COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 8 December 2010

9889/3/03
REV 3 EXT 1

COSDP 308

PARTIAL DECLASSIFICATION

of document: 9889/3/03 REV 3 CONFIDENTIEL
dated: 4 June 2003
new classification: none
Subject: Framework For EU Action In Response To The Crisis In Bunia

Delegations will find attached the partially declassified version of the above-mentioned document.

________________________
ANNEX

COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 04 June 2003

9889/3/03
REV 3 EXT 1 (8.12.2010)

COSDP 398

NOTE

from : COREPER

to : Council

Subject : Framework For EU Action In Response To The Crisis In Bunia

The COREPER forwards to Council the Framework For EU Action In Response To The Crisis In Bunia and recommends it approves Option 1.
FRAMEWORK FOR EU ACTION IN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN BUNIA

1. **AIM**

1. Following the request of the UN and in view of the mandate given by the GAERC to the High Representative on 19 May 2003, the aim of this paper is to outline the framework for EU action in response to the crisis in Bunia. The main option is an EU-led military crisis management operation with France acting as the Framework Nation, supported by political, diplomatic, financial and other measures. Given that the situation on the ground demands immediate action, this paper groups together as a single strategic planning document key elements of a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) and of a Military Strategic Option (MSO). A draft Joint Action which allows for the implementation of this option is also presented. The paper also indicates that there is a second option for the EU to support a French-led multinational military operation.

II. **CURRENT CONTEXT**

2. **Background**

   **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

   The Ugandan troops have now withdrawn under the Lusaka agreement. This has left an initial power vacuum within the city of Bunia, the principal city in the Ituri region, leading to the current bout of instability and inter-ethnic violence and underlining the precarious situation throughout the wider region.

   An important underlying cause of the conflict is the battle for control of the region's significant mineral resources. Rebel groups **NOT DECLASSIFIED** fought constantly for control of these resources **NOT DECLASSIFIED**. These concerned have exploited the ethnic tension between the Hema and Lendu people.

3. **External involvement in the conflict**

   Control of the Ituri region is disputed by a large number of armed actors motivated by different ethnic, political, economic and historical factors **NOT DECLASSIFIED** the 1999
called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the DRC.

Both Rwanda and Uganda have confirmed to the UN their support for the deployment of a multinational force in Bunia.

4. **Current situation in Bunia and Ituri.**

The situation in Bunia and Ituri has reached a critical point and the humanitarian situation remains dire. Owing to its limited presence and equipment, and its restricted mandate, MONUC would be incapable of preventing a humanitarian catastrophe or large-scale massacres should the situation deteriorate further. Despite the UPC's dominance of Bunia, the security situation remains volatile due to the decreasing prospects for dialogue between the UPC and the less well equipped Lendu militia FRPI.

On 16 May, five of the seven armed factions fighting in Bunia signed a ceasefire agreement which also provided for the cantonment of combatants, the demilitarisation of Bunia, and an invitation to the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force. This did not prevent outbreaks of fighting which were reported in Bunia throughout May as well as in the border town of Aru, located 170 kilometres
Severe human rights abuses and looting have been and are still perpetrated by the armed actors in the region.

5. Regional attitudes to multinational intervention.

The Rwandan Government has expressed its official agreement to the deployment of the force even if it remains critical and the issue remains sensitive. In comparison to the UN-mandated interim emergency multinational force (IEMF), an EU force demonstrating a broader European engagement might slightly attenuate the risk to deployed personnel, although the local population would see little distinction.

Uganda's position towards international intervention remains less publicly critical.

III. EU OBJECTIVES

6. Political Objective. By contributing to the stabilisation of the security and humanitarian situation in Bunia (in accordance with UNSCR 1484) and through the concerted use of EU instruments, to give impetus to ongoing EU and UN efforts to keep the overall peace process in the DRC and the Great Lakes on track, in the context of the EU Common Position adopted 8 May 2003 (Common Position 2003/319/CFS).

7. Political Military Objective. Following the request of the UNSG to the EU, which drew attention to the precarious security situation in Bunia and the need to avoid a setback to the 1999 Lusaka Agreement from further local and potential regional destabilisation, the EU will deploy an interim emergency force. This force will contribute to the stabilisation of the security and humanitarian situation in Bunia, including, if the situation requires it, to the protection of the civilian population, and will allow the UNSG to reinforce MONUC's presence in Bunia.
IV. TIMING LIMITATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES


- On 28 May France decided to lead the multinational military operation in Bunia in response to the request by the UN Secretary General.
- On 30 May the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 1484 (Chapter VII) for an interim emergency multinational military operation in Bunia.
- On 1 June France commenced the deployment of 'force enablers' to the region and to Bunia.
- The Force Generation Conference will take place on 10 June in Paris.
- On 12 June the force should have an initial operational capability that will allow it to start fulfilment of the mission.

9. Consequences. Initial operational capability will not be reached before 12 June. The mission as such will commence from this point. Military activity prior to this will be focused on the deployment of force enablers and force protection elements. 12 June, therefore, is the last moment at which the EU could sensibly launch an ESDP operation. To meet this, the framework for EU action would have to be approved by 5 June, allowing the OPLAN to be submitted and approved by the Council prior to 12 June.

V. OPTION I Option I consists of an EU led military operation supported by other EU or Member States instruments:

10. The Military Operation:

a. Military Parameters. In this particular case, logistic, infrastructure and risk factors dictate the size, composition and mission of the force. These limitations allow only for the deployment of around 1,000 mechanised/armoured troops in Bunia within the envisaged timeframe of 2-3 months. Additional elements will be based at Entebbe airport which is envisaged as the Forward Mounting Base.

b. Military Tasks. Such a force should be capable of performing the tasks specified in the UN Secretary General's request. These are:
- To contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the
humanitarian situation in Bunia;

- To ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia;
- If the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town.

c. **Military Mission:** To deploy rapidly an interim emergency military force to Bunia in accordance with UNSCR 1484 in order to establish the local conditions for effective deployment of the reinforced United Nations presence by 15 August 2003.

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

e. **Military Endstate And Exit Strategy.** To establish the local conditions enabling the effective deployment of the reinforced United Nations presence in Bunia by mid-August 2003. The authorisation of the interim emergency multinational force terminates on 1 September 2003.

f. **C2 Structure.** France will be the Framework Nation of the EU force and will provide the OHQ and the FHQ. The Operation Commander will be Major General Neveux. The Force Commander will be Brigadier General Thonier. Preparations are underway to receive Member States staff officers, a liaison team from the Secretariat/EUMS and Capitals TCN liaison teams to the OHQ located at Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Operations (CPCO) in Paris.

g. **Outline Force Requirements.** France as the Framework Nation will provide the bulk of the force. The requirements of military effectiveness will limit the number of different contributions that can be accommodated. Some Third States could be invited by the EU and by the UN to participate in the Operation and contributions would be assessed on the basis of military effectiveness.
h. **Legal Basis.** On 30 May 2003, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1484 (2003) authorising, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the temporary deployment of an interim emergency multinational force in Bunia. The resolution authorises (UN) Member States participating in the interim emergency multinational force in Bunia to take all necessary measures to contribute to the stabilisation of security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town in co-ordination with MONUC.

i. **Co-ordination of force with MONUC In Bunia.** Detailed co-ordination arrangements will be set down in the OPLAN. The Joint Action should authorise the Force Commander to establish and maintain contact with the MONUC on issues relevant to his mission. Liaison between the two forces and Headquarters should be established to this effect.

j. **Political-Military Co-ordination In The Theatre.** It would be important to use the occasion of an EU-led deployment to obtain maximum political impetus at the regional, national and local levels. At the local level, with the guidance of the EUSR, the EU should engage in a sustained effort to facilitate the implementation of the Dar Es Salaam agreement. The EUSR should be active in the region both in support of the military operation and to pursue the EU’s political objectives: co-ordination between the EUSR and the Force Commander should be established to this effect. It would be helpful if Member States could operate in a co-ordinated fashion in support of the same objectives.

k. **Information Strategy.** An EU-led operation would be supported by an information strategy, co-ordination of which would be ensured by the PSC. The key objectives of the strategy would be to enlist and maintain support for the operation and to present the EU’s action as part of a wider international effort, notably by the UN. This would be done in particular by the development of a series of main themes (e.g. objectives and limitations of the operation, EU-UN co-operation, EU’s added value, etc.) into key messages. The information strategy would be aimed at several target audiences, **NOT DECLASSIFIED** but especially at the different authorities, groups and local populations involved in and around the crisis area. Detailed key media messages will be presented to the PSC by the Information Strategy Team.
11. **Political, diplomatic, financial and economic elements to support a military operation** (see detailed measures at Annex A). EU Member States should, as far as possible, organise their bilateral activities so that they support the EU action. EU instruments should also be oriented to the same goals. As regards possible political, diplomatic, financial and economic elements to support a military operation the following could be explored:

a. Strong and coherent political and diplomatic effort to accompany and support the military operation before and during deployment. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

b. EU diplomatic action to be prepared in close consultation with the UNSG and President Mbeki of South Africa, AU chairman in office. The Chairman of the AU Commission and other African leaders also to be involved. EU to seek also co-ordination with USA and other major donors.

c. EU message to underline that countries involved must cooperate fully with the implementation of the Lusaka and Dar es Salaam agreements in the framework of the DRC peace process and stop supporting local militias and feeding the ethnic violence in the Ituri region in order to exploit its mineral resources. The countries should be aware that their response will impact on their overall relationship with the EU including development co-operation.

12. **Potential Economic Levers**

**NOT DECLASSIFIED**

the political message should underline that the countries involved have more to lose in terms of donor relations than they can gain in terms of short-term exploitation of resources in Ituri.
13. **Community Measures.** As regards possible Community avenues in support of the Stabilisation Force, the Commission could, if requested, explore:

- Financial support through its Rapid Reaction mechanism (RRM) for the rehabilitation of the damaged Bunia airstrip upon a detailed and budgeted request to be submitted by MONUC or the Stabilisation Force,
- Financial support to the African partners participating in the peace keeping operation in order to promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the region (Article 1 Cotonou agreement); EDF procedures would need to be respected, which means that neither early disbursement nor reimbursement of costs can be envisaged.

Whether or not additional humanitarian assistance will be provided depends on secure access for humanitarian operators.

14. **Co-ordination With US, UN, African Union (AU) and South Africa.** EU and Member States should also seek co-ordination with USA and other important players. Moreover, any EU diplomatic action should be prepared in close consultation with the UNSG and President Mbeki of South Africa, chairman in office of the African Union.

15. **Co-ordination With UN On The Increase Of The Force Ceiling And The Deployment Of A Reinforced UN Presence In Bunia.** Action to enable the timely arrival of a reinforced United Nations presence in Bunia should be taken (Following the launch of the EU operation, the Secretariat will produce a paper on required action). The four EU Member States in the UN Security Council could have a particular role to play in this regard. The EU could also explore ways to strengthen the MONUC presence in DRC.

16. **Consultations with NATO.** The EU will continue to keep NATO informed on the general progress of the operation. Similarly, consultations with the "+ 5" will provide an opportunity for an exchange of views on the situation assessment.
VI. **OPTION 2**

17. Option 2 will consist of the above mentioned political and community measures in support of a multinational operation led by France with the participation other Member States.

VII. **EVALUATION OF OPTIONS**

18. **Option 1.**

Provided it could be deployed in the timeframe indicated, an EU operation would be the most effective way of supporting the UNSG's efforts in the Congo and MONUC. The intervention of the EU as such, in support of the UN, would bring greater political weight than a coalition of the willing. As the largest donors in the region, the EU and the Member States acting together are already in a position to exercise influence: a willingness to deploy force would give this a sharper focus, and would enhance the EU's credibility in the region and its influence even after forces had departed. The overall EU presence in the region will have a deterrent effect towards possible hostile actions from neighbouring countries.

The mission would nevertheless be constrained by the logistical and timing factors which limit the size of the deployment. This force will not replace MONUC but act as an interim force and will establish the conditions for the arrival of MONUC reinforcements.

Against the advantages of an EU operation, and the desirability of demonstrating that the EU is serious in its commitment to support the UN, must be set a number of risks, of which the most important are:

- The difficulty of coping with a wider crisis. If serious events were to take place at a distance from Bunia, the EU force might not be able to intervene. As well as adding a further humanitarian tragedy, this would have serious consequences for the peace process and for the EU, which could be seen as failing to live up to expectations.
- a vacuum following departure. The political-military objective does not envisage prolonging the mission in the event that the MONUC reinforcements do not arrive on time. If this occurs (and every effort to prevent it will be made) the effect of the operation could be cancelled, the peace process endangered and lives in Bunia put at risk.
19. **Option 2.** This will not be as helpful as option 1, lacking all the described advantages of an EU operation.

**VIII. WAY AHEAD**

03 June  
EUMC to finalise its military advice
RELEX to finalise the draft Joint Action

04 June  
PSC agrees to the Framework paper and to the draft Joint Action, and sends them for approval to Council.

04 June  
COREPER agrees to the documents as a II point

05 June  
Council approves the documents as an A point

06 June  
Op Cdr presents its OPLAN, and ROE auth to PSC
PSC ask EUMC to provide a military advice on the OPLAN and ROE auth

09 June  
EUMC finalises its military advice and send it to PSC

10 June  
PSC considers the military advice and recommends the approval on the OPLAN and the ROE to Council

10 June  
COREPER agrees to the documents as an I point

11 June  
Council agrees to the document as an A point.

If the EU decides against an operation along the lines set out above the second option would be discussed at that time.
1. **Measures:** A forceful and coherent political and diplomatic effort should accompany the military operation before and during deployment. In the first instance, urgent messages should be conveyed **NOT DECLASSIFIED**.

These messages could include

a) **For all interlocutors:**

- EU support to the UNSC Resolution 1484(2003) concerning the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo;

- encourage unequivocal support for the Interim Emergency Multinational Force and full cooperation with MONUC;

- reiterate EU support to the Ituri Pacification Commission;

- reinforce efforts to implement the global and inclusive Sun City Agreement on transitional institutions in DRC, as well as Lusaka, Pretoria and Luanda Agreements;

- reaffirm that perpetrators of war crimes and human rights violations should be brought to justice;

- guarantee free and safe access to the humanitarian organisations to assist local population and IDP;

- GAERC on 16 June will evaluate the situation and decide on further action in the light of the results of these demarches.
2. **Method of Demarches:** The above messages should be conveyed at the highest political level. The following options can be considered:

a. a mission to the region at short notice by the SG/HR assisted by the EUSR (the possibility of troika format could be explored);

b. a series of telephone conversations between the SG/HR, the Heads of State of the three involved countries and the leaders of the RCD-Goma and MLC. In any event, Commissioner Nielson should be closely associated;

Missions to the region by Ministers from Member States should convey the same message, following prior consultation with the SG/HR and the Presidency. Moreover, any EU diplomatic action should be prepared in close consultation with the UNSG and President Mbeki of South Africa, Chairman in office of the African Union and involving the President of the AU Commission and other African leaders. EU and Member States should also seek coordination with USA and other important players. The PSC shall be timely kept informed.