is considered essential material for the development of comparative studies, since the image it reflects is based on indicators with the highest possible degree of precision, and on scientific analyses of the conditions under which target societies lived before the outbreak of popular protests, and onset of revolutionary activism. This third report, which has already been made public, contains essential data that helps develop a vision that gives substance to studies and analyses that look at the motives and causes behind these change movements. Thus, although the Arab revolutions, regardless of their nature, came as a surprise to internal and external observers, alike, the element of surprise was more about their timing rather than their contents or root causes.

As the revolutionary path gained pace in several of the Arab countries under study, some suggested that we change the report’s title from “State of Reform” to “State of Change” in the Arab world. However, we believe that reform does not exclude change, and could also take several forms and means of expression. Even revolutions could be part of a genuine, effective, far-reaching and radical reform process. The Index’s indicators allow the measurement of change over time, and a comparison of conditions in different Arab countries. These indicators undoubtedly have a number of negative aspects, as well, including seeing all countries under study through the same lens, at a time when history, the nature of political regimes, the particular characteristics of each society and the pace of change can differ from one country to another. Their importance lies in the fact that the Index is based on a set of universal criteria. For despite protests by certain countries regarding their particular characteristics, and their resistance to implementing these universal criteria in the political and legislative domains, they decided to introduce legal reforms in the economic domain, in line with the relevant international criteria. On that basis, evaluating political conditions in these countries based on universally accepted criteria becomes a legitimate exercise.

The Index’s analytical papers were confined to first impressions regarding the early stages of change in Egypt and Tunisia. It is necessary to point out, however, that although several political, economic, social and security problems and issues that actively helped determine the nature of change did not find their way into the report’s analytical studies, they remain the focus of interest, research and follow-up by the Arab Reform Initiative, and its partner centres, as part of the wide array of projects that cover the entire Arab region.

This report is published exclusively in electronic form due to the rapidly changing conditions that outpace the timeline necessary for publication. However, this does not mitigate its importance as a reference point in the effort to understand and visualise the changes currently taking place. The Arab Reform Initiative will maintain the tradition of producing paper and electronic copies for the next report, which will be exceedingly important since it will examine the signs of change in several countries, and help in the evaluation and adjustment process.

A large team of Arab researchers worked on this report based on a joint and well-studied methodology, under the supervision of the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research. The Arab Reform Initiative hopes that the Arab Democracy Index will help launch a general scientific debate on the means and potential for democratic transitions in the Arab region.

\(^1\)Acting Director of the Arab Reform Initiative
Introduction

Dr. Khalil Shikaki

In early 2011, the Arab region witnessed a series of radical changes that brought down a number of Arab political regimes and threatened others. It was in Tunisia that the popular youth revolution first ignited before spreading to Egypt and other countries, including Libya, Yemen and Syria, with people calling for the authoritarian regimes' downfall and their replacement by democratic systems that uphold human rights and defend the citizens' integrity against control and abuse by the security services. At the same time, several other Arab countries were witnessing popular demonstrations calling for change and reform, including Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Bahrain, Palestine and Saudi Arabia. This report covers all Arab countries that experienced revolutions or popular movements, except for Libya, and although it covers 2010 its importance lies in the fact that it documents the situation in the Arab world as it stood on the eve of the Arab Spring. This allows the examination of the points of departure that eventually became the motive behind the popular revolts against the status quo, and serves as basis for comparison, a year from now, to gauge the progress achieved by different democratic transitions. The report does not only gauge progress in countries where a revolution has taken place, but also in those that watched the unfolding events closely, knowing full well that continuing to reject reform is a recipe for political suicide, a subject we will revisit later in this introduction.

This is the third annual report of the Arab Democracy Index that the Arab Reform Initiative produces. It covers twelve different Arab countries, including two new ones not covered by the previous report, and comprises forty quantitative indicators that gauge various key aspects of the democratic transition process. The report aims to influence these transition processes by providing a mechanism that allows democracy's advocates in the Arab world, as well as ordinary citizens eager to hold their leaders accountable and take part in decision-making, to closely monitor how the process is unfolding. It provides an objective mechanism for gauging change in the context of the democratic transition processes, in a manner that allows valuable insight into the latent potential for change, and its sustainability. The report looks closely at the state of democracy in Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Algeria, Yemen and Kuwait, alongside two new countries Tunisia and Bahrain, by collecting and analysing data on forty indicators relevant to the process of democratic transition.

The Arab Democracy Index indicators are divided into two: indicators that measure the means that allow a democratic transition to happen (like legislation), and indicators that measure the practices associated with the democratic transition (like elections). These indicators are themselves divided into four groups of principles (values) or constituent elements: the indicators that gauge the presence of strong public institutions (the separation of power or ability to hold the government accountable), those that measure respect for rights and freedoms (political party freedom or freedom to demonstrate and protest), those that measure the effectiveness of the rule of law (independence of the judiciary or prevalence of arbitrary arrests) and, finally, those that gauge equality and social justice (gender equality, level of illiteracy and its prevalence among men and women, and percentages of men and women university graduates).

Because we realise that we cannot directly measure all the above principles (values) and elements, we developed measurable indicators for each. For example, the rule of law depends on seven major indicators, including the extent of the judiciary’s independence according to the legal and constitutional provisions and whether there are different criteria for citizen interrogations, such as the use of alternative legal systems like state security courts, two indicators regarding which precise numerical data could be easily obtained. Quantitative data allows us to understand various developments associated with this particular value. The final numerical score that each country receives is not at all meant to pass judgement on that particular country; it is essentially designed to allow the reader to compare the performance of a given country with that of others.

Several organisations compare international and regional data, using various methodologies. A report published in 2004 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) referred to around sixty different indices, projects or reports based on gathering quantitative data relevant to political change. Among the most important of these is the Human Development Report, which has been published by the UNDP since 1990 on education, health and per capita income. Likewise, Transparency International has been publishing a report since 1995 on perceptions of corruption based on public opinion polls, data and the general impressions of businesspersons and analysts in around 180 countries. However, these two reports do not directly address the political dimensions of democratisation, as does the comprehensive report, “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” published by the World Bank, which covers over two hundred countries and regions. It gauges governance from six different angles: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control of corruption. In a similar vein, the Freedom House “Freedom in the World” report measures change related to accountability, civil liberties, the rule of law, and fighting corruption. Freedom House defines “freedom” based on two criteria — political rights and civil liberties — and gives each individual country a score ranging from 1 (the best) and 7 (the worst, or “not free at all”). Another report published by the German Bertelsmann Foundation addresses democratic conditions (such as political participation, the rule of law, stability of democratic institutions, ability of the state to extend its control over its entire territory, and political and social integration), as well as conditions of the market and the administration. Finally, the Global Integrity Report classifies countries based on a variety of indicators, including civil society, the media, electoral processes, government accountability, administration and the civil service, oversight and regulatory mechanisms, anti-corruption mechanisms and the rule of law.

Despite the fact that some of these reports, like the World Bank’s indicators, provide a large collection of data, many of them are based exclusively on non-objective mechanisms, like group, individual or public impressions, or depend on examining procedural political processes such as reviewing laws and constitutions. Researchers find it difficult to generate documented results based on available international mechanisms, not just due to their differing methodologies and principal reliance on impressions, but also because of the contradictions inherent in some of their findings. For example, the 2010 Human Development Report places Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia at the top of list of twelve Arab countries analysed in our report, and places Morocco and Yemen at the bottom of the list. On the other hand, the 2010 report by Transparency International places Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Jordan at the top of the list, followed by Kuwait, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt, while Algeria, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen trail the list. Freedom House’s 2010 report divides the countries in our study into two groups:

*Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Ramallah, Palestine.
The 16-point drop in the means indicator is due to the addition of Bahrain and Tunisia, given that the means scores of all the other countries have remained unchanged in this report. For its part, the practices Index dropped by 6 points because of a drop in the practice scores of seven of the ten countries covered by the previous report, and because the score of one of the two new countries in this report is below the overall average. This wide gap between the means and practice values indicates the presence of a significant gap in the democratic transition process that prevents it from being fully integrated, if not vulnerable to an eventual reversal.

The scores of two of the four values measured by this Index dropped down, while two rose up, the main drop being in the domain of respect for rights and freedoms, which dropped from 510 down to 484 points. This drop occurred in the scores of both means and practices relative to respect for rights and freedoms, for two main reasons: 1) the inclusion of Bahrain and Tunisia in the report, two countries whose scores were much lower than the overall average for this value, and 2) the drop in the practice scores of most countries covered by the previous report. There was also a drop in the score of “strong and accountable public institutions” from 555 down to 536 points. The reason for this is that a drop in the means and practices scores related to this value, partly due to the fact that Bahrain, one of the two new additions to the current report, obtained a low score, as well as to a drop in the practice scores of some countries. On the other hand, there was a tangible increase in the equality and social justice scores, from 471 up to 502 points, in both the practices area (due to the addition of Bahrain and Tunisia) and the means area (due to the addition of Tunisia and improvement in the practice scores relative to this particular value in countries like Morocco, Lebanon, Kuwait and Palestine). There was also a slight increase in the “rule of law” score from 614 to 616 points.

There was an improvement in the working team’s ability to collect and analyse the data necessary to compile these indicators, and two new countries were added to the Index.

Only two out of the forty indicators obtained full marks in all ten countries, namely “legal guarantees against torture” and the “judiciary’s independence,” and only one indicator, the mistreatment of detainees, scored less than 100 points in all countries; most of the other indicators scored between 300 and 700 points.

With a score of 673, Morocco topped the list of Arab countries in the Index, followed by Lebanon with 600 points, and Kuwait with 588 points. Jordan came in fourth place with 587 points, followed by Egypt with 569 points, Tunisia 537 points, Algeria 511 points, Palestine 494 points, Yemen 454 points, Syria 440 points and Saudi Arabia with 395 points. The results show that Algeria’s democratic transition has witnessed the biggest retreat compared with the previous report, followed by Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, respectively. This drop in Algeria’s score is the result of a decrease in the scores of ten indicators, including obstructing the political parties’ work, obstructing parliament’s work, government accountability, violation of the constitution and arbitrary arrests. In Jordan, there was a drop in the scores of ten indicators, including obstructing the activities of elected bodies by the executive authority, violation of the constitution, interferences by the security services and corruption in public institutions. Egypt’s score dropped by 22 points, all of which were in the practices area, particularly those relative to rule of law and respect for rights and freedoms. The current report shows that Morocco made the biggest progress compared to the previous report; it obtained first place in both the means and practice scores and first place for the rule of law. Kuwait registered the second biggest progress compared to the previous report, and ranked second after Morocco in the practices score despite ranking eighth in the means score. Lebanon was third in terms of progress compared to the previous report.

In the two countries whose democratic transition was evaluated for the first time, Tunisia and Bahrain, the results show that the overall average of Tunisia, which ranked sixth, is ten points above the overall...
Arab average due to a practices score above the overall average practices score, and an average means score below the overall average means score. However, it is worth noting that although Tunisia scored high, 681 points, for equality and social justice, (179 points above the overall average for this value), its 170 practice score relative to respect for rights and freedoms was one of the worst in this report, compared to the overall Arab average of 346 points. Tunisia also scored high for strong and accountable public institutions, obtaining 614 points, or 78 points above the overall average for this value. On the other hand, the overall average of Bahrain, which ranked ninth, is clearly below the overall Arab average due to a low practices score (410 points) and low means score (606 points), both of which were below the overall average. It is worth mentioning that, in the case of Bahrain, eight of the forty indicators scored zero, one of the worst results among all countries covered by the report.

The third part comprises two analyses of the democratic transition process in Egypt and Tunisia. Dr. Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayed’s paper analyses Egypt’s popular intifada (rebellion) and examines its motives and significance. Popular activism has succeeded in removing a big part of the ruling elite, displacing an entire party from power and bringing down major security and media figures; it also succeeded in sidelining major capitalist figures close to the old regime. However, although it managed to bring the youth to the surface as an effective political group and gave legitimacy to political parties once banned from political life, it made it easier for the armed forces to emerge as a major player in charting Egypt’s political future. This popular activism also caused a major shift in the political culture of the Egyptian people, by replacing fear and submission with challenge and rebellion. However, this same popular revolution failed to bring about change in other domains: the new constitution is not much different from the old one, the old era’s economic and social policies did not change much either, and the same goes for the country’s security and foreign policies. The style of governance has also remained the same, since major decisions are still made without prior discussions or consultations with different social sectors, not to mention that many of the new faces are members of the old elite.

Dr. Al-Sayed indicates that among the indirect causes of the revolution is the increase in the number of educated people in Egypt, the opposition enjoying a wider scope of manoeuvre and freedom of expression, the ability to organise protests and widespread availability of technological tools. The author believes that the blatant accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few and the growing economic pressure on the poor have also helped foster the right conditions for a revolution. On the other hand, the direct causes that decided the revolution’s timing include, according to the author, the increasing talk about the two revolutions, the blatant rigging of the People’s Assembly elections, the security services’ savage treatment of the popular opposition and success of the Tunisian revolution.

Dr. Al-Sayed concludes that the Egyptian popular intifada is still an unfinished revolution; for although the old regime is gone and will not return, the future is still hostage to the interaction among different new, up-and-coming political forces: the armed forces, the Islamists and new civil society groups led by the youth. In the second analytical paper, Asma’ Nouriea addresses the developments of the successful Tunisian revolution, starting with the “regime’s purging” and ending with the political transition to the post-revolutionary stage. The paper wonders about the revolution’s significance and outcome, and its ability to generate a genuine democratic transition in Tunisia. The author believes that the process of “toppling the regime” took three distinct forms: several members of the old ruling elite were removed from power; major official institutions associated with them, like the Chamber of Deputies and Constitutional Council, were dissolved and the 1959 constitution suspended, and steps were taken to pursue elements involved in corruption.

However, the building process is still at the initial stage; though there is an independent elections committee the date of the elections has been postponed, and though there are several new political parties, the Tunisian citizen has not yet had the chance to know them well enough, a fact that favours already established and well-known opposition parties (such as the Islamist Ennahda Party). Moreover, although the revolution helped civil society make a strong entry into the political arena, the public political debate among different civil society groups is still rife with mutual accusations. Furthermore, although the revolution helped promote the freedoms of opinion and expression and led to the emergence of several new media outlets, this happened in the absence of any regulatory laws. Finally, despite the relative calm on the security front, the constant demonstrations, sit-ins and instability fuelled by public demands have fostered a state of instability and chaos that negatively impacted the country’s economy. For all the above reasons, the future of the democratic transition in Tunisia remains in question.

The fourth part contains a list of general and specific recommendations. While the general recommendations are based on the Index’s overall results, the specific recommendations rely on the results of individual countries. The general recommendations focus on four issues: freedoms, social justice, educational affairs, and strengthening public institutions. The recommendations call for guarantees of greater political and civil freedoms, in particular by promoting monitoring and the role of human rights organisations, and for issues of social justice to be given a pivotal role in the reform process in the Arab world. The recommendations also stress the urgent need for reform in educational affairs through the allocation of additional budgetary resources, combating illiteracy, reducing school drop-out rates, and improving educational standards and conditions, particularly for girls and women. Finally, the general recommendations identify the need to reinforce public institutions vital to the reform process, such as parliaments, the judiciary and the law enforcement authorities, through parliamentary accountability, respect for judicial freedom and oversight of the security services.

The report includes four annexes that contain a description of the indicators and systems of calculation; detailed results from each country’s indicators; a table that presents changes in the measurement tools and sources of information between the two surveys; and an annex providing a brief description of the prevailing conditions in each of the surveyed countries with respect to the character of the political regime and major events that took place during the period of the survey.

There is no doubt that the process of quantification used in this report poses a number of problems, for there are significant aspects of the political process that are difficult to adequately quantify or measure. One might also argue that the importance of the different indicators used varies considerably, for not everything that can be counted and measured is actually worth counting and measuring. Another problem relates to the significance of the final scores awarded to each country and to the Index as a whole. A measurement naturally has to start at a given point, but the nature of this point may be insignificant, since what is of greater concern to us is where this point stands relative to other countries, and the amount of progress or regression in relation to previous years. However, this comparison with other countries presents problems of its own since it raises questions about the feasibility of ranking countries whose political and social systems are fundamentally very different. Since there is no entirely satisfactory answer to this question, we have attempted to compensate for this limitation in the report by including good-quality analytical articles.

Given the current activism on the Arab street, it is important to note that the current Democracy Index aims to document the various democratic transitions rather than predict the potential for political reform, or the popular demand for it. However, despite the current context, i.e., failure of the reform process and outbreak of popular revolutions calling for the incumbent regimes’ downfall rather than only their reform, this report departs from the premise that reform is now possible or, we could even say, that the possibility of it happening today has become more realistic. The reform process could be initiated from above, like the regimes in Morocco and Jordan’s are trying to do, when the decision-
makers and elite that support them realise that the cost-benefit analysis, i.e., their very survival, depends on the introduction of genuine reforms that can contain the people’s demands before they erupt into a mass revolution. On the other hand, and despite the allure of calling for the regime’s downfall, the bloody experiences of Libya, Syria and Yemen will likely provide an opportunity for reform, as long as public opinion feels that they are serious. In other words, while previous Index reports have registered a persistent yearly decline in the area of respect for rights and freedoms, we should expect a marked improvement in this value in the coming years. Previous reports have shown that ruling elites do not reform themselves except when pressured to do so. However, because pressure has previously come from abroad, it focussed more on the means rather than practices of the democratic transition; however, since pressure from the people cannot be similarly contained, we expect reforms to focus more on practices, in the next few years.

It is important to note that this document is the outcome of a collaborative effort among a group of Arab research centres and universities, most of which are members of the Arab Reform Initiative. These centres collected initial data in their respective countries, and the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research in Palestine calculated each country’s indicator scores based on this initial data. Although all participant research centres adhered to a standardised methodology, in some countries a small number of indicator scores relied on the researcher’s estimates, on those of the centre’s main researchers, or on the collective evaluation of the main working group. The fact that there were many data-gathering centres and discrepancies in the estimates and impressions acted as a restraining factor, one that is inherent to teamwork. However, the progress made by these centres in working together more effectively on this report bodes well that these constraints will be overcome in the future.

Methodology

The Arab Democracy Index, which is the core of the Arab Reform Initiative’s Annual Report, monitors different indicators that assess issues relevant to the nature and performance of political systems (different authorities). It also reflects the extent and depth of changes that could together reflect various democratic changes ensuing from different reform processes in the Arab world. The Index’s third (current) analysis covers twelve countries, including two new ones (Bahrain and Tunisia) not included in the previous (second) Index; the intentions is to continue adding new countries to the list until all the Arab countries are covered.

The Index is a numerical analysis of 40 indicators selected to reflect the variables expected to change if the reform process succeeds in bringing the Arab world closer to democracy, based on the prevailing democracy paradigm. Most indicators examine how close a country stands to the liberal democratic model of the nation state. This does not reflect the political or ideological preferences of those who designed the Index, or diminish the importance of theories that criticise this particular paradigm. It was rather our desire to work within the context of a common denominator that made us opt for this particular choice. Thus, since this liberal paradigm, associated with the classical vision of the nation state, above all has to do with the procedural aspects of democracy, and therefore reflects a minimum degree of the democratisation process we are hoping for, this paradigm becomes the closest option to the common denominator we seek. The forty indicators gauge four major values and principles relevant to the democratisation process: strong and accountable public institutions, respect for rights and freedoms, the rule of law, and equality and social justice. Neither does the Index’s methodology overlook the use of the prevalent liberal paradigm; it reinforces the Index with indicators relevant to equality, justice and economic independence.

It is worth stressing here that this Index monitors changes that ensue from reform processes initiated by the official political regimes. Naturally, the mechanisms involved in changing a political regime are not limited to that; there is the public activism that takes the form of an intifada or revolution, there is war and/or “outside factors,” and there is state failure.

Public activism can impact the political regime in variety of ways, ranging from pushing it towards reform to threatening its stability to the extent of destabilising it and forcing it to relinquish some of the powers that give it legitimacy. This could force the regime to search for new sources of legitimacy by expanding or changing its socio-political base, or coexist with a lower level of legitimacy, that requires it to tighten its security grip on the country with all what this entails in terms of danger to itself from the street and the elite. However, the most drastic threat to the regime from public activism is top-down change (revolution).

This is why public activism is an important factor of change in any political regime, which is what we clearly saw happen in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011, and see happening today in Yemen, Libya and Syria. Nevertheless, because the Index cannot assess activism’s direct impact, it limits itself to assessing its impact on the political regime’s performance, which will in turn reflect itself in future analyses.

Concerning the forty indicators that constitute this Index’s backbone, the relevant data is collected on a regular basis (every year, in principle), which means that when these indicators are regularly evaluated and calculated, it becomes possible to gauge the impact of changes in Arab political regimes, and whether these regimes have fulfilled the requirements of a transition to the above-mentioned model of democracy.

1 See a list of these indicators, the way they are measured and the sources of information regarding each one of them in Annex (1).
Whenever possible, the third analysis covered the period from early January 2010 to the end of December 2010. The countries covered are Jordan, Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Kuwait, Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco and Yemen. The analysis relied on the same forty indicators used in the second report.

This Index is an extension of international and Arab experiences, among which are those of the Centre for Palestine Studies and Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research that together compiled and published the “Democracy Index in Palestine.” The Index’s indicators were modified to suit its comparative nature, adapt to the data collection options in different countries, and take into account each of these countries’ size, resources, history and particular characteristics.

The Index has also its own distinguishing factors, restrictions and limitations; it gives the reader a quick view of the state of various democratic transitions in the Arab world, as well as a series of quick and consistent relevant details. It allows the reader to easily follow these transformations, year after year, and ascertain whether real change or political sluggishness had taken place, in a manner easy to understand. It is worth mentioning, however, that these indicators’ ability to monitor change associated with various democratic transitions is naturally limited (it remains confined to following-up and assessing facts on the ground rather than predicting the future), and that the numerical assessment of these changes involves a certain level of simplification and abstraction.

Many Indices monitor economic, social and political conditions. For example, Average per Capita Income is used to classify a given country on the economic development scale, in comparison with others. Similarly, the Average Price Index is used to measure the general increase in prices, and, by extension, the actual value of wages. In the same vein, the Democracy Index is an attempt to find a quantitative (or numerical) expression for the pace and direction of democratic transition, as part of the process of change in a given political system. However, since the nature of political transition is different from economic or other transformations, this Index relies on a larger number and variety of indicators to gauge democratic change. Different indicators use different measurement methods to ascertain whether conditions, in general, reflect the success or failure of a transition process. This Index does not try, for example, to answer whether democracy is liable to encourage political pluralism or not; instead, it presupposes that one of the reasons for seeking democracy is precisely to encourage pluralism. Consequently, it sees any increase in the number of political parties as a positive sign of democratic transition. However, despite its importance, this Index does not at all examine the degree, seriousness, status and nature of the political parties’ participation in political life, or the nature of these parties’ programmes, etc. It presupposes that if pluralism were effective in encouraging democracy, it would have an impact on political participation, and on the political authorities’ performance, e.g., by increasing their accountability level. Similar constraints apply to most of the indicators used; indicators relevant to education examine the ratio of educated individuals and the number of years they spend in academia, rather than the quality of their education. Nor does the indicator relevant to social security examine its effectiveness, or the safety net it provides.

Various indicators address issues relevant to legal structures, social conditions, freedoms, the economy, the authorities’ performance, institutional performance and other issues whose conditions, or quality, are supposed to change as the result of democratic transition. Indicators examine these issues from the point of view of relevant preparations underway (policies and legislation), and the level of practices and their outcome. The Index is based on the premise that a positive democratic transition is the outcome of a certain political will; therefore the lack of such a transition (obstructed or absent) means that either this will does not exist, or has not been actualised.

### Selecting Countries for the Survey

We faced a number of practical and objective limitations in deciding which countries to cover in the survey. In principle, all the Arab countries were candidates; nevertheless, and despite various resource and time limitations, these limitations were not a deciding factor since other factors intervened to resolve the issue, one way or another. Among these was the availability of local working groups ready and able to start working immediately on collecting and evaluating data, whether opinion surveys could be conducted in the concerned country, and whether access to information was relatively easy. The availability of the working groups in Syria and Kuwait, during the collection of data for the second report, played a vital role in adding these two countries to the group of Arab countries surveyed for the second analysis. Furthermore, the availability of such groups in Bahrain and Tunisia allowed the addition of two new countries to the third survey, alongside the eight covered by the first one.

We cannot claim that the twelve countries covered by the first survey are a representative sample of the Arab world (which applies even more to the eight countries covered in the first survey). Nevertheless, the chosen sample does include countries from the Arab Mashreq (including the Arab Gulf region) and Maghreb, rich and poor countries, countries with large and relatively small populations, three oil producing countries, and ones witnessing more politically turbulent times than others. And despite the absence so far of a number of Arab Gulf and African countries from the Index’s sample, the research team believes that the sample surveyed in this report could give a well-balanced impression of the Arab world. Of course, this impression could be somewhat optimistic, since the availability of information and the relative ease of access to it, reflect to a certain extent what the survey seeks to examine. The reader should therefore be aware of the high probability of a structural bias in the Index, due to the mechanism it is based on. One could say that this rewards the sampling bias had the research team not been conscious of the fact that the sample is not representative.

### Indicators of the Arab Democracy Index

After much debate, a re-examination of relevant texts, and a study of several examples from around the world regarding the measurement of democracy and democratisation, forty indicators were selected for this Index. Each has its own set of detailed sub-indicators and a specific way of calculating respective scores, based on the information available and the particular situation it is supposed to monitor.

The selected indicators have to do with daily political, economic and social issues, and reflect the entire democratic decision-making process This starts from the tendency and desire to take part in the decision-making process, to the decision-making process itself, its implementation, guarantees for its continued
implementation, and making the necessary adjustments for it to happen.

All the Index’s indicators were given equal weight1, meaning that each indicator contributed 2.5% to the Index. The process of deciding on the respective weights, or the decision to give all indicators equal weight, was a decision of the working group that carries within it a largely arbitrary judgment regarding the importance of various constituent elements of a democratic system. Some might choose to re-examine the Index by giving each indicator the weight he or she thinks it deserves. The importance of this Index lies in its ability to compare results from consecutive years, and monitor the ongoing process of change. What is important here for any diligent researcher is not how the image is formed, but how it changes and transforms as the result of changes in the system’s attributes and performance.

It is rather difficult to rationally and objectively delineate the specific weight of countries going through different stages of development, since each focuses on an area of tangible change within the democratisation process. While some countries are at the stage of modernising and democratising their political system’s constitutional and legal structures, others are promoting political participation, strengthening their economy or liberalising it, let alone the countries expected under a restructuring of their entire political system, in next few years.

The experience of the past two decades shows that there is no single formula for democratic transition, regardless whether it is on a positive or negative course. Countries with different socio-economic structures certainly need to focus on different aspects of the democratic transition process. For some countries, it is a matter of institution building, for others it is re-forming them; for some it is establishing a solid basis for elements of prosperity to take root, in others, it is expanding it; in others yet, it is re-examining the entire legal structure, liberalising the economy, and so on. Moreover, the extent of the political regime’s resilience and threshold of its people’s anger differ from one country to the other, depending on the internal and external circumstances and history of each. The political activism that the Arab world is experiencing today confirms the need to take into account the disparities and different social infrastructure in various countries, rather than only their political and economic structures (while admitting the link among all three). Active forces that act as catalysts for change play an important role in defining the political map, since they themselves are a product of political and economic conditions on the ground.

The forty indicators are the constituent elements of the Arab Democracy Index; each of them examines a given domain that reflects the process of democratic transition in the Arab world, and quantitatively reflects the examined data.

The indicators are divided into groups, based on different classifications; there are two kinds of indicators: on the one hand, there are tools (means) and practices (results), and on the other, there are political, economic and social indicators. There are also indicators relative to internal and foreign policies, and indicators relative to the basic values and principles of a democratic system, i.e., strong and accountable public institutions, respect for rights and freedoms, the rule of law and equality and social justice.

These indicators were chosen based on several considerations, the most important being the need to cover all the aspects listed above. Other important considerations were the degree of these indicators’ reflection of democracy as a governance system, act as a and as a regulator of the political regimes relationship with society, and their ability to gauge the state’s potential for fulfilling its role, and commitments to the people and society. Other considerations is whether they reflect the level of the state and institutions’ respect for human rights, and their ability to project an image of relationships within civil society’s institutions, associations and organisations. A different set of considerations has to do with whether the indicators could be measured repeatedly, and at specific time intervals, (usually on an annual basis), without neglecting those relevant to phenomena like elections that require a longer time frame to change, yet are key elements in the democratic transition process. These indicators were selected after a long process of reflection and testing that lead the team to a reasonable level of confidence that they were collectively able to monitor the course and pace of a democratic transition ensuing from a reform process that the political regime itself has decided to undertake (regardless of the motives).

Though we did mention a general tendency in the Index towards procedural matters and a focus on political indicators, the team’s awareness of the importance of the socio-economic aspects of democratisation prompted it to include a number of additional indicators. These are relevant to the citizens’ interest in using and promoting democratic tools to ensure their participation in a decision making process that goes beyond the mere choice of leaders. This latter set of indicators examines the true extent of genuine democratic practices, whether they are restricted to the elite, and if they risk becoming another tool for legitimising tyranny and the poor distribution of the country’s wealth. The set of concomitant indicators, classified under the principles (values) of equality and social justice, constitutes the main component in measuring the nature of a democratic transition that is not limited to procedural matters.

We believe that this Index could interest observers with different backgrounds and concerns. It could also turn public opinion’s attention to areas of success and failure regarding different aspects of the democratic transition process. It could provide politicians who desire to introduce change, with precious information as to the Index’s ability to pinpoint areas of weakness in policy implementation, areas that need further development or those where policies have to be amended. It is also important for legislators who aspire to hold the executive authority accountable, as far as its performance in democratising the community’s life is concerned. It could also reveal areas that still need legal or constitutional reform, and point out domains that researchers should further explore to uncover reasons behind successes or failures to democratisation.

Sources of Information

Given the wide variety of indicator and the wide range of issues they portray, different ways were used to access data necessary for crafting the indicators and allocating scores to individual domains. The research group tried, as much as possible, to rely on basic sources of information, and was careful, whenever possible, to obtain the necessary information from independent and varied sources. The Index also paid special attention to public opinion, and allocated a quarter of the indicators to it. In cases where precise information could not be obtained, or the results reached did not provide a clear-cut result (due to contradictory information, or to obvious disparities between official data and data from the field), the team resorted to the evaluation of experts from the countries concerned.

Sources of information used in the Index come from government or non-government sources. Government sources include ministries, intelligence and security agencies, central statistics departments, parliamentary committees, parliamentary secretariats, higher judicial councils and court administrations, as each case required. Non-government sources included local government centres, like regional, tribal and municipal councils; non-governmental organisations, unions and relevant professional associations, local newspapers and the internet. As for sources relevant to the citizen’s impressions and assessment of the situation, opinion surveys, especially designed for the Index, were carried out by technically qualified teams, based

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1 Focus groups were held in Syria, Bahrain and Tunisia for the present report. To this end, national teams held meetings with groups that represented, as much as possible, a cross-section of public opinion. In Syria, three focus groups were held comprising 59 people in all, among whom 31 represented the youth, 21 the intelligentsia and 7 the ruling regime (National Front parties). In Bahrain, the focus groups comprised 30 people in all divided among six groups representing technicians (from the oil industry), artists, literary figures, journalists, activists from youth societies and political activists in various political societies. In Tunisia, two focus groups were held comprising a total of 41 participants among whom where activists from different societies, unions, women’s movements, media figures, members of the legal profession and activists from the political opposition; the country team was unable to organize a focus group representing the ruling party.
The Concept of Democracy and the Democratic Transition Process

The Arab Democracy Index is a numerical projection of the democratic transition process. By transition process, we mean a series of changes in the characteristics, nature and performance of a political system during a period of transition, which is by nature imprecise, suffers from periodic bouts of regression and is not guaranteed against failure. Measuring the transition process forces us to concentrate on indicators that clearly portray changes in the political system and its elements. It also compels us to stay away, as much as possible, from other important elements and indicators that project the depth, effectiveness and sustainability of an existing democratic system, but do not necessarily play a key role in the transition from an undemocratic to a democratic system.

The kind of democracy we seek and are trying to gauge is, for the purposes of this Index, a mode of organization of political life based on the premise that people are the source of power, and that a political system should reflect the popular will, and ensure justice and equality through participation in the decision-making process. Democracy is, therefore, a mean, rather than an end in itself. Democracy at the core is also not a way of thinking, a belief, a set of values, or a cultural trend, but a mechanism for participation in the decision-making process, and one that ensures that the decisions taken reflect the will of the people.

Gauging democracy in a given country means measuring the level of the people’s effective participation in making decisions that affect their lives, in a democratic way. It also means the presence of various ways and means that allow this participation to take place, and the degree to which they are institutionalised, sustainable and available for the people to use. This can be measured using a set of indicators that cover available mechanisms for participation in the decision-making process, the ability to amend them and object to them, and the level of public satisfaction with decisions made (political or other). This reflects, on the one hand, the extent of the people’s involvement in decision-making and, on the other, how seriously a decision is implemented (relative to the intention when it was made). It also reflects the extent of the people’s effective participation in, and impact on, the decision-making process, and how encouraged they are to participate and use available mechanisms, as well as the presence of guarantees regarding the consequences of free participation. Moreover, it shows how deeply institutionalised are all the above mechanisms, their implementation, relevant practices and sustainability within the system, and society’s ability to shoulder the ensuing burden.

This report is based on the premise that democracy (in its general sense) is not a tactical position, but one that reflects a certain socio-political-economic tendency embodied in the political system. It has its own institutional, contractual (constitutional), procedural (administrative) and value-related manifestations, the most important among which are the unequivocal respect for the rule of law, upholding human rights and preserving man’s dignity, and honouring the concept of citizenship. Seen from this angle, democracy is the people’s option. However, because this option is in contradiction with the interests of certain groups, particular institutions are necessary to formulate specific arrangements, measures and legislation that lay the foundations of democracy, guarantee its sustainability and deter anyone from causing it harm. Among these arrangements and measures are separation and independence of powers (executive, legislative and judicial), exercise of power through regular and fair elections (i.e. admitting the legitimacy of competition between forces and parties with different agendas on governance), and enacting legislation that ensures freedom of expression, organisation, assembly, press and the right to strike (i.e., to participate in public life). Democracy is not only a question of implementing the principles of practicing power through regular elections, respect for party and intellectual pluralism and upholding minority rights, but goes well beyond that to enshrining basic individual rights, like the right to work, movement, shelter, education, health and social care, regardless of one’s ethnicity, religion, gender or colour. The Index’s indicators were designed in such a way as to take all of the above into consideration, as much as possible, and look ahead to including other dimensions, like women’s participation in public life, the real conditions under which they live and the extent to which the legal infrastructure promotes their equality with men.

The Index's Classifications

The Index’s data have a numerical value that reflects the average value of indicators in each individual country, group of countries, or all Arab countries together, from which data is collected. However, it is worth looking at specific classifications by grouping indicators into sets that reflect the transition process, from one angle or another of aspects reflected by these indicators, as mentioned above.

The first classification divides the indicator into two kinds: those that reflect the means through which democratic transition is taking place (indicators 1-10), and those that reflect the practices associated with it (indicators 11-40). As Figure 1-1 shows, indicators relative to the means make up one quarter of indicators, while those relative to practices make up the remaining three-quarters.

Indicators relevant to the means reflect those aspects of the democratic transition according to which constitutional, legal and institutional principles that lay the legal foundations for guaranteed democratic processes are formulated. These indicators therefore serve to ascertain, for example, whether constitutional texts highlight the importance of the separation of powers, and include legal guarantees for the freedom of the press, the right to form and join political parties, etc. Furthermore, indicators relative to means are confined to the political aspects, since they reflect the minimum amount of political will necessary to undergo a democratic transition.

As to indicators relevant to practices, they reflect the implementation of constitutional provisions, and rule and regulations, on the ground. They measure, for example, violations of constitutional principles and laws that harm the balance of power among the three branches of government, or restrict freedoms. They also measure the extent to which the government is dependent on foreign funding, or on foreign markets, to an extent that it has become more responsive to foreign pressure than to domestic public opinion. Indicators that reflect the public’s impressions, which the Index bases on public opinion surveys, are among the indicators that reflect practices. They monitor, among other, issues like whether people are able to criticise the authorities, and whether they feel corruption is widespread in the public sector. Moreover, among the indicators that reflect practices are a number of indicators that examine social issues, such as education, health, social security, and the like.

![Figure 1-1: The Index’s First Classification Based on the Type of Indicator (Practices and Means)](image-url)
As shown in Figure 1-2, the second classification divides the Index into four groups reflecting the basic values and principles of democratic transition:

**Strong and accountable public institutions** (13 indicators: 1-3; 11-20); cover issues like people’s evaluation of public institutions’ performance, of the rule of law and whether the public feels personally safe.

**Respect for rights and freedoms** (13 indicators: 4-7; 21-29); cover issues like licensing new political parties, appearance of opposition political party views in the press, and the people’s assessment of press freedom.

**The rule of law** (7 indicators: 7, 8, 25-29); cover issues such as independence of the judiciary, and how people's complaints against governmental authorities are dealt with.

**Equality and social justice** (7 indicators: 9, 30-35); cover issues such as government spending on health and education compared with security and defence, and the ratio of women in the labour market.

Figure 2-1 below shows the two-thirds share, out of the total Index, of indicators relevant to public institutions and respect for rights and freedoms, and the 18% share of those relevant to the rule of law, equality and social justice.

### Figure 1-2: The Index's Second Classification based on the Basic Principles of a Democratic System

- **Strong and accountable public institutions**: 32.50%
- **Respect for rights and freedoms**: 17.50%
- **The rule of law**: 17.50%
- **Equality and social justice**: 32.50%

#### Reading the Index

The Index does not presuppose the existence of a democratic standard based on which measurements can be made. This is why the Index relies on a quantitative estimate of the condition of democracy in the Arab world, in the period covered by the annual report. However, despite the fact that this estimate gives an impression of democratic conditions in those Arab countries where surveys were conducted, this Index does not make value judgements on them, and should not be used as such. Although the Index allows comparisons between various Arab countries, these comparisons remain confined to contrasting indicators that constitute this Index’s elements. The Index unifies the measurement period, indicators and calculation systems, and uses coordinated information-gathering methods, which guarantees uniformly high credibility of the information used. Consequently, the Index’s effectiveness is linked to the ability to manage the research process in a manner that succeeded, as much as possible, in maintaining a level of consistency among research groups in different countries, and ensuring that the information gathered is equally consistent in all aspects. The main research tool here is information gathering; and the more research groups are successful in collecting and documenting necessary information, with a certain degree of consistency, the smaller the margin of error becomes, and the fewer distortions occur in drawing a picture of different countries’ indicators in a single survey.

It is worth repeating that the Index does not reflect democratic conditions as such, but the democratic transition process, by quantitatively measuring and reporting on the condition of democracy at several points in time, whereby each point represents a given time period. Once a year, the Index freezes in time an instant in a given country’s life, which means that we have to see the result as a static, rather than a moving picture. We should also consider that drawing this picture year after year will enable us, over time, to construct a cinematic image, and that each indicator in the Index is a single frame in a picture that portrays an instant in the life of an Arab country.

On the other hand, it is possible in principle to use the Index to compare various Arab states, taking into consideration the context in which pictures of different countries were drawn. Just as bodies appear bigger or smaller depending on their distance from the lens when the picture is taken, data gathered through inconsistent tools in this Index could be misleading if their context is not clear. One should pay special attention to this consideration when making comparisons.

The Index’s methodology presupposes a high level of coordination and agreement between research groups in different countries, and there is no doubt that this requirement will improve as different national research teams gain experience. There is also no doubt that other parts of the annual report (the qualitative reports, in particular) will contribute to defining the contours of the static image drawn by the Index, and help the reader better imagine what lies behind, and around, it.

This first report aims at establishing a framework for future measurements; it acts as a frame in which pictures will be displayed, year after year, while this third report, like its predecessors, is a continuation of this framework.

In any reading, the Index’s score can range between zero and one thousand; this applies to the indicators and sub-indicators in any mode of classification. In general, and with a certain amount of distortion that cannot but be noticed by the reader, one can assume that the Index’s scores, the collective one and the one specific to a given country or sector, could be used to classify countries into categories. We could say that any score below 400 indicates undemocratic conditions, and a lack of policies aimed at fostering stirrings in favour of a democratic transition. We could say, in the same vein, that a score between 400 and 700 indicates undemocratic conditions that comprise a few elements of democracy (such as liberalising political or social life to a certain extent), which reflect either a tendency towards a transition, that the political regime is amenable to such an eventualty, or that it is compelled to do so. Scores between 700 and 1000 reflect instances of progress in the democratic transition processes, whereby people have become aware of certain democratic manifestations. Countries that scored enough points to place them in that category need more diligent study, as well as additional indicators to evaluate the extent to which their respective political systems have developed.
The Index can be read at different levels:

The first level involves reading the final numerical projection (overall figure), which allows a general and unencumbered view of the democratic transition process in Arab countries in which a survey was conducted. It also allows us to take stock of the democratic transition process separately in each surveyed country.

The second level involves reading the numerical projections of the Index’s sub-indicators, on the basis of which the indicators are classified into groups, like the results of sub-indicators relevant to practices, means, rights and freedoms, or the rule of law. One could also read each country’s results separately.

The third level involves reading each indicator separately; this allows the reader to monitor changes in all forty indicators, either for the surveyed countries as a whole, or for each country separately.

The Index comprises information that allows the reader to view data on both the regional and national levels.

However, we do not advise the reader to look at this Index, and its indicators, only from the quantitative angle. Democracy and democratisation symbolise a qualitative condition that reflects, reinforces and contributes to the development of a malleable and changeable socio-political and economic system. When the median value is used, in particular, a given indicator, is a quantitative (numerical) expression of an instant frozen in time, to provide qualitative values over a given time period. We advise the reader to view this data against a backdrop of dependency, vulnerability and anxiety regarding the future, three general conditions that Arab societies currently suffer from. Therefore, we have to be wary of any attempt to reduce the democratic transition process to a mere number, or a set of quantitative variables.

Instead, we should deal with indicators and classifications, as well as the Index itself, as tools to monitor change (both negative and positive) in the condition of democracy, and thus intervene in formulating policies and guidelines that serve the democratic transition, and help entrench democracy.

Many precautions are necessary when reading the Index and interpreting its findings. These include a margin of error that could be reduced through diligent effort, though not eliminated entirely, and the existence of a link between the Index’s mechanism, and popular aspirations that change in tandem with progress. The Index’s partial dependence on opinion surveys, for example, means that it equates evaluations of the same process by different publics, using the same measurement tool, despite divergent public expectations in different countries that affect the evaluation of facts. This means that the higher the ceiling of expectations, the less this tool is capable of reflecting real change. Some of the Index’s indicators compare texts that reflect the same legal and constitutional principles in different legal environments, environments that might be undergoing different processes of development. There is also the impact of language differences; a certain term could mean one thing in one country, and another in a different country. However, awareness of these constraints by the research team and the readers, and their ability to take them into consideration, enhances the Index’s effectiveness as a tool. To arrive at the best results therefore, the Index must be used sensibly.

Remarks on the Current Edition

This edition is the second step of a process to enhance the structure and the tools of measurement in the Arab Index, as the first edition was a pioneering project and largely experimental (being the first of its kind). The working team made a number of changes on the second report following multifaceted deliberations over the results of the first edition, including checking certain indicators, modifying the means of measurement and, consequently, the calculations. Other modifications occurred due to changes in circumstances (a new working team in Algeria, introduction of opinion surveys in some countries such as Egypt, change of institute carrying out the opinion survey in Algeria, lack of updated official statistics for reasons beyond the efforts of the working team in Saudi Arabia), or changes in the field research methodology to gauge public opinion in Morocco and improve the quality of data in the third report.

Now that the methodology has been set, there are no differences between the indicators and data collection systems of the second and third reports. The working team will nevertheless reconsider the methodology in light of the Arab revolutions, and the prevailing non-reformist nature of the tools used to effect the democratic transition. There is a majority opinion among various working groups that the fourth report will involve additional indicators, and that some restrictions on the collection of data will change positively or negatively in time for the next report, as Arab political systems change in tandem with current interactions on the Arab street.

It is still not possible to cover Palestine in a normal way due to the continued rift between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the presence of two separate governments. Whenever possible and reasonable, the local team dealt with Palestine as a single unit and succeeded in doing so as far as indicators relevant to the people, their conditions and impressions were concerned, without direct contacts with the divided authorities. This applied to the practices area where there is consensus that the laws in effect are those issued by the president, whether before or after the rift occurred; it also applied to the social and economic indicators which data was collected in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single unit. The remaining indicators (11 to 34), namely those relative to practices (i.e., those linked to the authorities, like freedom of opinion, human rights, the rule of law and institution building), data concerning them was collected only in the West Bank (under the Salam Fayyad’s Government) and not the Gaza Strip (under Ismail Hania’s Government). The team was also forced to suspend the fifteenth indicator in this survey because the Legislative Assembly did not meet as a unified institution.

These changes, regardless of why they had to occur, will limit the ability of the team, as well as the readers, to make useful comparison between the results of this edition with the previous one. The central working team estimated the consequences of these changes and made the decision to suspend (with retroactive effect, as mentioned above) some results from the previous edition in the cases where amendments to the way of measurement rendered the index of both editions incoherent, and – therefore – useless. The team also decided to keep some data while mentioning the changes that have taken place and the need for caution; while the level of accuracy which this report seeks may not have been retained, the data can still shed some light on the situation. The details of these changes, as well as their consequences with regards to reading the results, are listed in detail in the chapter “Findings”, and the changes are listed in Appendix 3.

The absence of grades for seven indicators in the previous edition sheds doubt on the possibility of making useful comparison between the two. However, the possibility to read the current indicators has become remarkably complete. The process of suspension does not affect any indicator as a whole, but was restricted to cases that are related to the circumstances of certain countries: the suspension of the indicator regarding hindering the performance of the parliament in Saudi Arabia as there is no such parliament in the country and in Palestine because the parliament was incapacitated, and the suspension of the indicator regarding...
taking executive authorities to trial due to the absence of the necessary information on this topic.

The process of collecting the information and revising the data has led to conclusions related to the previous edition, or two previous editions (see Annex 3 for details). The grades of the first edition have been amended to the best of the working team’s ability. The grades given in this report regarding the previous edition should replace those published in the first report.

One of the methodological challenges in this report lies in the disparity in sensitivity of the indicators, which results from the nature of the information reflected, its source, or the way in which an indicator is measured. This disparity can arise for example from opinion surveys, where data can change when the sample is changed, or from adopting a calculation mechanism which puts under a microscope changes occurring as a result of the percentage error in the index or due to rounding up figures, etc. The indicator on school dropout rates is a good example, as it moves up or down a hundred points for each 0.5% of change in the dropout rate. Although the sensitivity of the indicator and that of the measuring tool should be harmonised, reducing the sensitivity of such an indicator is impossible to do, since governments should aim for a 0% school dropout rate and, as such, it is illogical to neglect fractions of percentages that indicate large numbers of students. Nevertheless, the team still hopes to continually check this data and to better calculate in the future, especially as multiple national and international statistics can provide data for this indicator.

On the other hand, the team decided that data from the previous report could be sufficient in cases where no new data is available for slow-changing indicators, and when there is no indication that new tangible data is to be expected in the future. In a number of cases the team drew on data from the previous survey, as indicated in Chapter Three and Annex 3.

The current survey and Arab street activism

As mentioned above, this Index cannot predict or explain future events, all on its own; it was designed to measure changes associated with political reforms (lead by the political authority) by examining facts on the ground. Doing so enables it to discover the extent and nature of the changes, and other major events, that the street intifadas, counter revolutions and military interventions in politics are likely to produce in 2011, and include them in the next report.

In general, social science is still incapable of predicting the outbreak of popular activist movements or the advent of sudden changes in the political system, and is likely remain so. However, although it failed to predict the downfall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and other major events, it is still able to gauge the extent, nature, and success or failure of political change processes, including democratic transitions.

Also worth noting is the difficulty of measuring the impact of political activism on internal dynamics. What can be measured, however, are the results at a given point in time rather than all the overall dynamics and their many interwoven and complex elements. The activism we witnessed and are still witnessing today in the Arab world is still incomplete; it is an ongoing process that defined a series of very general markers in some countries (like Tunisia and Egypt). Thus, although it is clear today that the situation will not go back to what it was before January 2011, its shape in 2012 is still far from clear.

The Findings

This section analyses the indicators on the regional and individual country levels, using the Index’s general data and data that reflects aspects of the means or practices, as well as the sub-indicators for the four values or principles referred to in the methodology. The various sub-indicators will be compared when anything of significance or interest arises and, whenever feasible, and the findings of this survey will be compared to those of the two previous surveys (conducted in 2008 and 2009).

There will then be a review of each of the forty indicators, followed by a description of any figures that deviate from the general methodology, for example the use of different sources of information in one of the countries, the suspension of an indicator, etc...

Regional Findings

The Index’s overall score stands at 527 compared to 536 in the previous survey. This score, like the previous overall score, means that the twelve countries whose indicators were examined show, in general, a certain tendency towards democratic transition, and reflects an initial willingness in the Arab region to democratis as a result of the addition of two new countries did not raise the score, since the Index score of the present survey, without Tunisia and Bahrain, (i.e., for the ten countries surveyed in the previous report) would be 531 instead of 528 points.

As Figure 1-2 shows, the differences in the Index score of each separate country indicates that differences among the twelve countries could be described as falling within the normal distribution of differences, since these differences are relatively graded. Morocco is in first place with a 673 score, followed by Lebanon with 600, Kuwait 588, Jordan 587, Egypt 569, Tunisia 537, Algeria 511, Palestine 494, Bahrain 459, Yemen 454, Syria 440 and Saudi Arabia with 395 points. This means that eleven of the twelve countries scored above 400, the score that the team has previously earmarked as the cut-off point between autocracy and totalitarianism, and signs of a potential democratic transition. This allows us to say that the prevailing factors confirm a trend towards a democratic transition in the region, a result that conforms to the findings of the two previous surveys, as indicated in Figure 2-2 below.

Figure 2-1: Index, by Country, 2010
We could unequivocally say that progress towards a democratic transition (at the reform level) is still embryonic, largely dependent on foreign pressure and incapable of catching up with the people’s yearning for change. As Figure 2-4 indicates, one of the signs that the region’s democratic transition is still embryonic is the fact that the means score stands at 760, or almost double that of the practices (450). If we take into consideration that means indicators only address constitutional and legal texts, and that there is external pressure behind the legal reforms, pressure aimed at liberalising states that gained momentum in the early 1990s whose impact on political performance is still weak, there are no indications that the legal or constitutional reform process is capable of motivating reform at the practices level. The practices score has remained unchanged in the third survey (450) compared to the second survey (456).

As Table 1-2 shows, what is noteworthy is that the scores of the two kinds of indicators are closest to each other in Saudi Arabia, the country that obtained the lowest score in the Index, whereby the scores of the means and practices are on par with each other (11:10), while in Kuwait, which came in third, these scores are 14:10. The other countries’ scores are further apart, with 15:10 in Jordan, Syria and Morocco, and 27:10 in Yemen.
These figures correspond to the prevailing impressions regarding the degree of stability of each country, since it is natural for practices to keep pace with the legal framework when this framework is stable, and when political and administrative life is consistent with it. This happens either because the framework has remained unchanged for a long period of time, or because changes within it have successfully moved on to a practice mode acceptable to society.

The authors of this report expect the difference between the two kinds of indicators to mean that there is a certain activism among the ruling authority’s ranks, either positively in response to the people’s demands for change, or in confrontation with these demands. The authorities could react to the threat of instability or loss of legitimacy, and try to boost the power of certain elites as the result of changes in available opportunities due to a change in legal framework or measures (like what economic liberalisation policies could lead to), and the emergence of new opportunities to gain advanced position in the economic, political and social spheres.

This phenomenon suggests that a democratic reform process that is built on reform measures involving a country’s ruling elite, i.e. one that does not happen as a result of a dramatic political shift (like a revolution) that leads to a radical change in this elite, cannot produce a major change in political practices. This is because the elite wish to preserve their status, as well as to ensure a minimum level of political stability by limiting turbulence during the period of transition, an unstable time by nature. To avoid any undesirable surprises resulting from the transition process, local elites and the various conservative elements within society work alongside the international community to support the slow pace of the transition process. The figures also support the view that the democratisation of practices is not linked to legal reform as much as it is linked to public pressure and the requirements of government stability, and that legal reform is “an expression of intentions” rather than a guarantee of a successful democratisation process, or that could become a catalyst for activism within the political regime that does not threaten the elites in power.

The reader will note that disparities between the principles (values) of democratic transition from country to country appear to be quite consistent with their respective socio-economic conditions. The Index’s average scores for values, or principles, as indicated by Figure 2-6, vary from (616) points for the rule of law, which improved slightly over the previous reading (614), to strong and accountable public institutions (536), which dropped from the previous survey (555), equality and social justice (502) which improved compared to the previous report (471), and respects for freedoms (484) which dropped markedly compared to the previous survey (510).

These figures correspond to the prevailing impressions regarding the degree of stability of each country, since it is natural for practices to keep pace with the legal framework when this framework is stable, and when political and administrative life is consistent with it. This happens either because the framework has remained unchanged for a long period of time, or because changes within it have successfully moved on to a practice mode acceptable to society.

The authors of this report expect the difference between the two kinds of indicators to mean that there is a certain activism among the ruling authority’s ranks, either positively in response to the people’s demands for change, or in confrontation with these demands. The authorities could react to the threat of instability or loss of legitimacy, and try to boost the power of certain elites as the result of changes in available opportunities due to a change in legal framework or measures (like what economic liberalisation policies could lead to), and the emergence of new opportunities to gain advanced position in the economic, political and social spheres.

This phenomenon suggests that a democratic reform process that is built on reform measures involving a country’s ruling elite, i.e. one that does not happen as a result of a dramatic political shift (like a revolution) that leads to a radical change in this elite, cannot produce a major change in political practices. This is because the elite wish to preserve their status, as well as to ensure a minimum level of political stability by limiting turbulence during the period of transition, an unstable time by nature. To avoid any undesirable surprises resulting from the transition process, local elites and the various conservative elements within society work alongside the international community to support the slow pace of the transition process. The figures also support the view that the democratisation of practices is not linked to legal reform as much as it is linked to public pressure and the requirements of government stability, and that legal reform is “an expression of intentions” rather than a guarantee of a successful democratisation process, or that could become a catalyst for activism within the political regime that does not threaten the elites in power.

The reader will note that disparities between the principles (values) of democratic transition from country to country appear to be quite consistent with their respective socio-economic conditions. The Index’s average scores for values, or principles, as indicated by Figure 2-6, vary from (616) points for the rule of law, which improved slightly over the previous reading (614), to strong and accountable public institutions (536), which dropped from the previous survey (555), equality and social justice (502) which improved compared to the previous report (471), and respects for freedoms (484) which dropped markedly compared to the previous survey (510).

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Table 1-2: Ratio of Scores for Practices versus Means in 2008, 2009 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ratio in 2008</th>
<th>Ratio in 2009</th>
<th>Average 2010</th>
<th>Average ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>14:10</td>
<td>13:10</td>
<td>15:10</td>
<td>14:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>17:10</td>
<td>17:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>16:10</td>
<td>16:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>23:10</td>
<td>18:10</td>
<td>21:10</td>
<td>20:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>10:10</td>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>11:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15:10</td>
<td>15:10</td>
<td>15:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>23:10</td>
<td>24:10</td>
<td>23:10</td>
<td>23:10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>17:10</td>
<td>14:10</td>
<td>15:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>23:10</td>
<td>17:10</td>
<td>16:10</td>
<td>18:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>30:10</td>
<td>19:10</td>
<td>20:10</td>
<td>22:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>20:10</td>
<td>19:10</td>
<td>15:10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>23:10</td>
<td>26:10</td>
<td>27:10</td>
<td>25:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average scores</td>
<td>20:10</td>
<td>17:10</td>
<td>17:10</td>
<td>18:10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When we study the distribution of the sub-Index’s scores for individual countries regarding the sub-indicators relative to the four values or principles (see Figure 2-8), we find a discrepancy in the order of the sub-indicators’ scores in the twelve countries. While the sub-indicator respect for rights and freedoms is at the top of the list of values in Yemen (for the third consecutive year) and Lebanon (also for the third consecutive year), it comes at the bottom of the list in Saudi Arabia (for the third consecutive year), Syria (for the second consecutive year), Palestine (for the second consecutive year) and in Bahrain and Tunisia. The sub-indicator relative to the rule of law tops the list in Jordan (for the third consecutive year), Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (for the third consecutive year), Syria and Kuwait (for the second consecutive year), and Morocco (for the third consecutive year). The sub-indicator for equality and social justice is first in the list in Tunisia, and last in Algeria (for the third consecutive year), in Kuwait (for the second consecutive year), Lebanon (for the second consecutive year), Morocco (for the third consecutive year) and Yemen (for the third consecutive year). The sub-indicator for strong and accountable public institutions heads the list in Syria (for the second consecutive year), Egypt (for the third consecutive year) and was second in Tunisia and Kuwait (for the second consecutive year), Lebanon (for the third consecutive year) and Yemen (for the third consecutive year).
Jordan moved from second and first place in the previous two surveys to 4th place in the 2009 Palestine ranked eighth in the overall Index, with its score dropping down for the second consecutive year; it maintained third place ranking in the sub-index relative to strong and accountable public institutions (with a higher score than in the previous survey); its score declined for the three other elements.

Morocco ranked first in the overall Index and the two sub-Indexes relative to the means and practices and first in improvement compared to the previous survey. It also ranked first in the sub-Index relative to the rule of law, and second in the sub-Index relative to strong and accountable public institutions.

Yemen ranked tenth in the overall Index, and its score continued its decline for the second consecutive year. It came in last in the sub-index relative to practices, last for the rule of law (despite registering some progress in this sub-index) and last for equality and social justice (with a decline compared to the previous year).

We can therefore summarise areas of weaknesses and strengths in each of the twelve countries as follows:

- Jordan moved from second and first place in the previous two surveys to 4th place in the present one. Its score registered the second biggest drop due to a decline of its democratic practices Index. It maintained its first place ranking in the sub-indicator relative to social justice among the ten countries covered by the previous survey, but dropped to third place in this sub-Index compared to Tunisia and Bahrain.

- Bahrain ranked second in the sub-indicator relative to equality and social justice, and its overall score put it in ninth place among the twelve countries; it scored low in the sub-indicator relative to respect for rights and freedoms.

- Tunisia ranked first in the sub-indicator relative to equality and social justice, third in the sub-indicator relative to strong and accountable institutions, and scored low in the sub-indicator relative to respect for rights and freedoms.

- Algeria registered the biggest decline compared to the previous survey.

- Saudi Arabia ranked twelfth, and its score declined for the second consecutive year in the overall Index and the sub-index relative to means; it ranked twelfth for strong and accountable public institutions and eleventh for respect for rights and freedoms.

- Syria ranked fourth in the sub-index relative to strong and accountable public institutions, eleventh in the overall Index score and sub-indicator for means, and ranked last for respect for rights and freedoms.

- Palestine ranked eighth in the overall Index, with its score dropping down for the second consecutive year; it maintained its third place ranking in the sub-index relative to means, and next to last place in the sub-index relative to practices.

- Kuwait ranked second in the sub-index relative to practices and its overall score moved up to third place after ranking fifth in the previous survey, thus registering the second best improvement compared to the previous survey. It also maintained its second place ranking in the sub-index relative to the rule of law.

- Lebanon registered the third biggest improvement in the overall Index compared to the previous survey, and showed improved for the third consecutive year. It ranked first for respect for rights and freedoms (for the third consecutive year) and second in the sub-index relative to practices.

When evaluating each of the twelve countries’ average indicator scores, we find that most of the scores fall within a very small range of difference. An examination of the standard deviation relative to values reveals that the similarity in the scores is limited to indicators that received very low scores (mistreatment of detainees and government expenditure on social sectors) and very high scores (legal guarantees against torture, and independence of the judiciary).

The scores for some indicators showed a high standard of deviation compared to other indicators, such as the indicators relative to political party freedom, obstructing parliamentary activities, trying civilians in non-civilian courts, violation of the constitution, obstructing political party activities and arbitrary arrests.

As Figure 2-9 shows, two indicators scored 1000 in all twelve countries, namely those relative to legal guarantees against torture and independence of the judiciary. Two indicators registered an average score of 900 and above in all twelve countries, namely discussing draft laws and the right to a fair trial. Two indicators scored 800-899, namely taking the executive authority to court and freedom of assembly, and four indicators scored 700-799, namely the right to an equal pay, the separation of powers, freedom of the press and the right to organise protests. Three other indicators scored 600-699, nine scored 500-599, eight 400-499 and one indicator 300-399 points. Six indicators scored 200-299 (relative to corruption in public institutions, obstructing political party activities, organising public meetings and demonstrations, widespread opposition press, censorship of the internet and publications, and arbitrary arrests), and three scored 1-99 (wasta or influence peddling in employment, government expenditures on social sectors and the mistreatment of detainees).}

**Figure 2-9: Average Score for the Arab Index’s Indicators, 2008 and 2009**

- Egypt ranked fourth in the overall Index after ranking third in the previous one, and maintained first place in the sub-Index relative to strong and accountable public institutions (with a higher score than in the previous survey); its score declined for the three other elements.

- Morocco ranked first in the overall Index and the two sub-Indexes relative to the means and practices and first in improvement compared to the previous survey. It also ranked first in the sub-Index relative to the rule of law, and second in the sub-Index relative to strong and accountable public institutions.

- Yemen ranked tenth in the overall Index, and its score continued its decline for the second consecutive year. It came in last in the sub-index relative to practices, last for the rule of law (despite registering some progress in this sub-index) and last for equality and social justice (with a decline compared to the previous year).

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Results by Country

1. Jordan

At the end of 2009, King Abdullah dissolved parliament while still in the middle of its regular four-year term, without a royal decree giving reasons for the move. Some opposition groups believed, however, that the King’s aim was to enact laws without having to submit them to parliament, while others believed that it was due to parliament’s ineffectiveness. One year after the dissolution of parliament new elections were held in Jordan based on a new election law that increased the number of tribal area seats at the expense of urban areas. The voting rate was 51% and the Islamic Action Front boycotted the elections in protest against the new election law. In 2010, Jordan witnessed a severe economic crisis, with a $2 billion deficit in its general budget, and the country’s foreign debt climbed up to $11 million, or 60% of the national product.

A comparison between the current survey’s results and the two previous ones shows a drop in Jordan’s indicator score relative to violations of the constitution, from 1000 points in the two previous surveys to 750 in the current one, accompanied by a drop in the indicator scores relative to obstructing elected interference by the security services, expressing opposition views in newspapers and widespread presence of opposition newspapers, and personal security. On the other hand, there was improvement in the public’s perception of government accountability, ability to criticise the authorities, social security and education.

While the score for the sub-indicator relative to the means is close to the countries’ average, as Figure 2-11 shows, the sub-indicator for practices is markedly higher than the average. Sub-indicators relative to democratic values and principles are above the sector’s average score for all four sub-indicators, while the score relative to respect for rights and freedoms and equality and social justice appears markedly higher, despite the drop in the means sub-indicator relative to equality and social justice to below the Arab average, as Figure 2-12 shows.

As Figure 2-12 shows, Jordan’s practice indicators remain higher than the overall average sub-Index scores relative to principles (values). However, the two sub-indicators relative to strong and accountable public institutions and equality and social justice remain below average for the third consecutive survey.
With a score of 459, Bahrain ranks ninth among the twelve countries, this being the first time that the country has been surveyed; it also ranks tenth in the means area (legislation) ahead of Syria and Saudi Arabia. As Figure 2-13 shows, seven indicators obtained a score of 1000, those relative to legal guarantees against torture, independence of the judiciary, right to a fair trial, obstructing the work of elected councils, discussing draft laws, organising protests, prosecuting the executive authorities and trying civilians in non-civilian courts. While the indicator relative to women’s participation in the labour force obtained a score of 900, eight other indicators scored zero, namely those relative to political party freedom, obstructing parliament’s work, violation of the constitution, mistreatment of detainees, obstructing political party activities, organising meetings and demonstrations, opposition press and government expenditure on sector sectors. The two indicators relative to the use of wasta in public sector employment and censorship of publications and the internet scored 40 and 43 points, respectively.

It is worth noting that Bahrain scored lower than the Arab average in all forty indicators, except those relative to holding regular elections, right to a fair trial, obstruction of the work of elected councils by the executive authority, arbitrary detentions, trying civilians in non-civilian courts, social security, education, school drop-out rates and women’s participation in the labour force.

As Figure 2-14 shows, the gap between Bahrain’s score and the Arab average in the means area is double that of the practices area; for while its 410 score in the sub-Index for practices is about 90% of the Arab average, its 606 score in the sub-Index for means is about 80% of that average.

Figure 2-15 shows that Bahrain’s practices scores relative to the rule of law and equality and social justice is above the Arab average, but sinks below that in the areas of strong and accountable public institutions and respect for rights and freedoms. In the means area, Bahrain scores above the Arab average only in the rule of law area.

Figure 2-15: Bahrain’s Comparative Sub-Index According to Democratic Principles (Values) Compared to the Average Scores of the Arab Sub-Index
With a score of 537, Tunis ranked sixth among the twelve countries, this being the first time that the country is surveyed by the Arab Democracy Index; it also ranked ninth in the means area (legislations) ahead of Bahrain, Syria and Saudi Arabia. As Figure 2-16 shows, nine indicators obtained a score of 1000 in the areas relative to the right of assembly, legal guarantees against torture, independence of the judiciary, right to a fair trial, government accountability, discussing draft laws, obstructing parliament’s work, violation of the constitution and trying civilians in non-civilian courts. Three indicators scored 900 to 985, namely gender equality, economic and political independence and social security, and five scored zero, namely waste in public employment, obstructing political party activities, interference by the security services and censorship of publications and the internet. Two indicators, relative to the opposition press and organising protest activities, scored 50 and 60 points, respectively.

Figure 2-16: Tunisia’s Comparative Scores for Individual Indicators for 2010

As Figure 2-17 shows, Tunisia’s score is close to the lower end of the Arab average for the means, and to the high end of that average for the practices. The country’s score is markedly above the Arab average for indicators relative to gender equality, government accountability, obstruction of parliament’s work,\textsuperscript{12} violation of the constitution, economic and political independence, trying civilians in non-civilian courts and social security. Conversely, its score is markedly below the Arab average for indicators relative to freedom of the press, obstructing political party activities, interference by the security services, opposition views in the press, censorship of publications and the internet, organising protest activities, suing the government, arbitrary arrests and ability of human rights organisations to do their work.

Figure 2-18 below shows that Tunisia’s score in the area of strong and accountable public institutions is generally above the Arab average, despite the weakness of the relevant legislation, though it rises sharply in the practices area. In the area of respect for rights and freedoms, however, Tunisia’s score is lower than the Arab average for both means and practices. In the rule of law area, although Tunisia’s score is slightly above the Arab average in the means area, it is lower than that in the practices area.

Figure 2-17: Tunisia’s Sub-Index According to Type, Compared to the Average Scores of the Arab Sub-Index

It is clear that Tunisia’s sub-Index score for democratic principles (values) relative to equality and social justice is above the Arab average for both means and practices. In fact, Tunisia’s score relative to equality and social justice (681 points) is markedly higher than in all other Arab countries, followed by Bahrain with 606 points, with the Arab average standing at 502 points.

\textsuperscript{12} In general, this is a characteristic of countries where the party in power forms parliament without any significant weight for the opposition in it.
Algeria saw an improvement in the security domain in tandem with an improvement in the country’s economic conditions. However, the political situation did not show any improvement against the backdrop of rumours regarding the presidency passing on to the president’s brother. There was also increasing talk about corruption. The Government refused to license new political parties, banned marches against its policies and closed internet sites belonging to opposition parties.

As Figure 2-20 shows, Algeria’s sub-Index according to type scored higher than the Arab average for the means, and below that average for the practices.

As to the sub-Index for democratic principles (values), as Figure 2-21 shows, although Algeria scored low for strong and accountable public institutions and equality and social justice, it scored high for public rights and freedoms and the rule of law, for the third consecutive year.

**Figure 2-20: Algeria’s Sub-Index According to Type, Compared to the Average Scores of the Arab Sub-Index**

**Figure 2-21: Algeria’s Comparative Sub-Index According to Democratic Principles (Values) Compared to the Average Scores of the Arab Sub-Index**

While indicators for the means receive the sub-index’s highest scores for respect for public freedoms and the rule of law, indicators for practices receive the lowest score in the sub-indicator for the rule of law and equality and social justice (see Figure 2-21). It is worth noting the marked drop in Algeria’s sub-Index for practices relative to the rule of law.
5. Saudi Arabia

The year 2010 witnessed efforts to combat corruption at the official level; this included the formation of a National Anti-Corruption Commission, appointment an official to lead it and review of dozens of corruption cases. Although several detainees were referred to the law after long periods of detention without trial, pressure on the press and human rights activists continued, leading to the resignation of the editor-in-chief of Al-Watan newspaper and arrest of a human rights activist for criticising the discrimination against the Shia. In early 2010, the armed clashes with Yemeni rebels came to an end.

There was improvement in Saudi Arabia’s scores for indicators relative to discussing draft laws, effectiveness of public institutions and social security. On the other hand, there was a drop in the scores of indicators relative to corruption in public institutions, political reform, ability to criticise the authorities, censorship of publications and the internet and wage equality.

Based on these factors, it seems that the decline in Saudi Arabia’s overall score is due to the authorities abandoning the country’s reform project, despite its modesty.

According to the sub-index of the type of indicator (see Figure 2-23), Saudi Arabia received a score significantly lower than the Arab average in the means area, while we find that the sub-Index for practices is close to it. At a time when Saudi Arabia ranks twelfth in both the overall Index and the means Index according to type of indicator, it ranks tenth in the practices Index according to type, ahead of Yemen and Palestine.

The sub-Indexes for principle (values), as Figure 2-24 shows, indicate a lower score for Saudi Arabia than the Arab average in all aspects except the sub-index relative to the rule of law, which remains higher than the Arab average for the third consecutive year. This applies to both means and practices, alike.

Figure 2-23: Saudi Arabia’s Comparative Sub-Index According to Type, Compared to the Average Scores of the Arab Sub-Index

Once indicators for practices and means are separated in the sub-indexes relevant to democratic principles or values, Saudi Arabia parts ways with the other countries in that the means index, which is usually higher, received a score of zero for equality and social justice, and a very low score (83 points) for strong and accountable public institutions, as Figure 2-24 shows.

What distinguished Saudi Arabia in the past two surveys in the sub-Index for democratic principles (values) relative to social justice, is that it used to score above the Arab average for practices, despite scoring zero for the means; in this survey, its 485 score is below the Arab average of 490, even if it remains close to it.
6. Syria

In 2010, Syria witnessed a series of momentous internal events in the shadow of a total absence of accountability by the executive authorities, and continued pressure on the independent press, bloggers and human rights activists. A number of journalists, human rights lawyers and leaders of Kurdish rights organisations were arrested. At the same time, the President’s wife tried to encourage public participation in non-political activities within the framework of civil society. In 2010, the Syrian authorities banned the niqab (face cover) at Syrian universities, and hundreds of female teachers who wore it were transferred to administrative positions.

On the foreign front, there was a slight improvement in Syrian-American relations and some European institutions expressed interest in forging economic ties with Syria, in response to some sings of internal economic openness. On the other hand, international Syrian-Western relations did not see much improvement due to tensions between Syria and Israel, against the backdrop of Syria’s close military relations with Hezbollah, in Lebanon.

The remaining indicators scored between 150 and 827 points, including seven low scores of between 150 and 250 points.

**Figure 2-25: Scores for Individual Indicators, Syria**

Syria’s scores were lower than the Arab average for both means and practices, as Figure 2-26 shows. In the sub-Indexes relative to democratic principles, as Figure 2-27 shows, Syria scored above the Arab average for strong and accountable public institutions, this being the case for both the overall situation and the practices, although its sub-Index for the means is below the Arab Index. The sub-Index for respect for rights and freedoms is markedly below the Arab average for both means and practices. In the rule of law area it drops below the Arab average overall, and for both the means and practices. In this survey, Syria’s rank in the sub-Index for democratic principles (values) declined in the area of equality and social justice, although in the previous survey its score in this particular area was above the Arab average overall, and for both means and practices; in the current survey, however, its scores are below the Arab average. This cannot be explained by the addition of Bahrain and Tunisia to the list of surveyed countries, since the Arab average for the sub-Index relative to equality and social justice, which improved on the previous survey thanks to the inclusion of Bahrain and Tunisia, is still (without the latter two countries) higher than Syria’s score for this sub-Index, both overall and for the practices, with a slight increase in the country’s means score.

**Figure 2-27: Syria’s Sub-Index According to Democratic Principles (Values) Compared to the Average Scores of the Arab Sub-Index**

Syria obtained a score of 440 and ranked eleventh among the twelve countries, registering a 17-point drop from the previous survey.

As Figure 2-25 shows, seven individual indicators obtained the highest score, two of which are relative to the means and five to the practices, a unique case among the twelve countries in the Index. In general, the indicators that score 1,000 points have a ratio of means to practices of 1:1, and not 2:5:1, as is the case here.

Ten indicators scored zero (including one of the means indicators) relative to political party freedom, corruption in public institutions, mistreatment of detainees, obstructing political party activities, opposition press, censorship of publications and the internet, trying civilians in military courts, ability of human rights organisations to do their work and government expenditure on social sectors.

The indicators that obtained 1000 score were relative to legal guarantees against torture, independence of the judiciary, government accountability, discussing draft laws, obstructing parliament’s work, suing the government and wage equality.
The internal rift continued between the two branches of the Palestinian National Authority, namely the West Bank and Gaza, as does the struggle between Fatah, which controls the West Bank and imposes severe restrictions on Hamas’ activities, and Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip and imposes similar restrictions Fatah’s political activities. Moreover, despite some improvement in the West Bank’s economy, the Palestinian-Israeli peace process has remained at a standstill for almost the entire period of the survey. Israel’s siege of the Gaza Strip continued despite some improvement in commercial activities between the Strip and Israel, and a similar improvement in the movement of individuals across the Rafah border with Egypt, following the clashes that took place at sea between Israeli forces and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla, in May 2010.

Two indicators obtained 800 points and over, two between 600 and 799, seven between 500 and 599 and ten between one and 499 points. The indicator relative to obstructing parliament’s work was suspended because the Palestinian Legislative Council is still not functioning.

Compared to the previous survey, the scores of indicators relative to corruption in public institutions went up slightly, as did those relative to the effectiveness of public institutions, personal security, education and expenditure on social sectors (rising from zero to 38 points), while there was a drop in the scores of eight other indicators.

Figure 2-28: Palestine’s Comparative Scores for Individual Indicators for 2008, 2009 and 2010

With a 494 score, Palestine ranked eighth among the twelve countries; its score dropped twelve point from the previous survey, after registering a 24- point drop between the first and second surveys. Seven out of ten means indicators obtained the highest score of 1000 points, due to the relatively late drafting of Palestine’s Basic Law. Like in the past survey, while three of the practices indicators obtained 1000 points and, as Figure 2-28 shows, eight scored zero, namely obstruction of the elected municipal councils’ work by the executive authority, government accountability, violation of the constitutions, obstructing political party activities, arbitrary arrests, mistreatment of detainees, organising meetings and demonstrations and trying civilians in non-civilian courts. There is no doubt that the colonial situation that Palestine still lives under plays a major role in this situation, a situation largely exacerbated by the division between Fatah and Hamas, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Figure 2-29: Palestine’s Sub-Index According to Type, Compared to the Average Scores of the Arab Sub-Index

Figure 2-30 Palestine’s Sub-Index According to Democratic Principles (Values) Compared to the Average Scores of the Arab Sub-Index

The internal rift continued between the two branches of the Palestinian National Authority, namely the West Bank and Gaza, as does the struggle between Fatah, which controls the West Bank and imposes severe restrictions on Hamas’ activities, and Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip and imposes similar restrictions Fatah’s political activities. Moreover, despite some improvement in the West Bank’s economy, the Palestinian-Israeli peace process has remained at a standstill for almost the entire period of the survey. Israel’s siege of the Gaza Strip continued despite some improvement in commercial activities between the Strip and Israel, and a similar improvement in the movement of individuals across the Rafah border with Egypt, following the clashes that took place at sea between Israeli forces and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla, in May 2010.

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Figure 2-29: Palestine’s Sub-Index According to Type, Compared to the Average Scores of the Arab Sub-Index

The sub-index relative to democratic principles (see Figure 2-30) shows that Palestine’s scores are higher than the Arab average for the sub-indicator for the values of equality and social justice and lower for the remaining sub-indicators. When the sub-indicators are classified according to type into means and practices, we find that the sub-indicators relative to means are higher than the average for public institutions, the rule of law, and equality and social justice, and lower than the average for respect for rights and freedoms. This is a similar picture to that revealed by the two previous surveys. The sub-indicators for practices were all below the Arab average, with the exception of those related to equality and social justice, with those relative to respect for rights and freedoms rising slightly above the Arab average (by 2 points).

It is worth noting here that Palestine obtained the third best score in the sub-Index for means after Morocco and Egypt, but came in next to last place in the practices area, followed only by Yemen.
Kuwait obtained a 588 score and ranked third (almost on par with Jordan), registering 61 points above the general average; it also came in second in terms of improvement compared to the previous survey (by 41 points).

As Figure 2-31 shows, Kuwait obtained the highest score possible in ten individual indicators, five of which were in the means area, and five in the practices area.

Five indicators received a score of zero (including one indicator relative to means). The indicators that scored zero were relative to the right to form political parties — as was also the case in Syria and Saudi Arabia — the obstructing parliament’s work, mistreatment of detainees, obstructing the political parties’ work and school drop-out rates.

The indicators that scored 1000 were relative to the right of assembly, legal guarantees against torture, freedom of the press, independence of the judiciary, right to a fair trial, government accountability, discussing draft laws, suing the government, trying civilians in non-civilian courts and women’s participation in the labour force.

The scores of the remaining indicators ranged between 219 and 980 points. The individual indicators whose scores improved compared to the previous survey were relative to government accountability, organising meetings and demonstrations, staging protests, arbitrary arrests and expenditure on social sectors. The indicators whose scores declined were relative to violation of the constitution, opposition press, civil society’s ability to do its work and education.

The scores of the two sub-Indexes relative to means and practices were above the overall average; while the means score was slightly above that average (3 points), the practices score was 80 points above it, as shown in Figure 2-32.

Kuwait’s scores for the sub-indicators relative to democratic values were in the range of the Arab average in all areas, as Figure 2-33 illustrates, is above the Arab average in the area of strong and accountable public institutions and respect for rights and freedoms, but drops for equality and social justice. The scores for the means are lower than the Arab average in relation to respect for rights and freedoms, and equality and social justice. In terms of practices, the score for strong and accountable public institutions was lower than the average, while the score for respect for rights and freedom was above average. In the practices area, the sub-Index for equality and social justice drops below the Arab average, as well.

Figure 2-32: Kuwait’s Sub-Index According to Type, Compared to the Average Scores of the Arab Sub-Index

Figure 2-33: Kuwait’s Sub-Index According to Democratic Principles (Values) Compared to the Average Scores of the Arab Sub-Index
Lebanon ranked second with an Index score of 600, which moved it up from fourth place among ten countries to second place among the twelve countries surveyed in this report. Its 17-point progress compared to the previous survey makes it the country with the third highest overall score compared to the previous survey.

Twelve indicators (six of which are relative to means) obtained the highest score possible (1000 points) and, as Figure 2-34 indicates, six indicators obtained a zero score, namely those relative to the mistreatment of detainees, arbitrary arrests, personal security, budgetary allocations for health and education, trying in the scores of four indicators were too small to mention.

The scores of eight indicators improved and two retreated compared to the previous survey, and changes in the scores of four indicators were too small to mention.

As Figure 2-35 shows, the sub-index relative to type indicates that Lebanon received higher than average scores in both the means and practices areas, and that its progress in the practices area continues for the third consecutive year.

Figure 2-35: Lebanon’s Sub-Index According to Type, Compared to the Average Scores of the Arab Sub-Index

Figure 2-36: Lebanon’s Comparative Sub-Index According to Democratic Principles (Values) Compared to the Average Scores of the Arab Sub-Index

When indicators relevant to practices are separated from those of means when calculating the sub-indexes relevant to democratic values, it becomes clear that the rule of law receives the lowest score among all sub-indexes. The sub-Index for rights and freedoms also remains higher in the area of means than in that of practices, as Figure 2-36 shows. Lebanon’s scores remain below the Arab average for the sub-Indexes relevant to democratic principles (values), for both means and practices relative to the rule of law and equality and social justice.
Egypt ranked fifth among the twelve surveyed countries; it obtained a score of 569, a 22-point drop from its score in the previous survey, which stood at 591. We should note here that because the team could not carry out a public opinion survey for this report in Egypt, the results of the previous survey were used which is why the scores of individual indicators that depend on public opinion remain unchanged.

Six means indicators obtained the highest score of 1000, as did six practice indicators. Six other indicators obtained a zero score, namely those relative to the mistreatment of detainees, trying civilians in non-civilian courts, violation of the constitution, obstructing political party activities, organising meetings and demonstrations and arbitrary arrests (which scored zero score for the very first time). As Figure 2-37 shows, the indicator relative to political and economic independence obtained a score of 958, a marked increase over the previous survey, and six indicators obtained scores between 700 and 875, five between 500 and 626, three between 316 and 368, and six between 72 and 264 points.

Figure 2-37: Egypt’s Comparative Scores for Individual Indicators for 2008, 2009 and 2010

The sub-index according to type of indicator shows, as in Figure 2-38, that Egypt received high scores for the means (the second highest score among the twelve countries), though the practices score retreated compared to the previous report and is now only slightly above the Arab average. It is worth mentioning here that the changes in individual practice scores would have leaned towards a steeper decline had the team been able to carry out an opinion survey, let alone the fact that the team’s inability to carry out the survey is itself a negative indicator.

According to the sub-index relevant to democratic principles (see Figure 2-39), Egypt’s scores were higher than the Arab average for equality and social justice and strong and accountable public institutions (for the third consecutive year), and for respect for rights and freedoms. It also shows that for the rule of law, Egypt was lower than the Arab average for the third year in a row.

Figure 2-38: Egypt’s Sub-Index According to Type, Compared to the Average Scores of the Arab Sub-Index

In Egypt, it is worth pointing out to the drop in practice scores of the sub-Index relative to the rule of law, and the persistent gap between means and practices in the area of respect for rights and freedoms, in particular, and all other areas, in general (Figure 2-39). For while the sub-indicator scores of all four areas is above the Arab average, the scores of the two sub-Indexes relative to respect for rights and freedoms and the rule of law are below the Arab average.
According to the sub-index according to type of indicator, Morocco scored higher than the Arab average for both means and practices, for the third consecutive year, and made significant progress in the area of practices (see Figure 2-41).

With a score of 673, Morocco ranked first on the Index and first in terms of progress achieved compared to the previous survey (601). Among the thirteen indicators that obtained the highest score (1000), seven were in the means area. As Figure 2-40 shows, three indicators obtained a zero score, namely those relative to obstructing parliament’s work, mistreatment of detainees and school dropout rates. Three indicators scored between 900 and 970, eight between 700 and 800, seven between 500 and 680, and six between 162 and 400.

The sub-indicator relevant to democratic principles (see Figure 2-42) reveals that Morocco scored above the Arab average in all sub-indicators other than in the area of equality and social justice, with the average score of indicators relevant to practices in this area dropping to 412 points, compared to the Arab average of 490 points. On the other hand, there is a marked increase in the sub-indicators for practices in the area of the rule of law (884 points) which is above the Arab average of 479, thus signalling progress on the previous survey (730).

It is worth noting in Morocco’s case that although various indicators are significantly above the Arab average, the sub-Index relative to equality and social justice remains markedly below that average.
Yemen is ranked eleventh on the Index with a score of 454 points, with the average scores of its individual indicators registering a slight 3-point drop.

Among eight indicators that obtained a 1000 score, six were means indicators. As Figure 2-43 shows, seven indicators obtained a zero score, namely obstructing parliament’s work, obstructing political party activities, arbitrary arrests, mistreatment of detainees, trying civilians in non-criminal courts, school dropout rates and organising meetings and demonstrations. Three other indicators scored 700, six scored between 500 and 699, ten between 194 and 387, and three between 19 and 75.

The sub-index according to type shows (see Figure 2-44) that Yemen scored higher than the Arab average in the area of means, and lower than the average for practices (it was ranked twelfth in the practices area).

The sub-indicator relevant to democratic principles or values reveals (see Figure 2-45) that Yemen scored slightly higher than the Arab average for respect for rights and freedoms, overall and in both means and practices (with a slight increase). It also reveals that it scored below that average in the sub-index for democratic principles relative to equality and social justice, overall and in both means and practices, and to the rule of law (overall and in the practices area).
Individual Indicators

Indicator 1: The separation of powers
Indicator’s details: A constitution or basic law guaranteeing the separation of powers, and the government’s accountability to an elected parliament that can give or withdraw confidence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>687</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>625</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>500</td>
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<td>1000</td>
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<td>750</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>750</td>
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<td>750</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>2009</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>625</td>
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<td>625</td>
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<td>875</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 250 points were deducted from Jordan’s score because the constitution states that the King appoints the Second Chamber of Parliament (the Senate).
- 500 points were deducted from Bahrain’s score because the constitution states that the King appoints the Shura Council (the second chamber), and the Council of Representatives can neither question the prime minister nor deny him a vote of confidence.
- 500 points were deducted from Tunisia’s score because the constitution states that the president of the republic appoints a certain percentage of the Chamber of Advisors’ members (the second chamber of parliament), and denies the Chamber of Deputies the right to a vote of confidence in the newly-formed government.
- 250 points were deducted from Algeria’s score because the President has the right to appoint one third of the Council of the Nation’s members.
- 250 points were deducted from Syria’s score due to the absence of provisions allowing Parliament a vote of confidence in the government.
- 250 points were deducted from Kuwait’s score because the constitution states that appointed ministers become automatically members of the National Assembly.
- 250 points were deducted from Egypt’s score because the president has the right to appoint one-third of the Shura Council members.

Indicator 2: Periodic and fair elections
Indicator’s details: Presence of constitutional or legal guarantees ensuring periodic free and fair elections, both municipal and legislative, based on an electoral system that does not discriminate against certain groups or sectors of the population, based on gender, ethnicity, region or political background, and guarantees equality among all. The system also should guarantee the right of all persons, and eligible individuals, to submit their candidacy, without restrictions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
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<th>Year</th>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>875</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>2010</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 562 points were deducted from Jordan’s score for three reasons: because the executive authority has the power to postpone local elections for six months; for not setting limits on campaign expenses; and absence of an independent body to monitor the elections.
- 312 points were deducted from Bahrain’s score because there is no independent body in charge of the elections, for not setting a limit on election campaign spending, and for the ambiguous text regarding equal access to the official media.
- 500 points were deducted from Tunisia’s score because there no independent body in charge of the elections, for not setting a limit on election campaign spending, and for imposing conditions on candidates to the presidency that prevent a multi-candidate election process.
- 500 points were deducted from Algeria’s score for two reasons: restrictions in the constitution and the election law on eligibility to the position of President of the Republic requiring that candidates prove that they participated in the 1954 revolution for independence or that neither of their parents were involved in anti-revolutionary activities; secondly, because of the non-existence of an independent election monitoring body.
- 750 points were deducted from Saudi Arabia’s score because the Shoura Council is not elected, because of the absence of an independent election monitoring body and the absence of legal limitations on (or legislation regulating) electoral campaigns’ budgets.
- 375 points were deducted from Syria’s score due to the absence of legislation (texts) establishing an independent election monitoring body and guaranteeing equal access to official media for all parties and candidates.
- 375 points were deducted from Kuwait’s score due to the absence of an independent election monitoring body, the absence of legal provisions limiting electoral campaign budgets and the absence of guarantees for equal access to official media for all candidates in the election law.
- 250 points were deducted each from the scores of Lebanon and Morocco due to the absence of legal provisions for an independent election monitoring body.
- 125 points were deducted from Egypt’s score for not setting a limit on campaign expenses for the Shura Council elections, and not giving the candidates equal opportunity to appear in the official media during the legislative elections.
- 250 points were deducted from Yemen’s score due to the absence of legal provisions setting limitations on electoral campaign budgets and the absence of regulations for candidates’ access to official media.

Indicator 3: Excessive powers of the executive
Indicator’s details: Whether the executive authority has a constitutional prerogative to dissolve the elected parliament, postpone or cancel elections, declare a state of emergency or any other equivalent measure, for a long period of time, and without parliament’s approval.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
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<th>Year</th>
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<td>750</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>2010</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 750 points were deducted from Jordan’s score because of legal and constitutional texts that give the king the right to dissolve the House of Representatives, prolong its term and declare a state of emergency, without consulting parliament.
- 625 points were deducted from Bahrain’s score because of legal and constitutional texts that give the king the right to dissolve the Council of Representatives, extend its term, and declare a state of emergency for a three-month period, without consulting parliament.
- 375 points were deducted from Tunisia’s score because of legal and constitutional texts that give the president the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, within certain limits, and declare a state of emergency without specifying its duration.
- 500 points were deducted from the scores of Algeria, Syria, Lebanon and Morocco for legal and constitutional texts that give the chief executive (king or president) the right to dissolve the lower house of parliament, and declare a state of emergency, without consulting parliament.
- 250 points were deducted from the scores of Kuwait, Egypt and Yemen because of legal and constitutional texts that give the chief executive (emir or president) the right to dissolve the lower house of parliament.

Indicator 4: Freedom to form political parties
Indicator’s details: Presence of constitutional or legal guarantees ensuring the right to form political parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
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<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1000</td>
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<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
500 points were deducted from Palestine’s score due to the absence of a political parties’ law.

**Indicator 5: Right of assembly**

**Indicator’s details:** Presence of constitutional or legal guarantees ensuring the right of assembly and peaceful demonstrations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 7: Freedom of the media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator’s details:</strong> Presence of constitutional or legal guarantees allowing individual citizens, groups and political parties to own media outlets like newspapers, magazines, radio stations, news services, internet sites, publishing houses, and the like, without impossible or very difficult basic, financial or bureaucratic conditions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 8: Independence of the judiciary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator’s details:</strong> Presence of constitutional or legal guarantees ensuring the independence of the judiciary, especially the extent to which the executive authority can appoint or remove judges.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 10: Gender equality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator’s details:</strong> Presence of constitutional or legal guarantees regarding gender equality.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

500 points were deducted from Bahrain’s score because of Bahrain’s right to refuse a license to television and radio networks without justification.

485 points were deducted from Saudi Arabia’s score because of strict financial conditions on the licensing of newspapers and magazines.

500 points were deducted from Tunisia’s score because of conditions that ban the formation of political parties with nationalist and Islamist leanings.

500 points were deducted from Syria’s score because of conditions that ban the formation of political parties with nationalist and Islamist leanings.

500 points were deducted from Syria’s score because of conditions that ban the formation of political parties with nationalist and Islamist leanings.

500 points were deducted from Jordan’s score due to a legal provision granting the government the director of general security.

500 points were deducted from Tunisia’s score because of conditions that ban the formation of political parties with nationalist and Islamist leanings.

500 points were deducted from Jordan’s score due to a legal provision granting the government the director of general security.

500 points were deducted from Syria’s score because of the wide prerogatives granted to the director of general security.

500 points were deducted from Bahrain’s score because of strict financial conditions on the licensing of newspapers and magazines.

500 points were deducted from Tunisia’s score because of conditions that ban the formation of political parties with nationalist and Islamist leanings.

500 points were deducted from Jordan’s score due to a legal provision granting the government the director of general security.

500 points were deducted from Syria’s score because of conditions that ban the formation of political parties with nationalist and Islamist leanings.

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500 points were deducted from Syria’s score because of conditions that ban the formation of political parties with nationalist and Islamist leanings.

500 points were deducted from Jordan’s score due to a legal provision granting the government the director of general security.

500 points were deducted from Syria’s score because of conditions that ban the formation of political parties with nationalist and Islamist leanings.

500 points were deducted from Jordan’s score due to a legal provision granting the government the director of general security.

500 points were deducted from Syria’s score because of conditions that ban the formation of political parties with nationalist and Islamist leanings.

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500 points were deducted from Jordan’s score due to a legal provision granting the government the director of general security.

500 points were deducted from Syria’s score because of conditions that ban the formation of political parties with nationalist and Islamist leanings.
Palestine obtained a zero score for the second consecutive year because the current legislative council failed to fulfill its role in holding the government accountable, as a result of the continued conflict between the two main parliamentary blocs (Fatah and Hamas) and the PLC’s failure to convene a session.

The score of Jordan rose by 236 points, of Kuwait by 539 points and of Lebanon by 13 points, compared to last year’s scores.

The scores of Algeria and Yemen dropped down significantly due to the scarce use of parliamentary tools to monitor the executive authority.

**Indicator 13: Publication of draft laws**

**Indicator’s details:** Publication of information on the existence and the content of a public debate around laws or amendments of laws in preparation such as the publication of draft laws, press information about workshops for discussing draft laws or opinion editorials discussing a draft law.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
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<th>Morocco</th>
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<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This indicator was suspended in the first survey due to a lack of data in most countries.

Saudi Arabia’s score increased by 50 points compared to the previous survey.

**Indicator 14: Corruption in public institutions**

**Indicator’s details:** Ratio of those who believe that there is corruption in public institutions, and number of corruption cases referred to the courts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public opinion surveys were replaced by focus groups in Syria, Bahrain and Tunisia.

Opinion surveys carried out for the previous report were used in Kuwait and Egypt, due to the inability to carry out surveys for the current Index in these countries.

The Index scores increased by varying degrees in Jordan (4 points), Algeria (70 points) and Saudi Arabia (355 points).

In the second part relative to the number of corruption cases referred to the courts, no data was available in any country except Lebanon and Bahrain.

**Indicator 15: Obstruction of the work of parliament**

**Indicator’s details:** Number of cases in which the executive authority sought to obstruct legislative work, such as: not issuing and publishing laws approved by the legislative bodies; attempting to void laws of their content by issuing executive orders that contradict their provisions; non-attendance by ministers of such as: not issuing and publishing laws approved by the legislative bodies; attempting to void laws of their content by issuing executive orders that contradict their provisions; non-attendance by ministers of such as: not issuing and publishing laws approved by the legislative bodies; attempting to void laws of their content by issuing executive orders that contradict their provisions; non-attendance by ministers of such as: not issuing and publishing laws approved by the legislative bodies; attempting to void laws of their content by issuing executive orders that contradict their provisions; non-attendance by ministers either did not attend, or were late in attending, parliamentary sessions and responding to questions and queries addresses to them.

Four countries obtained a zero score (Bahrain, Kuwait, Morocco and Yemen), the lowest score possible in any index, indicating the obstruction of the legislative authority’s work by the executive authority.

**Indicator 16: Use of wastaf (influence peddling) in public employment**

**Indicator’s details:** The people’s perception regarding the use of wastaf in public sector employment (includes government administration and institutions financed by the state such as parliament, the presidency or local authorities).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variations in this indicator have no statistical impact, except in Morocco’s case.

Public opinion surveys were replaced by focus groups in Syria, Bahrain and Tunisia.

Opinion surveys carried out for the previous report were used for Kuwait and Egypt, due to the inability to carry out surveys for the current Index in these countries.

The Index score rose slightly in the third survey compared to the previous one in Algeria (38 points), Jordan (4 points) and Palestine (one point). In Morocco, the Index score rose significantly by around 484 points.

The Index score in the present survey dropped down in comparison to the previous survey in Saudi Arabia (66 points), Lebanon (3 points) and Yemen (15 points).

**Indicator 17: Performance of public institutions**

**Indicator’s details:** The people’s evaluation of the public institutions’ ability to deliver services, and play their role effectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>488</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>390</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>448</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public opinion surveys were replaced by focus groups in Syria, Bahrain and Tunisia.

Opinion surveys carried out for the previous report were used for Kuwait and Egypt, due to the inability to carry out surveys for the current Index in these countries.

Saudi Arabia’s Index score rose by around 458 points; Jordan, Algeria, Lebanon and Yemen’s by 100 to 150 points, and Palestine’s by 61 points, compared to last year’s survey.

The Index scores of Syria and Morocco dropped down by 120 and 62 points, respectively.

**Indicator 18: Violations of the constitution**

**Indicator’s details:** Number of cases in which the constitution was violated, and other equivalent violations by the executive authority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>429</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The opinion of an expert was used in Tunisia, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Syria.
The score of this Index dropped down by 250 points in Jordan, Palestine and Kuwait, and by 500 points in Syria.

In the current survey, the score of Lebanon increased by 750 point and those of Morocco and Yemen by 250 points.

Four countries obtained a zero score in the current survey (Bahrain, Algeria, Palestine and Egypt) compared to only three countries in the previous survey (Algeria, Lebanon and Egypt). Egypt obtained a zero score in all three surveys, and Algeria in the last two surveys.

**Indicator 19: Political and economic independence**

**Indicator’s details:** Extent of the general budget’s dependence on foreign assistance, dependence on foreign markets to sell public sector products and presence of foreign military bases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>537</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Kuwait and Morocco maintained the same score as in the previous score.

The scores of Jordan, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon increased due to a drop in the ratio of foreign aid (grants and assistance) for this year’s budget, compared to the ratio in the previous report. The improvement in Egypt’s score is due to a drop in the ratio of imports that rely on gas and oil exports, in comparison to last year’s ratio.

**Indicator 20: Political reforms**

**Indicator’s details:** The people’s belief that the executive authority is introducing political reforms based on a genuine interest on its part to do so, and the public’s evaluation of the general condition of democracy in the country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>210</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public opinion surveys were replaced by focus groups in Syria, Bahrain and Tunisia.

Opinion surveys carried out for the previous report were used for Kuwait and Egypt, due to the inability to carry out surveys for the current Index in these countries.

The Index score dropped down to varying degree in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon. In Jordan, it dropped by 171 points, in Lebanon by 169 points, in Syria by 100 points, Algeria by 99 points and Palestine by 9 points.

The Index’s score rose (compared to last year’s score) in Morocco by 103 points, and in Yemen by 19 points.

**Indicator 21: Mistreatment of detainees**

**Indicator’s details:** Number of torture or death cases involving detainees during their detention period or disappearances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of Algeria, documented cases of missing persons remain unchanged from the previous report.

**Indicator 22: Obstruction of the activities of political parties**

**Indicator’s details:** Allowing or obstructing party-related activities, such as licensing new parties or refusing to do so, banning certain parties, or arresting political leaders for political means.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>463</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The opinion of an expert was used in Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Kuwait.

The scores of Bahrain and Yemen were reduced due to the authorities’ arrest of political activist; Palestine’s score was reduced due to the interior minister’s refusal to accept requests for licensing new political parties, Egypt’s for suspending three political parties, and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Syria’s for banning all political party activities.

Eight of the twelve countries in the present survey obtained a zero score.

Lebanon maintained the highest score of 1000 points, for the third consecutive year, while Jordan maintained the same score for the second consecutive year.

Yemen’s score dropped down significantly in the current survey, from 800 points to zero, the lowest possible, and Algeria’s score dropped by 400 points for refusing to licence two political parties in 2009.

Morocco’s score increased by 800 points in the present survey compared to the previous one.

**Indicator 23: Suppression of protests and demonstrations**

**Indicator’s details:** Cases of suppressing protest activities (demonstrations, public gatherings, sit-ins, etc…).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>233</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

500 points were deducted from Kuwait’s score for the suppressing demonstrations by Egyptian workers against the Egyptian regime.

800 points were deducted from Syria’s score for suppressing four Kurdish demonstrations.

600 points were deducted from Tunisia and Morocco’s scores for the authorities’ ban on protests.

**Indicator 24: Interference by the security services**

**Indicator’s details:** Number of cases in which a citizen putting in a request for a license or government documentation is asked to seek the approval of the security services first, obtain a certificate of good documentation is asked to seek the approval of the security services first, obtain a certificate of good conduct or non-objection from them before taking a job.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>490</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public opinion surveys were replaced by focus groups in Syria and Bahrain.

Opinion surveys carried out for the previous report were used for Kuwait and Egypt, due to the inability to carry out surveys for the current Index in these countries.
The opinion of an expert was used in Jordan, Bahrain, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Tunisia concerning the first part of the survey.

The score of the first part was used for the entire Index in Tunisia for omitting to solicit the focus group’s opinion about the citizens having to report to the security services for documentation. Only the opinion of an expert was used in this context (an official in a human rights organisation).

Pakistan’s score was reduced compared to last year’s due to an increase in the percentage of citizens who said that they were asked to report to the security services; we also note the increasing role of the security services due to the rift between Fatah and Hamas.

Jordan’s score dropped down due to a drop in the score of the first part of the Index.

Algeria’s score dropped by 58 points compared to last year’s. This year, the scores of both parts of the Index were calculated, while the score of the first part was used for the entire Index for omitting to solicit the focus group’s opinion about the citizens having to report to the security services for documentation.

Lebanon’s score rose by 18 points, Saudi Arabia 17 points, Syria 57 points, Yemen 120 points and Morocco 19 points, due to the increase in the percentage of citizens who said that they were not asked to report to the security services.

Egypt’s score in this Index dropped 350 points due to a drop in the score of the first part of the Index.

Indicator 25: Opposition views in the local press

Indicator’s details: Citizens’ belief that the government withholds important, sensitive news and conceals information on the activities and stances of opposition in the daily press.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>414</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the countries’ scores were suspended in the first survey due to variations in the data used to tabulate the indicator.

Public opinion surveys were replaced by focus groups in Syria and Bahrain, while this indicator was suspended in Tunisia for omitting to include it in the focus group’s discussions.

Public opinion surveys carried out for the previous report were used for Kuwait and Egypt, because public opinion surveys could not be carried out for the current survey in these countries.

Indicator 26: Criticism of the authorities

Indicator’s details: The people’s assessment of the citizen’s ability to criticise the government and leaders without fear.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>515</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>459</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>472</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public opinion surveys were replaced by focus groups in Syria, Bahrain and Tunisia.

Public opinion surveys carried out for the previous report were used for Kuwait and Egypt, because public opinion surveys could not be carried out for the current survey in these countries.

It is worth noting that most countries saw a slight increase in this indicator’s score except for Morocco (103 points), Lebanon (146 points) and Yemen (208 points), compared to the previous report. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia’s score was almost cut in half, from 386 points in last year’s report to 199 points in this year’s report.

Indicator 27: Opposition newspapers and magazines

Indicator’s details: Number of opposition newspapers and magazines compared to the total number of newspapers and magazines.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The opinion of an expert was used in Syria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Information was available on newspapers only (not magazines) in Lebanon, Morocco and Algeria.

Indicator 28: Censorship of publications and internet sites

Indicator’s details: The citizen’s ability to access foreign publications and internet sites, and the number of banned newspapers, magazines, books and internet sites.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>290</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The public opinion survey was replaced by focus groups in Bahrain.

Public opinion surveys carried out for the previous report were used for Kuwait and Egypt, because public opinion surveys could not be carried out for the current survey in these countries.

No data was available for the second part of the Index in Algeria, and the survey’s results were used for the entire Index.

The opinion of an expert was used for the second part in Yemen.

Algeria’s score increased by 450 points because the survey’s results were used to tabulate the entire Index.

The score of the part relative to the ban on books was used for the entire Index in Syria and Tunisia.

Indicator 29: Ability to organise protest activities

Indicator’s details: Number of demonstrations organised by individuals, labour and professional unions, political parties and human rights organisations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>775</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>713</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>713</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The content of the indicator was modified compared to the first report as the sources of information and the issues surveyed have changed. In the 2008 edition, the indicator was based on mapping the number of demonstrations and protest activities (part 1 of the indicator) and participation through the opinion polls (part 2 of the indicator), while in this edition, the indicator surveyed only the number of demonstrations and protest activities. For this reason the first survey’s scores for this indicator were not included in the calculation of sub-indicators, or other calculations.

Most countries obtained high scores (nine out of the twelve countries) while Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia obtained low or very low scores.

Indicator 30: Prosecution of the executive authorities

Indicator’s details: Number of cases raised in the high court of justice or an equivalent court (highest legal recourse for suing the administration).
Indicator 31: Detention without a charge
Indicator’s details: Number of detainees jailed without trial.

Indicator 32: Security courts
Indicator’s details: Number of cases in which civilians were tried in state security courts, in military courts, or the like.

Indicator 33: Ability of human rights organisations to operate
Indicator’s details: Presence of local and international human rights organizations and their ability to work freely.

Indicator 34: Personal safety
Indicator’s details: The people’s opinion regarding the state of law and order in the country, and available guarantees for the security and safety of the individual and his family.

Indicator 35: Social security
Indicator’s details: Rate of participation in the social security system to earn a pension in all employment sectors (public, private and non-profit).

Indicator 36: Education
Indicator’s details: Indicator’s details: Illiteracy levels among men and women, and ratio of university graduates based on gender.
147 points were added to scores of countries in the first survey, which is the difference between the average scores of each country in the two surveys. This is due to the suspension of the section relevant to the percentage of BA holders (Licence) and male-female rate among them, in the first survey.

Bahrain’s score was calculated for the first part (relative to the country’s illiteracy rate) based on 2010 data, while the Statistical Report for 2001, the only official report recognised in Bahrain, was used to calculate the three other parts.

Morocco’s score was calculated by applying the scores of the first and second parts, relative to illiteracy rates and difference between men and women in this domain, to the entire Index, due to the lack of data regarding the percentage of graduates.

Tunisia’s score was calculated taking into consideration only the section relative to university degrees and the percentage of graduates in society, due to a lack of information on the differences between male and female graduates.

**Indicator 37: School drop-outs**

**Indicator’s details:** Drop-out rates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>194</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Palestine’s score dropped in the current report from 840 to 800 points, due to a rise in the school dropout rate from 0.8%, based on the statistical yearbook of 2008, to 1% based on the statistical yearbook issued at the end of 2009, by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.

Jordan’s score dropped in the current survey compared to the previous one from 920 points to 880 points, due to a rise in school dropout rates from 0.4% to 0.6%, in 2009, based on Ministry of Education statistics.

Syria’s score dropped 40 points due to a change in the sources of information; data published in government newspapers was used in the previous survey, while the opinion of an expert was used in the current one.

For the current survey, the working team drew on information collected for the previous report in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, and Lebanon, due to the lack of new data on the current year.

It is worth noting that expected variations on this Index are very slim; however, this is a very sensitive Index due to the low threshold of its decreasing score. For this reason, the team closely examined the apparent variations in the scores of Jordan, Palestine and Syria, and found that they do not reflect fundamental changes in the status of education in any of them.

**Indicator 38: Participation of women in the labour force**

**Indicator’s details:** Rate of women’s participation in the labour force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Egypt, Yemen and Algeria the data was drawn from the same source (the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, Central Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry in charge of Family and Women’s Affairs). In Lebanon data for the two surveys was drawn from different sources (United Nations Development Programme for the previous year, and the World Bank for this year).

In the current survey, Jordan’s score increased by 24 points, Algeria by 33 points, Saudi Arabia by 24 points, Palestine by 27 points, Lebanon by 100 points, Yemen by 187 points and Syria by 23 points, compared to their scores in the previous report.

There was a drop in the scores of Morocco, by 3 points, and Egypt by 133 points.

**Indicator 39: Equality in wages**

**Indicator’s details:** Equal wages for men and women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This Index was suspended in the case of Yemen for lack of information.

For the current survey, the working team drew on information collected for the previous report in Algeria and Lebanon, due to a lack of new data on the current year.

Morocco’s score increased by 129 points due to variations in the sources of information (the opinion of an expert was used for the previous report, while the current one drew on data from the Ministry of Employment and Professional Training).

Jordan and Syria maintained the same score as in the previous two reports, because the statistics departments in both these countries used the same data for two consecutive years.

Saudi Arabia’s score dropped by 294 points due to variations in the sources of information (the previous report drew on data from the Department of General Statistics and Information, while the current one drew on the Labour Ministry’s Annual Statistical Report for 2009). Palestine’s score dropped by 88 points despite using the same source (the Central Bureau of Statistics).

**Indicator 40: Public expenditure on social needs compared to security**

**Indicator’s details:** Government expenditure on the health and education sectors, compared to expenditures on security related matters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Country Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An Unfinished Revolution

Asma' Noueira*

Introduction

No one predicted that a young man would immolate himself in one of Tunisia’s central provinces, on December 17, 2010, and that this incident would bring down the incumbent regime. Can we say today, however, ten months after the revolution that this regime has really fallen? Does the departure of former president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, under still murky circumstances, mean that the old regime is indeed gone? Were the events that took place between that date and January 14, 2011 – whether a revolution or an intifada – designed to bring down the regime?

In fact, the incident in Sidi Bouzid that ignited the entire country from north to south was not the first of its kind, nor was the ensuing popular fervour much different from the Gafsa Mine incident of 2008; however, the fact that several factors came together and compounded one another led to the so-called January 14 Revolution. Among these factors is worsening financial and political corruption, rising unemployment among holders of university degrees and the ensuing tension on the Tunisian street, and the onset of a new virtual public space through blogs and social networking sites. If we consider what took place a “revolution,” then it is a revolution whose particular characteristics have had a significant impact on the political sphere, later on. Today, almost seven months after Ben Ali’s demise, we are still wondering about this revolution’s objectives, its nature and whether it has achieved its objectives. Did the revolution that began with the slogan “Work is a right you gang of thieves” and ended with “Degage” (Go away) actually aim to bring down Ben Ali’s regime and replace it with a liberal democratic system (in the political sense) capable of ensuring economic prosperity and bringing communal peace?

Not every revolution necessarily leads to a democratic transition, nor does every revolution necessarily achieve its objectives in a short period of time. This is why the old regime’s departure does not necessarily mean total change, especially since the Tunisian revolution had neither a particular ideology, nor a clearly defined and united leadership. We will try to understand what happened between January 14 and today, and follow developments on several levels to determine how past events are likely to impact the country’s political future.

Purging the “former regime”

Issues related to purging the former regime unfolded on three different levels in Tunisia: the ruling elite, the institutions, and corruption of what used to be known as the “royal family.”

On the ruling elite level, i.e., the fate of the government and the president’s former advisors, it all began with Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali departure to Saudi Arabia and the announcement, on January 15, 2011, that the post of president of the republic was officially vacant, based on the provisions of Chapter 57 of the 1959 Constitution. Also based on these provisions, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies assumed power temporarily until presidential elections could be held within a two-month period, and former prime minister Mohammad Al-Ghannouchi was tasked with forming an interim government. After holding consultations with a number of opposition parties, the Tunisian General Labour Union and various legal organisations, a first government was formed on January 17, 2011 that some liked to call the “government of national unity.” It comprised opposition party members, like Ahmad Ibrahim, Secretary General of the Renewal Movement; Nejib Chebbi, President of the Progressive Democratic Party; Mustapha Ben Jafar, Secretary General of the Bloc Party, and Al-Tayeb Al-Bakoush, Director of the Arab Institute for Human Rights, alongside representatives of the Tunisian General Labour Union, a woman film director and a well-known blogger who was in prison during the revolution. Eight ministers kept their former positions, including a number of sovereign ministries (Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence). This new ministerial composition was however not well received by public opinion, which prompted a number of withdrawals and caused the prime minister to reshuffle it on January 20, by removing old regime figures at the head of sovereign ministries. At the same time, the Ministry of Information was eliminated, and several officials at the presidency were dismissed from their positions.

Because Al-Ghannouchi’s government was operating under pressure from the street and the opposition, its decisions remained hesitant and its performance weak; the experience ended with Mohammad Al-Ghannouchi’s resignation when some of the strikers in Al-Kasba 2 called for his execution in the public square. On February 28, 2011, Al-Baji Qaed Al-Sabsi, a lawyer and politician who helped build the state after independence and held several positions under Al-Habib Bourguiba, including the Interior Ministry in 1965, was appointed as new prime minister. However, although Qaed Al-Sabsi was a seasoned politician with long experience, he chose to form a government of technocrats to manage the country during the transitional period. He also made it a condition that its members not run in the Constituent National Assembly elections, which prompted the resignation of two ministers, Ahmad Ibrahim, Minister of Higher Education, and Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, Minister of Local Development. This condition was included in the decree relevant to the provisional organisation of public authorities, issued on March 23, 2011.

The new government began its work in a climate of relative public confidence that was soon shaken by an interview with the Interior Minister, Farhat Rajhi, who accused the Army of planning a take-power if the Ennahda Movement wins in the elections, like what happened in Algeria in the late 1980s. He also spoke about a shadow government running the country, led by businessman Kamal Eltaief. These statements cost the country three days of violence and instability until Rajhi apologised for his comments, saying that he was set up by the journalist who interviewed him. The press continued to attack the government, in particular the prime minister, and rumours continued to circulate regarding goings on behind closed doors, which cast doubt on the credibility of the prime minister and his ministers.

The new prime minister came under pressure from the High Council for the Achievement of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reforms, and Democratic Transition, a body that comprises representatives of a number of important political parties, national organisations and independent figures. The very tense relations between the two institutions affected both the Council’s work and the government’s relationship with the public, the main motive being a struggle over power. Some groups within the Council saw the Council’s main role as overseeing the government’s performance and holding it accountable, while the prime minister saw this as a violation of his prerogatives and interference in his professional domain. The crisis worsened especially after the appointment of an interior minister accused of having worked in the ministry’s administrative bureau in the late 1990s, coupled with accusations to the effect that the prime minister was seeking to reinstate and protect members of the old regime. All this happened at a time when the government was dragging its feet on bringing to trial a number of ministers and advisors who held prominent positions under the old regime, and were accused of sacrificing the country’s interests in favour of a few families close to the former president. Nevertheless, and despite the slow pace of progress, many members of the old regime were questioned and several were sent to jail, including Abdul Aziz Bin Dia, a close advisor to the president and his wife; Abdul Wahab Abdullah, once in charge of the media, and Bechir

* Professor at University of Tunis
Tekari, a former justice minister. Other former ministers remained unaccountable, with some even allowed to continue being active in politics by granting them licenses to form new parties.

The issues of accountability and form of transitional justice raise questions regarding the role of the judiciary. The slow progress in bringing to trial those involved in political and financial corruption, on the one hand, and the release of detainees involved in violent incidents, on the other, shows that the judiciary inherited from the former regime is not qualified to play a role in the transitional period. It also shows the extent to which this body was intertwined with the old regime, which is why the government should have established a transitional judicial system to work on such issues, from the very beginning. Despite that, one could say that the latest movements within the judicial body (late July) indicate that the government has finally decided to purge it in order for it to play its rightful role.

On the institutional level, the Chamber of Deputies, Chamber of Advisors, Economic and Social Council and Constitutional Council were dissolved based on the Decree relevant to the provisional organisation of public authorities. This followed the suspension of the 1959 Constitution, in early March 2011, and announcement of plans to hold elections to a National Constituent Assembly tasked with writing a new constitution.

In the ruling party’s case (the Constitutional Democratic Rally), one of the government’s first decisions was to distance it from the centres of administrative and political power, and suspend its activities and financial assets. A number of ministers in the transitional government resigned from the Party and, in an interview broadcast on a foreign television network, its secretary general expressed the Party’s support for the revolution one week after the departure of the former president, who was also the party president. The Party’s secretary general also said that changing the party’s name was a possibility, and 38 members of the Party’s central committee issued a statement reiterating their support for the revolution. This, however, was not enough for a population that had for many years suffered under the yoke of the Party’s control over their public and private lives, especially in the countryside. Thus, in response to insistent popular demands, the Interior Ministry raised a case in the court of first instance in Tunis, on February 21, 2011, asking that the Party be dissolved; on March 9 the court of first instance approved the request and, on March 28, the court of cassation endorsed the decision. Several new parties were born from the remnants of the old party, the main ones being Al Mubadara (Initiative) Party led by Kamal Murjan, the former Foreign Minister, and Al Watan (Motherland) Party, led by Ahmed Friaa, the former Interior Minister, and Mohamed Jegham who held several ministerial positions under Ben Ali. People protested against granting licenses to these small parties because they accused their founders, who were once members of the old regime, of seeking to return to power via the establishment of a new political front. In this context, Kamal Murjan recently called upon centrist parties to form a coalition to contest the upcoming elections.

Matters did not end there either for the Party, or for its members and followers; a campaign was launched to oust the latter from public institutions, even from some private ones, and municipal councils were suspended and replaced by committees for the protection of the revolution. There were also protests against a number of mayors and local officials appointed after the revolution, on account of their links to the ruling party. It went so far as requesting that they be denied the right to run in the National Constituent Assembly elections, a condition officially included later on in Chapter Fifteen of the new election law. The said chapter elicited a lengthy debate and became the cause of much tension between the government and the High Council over the achievement of the revolution’s objective. A large number of the Council’s members called for banning all those who once occupied positions in the Democratic Rally, or joined the Party twenty-three years ago, while others, including the prime minister, believed that this was a step too far. However, after consultations between the government and the Council, the crisis was averted by agreeing on the following wording of Article 15:

CANNOT become candidates:

- All those who held a major government responsibilities under the former president, except those who never became members of the Constitutional Democratic Rally or assumed responsibilities in any of the said Party’s institutions, under the former president’s regime. These responsibilities will be defined in a decree based on the recommendations of the High Council for the Achievement of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reforms, and Democratic Transition.
- All those who called upon the former president to run for another term in office, in 2014. A list of those individuals will be compiled by the High Council for the Achievement of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reforms, and Democratic Transition.

Based on that, the body formed within the Council under the name “The Article 15 Commission” succeeded in compiling a list of individuals to be banned from running in the elections, and delivered it to the High Independent Elections Commission in late July 2011. The report of the High Council for the Achievement of the Goals of the Revolution comprised a statement to the effect that “Chapter 15 confirms the principle of holding politically accountable all those involved in the attempt to eternalise authoritarianism and tyranny, and banning them from running in the elections to the National Constituent Council, though this does not involve denying them their political rights, including the right to vote.” The Council forbade the use of this list for any other purpose, including the defamation or slander of the individuals involved. The report went on to say that in compiling the list the Committee was intent on accessing the original documents containing the applicants’ signatures, by relying primarily on lists published in newspapers, in their capacity as public documents.

As to the financial corruption of the former president, his wife, family and in-laws, their domestic and foreign assets were frozen, as a first step, pending a decree confiscating their liquid assets, transferable assets and real estate holdings, issued on March 14, 2011. A preliminary list of figures whose assets were confiscated comprised 112 members of the president’s family, and those of his wife and in-laws, alongside three of his advisors and a former interior minister involved in cases of torture against the Islamists, in the early 1990s.

A Confiscation Commission was formed and tasked with implementing the above decree, and another commission was tasked with recovering assets abroad. A national fact-finding commission was also formed to investigate corruption and embezzlement cases, and charged with “uncovering the truth about cases of corruption and bribes and those that perpetrated or benefitted from them, be they physical or abstract, public or private individuals, by virtue of their position in the state system or the administration, or their relationship, be it familial or other, to a state official or group of officials, particularly between November 1987 and January 14, 2011.” (Article Three of the Council’s amended decree, dated February 18, 2011). The Commission was asked to submit all collected information, papers and documents to the concerned judicial authority, in order to pursue the perpetrators of these crimes. Until the middle of July, the commission had referred 124 cases to the concerned judicial authorities.

The Commission became the object of a savage attack by a group of lawyers seeking to disband it by raising a series court cases against it in both judicial and administrative courts, on the premise that its responsibilities contradict the principle of judicial independence. It is a correct but ill-intentioned statement, since nothing in the decree relevant to the commission’s formation contradicts this principle, or prevents the judiciary from performing its duty. It seems that those responsible for the campaign have a vested interest in concealing their involvement in such cases, a possibility that the Commission
Post revolutionary transition

We will address the political dimension by examining a number of interconnected issues and trying to clarify them; these are the elections, the political scene, the media and civil society.

The elections

The people’s call for a total break with the old regime and the 1959 Constitution led to the announcement of elections to the National Constituent Assembly, tasked with writing a new constitution. An interim president would also be appointed to manage the country’s affairs until the Assembly finishes its work and a new system of government is finally in place; once this is done, the ensuing presidential and parliamentary elections will be an event of utmost importance. Even more important is the fact that these elections will lend electoral legitimacy to the country’s future authority and its institutions, given that the current one – both government and institutions – suffers from a legitimacy crisis that affects its performance and options.

Although on March 3rd, 2011, the interim president announced that election to the National Constituent Assembly would be held on July 24, 2011, the new election law was delayed until early May 2011 because the Commission for Political Reform responsible for drafting the election law was expanded and transformed into the High Council for the Achievement of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reforms, and Democratic Transition. However, because this made holding fair and transparent elections according to international standards, and on the appointed date, virtually impossible, the High Independent Elections Commission decided to postpone the elections until October 23, 2011. The Commission is elected by the High Council for the Achievement of the Goals of the Revolution expressly for the purpose of supervising the elections, elections that for the very first time would not be subject to the Interior Ministry’s control.

The idea of electing a Constituent Assembly saw the light under difficult circumstances, namely during the Kasba 2 strike that led to the downfall of Ghannouchi’s government, and grew in a context rife with problems and threats. After a first date was announced and rejected by several political currents because they wanted more time to prepare, some openly called for their postponement while others tried to do that by obstructing the work of the High Council for the Achievement of the Goals of the Revolution. They did that by raising marginal issues relevant to the Council’s expansion, question of the representation and calling for governmental accountability. They also stretched the debate on the draft law obstructed as a result of the crisis between the Council and the government regarding Chapter 15, relevant to banning members of the dissolved ruling party from running in the Constituent Assembly elections. All along, the government continued to reiterate its commitment to the assigned election date, until the text was published and the High Independent Election Commission elected. Paradoxically, when it became obvious that holding the elections on the appointed date was impossible, there was more talk in the media about the importance of holding them on time to avert a disaster, even by those who were opposed to the original date. Postponing the elections to the following October was not an easy decision for High Independent Election Commission, which found itself the object of fierce attacks even by those who elected its members. Finally, the October 23 date came as a result of consultations with various active political forces in the country, a development that brings us to the political scene and its link to the elections.

The political scene

After January 14, a large number of new political parties appeared on the political map in Tunisia, so large that today the country boasts over one hundred political parties. Thus, in addition to opposition parties that operated underground during Ben Ali’s regime, like the Tunisian Communist Party and Islamist Ennahda Movement, several leftist, centrist and rightwing parties similar in name and objectives, including some established by members of the old ruling party, appeared on the political scene and defined themselves as centrist parties. The Tunisian people were amazed at this large number of parties, most of which they neither knew, nor trusted; this one way or another affected their will to register and vote in the elections, especially given the very large number of candidate lists expected.

The above parties fall under four wide categories: liberal, leftist, nationalist and Islamist. Despite their differences, however, they all insist on their commitment to the Arab Islamic identity and to maintaining Article One of the Constitution, which states that Islam is the state religion, despite all the jurisprudential and political debates round this article over the past fifty years. However, although these groups insist on their commitment to democracy, they all violate its principle on the practices level, with the High Council for the Achievement of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reforms, and Democratic Transition acting as the arena where they jostle and try to outdo one another. This experience helped reveal the stark aridity of the political scene the country inherited from Ben Ali, coupled with an absence of political culture. It seems that until today these political parties, whether from the right or left, still operate under the slogans of the 1970s and with the mentality of that era, and still behave like university students do.

Various parties began forming alliances in preparation for the upcoming elections, and several small parties coalesced in a larger single party. The first such party, the Democratic Modernist Pole, formed upon the initiative of the Renewal Movement, comprises a number of parties, civil society organisations and independent figures. Its objective is to resist the threat that some groups pose to modernity and its acquisitions in Tunisia, and to the democratic transition process, by which they mean the Islamist Ennahda Party, which in turn formed its own coalition with a number of leftist parties.

The Islamists’ strong return to the political scene is an important development; for despite all the repression and dislocation they suffered under Ben Ali, they returned to the political arena as a well-structured organisation with considerable financial resources and abilities. However, although the Movement is accused of having a dual discourse due its leaders’ often contradictory, hesitant and equivocal statements, what is amply clear is that it has shed its ideological nature and turned itself into a political party, in every pragmatic and Machiavellian sense of the term. Many observers believe that, today, Ennahda is the biggest political force in the country and, as such, is likely to win the largest number of seats in the Constituent Assembly. This is perhaps due to the fact that all manifestations of Islam and political Islam in Tunisia are ascribed to Ennahda, at a time when the Islamist map is much more diverse than that in terms of ideology (Salafists, Islamist left, Shia...) and type of activities (parties, societies and groups). This exaggeration in Ennahda’s size, even before it has been tested in any elections, could have an impact on the democratic transition because its failure to obtain the expected results could lead to confusion and complaints against these results, especially since rumours regarding a possible repeat of the Algerian scenario in Tunisia have already caused some problems in the country.
Civil Society

Civil society has experienced its own quantitative and qualitative growth; societies interested in public issues and were constrained or banned under the former regime, such as the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights and Tunisian Association of Democratic Women had now a significant role to play in the post revolutionary political arena. A variety of new societies with expertise in different fields emerged on the scene (over one thousand) with interests ranging from charitable causes to social, educational and cultural activities, which only goes to show the high level of civic consciousness among the Tunisian people. Several societies also focus on the meaning of citizenship and sought to spread the values of democracy, and a number of new initiatives, including the Citizenship Initiative and Citizenship Charter eventually turned themselves into societies. These initiatives saw the light thanks to the idea of drafting a “Republication Charter” as an honour code among civil and political society members, through which they commit to respect a series of principles, such as protecting the acquisitions of modernity in Tunisia and committing to the Arab Islamic dimension of the Tunisian identity. The High Council for the Achievement of the Goals of the Revolution issued a charter, entitled the “Republication Contract,” that all political parties would commit to respect when writing the new constitution. Discussions round the contract highlighted the extent of the elite’s bid to outdo one another, including the campaign launched by groups affiliated with the nationalist and Islamist currents against a number of intellectuals whom they accused of normalising with Israel; they eventually succeeded in inserting a provision in the Republican Contract banning normalisation. Those who defended this contract forget, however, that it is non-binding on the elected constituent authority whose power is absolute, and unfettered by any restrictions.

The media scene

One of the revolution’s positive features is the new-found freedom of the press, in all its shapes and forms. The media freed itself of all restrictions imposed on it by the former regime, though this freedom soon turned into anger amid a total absence of controls on journalists. Since January 14, experience has highlighted the lack of professionalism among a high percentage of journalists, with newspapers still operating the way they used to do under Ben Ali. Just like the country’s parties and societies, there was an exponential increase in the number of newspapers and media outlets, and in the number of requests for licenses to launch new television and radio stations. Given this high number of requests, the administration decided to grant temporary licenses until a law regulating that sector could be issued. The sub-committee in charge of the media within the High Council for the Achievement of the Goals of the Revolution worked on issuing a new press law, and another law relevant to the establishment of a body responsible for reforming the audio-visual sector, in coordination and consultation with the High Council tasked with reforming the media and press syndicate. On May 20, the first law guaranteeing the right of access to information was issued.

Security conditions

Since January 14, the country has been experiencing difficult security conditions, with many public, administrative and security institutions burned down, including a number of prisons. There also was much talk about snipers and clashes between the Army and the presidential guard, and citizens had to form popular committees to defend the residential areas. The situation calmed down slightly when the Army and security forces gained control of the situation.

Protest movements began in the very first weeks following the revolution, and while some were political others were socio-economic in nature. Habib Bourguiba Street – the capital’s main avenue – became the scene of almost daily demonstrations raising a number of demands, and although these began peacefully they soon turned into confrontations between the demonstrators and the security forces, often leading to human and material losses.

Government Square was the scene of two sit-ins, Kasbah 1 and Kasbah 2. The first was initiated by the citizens of provinces where the revolution first began, who came to the capital to stage a sit-in in Government Square in the Kasbah, and call for a total break with the old regime by dissolving the ruling party, and distancing its leaders from power. They were supported by many Islamist, leftist and nationalist political groups, and by the Tunisian General Labour Union. On the other hand, the Al-Kasbah 2 sit-in helped crystallise demands for a break with the 1959 Constitution, and the call for elections to the National Constituent Assembly.

On the socio-economic level, several sit-ins were organised inside public and private institutions, and although these began by calling for the ouster of officials belonging to the ruling party, they soon turned their attention to issues such as better living conditions, and the immediate resolution of pending labour-related problems. The number of labour-related sit-ins increased even among members of the security services, which led to the closure of several private institutions, and adversely affected foreign investments and the tourism sector.

It seems that anti-revolutionary forces have taken advantage of various political developments and the socio-economic protests to spread confusion and fear among the people, and fear of the Islamists, in particular the Salafists, became the scarecrow of choice.

What future awaits Tunisia after the revolution?

Although a revolution does not necessarily lead to democracy, it could be the catalyst for a democratic transition because revolution means change, a change in line with the style and ideology of those who launch it. Democratic transition means moving from an undemocratic system, no matter what one wishes to call it (one-party system, military or a totalitarian system, etc.) to a system that rests on three basic principles: citizenship, individual freedom and political participation. Will the Tunisian revolution lead to democracy, especially since one of its main demands was bringing authoritarianism to an end?

Today, Tunisia’s democratic transition is under threat from several directions, including a possible return to dictatorship either through the imposition of a particular ideology or through the Army taking power, if the civilian administration fails to bring stability to the country. Chaos in any form, whether through social action (strikes and sit-ins), violating laws and regulations, or the unchecked freedom that takes us back to the natural state which social contract theories speak about, poses a threat to democracy and could lead to what Plato termed the “oppressive state.” There is also the fear that certain political and ideological currents will use the freedom that democracy brings, but that they themselves do not believe in, to impose their ideology and particular social concepts on society, using violent and coercive means. Moreover, the anti-revolutionary forces who once benefitted, one way or another, from the old regime will try to impede change, and use all means possible to pull the country backwards, regardless of the cost.

What has been achieved so far indicates that Tunisia is heading towards democracy procedure-wise, i.e., through holding free, fair and transparent elections in line with international standards. At the same time, however, there is a clear absence of democracy as a value based on freedom and equality. Spreading this culture will require hard work over a very long period of time. Though we sense today among the elite and public opinion a clear shift towards democracy, it is a non-liberal democracy.
An Incomplete Revolution

Dr. Mustapha Kamel Al Sayyid

Even observers with the deepest knowledge of Egypt could not predict that the celebrations held by the regime, which is a coalition among statesmen and major Egyptian capitalists under Husni Mubarak’s leadership, to mark Police Day on January 25, 2011 would signal the start of a sweeping popular intifada (rebellion) that will end with Mubarak’s downfall from power. It will also lead to the arrest of his prime minister, his aides who sit at the head of various state institutions and a large number of Egypt’s major capitalists. However, five months after this tremendous event some Egyptian commentators still wonder whether what has transpired since Mubarak’s demise, on February 11, was a revolution, an intifada or, given the ongoing popular mobilisation in the form of protests, demonstrations and strikes, is yet an incomplete revolution.

This chapter will try first to identify the nature of this event, review and discuss its reasons and development, and end with a brief overview of what Egypt’s future political system, and the major issues that will ensure, are likely to be.

An incomplete revolution

Although many political activists in Egypt are disappointed, especially the liberals and leftists if not the entire population, that the changes that have taken place in Egypt since February have, in their view, done no more than remove some of the regime’s leaders without improving the lives of ordinary Egyptians, we should be careful not to minimise the significance of the changes that have already taken place and affected several aspects of Egypt’s political system.

First, there is of course a change in faces; the head of state has fallen and with him two prime ministers that he himself had appointed, most of his ministers, the speakers of the two chambers of parliament, the presidential secretary, the main leaders of the ruling National Democratic Party and the heads of major media outlets, including newspapers, radio and television. There was also a social change manifested by the demise of major Egyptian capitalists who once relied on their contacts within the state to continue enriching themselves. They did that by monopolising the market or acquiring land free of charge, or for a very little money, and using it to establish real estate project that brought them untold riches, without resolving any of the housing problems that afflict most citizens. These developments mean a decline in the power and influence of business men, and the demise of the illegitimate marriage between money and power, at least temporarily. It is a positive development by any measure because it means weakening the parasitic wing of Egypt’s capitalism, and opening the door to a healthy development that relies on its own power, and on projects that compete over cutting spending and improving efficiency.

These developments were accompanied by the appearance of new political forces and the legitimisation of others, once denied this privilege. Moreover, Egypt’s youth emerged as a major force on the political scene, when once no one imagined that one day these youths could play a role one could depend on. The prevailing impression was that these youths were not interested in national matters, that those that were better off were busy following the latest foreign and Arabic songs and movies, or that the overwhelming majority were busy looking for a job to earn their living. However, the pioneering role that these youths played in the revolution put an end to this stereotypical image and replaced it with that of a mature young generation, aware of the modern world and their society, and uses the latest technology to improve the country’s political life; this stunned older generations interested in public matters, and earned these youths boundless admiration. Not only did the youth take the initiative to call for a revolution, keep working at bringing down the regime and finding the means to paralyse its ability to respond, they also kept vigil over the revolution’s objectives, and continued to mobilise against all what they perceived as deviation from its principles, or delay in doing all what is necessary for it to succeed. Furthermore, a significant number of youth groups managed to adapt to the post revolutionary conditions by finding the right organisational models that allow them to maintain a permanent presence on the political scene, either by forming their own political parties or joining parties lead by veteran politicians. Among these was the legal legitimisation of the Muslim Brotherhood that the former regime had denied them, despite their prominent presence in different parliamentary bodies and unions. However, although the Brotherhood’s legal status is not clearly defined yet, they succeeded in forming a party whose membership is supposed to be open to all Egyptians, Muslims and Copts alike. In fact, the vice-president of the party, aptly and significantly named the “Freedom and Justice Party, is a Christian. The Brotherhood was not the only group to earn legitimacy; other groups with various tendencies began working in the open, including a number of Islamist groups such as the Jamaa Islamiya, that once raised the banner of armed struggle in the 1980s and 90s, as well as other Salafists currents. The Egyptian Communist Party was also affected; it went down to the streets alongside other groups bearing red flags, in the first celebration of Labour Day (May 1st) in the middle of Cairo since the regime’s downfall. Alongside these new forces, another force that had so far remained dormant appeared on the legal political scene, with a major role to play in steering events on the ground. This force is Egypt’s armed forces, led by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and comprising the leaders of all the main military branches; by siding with the people, the latter had decided the fate of the confrontation between the rebellious masses and Mubarak’s regime, that was still trying to cling to power.

One of the most significant changes to affect Egypt’s political system is perhaps the fundamental change in the political culture of the Egyptian people, a culture once described as one whose main virtue is submission to authority, and fear of resisting it in the open. Instead, they resisted it in secret displaying only flattery and hypocrisy when face to face with it; they also spread jokes and popular stories about those who walked away from it, even if they were considered rejects and scoundrels or, what is known in political science, primitive rebels. This culture disappeared and was replaced by one of resistance and rebellion, so much so that some commentators and authority figures found it hard to accept and called for putting an end to all the sit-ins, demonstration, strikes and marches in which peasants, labourers and residents of poor and squatter neighbourhoods took part alongside the middle classes, including professionals, government employees, even the disabled. There were signs of this impending transformation in the popular culture as sectoral protests began to gain momentum, in 2004, before increasing exponentially in the wake of the revolution. There were many attempts to explain the phenomenon, including the theory that it was all work of the fulool (remnants of the old regime), or simply a wilful attempt to distort the pure face of a revolution that raised the banner of democracy and dignity, instead of narrow factional demands. However, regardless of the reasons, none of the theories could deny the fact that this collective activism is a reflection of a sea change in the political culture of the Egyptian people.

Despite that, other fundamental elements in Egypt’s political system remain unchanged, and calls for changing them still meet with resistance and delays. The institutional foundations of Mubarak’s regime are still in place, as is the constitution that governed the country’s political life for thirty years, but under a different name, now. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) that ran the country since
February 11, 2011 announced the suspension of this constitution, and formed another committee to amend it, following the one that Mubarak had appointed for that purpose. However, after a referendum was held on these amendments and the people had approved them, to everyone’s surprise SCAF issued a constitutional declaration that included no less than fifty-four articles that were not part of the referendum, in addition to the eight that were included. The above constitutional declaration was an abridged version of Sadat and Mubarak’s constitutions; it kept the president’s wide prerogatives in place, despite limiting him to two terms in office of no more than four years each, instead of six years for an undetermined period, like in the old constitution. Again, the constitutional declaration gave the judiciary total supervision of the election process, which is what the previous constitution had also done until Jamal Mubarak and his committee amended it in 2007. Moreover, although the amendments kept a bi-cameral parliament, it weakened the powers of the Shura Council, which again raises the question about the need for it at all. Moreover, most of the former regime’s policies have remained unchanged, especially in the socio-economic domain. The new regime continues to implement the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and provide Israel with natural gas, despite a legal order to annul the agreement. The gas supply to Israel stopped only temporarily when unknown elements destroyed the pipeline that provides Israel and Jordan with gas, although Issam Sharaf’s Government insisted after the revolution that it intends to renegotiate this agreement with Israeli officials. Furthermore, although Nabil Al-Arabi, the Foreign Minister, also insisted that Egypt does not consider Iran an enemy, the country did not re-establish diplomatic relations with it. There were rumours in the Egyptian press that the reason for the delay in raising relations with Iran to full ambassadorial level was pressure by some Gulf countries, all of which happen to have full diplomatic relations with Iran. The new government also announced its intention to follow the same market-oriented economic and social policies that rely on the private sector, and seek to attract foreign investments. It was even on the verge of signing a new treaty with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in July 2011, reiterating the old governments’ mantra regarding the need to prioritise the social dimension by taking the interests of the poor into account. However, although it is true that the deteriorating economic conditions that accompanied and followed the revolution justify the search for foreign resources, and that it might not be beneficial to shift away suddenly from the old policies, especially since the revolution’s slogans did not lead to the establishment of an alternative economic system, most of those in charge of the economy after the revolution, including the government’s advisors on economic policies, were close to the economic decision-making circles in the former president, and members of policy committees headed by his son.

More important than all that is the fact that the style of governance in Egypt has not changed. SCAF makes all the fateful and final decisions without any serious consultations with other institutions, and in a manner that shows both haste and lack of vision. A good example are the plans for the transitional period that involve hastily arranged legislative elections, before allowing the new political parties time to firmly establish themselves and build relation with the community, and before agreement on a permanent constitution for the country. Furthermore, the task of writing the new constitution was entrusted to people who have only known political activity under the former regime, whether the Muslim Brotherhood or the former regime’s supporters, and have become experts at holding elections that will culminate in the re-election of the same two houses of parliament, and same prime minister, after the new constitution is approved.

Even when there is change in people holding leadership positions, these rarely come from outside the familiar elite that once surrounded the former regime; this has become evident by the selection of new governors, who, like their predecessors, were for the most either retired Army and Police members or former university presidents, which elicited wide protests in several governorates. The same could be said about those selected to run the so-called national dialogue, a dialogue that failed to address any of the major issues, leaving them entirely for SCAF to deal with. Furthermore, several youth groups complained that certain security measures associated with the former regime and are still being practiced today, including the arbitrary arrest of political activists and trying civilians in military courts, which gives the impression that some state agencies still behave with the same mentality of disrespect for the basic rights of citizens.

Reasons for the revolution

Although the successful removal of the head of state, his government and those who turn in their orbit came perhaps as a surprise, there were many signs of widespread anger against the regime’s policies among most sectors of the population. It was also clear that the people did not hesitate to express their dissatisfaction with the president’s policies. In fact, although signs of the deteriorating situation were not difficult to ascertain, the worsening economic, social and political conditions, at least among wide sectors of the population, was typical of several Arab non-oil producing countries, yet no revolution had taken place in any of these countries the way it did in Tunisia and Egypt.

In fact, we should distinguish between two kinds of reasons; first, the indirect reasons that have deep roots in society and, second, the direct reasons that turned public anger into widespread mobilisation at a given point in time.

One of the most important indirect reasons is the increase in the number of well educated people in Egypt, and no matter what people say about the poor level of education in that country, the percentage of those able to read and write, especially read the newspapers, had increased considerably in the past three decades, coupled with a 29% decline in illiteracy rates among the youth. Not only is the overwhelming majority of Egyptians able to read the newspapers, the fact that they also understand the political discourse means that the public with which Mubarak’s successive governments have dealt were not a mere bunch of illiterates, ignorant of political terminology and the way the authorities behave, but citizens that are fully aware of all what is happening on the political scene. Linked to that is the fact that the former regime, through its media and technological policy, has involuntarily exposed the country’s citizens to a wide range of opinions, most of which were against its policies. The old regime used to pride itself on the wide scope of free expression open to the media and, regardless of its violation of that right, the fact remains that the presence of a wide variety of opposition and independent private newspapers was a distinguishing characteristic of Husni Mubarak’s regime. Not only did some of these newspapers have a wide readership among the public, years earlier a number of independent television channels had begun to broadcast their programmes. Moreover, although satellite channels were not allowed to air news programmes, their debate and discussion programmes managed to attract a wide audience by hosting opposition and independent figures that government-owned television and radio stations not only ignored, but was actively trying to distort their image. In doing so, these newspapers and television channels exposed the public to alternative views critical of the government and its policies, and helped raise political awareness among the citizens. These independent media did such a good job expanding the scope of free expression in society that people began to say that there were no longer taboo subjects the moment criticism moved from the president’s policies to his plans to pass the presidency on to his son.

Furthermore, although the former regime had tightened its grip particularly on the Muslim Brotherhood in the years that followed their success in the People’s Assembly elections of 2005, it allowed liberal and leftist groups a certain degree of freedom to assemble and organise. This caused an unprecedented rise in mass protests in Egypt, after 2004, launched initially by the Egyptian Movement for Change – Kifaya – followed by the establishment of several other civil society groups that did not ask the government for a permit to operate. Several other groups similar to Kifaya appeared among writers, students or workers,
obtained by illegal means, including the acquisition of state-owned lands for no or very little money, managed to grossly increase their wealth members of the old regime, their fortunes were also increase the people’s anger against the government’s policies. Not only were many of those who from coming close to what could be described as a decent standard of living, which did nothing but fighting the government in court. With the judiciary’s help, it managed to elicit orders nullifying contracts for huge construction projects, behind which stood big business and the political leaders intent on putting their hands on large plots of land for personal exploitation. They also managed, among other, to prevent the export of precious natural resources, like natural gas, to Israel; dismiss guards stationed by the Interior Ministry at various universities, and fix a minimum wage, a project on which the government was dragging its feet.

The government’s encouragement of the widespread use of information technology, including computers and social networking sites, helped raise the protest movement’s effectiveness. The easy availability of such tools provided an alternative source of information to the government-owned media, and gave large numbers of people access to the websites of independent newspapers, even the chance to make their own contributions to these sites. The availability of such tools also facilitated the access to Face Book and Twitter, and hence to contacts between these sites and their virtual audiences, which helped further spur the movements’ mobilisation and organisation efforts. It is worth mentioning in this context that the strike of April 2008, and the accompanying invitation to take part in a general strike, were launched on the internet, and that membership of the website “We are All Khaled Said” reached almost half a million individuals. The campaign launched by the National Association for Change also reached hundreds of thousands of people.

Finally, a fact that needs no explanation is that the revolution would not have been able to mobilise all these millions from all over Egypt, and ask them to go out in huge demonstrations against the former regime, had the latter’s economic policies not shown its true colour. These policies allowed the few to accumulate flagrant amounts of wealth but did nothing to provide a decent standard of living for hundreds of thousands of new graduates. It limited their sources of income to marginal activities in the informal economy and prevented millions from escaping poverty, and more millions from coming close to what could be described as a decent standard of living, which did nothing but increase the people’s anger against the government’s policies. Not only were many of those who managed to grossly increase their wealth members of the old regime, their fortunes were also obtained by illegal means, including the acquisition of state-owned lands for no or very little money, relying on their contacts with people in power to obtain huge loans from government-owned banks, or using these contacts to protect their monopoly of the market. The accumulation of these fortunes was not the outcome of productive activities that respond to the people’s basic needs, but of parasitic activities that satisfy the needs of the few who use it to show off their wealth, and set themselves apart from the overwhelming majority.

The direct reasons

Though the above-mentioned factors could explain the reasons for the people’s anger against the former regime, they do not explain why the revolution happened when it did, especially since there were calls for a general strike more than once in the past few years, without garnering the wide popular response we have been seeing since January 25, 2011. No doubt that much ink will be split trying to explain the possible direct causes of the revolution, and this section will try to do just that by examining a number of direct factors that hastened the regime’s demise. These mainly include the launch of what was perceived as a plan to pass the presidency from Husni Mubarak to his son Jamal, coupled with the flagrant rigging of the People’s Assembly elections, brutal mistreatment of innocent citizens by the police and, finally, success of the Tunisian revolution in removing Ben Ali from power.

However, although the issue of Jamal Mubarak’s inheritance of the presidency was based on mere allegations in the years that preceded the revolution, allegations that were sometimes denied by Mubarak himself who often expressed his willingness to stay in power as long as his heart “keeps beating”, there were increasing signs in the spring of 2010 that the inheritance plan had indeed started in earnest. Among these signs were the statements by powerful businessman Ibrahim Kamel, a close friend of both Mubarak and his son Jamal, stating his preference for Jamal’s accession to the presidency. Another sign was the so-called popular campaign endorsing Jamal’s candidacy, a campaign that met with abject failure because public opinion totally rejected the idea. This is why the launch of the inheritance plan by Jamal’s supporters was a strong motive for those calling for a revolution and their supporters, who felt that time had come to resist the plan since the longer they wait, the more it is likely to succeed.

What further gave the impression that the succession plan was well underway was the flagrant rigging of the People’s Assembly elections in 2010, and before that the local council elections, especially in light of the security agencies’ refusal to accept the candidacy papers of those believed to be members of the opposition, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. At the time, the security agencies had refused to implement the court’s decision endorsing the legality of the latter’s candidacies, and continued to hold elections in constituencies where the courts had ordered that they be annulled; they then proceeded to scare the voters and falsify the results in a manner that ensured the ruling National Democratic Party’s overwhelming victory (almost 97% of the seats), to the exclusion of even the most amenable opposition groups. This blatant tampering with the most basic rules of the electoral process was amply clear to the citizens who mocked the process and its outcome, which further entrenched the idea that this flagrant falsification was meant to thwart any chance that an independent candidate would win the necessary support in any elected council, and thus fulfil the conditions necessary to run for president. This was especially true in light of Mohammad Al-Baradei’s potential candidacy to the presidency, though he himself had denied his intention to run based on the provisions of the constitution in effect at the time, but Jamal Mubarak’s supporters in the ruling National Democratic Party did not want to leave anything for chance.

Then came the savage murder of young Khaled Said by the police in Alexandria, for no apparent reason at all, followed by the Interior Ministry’s denial of the entire murder story; instead, they began spreading lies about Khaled Said’s involvement in the drug trade, claiming that his death was due to an overdose.
Moreover, there was collusion between the medical examiner’s office and the Interior Ministry who coordinated their accounts of the incident, despite the testimony of several witnesses in Alexandria who saw what had really happened to Said. This did nothing but exacerbate sentiments against both the Interior Ministry and the regime that stands behind it, especially among the youth, and Khaled Said’s murder became the rallying cry that brought large masses into the streets of Alexandria, in protest against the police’s brutal treatment of the young man. Many civil society groups took part in the mass protests, coupled by the youth’s enthusiastic response to the “We Are All Khaled Said” website, launched by Wael Ghoneim whom the security forces blamed for the January 25 demonstrations. The choice of January 25 to stage the huge demonstration that eventually led to the regime’s downfall was no doubt deliberate, since it marked National Police Day, making it an apt occasion to protest the police’s demeaning treatment of the people, and show contempt for the regime that protects it.

Finally, the Tunisian Revolution had a strong echo in Egypt. The Tunisian and Egyptian regimes shared many similarities, and just like the ruling regime in Tunisia appeared stable and strong in the summer of 2010, so did the Egyptian regime, and no commentator could have imagined that any of them would fall so quickly, or do so in response to a spontaneous popular uprising. The Egyptians learned from the Tunisian experience and began to tell themselves, “If the Tunisians can remove Ben Ali, we can also remove Mubarak.” The Tunisian Revolution turned the hope in the angry Egyptian people’s hearts against Mubarak’s regime into a near certainty that his downfall was not only possible, but inevitable.

What does the future hold? The problematic relationship between the revolution and the state

Perhaps not all the chapters of the Egyptian revolution have been written yet, and perhaps the events that will unfold in autumn 2011, and the years that will follow, will tell us if the events of January 2011 were the beginning of a yet unfinished revolution, or simply an intifada that laid the ground for a military coup. It is also likely that the old regime is gone forever and that Egypt will not return to the era of suppressing free expression and organisation, or election rigging, despite a serious fundamental contradiction. This contradiction is between the views of those who initially called for the revolution and the regime’s downfall, but never got the chance or wanted to govern, and those of the armed forces’ leaders, the mainstay of the old regime and its erstwhile protectors, who tend to favour stability and see the revolution as a mere change of faces. The future will be determined by the interaction between three forces that the revolution propelled onto the political scene: the armed forces’ leaders; the Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, and the new civil society groups at the heart of which are the youth who launched the call for a revolution.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The findings of the Arab Democracy Index for 2010 show the continued presence of embryonic signs of a democratic transition in most of the Arab countries selected for our study. The findings also show, however, a certain degree of regression in the transition process compared to the previous year, and that the positive signs are essentially limited to the transition’s theoretical or legislative aspects. In the meantime, the practical aspect (practices) has witnessed a tangible setback.

On the positive side, the sub-index for means that examines the constitutional and legal framework for the process of democratic change, exceeded seven hundreds points, the score that we considered the dividing point between an inclination towards democracy and actual progress toward democratic change. The improvement in the means index is clear in the scores given to rule of law and respect for rights and freedoms, the only two scores that surpassed 700 points. With regards to means, we find bright spots in Arab countries such as Egypt and Morocco, where the means score exceeded 900 points. Jordan, Kuwait, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Yemen, Bahrain and Tunisia all received the top means score for rule of law. Lebanon, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco received top means scores for respect for rights and freedoms, while Palestine was the only country to obtain the maximum means score for strong and accountable public institutions.

On the other hand, the 2009 Index shows substantial failure in the practice of democratic transition, even if the means scores surpassed 400 points, the score that separates absence of democratic movement from an inclination toward democratic change. The failure in the practices of democratic change is clearly visible in Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Syria where there is lack of popular confidence in the performance of public institutions, and - for the second year in a row - the quasi-unanimous spread of favouritism in public employment and increase of corruption in public institutions. It also appears in the maltreatment of the political opposition, arbitrary arrests, abuse of detainees, and the inability to organize public meetings and demonstrations, and the increase in public expenditure on security rather than education and health care.

The following recommendations aim to commend successes in the process of democratic change and to point out other features that lag behind. The general recommendations call on all who are interested in reform in the Arab world to focus on the areas of insufficiency which are found in most (if not all) Arab countries. The special recommendations address reformists and decision-makers in each country, calling upon them to focus their efforts on the areas of deficiency documented for their countries.

General Recommendations

1- The need is urgent in the Arab world to guarantee greater political and civil freedom, not only through more legislation but also by enhancing monitoring functions and the role of human rights organizations.

2- There is a pressing need to make the issues of social justice and social and economic rights the core of the reform process.

3- There is a pressing need to reform education by allocating bigger budgets, combating illiteracy, reducing the school drop-out rate, and improving the conditions of education, especially for females.

4- The ability to implement the above recommendations is closely connected to the ability to strengthen relevant public institutions, such as parliaments, the judiciary, and authorities.
Specific Recommendations

1- Jordan

The weakness in Jordan’s democratic transition appears mainly in the practices area relative to respect for rights and freedoms, and in the means area relative to strong and accountable public institutions. Therefore, our recommendations for Jordan are:

1. Start moving towards a constitutional monarchy by adopting an election system that guarantees a fair distribution of seats among the country’s different regions, and regular elections without interference from the king or the executive authority. The election system should also grant parliament exclusive legislative prerogatives with guarantees of new elections four months later, and allow the largest and most likely bloc or party to win the majority to form the government.
2. Institute a more comprehensive oversight and accountability system of the security agencies’ work to end arbitrary and administrative arrests and the mistreatment of detainees, and ensure respect for the right of assembly and demonstrations.
3. Shift responsibility for the elections from the Interior Ministry to the judicial authority, and responsibility for any challenges of the results from members of the lower house of parliament to the judiciary.
4. Promote political party activism by amending the Parties’ Law to remove all restrictions on their formation, and amend the Election Law in favour of a mixed system that allocates half or more of the seats to party or electoral lists.
5. Enact the necessary legislation to ensure that human rights and civil society organisations are able to do their work and achieve their objectives.
6. Develop the proper legislation to ensure that citizens, civil society organisations and political groups are legally protected against extra-judicial measures by executive agencies, and ensure that, if need be, the latter could be legally prosecuted.
7. Annul legal provisions in the Assembly Law requiring citizens to obtain permits for holding public meetings and staging demonstrations and sit-ins, and replace them by the principle of notification.
8. Change legislation relevant to civil society organisations in a manner that enables them to register their organisations through a simple notification, rather than requiring the authorities’ approval. Annul the condition that requires government’s approval to fund societies and projects, and replace it with a simple notification.
9. Annul all special and extraordinary courts to make the regular judicial system the only legal authority responsible for all persons and issues, including state officials.

2- Algeria

Although Algeria maintained its fifth place in the means area, it retreated to eighth place in the practices area. The weakness in Algeria’s democratic transition appears mainly in the practices area relative to the rule of law; for this reason we propose the following:

1. Launch a comprehensive debate on the necessary constitutional amendments to trigger a genuine participatory democratic transition involving all political parties and the public at large, so that the debates and discussions are not limited to experts working behind closed doors.
2. Maintain the same presidential term as previously defined.
3. Strengthen the legislative authority and its role in monitoring the executive authority and holding it accountable.
4. Shift responsibility for the elections from the Interior Ministry to an independent body to ensure a fair electoral process.
5. Institute a more comprehensive oversight system on the security services’ activities to end the mistreatment of detainees.
6. End the administration’s arbitrary denial of the citizens’ constitutional right to form parties, unions and societies and register newspapers; apply the law relevant to political party registration.
7. Strengthen public institutions by ending all violations of the constitution, ensure more transparent elections, strengthen anti-corruption measures and institutions, and combat the use of nasta (influence peddling) in public employment.

3- Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia ranks tenth in the practices area and twelfth in means area. The weakness in Saudi Arabia’s democratic transition is the same for the means (especially those linked to strong and accountable public institutions or to equality and social justice) and practices (especially concerning respect for rights and freedoms, or strong and accountable public institutions). Therefore, our recommendations for Saudi Arabia are:

1. Develop the country’s basic law into a comprehensive constitution that defines a clear transfer of power system; delineates the prerogatives, duties and responsibilities of officials and government institutions, and stresses the judiciary’s independence as a prominent feature of the separation of power principle.
2. Adopt elections as a means of selecting municipal and Shura Council members, and enact an election law for the Shura Council that specifically ensures women’s membership of that body.
3. Enact a private societies and institutions’ law, begin implementing it and, once implemented assess its effectiveness by adjusting and developing it on a regular basis; support the establishment, registration and capacity-building of private societies.
4. Promote the work of advisory institutions, allow a wider scope of government accountability, encourage the discussion of draft laws and legislations, and combat the use of nasta in public employment. In particular, the Shura Council should enjoy wider prerogatives by bringing qualitative issues to its attention, such as the state budget.
5. Promote the role of municipal councils, continue to elect its members at the appointed time, and involve women both as voters and candidates.
6. Rely on fair and public trials for all issues involving arrests and detentions, and either release detainees not brought to trial or detain them based a legal order; ensure that detainees are not mistreated by the security services.
7. Allow women to be an effective part of the labour market as independent individuals rather than a man’s dependents; reduce the restrictions imposed on them and all forms of discrimination against them. To this end, the civil status law should be reconsidered and drafted in a manner that puts an end to the persecution women are subjected to, precisely because no such law exists.
8. Address all cases of discrimination against citizens whether for ethnic, sectarian, regional or gender reasons, uphold the principle of equality and adopt the principle of citizenship as the standard of parity among all citizens.
9. Commit to human rights conventions and agreements to which the Kingdom is a signatory,
and ratify all other international legal agreements.
10. Uphold the principles of fairness and transparency in all financial and administrative systems, and speed up the establishment of the announced fairness commission.
11. Promote a balanced development programme by distributing development projects fairly among the Kingdom’s different regions.
12. Diversify the Kingdom’s sources of income and reduce the budget’s dependence on oil and its derivatives.

4- Palestine

In this year’s Index, Palestine suffered a setback in the practices area, which dropped it down to eleventh place, ahead of Yemen and behind Saudi Arabia. However, it still enjoys the third highest means ranking in a display of one of the ugliest contradictions between legislation and practice. The weakness in Palestine’s democratic transition process is mainly evident in three practice areas: respect for rights and freedoms, rule of law, and strong and accountable public institutions. Therefore, our recommendations for Palestine are:

1. Expand monitoring of the security agencies to ensure that they stop mistreating detainees and freedom for the political opposition to organize demonstrations and public meetings. It is crystal clear that the retreat in this practice field is the result of internal division and conflict. This makes it imperative that all Palestinian political parties work together to end political, economic, and geographic division, which threatens the future of the national structure.
2. Presidential, legislative, and local elections must take place, despite the divided internal situation. The extension of the presidency, the Legislative Council, and the local councils for longer than their legal terms can create a serious threat to the future of the Palestinian political system. In the meantime, the Legislative Council must be allowed to convene and oversee government accountability.
3. Encourage civil society organizations and political parties to conduct regular elections to select their leaders.
4. The Palestinian Authority must respect public freedoms, particularly freedom of assembly, expression, and political participation, without fear of suppression or intervention by security agencies.
5. Establish and ensure adequate funding of an active social security system.
6. The judiciary should not be involved in political and party conflict.
7. The executive authorities in both parts of Palestine must stop political detention and arbitrary arrests; they must enhance the capacity of the agencies for which they are responsible to impose law and order so as to increase the citizens’ sense of safety and personal security.
8. The executive authorities in both parts of Palestine must refrain from violating the Palestinian Basic Law (Constitution), as this will create dangerous precedents for the entire legal system.

5- Lebanon

Lebanon dropped to fourth place in the practices area despite a rise in this year’s practice score due to a steeper rise in the practice scores of other countries, like Morocco and Kuwait, though it remained in sixth place in the means area. Lebanon’s weakness is particularly evident in the means area relative to equality and social justice, and in the practices area relative to this value and the rule of law. For this reason we propose the following:

1. Reform the election system by adopting an election law based on proportional representation and not the sectarian register. The new law should reduce the voting age, adopt a quota for women at least in the nomination process, and give the Election Commission (which oversees elections) administrative and financial independence as well as judicial authority. The Commission should not be affiliated with the Ministry of Interior; it should organize and oversee elections independently.
2. Implement the Municipal Law, passed in 1977, with amendments to provide direct election by the people of chairperson and vice-chairperson, to shorten the terms of the municipal councils, and to remove obstacles that hinder their performance. This should be accompanied by ratification of the Administrative Decentralization Law to ensure administrative and financial independence for municipalities and curb central surveillance, in order to activate local participation. A comprehensive development process is also required, which should limit the influence of politicians in local development.
3. Adopt a law to protect individuals who uncover corruption, and create a monitoring institution, such as an ombudsman, to promote administrative reform and combat corruption in public institutions.
4. Tighten parliamentary and judicial oversight of the security services to end arbitrary arrests, mistreatment of detainees and trials in state security courts. We draw particular attention to the importance of continuing the effort to shift the responsibility for prisons from the Interior to the Justice Ministry, and of seriously and effectively pursuing and punishing those who commit acts of torture in Lebanese prisons, according to the Lebanese Penal Code; individuals detained without a court order should be released.
5. Allow the printing of leaflets and pamphlets without prior censorship, and the publication of periodicals (newspapers and magazines) without the need for a license.
6. Amend the Constitutional Law and expand its prerogatives to include the right to define the constitution, instead of than just monitoring the constitutionality of laws and deciding the validity of electoral challenges. The process of referring cases to the Constitutional Council should be made easier, and the Council’s ability to make independent decisions, take initiatives and review laws should be endorsed. There is need to reconsider the exclusive right of the president, cabinet, speaker of parliament, and at least ten deputies or heads of recognised religious sects (according to article 19) to consult the Council, since in Lebanon there could be political consensus on unconstitutional laws, without there being a majority to challenge them. The manner of selecting members of the Constitutional Council should be amended in a manner that strengthens it against political interferences and inconsistencies, and promotes its independence.
7. Ensure the judiciary’s independence and its protection against any intervention, no matter its nature, by launching a comprehensive reform process that restores its credibility as an authority parallel to the executive and legislative authorities. This requires constitutional and legal amendments aimed at protecting both the law and the judges against all interferences that seek to influence their decisions or apply pressure on them. This could be done by amending the manner through which judges are appointed to the High Judicial Council, and shifting to it all reshuffling and appointment processes.
8. Pay special attention to issues of accountability and social justice, including the institution of a social safety network, reducing unemployment, addressing school drop-out rates, ensuring equality between men and women by allowing women married to non-Lebanese men to pass their Lebanese nationality on to their children, and enhancing the role of national education in anchoring citizenship values.

6- Egypt

Egypt ranks second among the Arab countries in the means area, but is down to sixth place in the practices
area, though this does not mean that the constitutional framework of the country’s political system does not need amendment. The main weakness in Egypt’s democratic transition is evident mainly in the practices area relative to respect for rights and freedoms and the rule of law. For these reasons, we propose the following:

1. In light of Egypt’s early 2011 Revolution, and the preparations underway to write a new constitution, it is necessary to cleanse the country’s constitutional and legal frameworks of all provisions that restrict human rights, especially those relative to political parties, organisation and elections. It is not enough to enact laws that regulate such matters; it is necessary that they also allow the people the widest possible scope of civil and political freedoms, and that all restrictions on freedoms in the 1971 Constitutions, which was amended in 2005 and 2007, are annulled.

2. Until new elections can be held and a new constitution written, it is apt to use the transitional period to address the gaps that have come to light since the revolution. This could include the establishment of a civilian entity alongside the Military Council to work diligently on freeing the official and political discourses of all sectarian connotations, and ensure that protests are dealt with without resorting to violence.

3. It is important to normalise the situation at the professional unions parts of which have been under guard since 2009, including the Engineers and Doctors’ Unions where no elections have been held since the mid 1970s. Union members should have the right to run the affairs of their union, and choose their representatives in them without interference from the security forces. The same applies to several other civil society institutions.

4. The restrictions imposed on the formation and activities of political parties obstruct the development of a healthy partisan scene in Egypt, in which all currents play an active role on meetings and demonstrations can be freely organised.

5. Cases of torture by the police have increased in recent years, including the torture of citizens the majority of whom are not involved in politics. These degrading practices should be stopped, the perpetrators severely punished and members of the police should be trained to use investigative methods that do not involve violence. It might even be necessary to institute a rehabilitation programme that turns the security services into an agency that serves the people and their legitimate authorities, rather than a particular political group.

6. The security services, particularly the police, should respect the rule of law when dealing with the citizens; reports by human rights organisations and credible press agencies have documented several cases in which the police has violated the law by arresting people, keeping them in jail without trial, and continuing to detain or imprison them despite being officially cleared of any guilt. In order for the rule of law to prevail, these practices should be brought to an end. For this purpose, the state security courts should no longer be used, and organisations that maintain law and order should be strengthened to give citizens a greater sense of personal security.

7. In light of the relative drop in the level of education and recurrence of epidemics in Egypt, there is need for increased spending on health and education, and less on internal security. This is especially true in light of the recent increase in security spending without any urgent need for it, given the relative stability that Egypt currently enjoys.

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7- Morocco

Morocco is ranked first in both means and practices, indicating a marked improvement in the practices area. Despite this good score, there are weaknesses in Morocco’s transition to democracy, specifically in the practices area relative to equality and social justice and respect for rights and freedoms. In light of that, we propose the following:

1. The fact that the means score has improved in a monarchy means that Morocco could become a constitutional monarchy by introducing constitutional amendments that guarantee the right of political parties to form and operate, and ensure regular elections free of interference by the King or the executive authority. A shift towards a constitutional monarchy can also take place by ensuring that the government would be formed by the largest party, that this government would be accountable to parliament, and that the royal palace would cede more of its powers to the government and executive authority. The current constitutional reforms in Morocco lay the ground for such a transition by respecting the will of the people in all future consultations on national issues, and making a total break with a past in which elections were plagued by administrative interventions, election rigging and financial abuse.

2. Grant a bigger role to the judiciary that has the Interior Ministry as a constant rival in matters related to the elections and respect of rights and freedoms.

3. Promote democratic oversight of the security forces to ensure that detainees are not mistreated, and that those proven not to have committed violent acts are released. Moreover, the right of assembly and demonstrations should be guaranteed, the licensing of political parties facilitated and the opposition press granted a wider scope of manoeuvre. Human rights and freedom of expression should be respected, especially when dealing with protestors calling for change and reform, and the security forces should not respond with violent and repressive measures.

4. Focus attention on educational issues, such as allocating it a larger budget and combating school drop-out rates.

5. Grant wider prerogatives to the Anti-Bribery Commission to allow it to become an independent body that draws its strength from the constitution; it should also be granted the prerogative of referring people to the courts rather, than only making recommendations.

8- Yemen

Yemen is in twelfth place in the practices area, and in fourth place in the means area. In this respect, it reflects the sharp contradiction between words and deeds, and wonderful legislation and ugly practices. The weakness in Yemen’s democratic transition is evident in all practice-related values, especially the rule of law and equality and social justice. We therefore propose the following:

1. Strengthen democratic values in the constitution and the laws, including amending the constitution to shorten the terms of the president, the parliament, and local councils. The Local Administration Law should be amended, either by establishing a federal system that divides provinces into local states within the framework of the central government, or by adopting a local administration system with wider authority. The Press and Publications Law should be amended by abolishing provisions that allow restriction of freedoms, including imprisonment of journalists. Judicial independence should be strengthened: the judiciary should have full authority to execute its decisions, without intervention by the government. Finally, the mechanism for formation of the Shura Council (Upper House) should be amended to provide for popular election of half its members.

2. Halt arbitrary arrests and the use of extraordinary state security courts, especially for trials of writers, intellectuals, and journalists; rely upon ordinary justice; allow citizens to sue executive institutions; and reinforce the authorities in charge of maintaining law and order, so as to enhance individuals’ feeling of safety and personal security.

3. Increase monitoring of security agencies to halt the mistreatment of detainees; tolerate public meetings and demonstrations by the opposition and allow the opposition to publish periodicals and newspapers; stop censorship of publications and the internet; enhance the
independence of universities, and elect their presidents and deans of faculties without intervention by the security agencies.
4. Pay more attention to education, with bigger budgets and by combating school drop-out. Encourage women’s involvement in the workforce. In this regard, the Yemeni government must abide by the international agreements it has ratified regarding civil and political rights and prevention of discrimination against women.
5. Establish quotas for women in parliament for at least two terms, to accustom society to the presence of large numbers of women in parliament.
6. Combat corruption by transferring cases from monitoring agencies to the judiciary and by demonstrating government seriousness in treatment of the issue.
7. Reiterate the principles of transparency and accountability in the employment of civil servants, and implement the Financial Security Law.
8. Reiterate the principle of transparency and openness in the economy, especially with respect to the use of foreign assistance.
9. Adopt dialogue as a method and mechanism for the relationship between the ruling party and opposition parties.
10. Disarm all cities completely. To deal properly with the protests in southern Yemen, it is imperative to adopt and enforce the principle of equal citizenship in the employment of civil servants and the distribution of public wealth.

9- Kuwait

Kuwait ranks second in the practices and eighth in the means area, in a complete reversal of the situation of Yemen and Palestine. Weakness is clearest in the means area relative to equality and social justice, and in the practices area relative to public rights and freedoms and equality and social justice. Therefore, our recommendations for Kuwait are:

1. Establish an independent commission to oversee parliamentary and local elections, as well as elections within social associations, clubs, and public benefit societies, with special attention to the transparency, integrity, and accuracy of all procedures.
2. Strengthen the laws related to gender equality and to the periodicity and integrity of elections, and enact laws that allow political parties to work freely.
3. Enhance the role of public institutions by eliminating practices that hinder the performance of parliament and other elected councils, and by combating favouritism in public employment.
4. Enhance the election process by repealing the law that provides for the appointment of some members of local municipal councils and by supporting citizen participation in the selection of all council members, without intervention by the executive power.
5. Handle the issue of illegal residents in a way that guarantees their human dignity and supports their basic rights. This should include granting Kuwaiti citizenship to the children of Kuwaiti women.
6. Abide by international laws that the government has signed in the field of human rights and civil freedoms, especially regarding wages of foreign workers and their right to protest peacefully.
7. Enhance monitoring of the security agencies to prevent abuse of detainees and reduce censorship of publications and the internet.
8. Enact a financial disclosure law and establish an independent body charged with maintaining financial statements for individuals in leadership positions, to promote fairness and transparency in all matters related to public funds.

10- Syria

Syria ranks ninth in the practices area and eleventh in the means area. Weakness is especially significant in the means area relative to respect for rights and freedoms and equality and social justice, and in the practices area relative to the rule of law and respect for rights and freedoms. Therefore, our recommendations for Syria are:

1. Form a new government under the leadership of a national figure acceptable to the opposition comprising a wide array of political parties and independent figures, until a comprehensive national conference can be convened and tasked with writing a new constitution, granting the new government wide prerogatives by shifting some of the president and Baath party’s responsibilities to it, and placing the security services under its authority.
2. Enact legislation that promotes the democratic aspects of the country’s constitution and laws, such as the amendment of Article 8 of the constitution that considers the Baath Party the leader of both state and society, and Article 14 of the Election Law that grants workers and peasant 50% of the seats in the People’s Assembly (the parliament). Also in need of amendment is the article in the election law that considers each governorate a separate electoral district, and replacing it with a law that divides parliament’s seats into two: one part elected through small constituencies (city quarter, village, etc.) and a second part through a representative system that considers Syria a single electoral district. There is also need for modern and democratic parties and media laws, and for amending the societies’ law in a manner that allows the establishment of the largest possible number of non-governmental organisations, working as partners in building the nation and resolving its problems, regardless of the government and political activities. The emergency law should also be amended to include only those areas where emergency conditions exist, and the emergency law in effect for the past forty-eight years should be lifted.
3. Allow the opposition the freedom to operate, whether by forming political parties or publishing newspapers and magazines, and end censorship of publications and the internet and the mistreatment of detainees.
4. Enhance the separation of powers and give each of the three powers clear jurisdictions in a transparent constitutional and administrative system.
5. Undertake judicial reform and underscore the independence of the judiciary; abolish all extraordinary courts; give the judiciary jurisdiction to determine all civil, military, and political cases, and the ultimate right to make final decisions in all cases within its jurisdiction; eliminate intervention in judicial decisions.
6. Initiate a civil and democratic solution for the Kurdish problem, by recognizing the Kurdish nationality as a second nationality in the country. Grant Kurds the right to study and learn in their own language, to publish books, newspapers, and publications and to broadcast radio and television in their mother language, within the national unity of the Syrian homeland.
7. Enhance the principle of separation between state and religion.
8. Empower Syrian women: abolish all kinds of discrimination against women; withdraw all Syrian reservations on the CEDAW Agreement; amend the Personal Status Law to ensure equality between men and women; and amend the Citizenship Law to grant Syrian women the right pass Syrian citizenship to their children.
9. Abide by all international agreements and conventions which Syria has signed and ratified regarding human rights and sign and ratify other international legal agreements.
10. Reinforce the principles of transparency and integrity in all the country’s administrative and financial systems.

11- Tunisia

Tunisia ranked fifth in the practices area and ninth in the means area. The weakness in Tunisia’s democratic transition appears mainly in the practices area relative to respect for rights and freedoms and the rule of
It also appears in the means area relative to the separation of powers, regular and fair elections, political party freedom, media freedom, etc. For this reason and in light of Tunisia’s late 2010 - early 2011 revolution, we propose the following:

1. Include in the constitutional amendments the establishment of a balance of power that reduces the president’s current prerogatives, and gives the legislative and judicial institutions greater oversight and accountability prerogatives. The constitutional amendments should also include clear guarantees on regular elections and political and civil freedoms.
2. Rehabilitate the security sector to turn it into a professional institution at the service of the law, rather than the ruler or ruling elite.
3. Keep the Interior Ministry’s executive agencies away from local and regional councils and from issues involving political parties and the press, and confine their role to internal security matters.
4. Draw a development policy that addresses socio-economic issues and maintains a balance among different regions, both in the hinterland and seafront regions, with special priority to the hinterland during the initial stage.
5. Combat all forms of financial and political corruption, including the strengthening of relevant public institutions and ensuring that the necessary guarantees are in place to enshrine and respect them.
6. Pay special attention to education, especially higher education, to improve its quality, raise its standard and rehabilitate those who graduated sometime ago and have not yet found employment.

**12- Bahrain**

Bahrain is ranked eighth in the practices area and tenth in the means area. In the practices area, the country’s weakness is mainly relative to respect for rights and freedoms and strong and accountable public institutions, while in the means area, it is relative to legislation on political party freedom, separation of powers, codification of the executive authority’s control, right of assembly, media rights and gender equality. We therefore propose the following:

1. Enact legislation or basic laws that ensure the separation of powers and hold the executive authority accountable. Individuals should be guaranteed the right to form political parties, work and assemble freely, and the rights of free expression, gender equality and regular and fair elections as the only means of membership in the Legislative Council.
2. Give the opposition the freedom to operate and publish its own newspapers, refrain from obstructing political party activities and allow the organisation of meeting and demonstrations.
3. Combat corruption in public institutions and uphold skill and ability as the only criterion for public employment.
4. Strengthen public institutions, particularly the legislative authority.
5. Promote oversight of the security services’ activities to prevent the mistreatment of detainees, stop arbitrary detentions, allow human rights organisations to operate freely and ensure the release of political prisoners.
6. Underline the principle of equal citizenship and end all forms of discrimination among citizens, be it on religious, sectarian or ethnic bases, particularly in hiring and appointments to positions in the government’s civilian and security sectors. Additional resources should be allocated to social sectors such as health and education.
Freedom of the judiciary

- Presence of constitutional or legal guarantees of the independence of the judiciary, and in particular the extent to which the executive authority is able or not able to appoint or remove judges.

Rights of the media

- Respect for freedom of expression and the free flow of ideas.

Guarantees against torture

- Presence of constitutional or legal guarantees banning the use of torture.

Guarantees of the right of citizens to participative democracy

- Means for participation in the political process and the representation of the interests of citizens.

The obstruction of parliament's work by the executive authority

- Presence of an elected parliament and local councils, whether there were cases of the elected parliament or local councils being dissolved or their work obstructed, and whether there were cases of municipal or parliamentary elections being obstructed, delayed or cancelled other than by order of a competent court.

The multiparty system

- The presence of a multiparty system.

The obstruction of the media's work by the executive authority

- Presence of constitutional or legal guarantees allowing individual citizens, groups and political parties to own media outlets such as newspapers, magazines, radio stations, news services, internet sites, publishing houses, etc., without being subject to impossible or extremely onerous conditions.

The obstruction of parliament's work by the executive authority

- Presence of an elected parliament and local councils, whether there were cases of the elected parliament or local councils being dissolved or their work obstructed, and whether there were cases of municipal or parliamentary elections being obstructed, delayed or cancelled other than by order of a competent court.

Freedom of the media

- Means for respect for freedom of expression and the free flow of ideas.

Right of the media

- Presence of means for participation in the political process and the representation of the interests of citizens.

The publication of draft laws

- The publication of information indicating the existence and substance of a discussion within society on proposed legislation and amendments.

The obstruction of parliament's work by the executive authority

- Presence of an elected parliament and local councils, whether there were cases of the elected parliament or local councils being dissolved or their work obstructed, and whether there were cases of municipal or parliamentary elections being obstructed, delayed or cancelled other than by order of a competent court.

The obstruction of the media's work by the executive authority

- Presence of constitutional or legal guarantees allowing individual citizens, groups and political parties to own media outlets such as newspapers, magazines, radio stations, news services, internet sites, publishing houses, etc., without being subject to impossible or extremely onerous conditions.

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- Presence of an elected parliament and local councils, whether there were cases of the elected parliament or local councils being dissolved or their work obstructed, and whether there were cases of municipal or parliamentary elections being obstructed, delayed or cancelled other than by order of a competent court.

The obstruction of the media's work by the executive authority

- Presence of constitutional or legal guarantees allowing individual citizens, groups and political parties to own media outlets such as newspapers, magazines, radio stations, news services, internet sites, publishing houses, etc., without being subject to impossible or extremely onerous conditions.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Corruption in public institutions</td>
<td>Proportion of those who believe there is corruption in the public institutions of the state, and the number of corruption cases referred to the courts.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Strong and accountable public institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>This indicator is calculated according to one of the following methods: 1. If there is a poll and information available on cases of corruption, 500 points are awarded for each part of the indicator, calculated as follows: First: On the basis of the percentage of public opinion poll responses received – (a) the percentage of people who believe there is corruption in the state apparatus; (b) the percentage of people who believe that there is a certain amount of corruption in the state apparatus; and (c) the percentage of people who believe that there is corruption in the state apparatus – the score for the indicator is calculated as follows: Score = (a x 500) + (b x 250) + (c x 500). Second: The second part of the indicator equals: No. of cases referred to the courts x 500 Total no. of cases 500 points are awarded for this section if there are no such cases. This variable is zero if there is no information available or if it is not provided by the relevant authority. 2. In case only one of the two parts of this Practice is used in public employment x 1000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Obstruction of the work of parliament</td>
<td>Cases in which the executive authority attempted to obstruct legislative action, e.g. by not publishing or disseminating laws approved by the legislature; by attempting to empty laws of their content by issuing executive orders that contradict their provisions; by the failure of ministers to attend parliamentary sessions designated for investigation or questions, or by not attending committee meetings to which they were invited without excuse; by the cancellation of annual session of parliament; or by the executive authority preventing members of parliament from attending sessions of parliament, or preventing the press from attending parliamentary sessions in order to report on their proceedings.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Strong and accountable public institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>The value of this indicator starts at 1000 points and decreases by 200 points for each incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Use of waste (favoritism) in public employment</td>
<td>The public’s perceptions of the use of waste in employment in the public sector (governmental institutions, institutions financed from the state budget such as the parliament, the</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Strong and accountable public institutions</td>
<td>Public opinion poll</td>
<td>The value of this indicator is calculated as follows: The percentage of people who do not believe waste is used in public employment x 1000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Performance of public institutions</td>
<td>The public’s evaluation of the ability of public institutions to deliver services and perform their role effectively.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Strong and accountable public institutions</td>
<td>Public opinion poll</td>
<td>On the basis of the percentages of public opinion poll responses received – (a) Very good; (b) Good; (c) Neither good nor poor; (d) Poor; (e) Very poor – the score for each institution is calculated as follows: Score = (a x 1000) + (b x 750) + (c x 500) + (d x 250) + (e x 100).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Violations of the constitution</td>
<td>Number of cases of violations of the constitution or equivalent violations by the executive authority.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Strong and accountable public institutions</td>
<td>Statistical bureaus, the ministry of trade, ministry of economy, etc.</td>
<td>This indicator decreases by 250 points with each violation of the constitution or the law by the president or the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Political and economic independence</td>
<td>The percentage of foreign assistance that constitutes the state budget, dependence on foreign markets to sell public sector products, and the presence of foreign military bases.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Strong and accountable public institutions</td>
<td>Statistical bureaus, the ministry of trade, ministry of economy, etc.</td>
<td>This indicator is divided into three sub-indicators. The first relates to the percentage of foreign assistance (300 points). The score is zero if the percentage is greater than 20% and 300 points if the percentage is 0%. The score is calculated based on the percentage: The second: 300 points are awarded if dependence on foreign markets is below 25% of the sale of public sector products, and zero points are awarded if it is 55% and above. The score is calculated from the percentage between these two values. The third: The score for this indicator is 400 points in case there are no foreign military bases stationed in the country, zero if such bases are present, and 200 if foreign troops are present for a limited period of no more than six months.</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Political reforms</td>
<td>The public’s belief that the executive authority is introducing political reforms or that there is a genuine interest on its part to do so, and the public’s evaluation of the general state of democracy in the country.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Strong and accountable public institutions</td>
<td>Public opinion poll</td>
<td>This indicator is divided into two parts, and up to 500 points are awarded for each part. The value of the first part is calculated as follows: 500 x the value obtained from the question on evaluation of government’s ability to carry out reforms. The indicator falls by 50 points for each 10% of people who believe that the government has not succeeded in implementing its reform programme. The value of the second part is calculated as follows: On the basis of the percentages of public opinion poll responses received – (a) Very good; (b) Good; (c) Neither good nor poor; (d) Poor; (e) Very poor – the score is calculated as follows:</td>
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*Note: The systems of calculation are based on specific indicators and their respective methods of evaluation.*
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Mistreatment of detainees</td>
<td>Number of torture or death cases involving detainees during their detention period or forced disappearance.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Respect for rights and freedoms</td>
<td>1. Reports by human rights organisations operating in the country.</td>
<td>Score = (a x 300) + (b x 375) + (c x 250) + (d x 125) + (e x 0).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. The ministry of the interior for the number of deaths</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Obstruction of the activities of political parties</td>
<td>Whether party-related activities are allowed or obstructed, for example by licensing new political parties or refusing to do so, banning parties, or arresting political leaders for political motives.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Respect for rights and freedoms</td>
<td>1. The ministry of the interior or body responsible for the registration of political parties.</td>
<td>The value of this indicator is 1000 points in case all political parties that submitted applications were licensed, no political party was banned without order by a competent court, and no political leaders or candidates were arrested for political motives. It decreases by 200 points for each infringement of the above provisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Suppression of protests and demonstrations</td>
<td>Cases of suppression of protest activities (demonstrations, marches and public meetings).</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Respect for rights and freedoms</td>
<td>1. The press. 2. Civil society organisations (statements, reports). 3. Human rights organisations (statements),</td>
<td>The value of this indicator starts at 1000 points and falls by 200 points for each activity that was banned or suppressed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Interference by the security services</td>
<td>The domains for which a citizen requesting a licence or government documentation must seek the approval of the security services or obtain a certificate of good conduct from them (a certificate from the security services stating that they do not object to the person’s act).</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Respect for rights and freedoms</td>
<td>1. It is possible to examine the conditions for obtaining a licence from governmental institutions, e.g. for publishing a newspaper, for a publishing house, for a civil society organisation, for appointment to public office, etc., based on whether it is necessary to obtain a certificate or approval, or to undergo an interview with one of the country’s security services.</td>
<td>This indicator is divided into two parts. The value of the first part starts at 500 points if there are no such domains, and decreases by 50 points when there is a single domain, by 150 points when there are two domains, by 300 points when there are three domains, and falls to zero when there are four or more domains. The value of the second part is calculated as follows: On the basis of the percentages of public opinion poll responses received – (a) No; (b) Don’t Know; (c) Yes – the score is calculated as follows: Score = (a x 500) + (b x 250) + (c x 0).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Opposition views in the local press</td>
<td>Citizens’ perceptions of whether the authorities censor the news and whether there is a blackout of the opposition’s activities and positions in the daily newspapers.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Respect for freedoms</td>
<td>Public opinion poll</td>
<td>On the basis of the percentages of public opinion poll responses received – (a) the percentage of persons who believe that it is possible to criticise the authorities without fear; and (c) the percentage of persons who believe that is it not possible to criticise the authorities without fear; and (c) the percentage of persons who believe that it is not possible to criticise the authorities without fear. The score for this indicator is calculated as follows: Score = (a x 1000) + (b x 500) + (c x 0).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Criticism of the authorities</td>
<td>The public’s views regarding the ability of the citizen to criticise the government and leaders without fear.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Respect for freedoms</td>
<td>Public opinion poll</td>
<td>On the basis of the percentages of public opinion poll responses received – (a) the percentage of persons who believe that it is possible to criticise the authorities without fear; and (c) the percentage of persons who believe that is it not possible to criticise the authorities without fear. The score for this indicator is calculated as follows: Score = (a x 1000) + (b x 500) + (c x 0).</td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Opposition newspapers and magazines</td>
<td>The number of opposition newspapers and magazines compared to the total number of newspapers and magazines.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Respect for freedoms</td>
<td>Public opinion poll</td>
<td>The percentage of opposition newspapers from the total number of newspapers x 700.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1. The ministry of information 2. Interviews with a sample of bookshops 3. Interviews with opposition party officials</td>
<td>Magazines are assigned a value of 100 in the foregoing equation, and are combined with it after the indicator has been divided into two parts. Thus newspapers receive a score of 500 points and magazines 300 points. This calculation is based on the assumption that the percentage of the public that supports the opposition amounts to approximately 30% of the total, and that the distribution of opposition newspapers is far lower than that of non-opposition newspapers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Censorship of publications and internet sites</td>
<td>The citizen’s ability to access foreign publications and internet sites, and the number of newspapers, magazines, books and internet sites banned in the country.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Respect for freedoms</td>
<td>Public opinion poll</td>
<td>This indicator is divided into two parts. The first part: Up to 500 points are awarded. The second part: Up to 500 points are awarded. 250 points are deducted for each</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1. The ministry of information 2. Nowstands 3. Public opinion poll 4. Reports by human rights organisations operating in the</td>
<td>On the basis of the percentages of public opinion poll responses received – (a) Not banned; (b) Don’t Know; (c) Banned – the score is calculated as follows: Score = (a x 500) + (b x 250) + (c x 0).</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Ability to organise protest activities</td>
<td>Number of demonstrations organised by individuals, trade and professional unions, political parties and human rights groups.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Respect for freedoms</td>
<td>1. Reports by human rights organisations operating in the country. 2. The ministry of the interior.</td>
<td>The value of this indicator starts at zero and increases by 50 points for each demonstration that is organised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Prosecution of the executive authorities</td>
<td>Cases brought to the judiciary against decisions and actions by ministers, the cabinet and the security services.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>The rule of law</td>
<td>1. The sources must be documented. 1. The press. 2. Human rights organisations. 3. Administrative court records. 4. The ministry of justice.</td>
<td>The value of this indicator starts at zero and increases by 25 points for each case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Detention without a charge</td>
<td>Number of detainees placed in detention without trial.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>The rule of law</td>
<td>1. Reports by human rights organisations operating in the country. 2. The local and international press.</td>
<td>The value of this indicator starts at 1000 points and decreases by 10 points for each case of detention without trial or indictment. The value of the indicator falls to zero when there are 100 or more cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Security courts</td>
<td>Number of cases in which civilians were tried in state security courts, military courts or similar courts.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>The rule of law</td>
<td>1. Reports by human rights organisations operating in the country. 2. The supreme judicial council. 3. The local and international press.</td>
<td>The value of this indicator starts at 1000 points and decreases by 200 points for each case, falling to zero after five cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Ability of human rights organisations to operate</td>
<td>Presence of local and international human rights organisations and their ability to operate freely.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>The rule of law</td>
<td>1. A survey sample of local organisations. 2. Reports by international human rights organisations. 3. Reports by local human rights organisations. 4. The ministry of the interior and/or the governmental institution charged with.</td>
<td>The score is calculated as follows: 1. 250 points are awarded for the licensing / registration of a local organisation or for it being allowed to operate. 100 points are given for this part if there is one such organisation, 200 points if there is one such organisation, and 250 points if all organisations that wish to operate are permitted to do so. 50 points are deducted if any organisation is banned (in case there is a conflict between the issue of licensing and permission to operate the assessment is left to the national team). 2. 250 points are awarded for the opening of international offices or for their being allowed to operate. 100 points are given in this part if one such organisation is allowed to operate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Personal safety</td>
<td>The public’s perception of the state of law and order in the country and guarantees of security and safety for the individual and the family.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>The rule of law</td>
<td>1. The bureau of statistics, ministry of social affairs, the social security institute, or the annual report.</td>
<td>The score was calculated as follows: the percentage of members of pension funds among all workers x100.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Social security</td>
<td>Rate of participation among all workers in the social security system to obtain pensions (public sector, private sector and civil society).</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Equality and social justice</td>
<td>1. The bureau of statistics, ministry of social affairs, the social security institute, or the annual report.</td>
<td>The score was calculated as follows: the percentage of members of pension funds among all workers x100.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Illiteracy levels and proportion of university graduates among men and women.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Literacy and social justice</td>
<td>1. The bureau of statistics, ministry of social affairs, the social security institute, or the annual report.</td>
<td>The score was calculated as follows: the percentage of members of pension funds among all workers x100.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>School drop-outs</td>
<td>School drop-out rates.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Equality and social justice</td>
<td>1. The bureau of statistics 2. The ministry of education</td>
<td>Between the proportion of men and women with a bachelor’s or higher degree. If the proportion of women with a bachelor’s or higher degree is lower than the proportion among men, the score is calculated as follows: ( \frac{% \text{ of women with bachelor’s or higher degree} \times 250}{% \text{ of men with bachelor’s or higher degree}} ) ( % \text{ of women with bachelor’s or higher degree} \times 250 ). If the proportion of women with a bachelor’s or higher degree is greater than the proportion among men then it is calculated as follows: ( \frac{% \text{ of men with bachelor’s or higher degree} \times 250}{% \text{ of women with bachelor’s or higher degree}} ) ( % \text{ of women with bachelor’s or higher degree} \times 250 ). The four scores are combined to obtain the total score for this indicator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Participation of women in the labour force</td>
<td>Rate of women’s participation in the labour force.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Equality and social justice</td>
<td>1. The bureau of statistics 2. Report by the central bank</td>
<td>200 points are deducted for every 1% of children who drop out of school. If the drop-out rate is 5% or above the score is zero.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Equality in wages</td>
<td>Equality in wages for men and women.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Equality and social justice</td>
<td>1. The bureau of statistics 2. The ministry of labour 3. The ministry of women’s affairs or supreme council of women 4. The central bank</td>
<td>The acceptable rate of women’s participation in the labour force was determined to be 90%. Therefore the score for this indicator was calculated as follows: ( \frac{% \text{ of women in the labour force} \times 1000}{30%} ).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Public expenditure on social needs compared to security</td>
<td>Government expenditure on the health and education sectors compared to expenditure on security.</td>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Equality and social justice</td>
<td>The public budget law</td>
<td>Expenditure/budget for security \times 100% \times \text{expenditure/budget for health and education} \times 100%. The ratio considered acceptable was 1:9. If the ratio is 1:9 then the value of the indicator is 1000, and zero if the ratio is 9:9 or higher. It decreases by 120 points for each additional increment of 0.1.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With 40 indicators covering twelve countries (Jordan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Kuwait, Tunisia, Bahrain and Yemen), the Arab Democracy Index measures democratic change in laws and actual practices, tracks intentions, monitors facade reforms and evaluates their real impact on the ground, and calls on governments to deal urgently with the most pressing common ills of their societies, namely:

1- To guarantee greater political and civil freedom, not only through more legislation but also by enhancing monitoring functions and the role of human rights organization.
2- To make the issues of social justice and social and economic rights the core of the reform process
3- To reform education by allocating bigger budgets, combating illiteracy, reducing the school drop-out rate, and improving the conditions of education, especially for females.
4- To implement these recommendations, Arab states need to strengthen relevant public institutions, such as parliaments, the judiciary, and authorities responsible for law and order, through accountability to legislatures, respect for judicial independence and surveillance over security force.